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Abstract 
This research sets out to examine the influence of landownership on rural develop-
ment in Britain. It is proposed that an analysis of the historical development of 
any region under specific landownership forms will enable a better understanding 
of its contemporary rural development problems and land use conflicts. It is hoped 
that the research findings will be of both academic interest and practical value. 
A conceptual framework of the ways in which landownership can influence rural 
development is constructed from an analysis of continuity and change in landown-
ership and rural society over the 19th and 20th centuries at the national level. The 
framework is then tested in relation to case studies of landownership and rural de-
velopment in the North Pennines. This is an upland region of Britain with a highly 
traditional pattern of landownership, dominated by landed estates and common 
lands. The development of three landed estates, under different landownership 
forms, over the 19th and 20th centuries are studied in detail, whilst a broader 
range of landownership forms are considered for the contemporary period. Finally, 
the relative importance of landowners and policy-makers in the current rural de-
velopment of the region are evaluated. 
It is concluded that change in landownership at the national scale has not been as 
great as is commonly assumed. Landowners are still an important group in society, 
both at the national and local levels, and can exert a considerable influence on rural 
development, although today, at the local level, this is contingent upon the specific 
economic, social and geographic characteristics ofthe area. In the North Pennines, 
an understanding of the landownership structure is of fundamental importance for 
an understanding of the region's historical development and contemporary land 
use issues. 
A historical perspective on the development of rural areas enables a deeper under-
standing of contemporary issues and provides a 'behavioural' perspective which, 
if incorporated into the policy-making process, could improve the effectiveness of 
rural development policies. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
"How land is owned and controlled is fundamental to our understanding of rural 
society". (Newby, 1980, 31) 
1.1 Introduction 
The hypothesis which this thesis sets out to test is that landownership has been in 
the past, and continues to be, a major influence on the development of rural areas, 
and that an analysis of the development of any area under specific landownership 
forms provides a historical and structural perspective which leads to a deeper un-
derstanding of that area's rural society and contemporary development problems. 
The thesis is, therefore, concerned with three interrelated and recurring themes: 
landownership, rural society and rural development. 
It is undisputed that British society in the 19th century was dominated by an elite 
group whose power was based on the ownership of land, and it is generally accepted 
that their influence permeated political, social and economic institutions from the 
village community to Whitehall and Parliament (Caird, 1967, 58; Bourne, 1986, 
16). It is also widely believed that over the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this 
landed elite disappeared, both through the break-up of their estates and through 
their loss of control over the institutions of power (Thompson, 1963, 24). The 
dominant pattern of large landed estates in the 19th century has, apparently, been 
replaced by a more equitable and diffuse pattern of landownership in the 20th 
century, whilst British society today appears to be dominated by a more diffuse 
elite, including commercial ~d industrial as well as landed interests (Sarre, 1989, 
67). The activities of landowners today are, in theory at least, controlled by the 
State to such an extent that it has been claimed (Douglas, 1976, 219), that it is 
no longer necessary to consider the role of the private landowner in studies of land 
use. 
17 
These assumptions would appear to be corroborated by the following statistics: 
in 1873, 24% of the land of England was held in estates of over 10,000 acres 
(4,167 hectares), and 40% of the land area in estates of over 3,000 acres (1,250 
hectares). In 1908, 88% of the agricultural area was rented. Today over 50% is 
owner-occupied. The dominant model of landownership has, apparently, altered 
from the landed estate to the family farm [1]. 
Over the same time period, fundamental structural changes in rural society have 
taken place. First, Britain has changed from a predominantly rural society in 
the 19th century to an urban-industrial society in the 20th century. The urban 
population of England and Wales first exceeded the rural population in 1851 (see 
Table 1.1), and the level of urbanisation has continued to increase ever since. Not 
only has rural land been lost to urban development, but the growth of the urban 
population has placed new pressures on the countryside for recreation and leisure. 
Table 1.1- Population of England and Wales, 1851 to 1911 
- URBAN DISTRICTS - RURAL DISTRICTS -
Year population %total population %total 
1851 8,990,809 50.2 8,936,800 49.8 
1861 10,960,998 54.6 9,105,226 45.4 
1871 14,041,404 61.8 8,670,862 38.3 
1881 17,636,646 67.9 8,337,793 32.1 
1891 20,895,504 72.0 8,107,021 28.0 
1901 25,058,355 . 77.0 7,469,488 23.0 
1911 28,162,936 78.1 7,907,556 21.9 
Source: Rowntree (1913, 11 ). 
Second, agriculture has changed out of all recognition. In the 19th century, agri-
culture was the backbone of rural Britain. Over the 20th century, however, the 
18 
absolute and relative numbers employed in agriculture have dropped dramatically 
(see Figure 1.1) because of the mechanisation and capitalisation of farming. The 
numbers of farm holdings have decreased through amalgamation. Agriculture is 
now a highly productive industry, but is no longer the dominant source of employ-
ment in rural Britain. 
Figure 1.1- Farm Workers in England & Wales 
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Third, the 19th century structure of local politics, based on patronage and status, 
has been replaced by a democratic structure of county and district councils. The 
democratisation of local politics, and the break-up of landed estates, have both 
acted, apparently, to reduce the influence of the landlord on rural society. Finally, 
the State has assumed a greater role over rural land use and the rural economy 
and society with the introduction of comprehensive legislation in the post World 
War Two period. 
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On the surface, therefore, it would appear that there are few points of comparison 
between rural society in the 19th century and rural society in the 20th century. 
Why then carry out a study of landownership and rural development today, and 
what value can a historical perspective have for the present? The following section 
will review the academic context within which this research is carried out, and 
show why such a study is necessary. 
1.2 The Academic Background 
To a large extent, the academic literature confirms this generally held belief that 
landownership is no longer an important factor in rural society. Landowners fig-
ure prominently in studies of 19th century society, economy, and politics at both 
local and national levels. There is a large body of material on the 19th century 
landed elite (for instance Brodrick, 1881; Spring, 1963; Thompson, 1963; Caird, 
1967; 1968; Sutherland, 1968; Douglas, 1976; Offer, 1981; Stone, 1984}. Agricul-
tural historians (for instance Ernie, 1961; Orwin & Whetham, 1971; Mingay & 
Chambers, 1976; Thirsk, 1985} have studied the role of landlords in 19th century 
agricultural innovation and in the enclosure movement. Only a small number of 
historical geographers have studied 19th century landownership. Tate and Turner 
(1978}; Mills (1980} and Kain and Prince (1985} have experimented with 19th cen-
tury data sources for reconstructing landownership patterns, whilst studies have 
also been carried out into the 19th century estate landscape and architectural 
styles (Prince, 1967; Girouard, 1978; Clemenson, 1982}. The many disciplines 
in which 19th century landownership has been studied reflect its wide-ranging 
influence on the society, economy and politics of 19th century Britain. 
Although in the period leading up to the 1947 Agriculture Act 'land nationalisa-
tion was a real political issue (Smith, 1989}, academic studies of rural Britain in 
the post World War Two period have tended to ignore, or at best make fleeting 
reference to, landownership as a factor in rural development [2]. The academic 
literature has been dominated by three approaches. In the 1930s and 1940s, much 
empirical work was carried out by rural geographers into national land use pat-
terns and resource needs. There was a recognition of the increasing pressures 
on the countryside, and the need for a national co-ordinated land use strategy 
(Stapledon, 1935; Stamp, 1962}. Landownership was referred to only so far as 
it was seen as an obstacle to agricultural improvement (Stapledon, 1935, 189}. 
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During the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s, the hallmark of rural sociology was the 
community study (for instance Arensberg & Kimball, 1940; Rees, 1950; Williams, 
1963). The community study approach was based on theoretical assumptions about 
urban and rural society. Truly 'urban' and 'rural' societies represented opposite 
ends of a sociological spectrum. Urban society was a 'Gesellschaft' (literally, 'so-
ciety') whilst rural society was a 'Gemeinschaft' (community) [3]. Whilst the 
definition of community has never been satisfactorily established, the key features 
of a community are: kinship, neighbourhood (attachment to place) and friendship 
(social interaction) , . Within this theoretical conception of the rural community, 
the family farm played an important part (Marsden et al., 1986a). 
A similar conception of rural society was the human ecology approach, which was 
adopted by both sociologists and geographers (for instance Hawley, 1950; Darling, 
1955). This approach emphasised the role of the environment. The community 
and the environment were conceptualised as an organic whole, living in a symbiotic 
relationship [4]. Community studies were, by definition, case studies of individual, 
usually isolated, communities, with little or no consideration of the outside world. 
The emphasis of these studies was on uniqueness rather than generality. 
Geographical conceptions of the countryside were influenced by this perceived di-
chotomy between urban society and rural community, and the relationships be-
tween them. Rural communities were conceptualised as unchanging and tradi-
tional, whilst urban society was dynamic and expansionist. Rural change was, 
therefore, the result of the encroachment of urban society. This encroachment was 
seen as a gradual process of diffusion outwards from urban centres. Thus, rural 
communities in the most peripheral areas were least affected by urban influences. A 
geographical 'rural-urban' continuum could be identified (Bell & Newby, 1971, 42). 
Many attempts have been made by geographers to classify Britain into 'rural' and 
'urban', and then into different degrees of 'rural', on the basis of socio-economic 
and land use data (Cloke & Park, 1985, 6) [5]. Although there is no standard 
classification, the existence and significance of geographical variation within rural 
Britain is recognised. A spectrum can be identified between two extremes: the 
uplands and the rural-urban fringe. These areas face very different sorts of land 
use conflicts and socio-economic problems (Harrison, 1981, 223). The uplands suf-
fer from an inhospitable environment, inaccessibility, and socio-economic decline, 
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although certain areas are now popular tourist destinations. Land use conflicts 
arise from competition between industrial, recreation and conservation interests. 
On the rural-urban fringe, the urban influence is very strong in terms of land use, 
employment and social composition. These areas face intense land use pressures 
for housing development. 
The third strand in post-war rural studies has been the tendency to sectoralise ru-
ral Britain into discrete categories: settlement, population, agriculture etc (Clout, 
1972; Tarrant, 1974; Cherry, 1976). This tendency to compartmentalise the coun-
tryside is epitomised by agricultural economics, an academic discipline which has 
emerged in the post-war period and which pays little attention to the individual 
or the uniqueness of place (Newby, 1986). These approaches reflect the sectoral 
nature of the rural planning framework. Certainly, academics have influenced gov-
ernment policy and vice versa, although it is difficult to say which side has had 
the greater influence. Carter (1979) argues that rural studies have suffered from 
the close alliance between academics and policy-makers: 
"the 'problems' requiring investigation have often been defined for the rural 
sociologist by these agencies rather than by him for the theoretical progress of 
his discipline .... " (Carter, 1979, 579). 
Recently, both the community study and the sectoral approaches have been criti-
cised for propagating misconceptions about the countryside, and failing to identify 
real problems (Carter, 1979; Marsden et al., 1986a; Newby, 1986). The community 
study approach has been criticised for its descriptive, subjective nature, and for 
the lack of theoretical content. Often researchers have been blinkered by ideologi-
cal preconceptions (Bell & Newby, 1971, 44). The sectoral approach has also been 
criticised for going to the other extreme and looking for general spatial patterns, 
with little or no consideration of local variation. In addition, this approach has 
also been criticised for concentrating on economic variables, with little or no con-
sideration of social factors (Hoggart & Buller, 1987, 197). Both approaches have 
lacked a theoretically informed framework, and have sought explanation within the 
existing structure of society. There has been an implicit acceptance of the status 
quo. 
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A dramatic shift in academic thinking has taken place over the last 25 years, 
which has questioned many formerly held assumptions about the countryside and 
has opened up new research horizons. Several factors have influenced this aca-
demic 'revolution'. Pahl's (1964) account of social change in Hertfordshire villages 
on the urban fringe of London challenged traditional views about rural and urban 
societies. He showed that a society could be 'rural' in form but 'urban' in nature. 
The term 'metropolitan village' was coined to describe villages which had been 
'urbanised'. At the same time, the incorporation of radical theories of third world 
underdevelopment into development sociology influenced thinking about rural de-
velopment and regional inequality in Britain (Carter, 1979). 
Rural sociology was brought into the mainstream of theoretical developments in 
sociology, however, through the work of Newby and his associates (1975; 1976). 
Newby's work on farm workers and farmers in East Anglia has disproved many 
assumptions formerly held by sociologists about rural society and rural develop-
ment. His work has shown that rural communities, in the strict sociological sense 
of the word, rarely, if ever, existed. Rural societies are subject to the same class 
and status divisions and power conflicts that have long been recognised in urban 
societies, and share many of the same problems of poverty and deprivation, albeit 
with a 'rural flavour' (Shaw, 1979, 182). Rural societies are not, and probably 
never were, isolated and unchanging, and cannot be studied in isolation from the 
non-rural world. There can be no theory of rural sociology without a theory of 
society (Buttel & Newby, 1980, 4). Political and socio-economic theories, such as 
marxian and weberian theory, formerly applied only to the study of urban society, 
can help towards an understanding of the rural society and economy. 
These theoretical developments in rural sociology have been mirrored by theoret-
ical developments in human geography (for instance Gregory, 1978; Urry, 1981; 
Harvey, 1982; Massey, 1984; Sayer, 1984; Thrift, 1987) and developments in both 
disciplines have influenced rural geography. Moreover, the boundaries between the 
social sciences have weakened as each discipline becomes more receptive to ideas in 
neighbouring subjects. Today, there is a considerable overlap in subject matter and 
theory between the work of rural geographers, rural sociologists, anthropologists, 
and even agricultural economists (Bowler, 1987). 
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Not only have former problems been reanalysed, events in the 1980s have opened 
up new areas of study. After forty years of planning, few improvements in rural 
society have been achieved and the existing planning framework is recognised to 
have many failings (Sho~d, 1987; Ambrose, 1986). The crisis of agricultural over-
" production in the EEC has led to a critical re-examination of British agriculture, 
and criticism of the environmentally destructive practices which have been allowed 
in order to increase productivity (Bowers & Cheshire, 1983). 
Current research on rural Britain can be divided into three interrelated themes 
(Buttel & Newby, 1980, 18): farming (Marsden et al., 1986a; 1986b; Gassen et 
al., 1988), the environment (Lowe et al., 1986) and rural development (Carter, 
1980; HoggG.rt & Bulle~~7In all these themes, landownership is now recognised as 
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being an important factor. Assumptions about the decline of the landed interest 
have been questioned. Newby (1980), for instance, identifies landownership as 
being the fundamental factor in the social, economic and political structuring of 
contemporary rural society. 
There has been a reassessment of process and pattern in rural development, and 
of the relationship of rural Britain to the State. The traditional classification 
of rural Britain into zones, or a continuum, has been replaced by a more fluid 
conceptualisation of geographical variation. 
"There is now, surely, a general awareness that what constitutes 'rural' is wholly 
a matter of convenience and that arid and abstract definitional exercises are of 
little utility" (Newby, 1986, 209). 
Rural societies are not isolated from the external world but are linked by vertical 
ties, and the relationships between the local and national levels are constantly 
changing. Rural development in any area is the outcome of national influences 
and locally specific conditions (Hoggcui & Buller, 1987, 183). The concept of 
a 'locality' has been put forward as a more dynamic and flexible alternative to 
'region' (Urry, 1981). 
MC!..n~ of. 
AHA these recent theoretical approaches can be described as 'structuralist' [6). Al-
though structuralist approaches offer many advantages for the researcher, Newby 
(1986) points out certain dangers. There may be a temptation to describe how 
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areas differ from the national picture without analysing the underlying processes 
which cause those differences. On the other hand, localities should not be seen as 
objects of study in their own right, but as laboratories for the testing of theoretical 
and empirical issues. Political economy theory, especially, tends to be blinkered, 
and may lead to a temptation to concentrate on those features which conform to 
marxist theory, whilst ignoring other, perhaps contradictory, but equally impor-
tant processes. Moreover, there is a temptation to simplify or gloss over the nature 
of the links between the national and local scales which in reality are very complex. 
Indeed, recent academic research has concentrated on the development of theo-
retical ideas about rural Britain, which have yet to be assessed against empirical 
research. Despite the assertion made above that it is unnecessary to classify rural 
Britain into zones, there are fundamental differences between rural society and 
rural development problems in upland and lowland Britain which should be recog-
nised. There has been an emphasis in recent research on lowland Britain. This 
is understandable, as change in agriculture and rural society has been more rapid 
in lowland England, and therefore appears to offer more material for study. It is 
also, perhaps, a reaction against the community studies which were mainly carried 
out in upland Britain. Nevertheless, there is a perceived need for more empirical 
work t~arried out on upland Britain. The findings must only add to the on-going 
structuralist debate about processes of change in rural Britain. 
Recent developments in rural studies can be summarised as follows: there has been 
a shift from a sectoral to an integrated approach; there is a greater awareness of 
process rather than pattern; and greater criticism and questioning of the existing 
institutional framework. Social factors are given as great as, or even greater im-
portance than economic ones. These developments have questioned many formerly 
held assumptions about rural society and rural development, and have recognised 
that landownership could still be a potentially important influence. At the same 
time, there has been a re-evaluation of the role of the State in rural development. 
1.3 Thesis Structure, Aims and Research Design 
This thesis has three main aims. First, it aims to contribute to an understanding 
of the operation of the processes by which continuity and change in landownership 
take place. Second, it is hoped to evaluate the importance of landownership as a 
25 
factor in rural development, both in the 19th century and the 20th century. Third, 
it is hoped that the results will be of interest both to academics and to people 
practically involved in rural development. 
The research design and the methodology have been infiuenced by two practical 
constraints. The constraints on time and resources, inevitable in a three year PhD 
programme {Phillips & Pugh, 1987; Renouf, 1989), require that the potentially vast 
subject matter of this thesis be whittled down to a manageable size. In addition, 
the choice of methodology is constrained by the nature and limited availability of 
data on landownership (see Appendix A). 
The research design consists of two connected spatial scales, the national and the 
local, and a historical dimension covering the period from the early 19th century to 
the present day. The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One consists of a general 
discussion and examination of landownership and rural development in 19th and 
20th century Britain, based on the analysis of secondary material. The aim of 
Part One is twofold. First, to establish the national structure of landownership 
and the position of landowners within British society in the 19th century; and to 
identify the factors which have caused change, and the processes by which change 
has taken place over the 20th century. This establishes a broad national level 
context for the following, more detailed, study. The second aim is to move from 
the national to the local level, and to identify the ways in which landownership has 
infiuenced rural development in the past, and can exert an infiuence today. From 
this more detailed analysis a conceptual framework of landownership and rural 
development is constructed, which is then applied to the empirical case studies 
of landownership and rural development in Part Two. By adopting this research 
design, it is possible to draw conclusions of more general significance from the case 
studies. The experience of the North Pennines can be contextualised and evaluated 
against the national experience. 
Although no one particular theoretical approach has been adopted, the research 
has been infiuenced by the recent theoretical developments in rural sociology and 
rural geography. The thesis contains much empirical material, but adopts a broadly 
structuralist method of interpretation, in that the emphasis is on process rather 
than pattern, and explanation is sought below surface patterns, at the deeper level 
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of political, legal, social and economic structures. Indeed, the whole question of 
landownership and rural development is political, and a consideration of society 
and the State is unavoidable. 
Despite the emphasis which has been placed on the generality of the research 
design, certain qualifications should be made. Even with the dual-level approach 
adopted, an equally comprehensive appraisal of all landownership forms and all 
rural development problems is beyond the scope of the thesis. The conceptual 
framework is developed with particular reference to the landownership forms and 
rural development problems of upland Britain, of which the North Pennines forms 
a part. The North Pennines was selected for several reasons. It has a distinctive 
upland landscape and upland economy. It also faces typical upland socio-economic 
problems: a marginal agricultural sector, unemployment, inaccessibility and poor 
service provision. The North Pennines is one of the few upland areas of England 
and Wales not to have been designated as a national park, and has only recently 
been designated as an Area Of Outstanding Natural Beauty. It has developed with 
relatively little public intervention, and landowners have, until recently, enjoyed a 
large degree of autonomy. Moreover, recent attempts at public intervention have 
met with conflict, thereby suggesting that there are powerful local vested interests. 
The landownership structure of the North Pennines is dominated by landed estates 
and common land. It has a highly traditional landownership structure, and is a 
region of Britain where continuity in the landownership structure has been more 
marked than change. The case studies focus on the development of landed estates 
and their influence on rural development over the 19th and 20th centuries, although 
commoQ. land and public landownership are also considered. The landed estates 
are owned by a variety of different landowners, providing the opportunity to com-
pare estate management under different ownership forms. Private, institutional 
and charitable landownership are all considered. Whilst the general discussion of 
landownership and rural society considers the whole spectrum of landownership 
forms and rural development problems, in order that the conceptual framework be 
applicable to the case studies, the discussion focusses on the landed estate and the 
development problems of upland Britain. 
A historical dimension has been incorporated into the research for two main rea-
27 
sons. First, more detailed information is available on 19th century landownership 
than is available for the 20th century. It is possible, therefore, to carry out an 
in- depth study of landed estate management in the 19th century, which enables 
better understanding of present day estate management. Second, a historical per-
spective may help the identification and understanding of the processes which 
underlie contemporary development problems. However, it should be remembered 
that different processes may produce similar outcomes (Norton, 1982). At what 
point in history the analysis should begin was a somewhat arbitrary decision. 1800 
was chosen as a starting date since at this time the hegemony of the landed inter-
est at national level was still unchallenged, and upland Britain was experiencing a 
period of prosperity. In the North Pennines, the early 19th century was a period 
of change in the agricultural landscape when much of the land was enclosed (see 
4.1). 
An important theme in the thesis is continuity and change over time: in landown-
ership structures and rural society, at the national and the local level. The terms 
continuity and change can be used to describe surface patterns over time, or to 
analyse the dynamics of underlying processes (Gregson, 1984, 17). Just as re-
lationships between observable phenomena at one point in time can be analysed 
and explained on either an empirical or theoretical level, so can continuity and 
change in these phenomena over time be analysed on two levels. It is important 
to remember that continuity is as important as change and requires just as much 
analysis and explanation (Redclift, 1986). 
Before moving on to outline the content of each chapter, some of the terms fre-
quently used in the thesis should be defined to avoid later confusion. The terms 
'landownership' and 'land control' are both used in the analysis. The former is 
self-explanatory, the latter refers to the actual control of a piece of land. As will 
become apparent later, ownership does not necessarily imply control. For instance, 
common land is a form of land control, but is not owned in the normal sense of the 
word. The term 'development' is difficult to define (Hoggcu:t & Buller, 1987, 18). 
In this research, rural development is used in its widest sense. It merely refers to 
changes in the rural economy and society over time, whether positive or negative, 
induced or natural. The term 'rural society' is also used in its widest sense, and 
should not be confused with any theoretical conception of 'community' or 'society'. 
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It is used to refer generally to the inhabitants of rural Britain and more specifically 
to the inhabitants of a particular locality. Finally, the term 'public intervention' 
refers to any action by the State, public agency, or the community, which affects 
the economy or society, at any spatial scale, in either a positive or negative way. 
As was stated above, Part One takes the form of a general essay on landownership 
and rural development, based on an analysis of the secondary literature. Chapter 
Two looks at changes in the pattern of landownership and the nature of landed 
society at the national level over the 19th and 20th centuries. Chapter Three then 
identifies the processes by which landownership may influence rural development 
at the local level, with a detailed analysis of landownership decision-making, the 
structure of rural society and the interaction of private and public interests in 
the rural development process. From this discussion, a conceptual framework is 
developed. 
Part Two, which is the main section of the thesis, includes the empirical work on 
the North Pennines. Chapters Four to Six follow the historical development of the 
North Pennines from 1800 to the present day, using case studies of landownership 
and land control. Chapter Seven considers certain recent public intervention mea-
sures in the region, and evaluates the interaction of private and public interests in 
the determination of land use. Chapter Eight draws together all the many issues 
which have been considered in the thesis and presents the final conclusions. 
Many of the issues raised in this brief discussion will be elaborated in later chapters. 
The aim of this introduction has been to outline the aims and structure of the 
thesis, introduce the main themes, and to show how the study fits into the academic 
and historical context. It should be emphasised once more that the empirical 
findings are not representative of the whole of rural Britain, or even of upland 
Britain, and are not presented as such. They illustrate events in one particular 
region Britain, but this does not mean to say that parallels cannot be drawn with 
the experience of other parts of upland Britain, or even rural Britain as a whole. 
The more general significance of the work lies in the identification of processes 
underlying rural development. At a more fundamental level, the themes of land 
use and land control are of universal significance. 
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Notes 
1. It is important at this point to state that, although owner-occupied farms are, 
by definition, family farms, the term 'family farm' refers to the farm business 
structure rather than the ownership form. Tenant farms may also be family 
farms. 
2. Although land nationalisation was part of the labour party manifesto in the 
1945 general election and received widespread support, the policy was never 
implemented, despite the fact that the government nationalised other politically 
contentious industries such as coal and steel. Smith (1989) suggests three 
explanations for this: 
• the elected labour government rejected some of its more radical policies after 
election. 
e It was thought that the provisions of the 194 7 Agriculture Act and Town and 
Country Planning Acts offered adequate controls over agriculture. 
• Political pressure from the agricultural policy community forced the question 
off the political agenda. 
3. The terms 'Gemeinschaft' and 'Gesellschaft' were introduced by Tennies, who 
is known as the father of the community study (Bell & Newby, 1971, 23). 
4. Darling (1955, 2) writes of this approach: 
"Ecology is the study of the organism in relation to its environment, but in any 
study of a higher animal species, environment must always include those mental 
and social factors which exert such profound influence on biological economics, 
especially in communities of human beings". 
5. The difficulty of defining what is rural is discussed by Cloke & Park (1985, 
9). It depends for what purpose the definition is needed. It can be defined 
functionally (in terms of land use, population etc.), or negatively (i.e. anything 
that is not urban), or perceptually (what people think of as the countryside). 
6. Structuralism can be defined as: 
"A set of principles and procedures .... which involve moving beneath the visible 
and conscious designs of active human subjects in order to expose an essential 
logic which is supposed to bind these designs together in enduring structures" 
(Johnson, 1986, 461). 
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Part I· 
Landownership and Rural Development in 
Britain 
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Chapter II 
Landownership in 19th & 20th Century Britain 
"Land: A part of the earth's surface, considered as property. The theory that 
land is property subject to private ownership and control is the foundation of 
modern society, and is eminently worthy of the superstructure. Carried to its 
logical conclusion, it means that some have the right to prevent others from 
living; for the right to own implies the right exclusively to occupy; and in fact 
laws of trespass are enacted wherever property in land is recognised. It follows 
that if the whole area of terra firma is owned by A, B and C, there will be no 
place for D, E, F and G to be born, or, as trespassers, to exist." (Bierce, 1967, 
The Devil's Dictionary, 202). 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of the first part of the thesis is to establish a framework within which the 
influence of landownership on rural development can be conceptualised in general 
terms. The framework will then be applied to the analysis of landownership and 
rural development in the North Pennines in Part Two. In order to develop a con-
ceptual framework it is first necessary to identify the components which should 
be included within it, and to establish their inter-relationships. The framework 
should include the processes by which landownership can influence rural develop-
ment at the micro-scale, and the linkages between these processes operating at the 
micro-scale and the macro-scale. It was stated in the introduction that local soci-
eties are linked to the national state by many complex ties, so that development 
in any one area cannot be understood without reference to, and an understanding 
of, the external environment. Moreover, a framework which includes two spatial 
scales, the local and the national, enables the experience of the local society to 
be compared with and evaluated against the national experience, thus giving the 
findings a more general significance. Furthermore, the framework should include a 
temporal dimension, since the study covers the period from the early 19th century 
to the 20th century. The identification of the processes acting to cause continuity 
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and change in landownership, rural society and the relationships between them at 
the local and national scale is also required. 
The following two chapters will, therefore, seek to identify the variables to be in-
cluded in the framework and to establish the relationships between them. The basic 
assumption of the framework is that landownership can influence rural society and 
rural development in two ways. First, landowners exert a direct influence through 
the ownership, control and management of land. How they manage their land 
can materially affect the lives of those people living on, or dependent upon, their 
land. It is vital, therefore, to identify the factors which influence how landowners 
manage their land. Second, landowners may exert an indirect influence on rural 
society and rural development through the exercise of political power at national 
and local level. To understand this second form of influence, it is necessary to 
examine the structure of rural society and the political process. These two forms 
of influence are related but require separate consideration. The analysis will look 
at each form of influence in turn and then at the relationships between them. 
Because of the interrelationships of many of the themes which will be considered 
in Part One, it has proved difficult to divide Chapters Two and Three into discrete 
sections. Inevitably, the material covered in each will overlap. The aim of Chapter 
Two is to look at landownership and landed society at the national level, and 
at continuity and change over the 19th and 20th centuries. Chapter Three will 
then adopt a more 'applied' approach, looking at how landownership affects rural 
society and rural development at the local level, and at the processes linking the 
local and national scales. 
2.2 Landownership in the 19th Century 
2.2.1 The Structure of Landownership 
The dominant model of landownership in 19th century Britain was the landed 
estate. The land of Britian has never before, nor since, been concentrated in so 
few hands as it was in the 19th century. Table 2.1 shows the national structure of 
landownership in 1873 [1]. The analysis of the 1873 Return of Owners Survey by 
Bateman (see Appendix A) found that 24% of the land area of England was held 
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Table 2.1- Landownership in England & Wales, 1873 
NUMBER OF OWNERS CLASS EXTENT {hectares) 
400 Peers & Peeresses 2,387,074 
1,288 Great Landowners 3,540,708 
2,529 Squires 1,799,696 
9,585 Greater Yeomen 1,992,761 
24,412 Lesser Yeomen 1,726,780 
17,049 Small Proprietors 1,638,252 
703,289 Cottagers 62,978 
Source: Bateman {1881, 187) 
in estates of over 4,167 hectares (10,000 acres). The Duke of Sutherland, report-
edly the richest man in Britain, owned estates in Shropshire (5,416.6 hectares), 
Yorkshire {833.3 hectares), and the Scottish Highlands (520,833 hectares). When 
the 1st Duke died in 1833, the annual income from his English agricultural estates 
was £27,545, but this was only one fifth of his total income (Robinson, 1988, 135). 
A further 40% of the land area was held in estates of over 1,250 hectares {3,000 
acres). The majority {95%) of the land area was within private ownership, the 
remaining 5% being owned by public institutions such as the Crown, the Church, 
colleges and charities (Brodrick, 1881, 170). 
The 1873 Returns enable some comparisons of the regional pattern of landowner-
ship to be made. Table 2.2 shows the number of large landowners, greater gentry 
and great landowners by region, whilst Table 2.3 shows the percentage of the 
land area owned by 'great landowners' and 'greater gentry' by county. It can be 
seen that the percentage of each county owned by great landowners varied from 
over 50% in Northumberland and Rutland, to under 10% in Essex, Middlesex and 
Herefordshire. The regional distribution of greater gentry was less variable, and 
nowhere did they dominate a county as did the great landowners. In Scotland 
there was a sharp geographical contrast in the structure of landownership between 
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Table 2.2 - The Regional Distribution of Landownership 
REGION LARGE LANDOWNERS GREATER GENTRY GREAT LANDOWNERS 
North 150 103 47 
North West 208 159 49 
East 193 143 50 
Midlands 223 171 52 
South East 335 266 69 
South West 227 163 64 
Source: Clemenson (1982, 24) 
the Highlands and the Lowlands (see Figure 2.1). The largest estates were clearly 
concentrated in the Highlands, reflecting that area's historical development under 
the clan system [2]. 
2.2.2 The Land Law of the 19th Century 
In the 19th century, land could be held by one of four tenures: freehold, leasehold, 
copyhold and customary. Freehold tenure granted the owner the highest degree of 
control over his land, and by the 19th century amounted in practice to absolute 
ownership [3]. On most freehold estates in the 19th century the freeholder did 
not occupy the land himself but rented it out on leases. As well as agricultural 
leases, other land rights could also be leased such as sporting rights and mineral 
rights [4]. The terms of the leasehold were governed by a lease, a contract between 
the lessor and lessee (Simpson, 1976, 31) [5]. Copyhold tenure was a residual 
form of tenure from the manorial period, but was still widespread in 19th century 
Britain. Copyholders fell between freeholders and leaseholders in the degree of 
control over their land. Although holding the land from the lord of the manor, 
they enjoyed inheritance rights and, with the exception of a small aimual money 
payment, enjoyed virtually exclusive enjoyment of their lands (6]. Much land was 
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Table 2.3- The Distribution of Landownership by County 
Great landowners Greater gentry 
CoUitty %Area uwne<l %Area owue<l 
Bcdfonl.ltirc 25.8 17.3 
BcrkMitirc 18.7 21.7 
Bu~kinglta.utMitire 21.8 10.8 
CambridgeMhire 11.0 0.6 
Cheshire 20.7 22.6 
Cornwall 26.7 21.7 
Cumbcrla.ud Hl.1 0.0 
Derbyshire 28.0 10.0 
Devou 22.1 14.1 
Dorset 36.7 20.3 
Durham 30.8 10.7 
Essex 0.2 18.2 
Gloucestershire 17.4 18.4 
Hampshire 21.1 25.6 
HerefordMhire 0.5 24.4 
HcrtfortMtire 20.0 17.8 
HuutiugdouMhire 10.2 21.0 
Kent 11.1 21.2 
La.u~a.sltire 21.0 18.5 
Lcicestershire 18.6 10.8 
LiucoluMhire 26.0 14.5 
Middlesex 3.7 10.7 
Norfork 10.6 22.8 
Nurtha.mptoushire 27.7 21.4 
N urthumberhwd 53.7 14.6 
N ottiughamshirc 38.4 18.7 
Oxfordshirc 14.4 25.5 
Rutla.ud 51.8 17.6 
Shropshire (Salop 24.0 20.2 
Somerset 23.5 15.1 
Staffordshire 20.0 21.0 
Suffolk 21.0 17.7 
Surrey 12.2 16.1 
Sussex 24.0 21.1 
W•1.1·wickshire 21.0 10.4 
Westmorland 22.6 16.0 
Wiltshire 35.6 10.7 
Wur~estershire 15.5 20.3 
Yorkshire 27.6 21.3 
England 24.4 10.0 
Source: Clemenson (1982, 229) 
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Figure 2.1 - Landownership in Scotland, 1873 
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Figure 2.2 Landownership in Scodand, 1873 
a) % area owned by Great Landowners (5000 acres); b) % area owned by 
Squires (1000-4999 acres); c) % area owned by Yeomen (100-999 acres); d) % 
area owned by Small Proprietors (1-99 acres). 
Source: Owners of Lands and Heritages 1872-73 (Scotland), House of 
Commons Accounts and Papers. 72(3). 1874. 
Source: Robinson (1988, 18) 
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also still held on a wide variety of customary tenures. These tenures also had their 
origins in the past and the occupiers of these lands also enjoyed largely unfettered 
rights [7]. 
Tenure determined the degree of control over a piece of land at any one time and 
the estate determined the duration of this control. A freehold tenure could exist in 
one of three different estates. The estate of greatest control was the fee simple, an 
estate of inheritance which could be passed on to the owner's heirs general. The 
generality of inheritance more or less guaranteed that an eligible heir could be found 
in every generation. An estate granted in fee tail was subject to strict restrictions 
as to who could inherit. Inheritance was usually limited to the immediate family 
and succession was, therefore, dependent on each generation producing an heir [8]. 
A life estate could be created for the lifetime of the owner, who in effect became a 
life tenant. Just as more than one tenure could exist in the same piece of land so 
could more than one estate [9]. 
Much land in the 19th century was still subject to non-exclusive or common rights 
[10]. Common land was an ancient form of land control dating from the manorial 
period (Hoskins & Stamp, 1963, 6). The area of common land in England and 
Wales had been greatly reduced by the 19th century by enclosure, and many further 
enclosures were made during the first half of the 19th century, but it was still 
an important land resource [11]. Freehold and leasehold interests could exist in 
common land, but their owners' right to exercise them were constrained by the 
rights of the commoners. 
The freedom to enjoy freehold and leasehold interests in the 19th century was also 
constrained by financial burdens (overriding interests) [12] such as rates and land 
taxes. The most burdensome land payment in the 19th century was the tithe. 
Although the last tithes in kind were commuted by the Tithe Commutation Act 
in 1836, tithes were still collected as a money payment (Evans, 1976) [13]. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the land law for an understanding of the 
landownership structure in the 19th century was the fee tail or strict family settle-
ment (Brodrick, 1881, 130). This was the main mechanism by which the landed 
elite had preserved and enlarged its estates. The principle behind the fee tail was 
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the preservation of the whole estate within the family from generation to gener-
ation. Inheritance within the family must be ensured and each successive owner 
of the property must be barred from selling any part of the estate. These two 
goals were achieved as follows. A strict settlement could be drawn up for three 
generations to include father, son and the son's heirs. The legal title to the estate 
would be vested in trustees, so that the father would act as a life tenant. The 
terms of the settlement stipulated that the life tenant pass on the property intact 
to the son and his heirs. The settlement could be renegotiated in every generation 
so that it never lapsed. It was estimated in 1848 that more than two thirds of the 
land of Britain consisted of estates under settlement (Garnier, 1911, 459). Families 
became highly adept at retaining the family name on the estate, even if a surrogate 
heir had to be found [14] . 
. 2.3 The Landed Interest 
The classification which Bateman used in his analysis of the 1873 returns, reflects 
the social status which was attached to landownership. In the 19th century a 
distinct 'landed interest' could be identified (Thompson, 1963, 7). It was a 'vertical' 
interest group, identified by the ownership of land, but internally differentiated 
according to the amount of land owned. Dominating this landed interest were 
the aristocracy and the great landowners. They formed a 'landed elite', which 
controlled Britain politically, socially and economically. Below the landed elite 
were the landed gentry. The estates of this group were less extensive and their 
political and social power concentrated at county and local rather than national 
level. Below the greater gentry came smaller landlords, owner-occupiers and tenant 
farmers. The base of the landed interest was formed by the landless agricultural 
labourers, and all other labourers dependent upon the land for their livelihood. 
The landed interest was the dominant group numerically and economically in 
Britain in the early 19th century. There were other 'interests' in 19th century 
Britain, such as a commercial interest and an industrial interest, but, in the early 
19th century at least, these groups presented no challenge (ibid., 1963, 4)[1Lj.a.J 
The power of the landed elite in British society could be attributed to political, 
economic and social factors. The landed elite controlled the national political 
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process. The British aristocracy being without exception a landed aristocracy, the 
House of Lords was: 
"the direct institutional expression of the landed aristocracy" (Thompson, 1963, 
45) 
The landed elite also exercised a high degree of control over the House of Commons 
through patronage and the selection of parliamentary candidates. For instance, in 
1820, 87 peers were accredited with the return of 213 members, as opposed to 137 
members who were returned by 90 commoners (ibid., 1963, 45). 
At county level, the political power of the landed elite and landed gentry was also 
unquestioned. Of the two major political figures in the county, the Lord Lieutenant 
and the High Sheriff, the former was, without exception, a great landowner of the 
county, whilst the latter position, being more arduous and costly, tended to be 
held by a member of the lesser gentry or the commercial class [15]. Most of the 
business of local government was carried out by the Justices of the Peace. They 
were appointed by the Crown, but on the recommendation of the Lord Lieutenant, 
and were drawn mainly from the landed gentry class (Orwin & Whetham, 1971, 
44 ). They were responsible for highways and bridges, prisons, licensing of public 
houses, the police force and local rates. None of these positions received payment, 
but this was compensated for by the political power and social status which they 
carried. 
The landed elite also held a dominant, although not exclusive, position in the 
British economy. By virtue of their ownership of land alone, landowners com-
manded vast resources of land and minerals [16]. The wealth of the landed elite 
was based first and foremost on agriculture which, until the mid-19th century, was 
the dominant economic sector of the country, but the estates of many landowners 
also included urban property and mining and industrial enterprises. For instance, 
as well as an agricultural estate at Woburn, the 7th Duke of Bedford owned a 49.5 
hectare estate in London, which included the valuable properties of Bloomesbury, 
St Pancras and Covent Garden, and copper and arsenic mines in Devon. In the 
1830s, the rents from the London estate provided 72% of the Duke's total income 
(Spring, 1963, 13). 
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The role that the landed elite played in the economy ranged from passive rentier 
landlords at one extreme, to active capitalists and entrepreneurs at the other. The 
degree of involvement largely depended on the individual. The landed interest as 
a whole played an important role in agricultural innovation, mining and industrial 
enterprises, the development of the railways and urban development in the 19th 
century [17]. As the century progressed, the economic dominance of the landed 
elite began to be matched by other interests, particularly the commercial and 
industrial classes. The social and political power that the landed elite exercised, 
however, enabled them to retain their dominant position in British society after 
their economic dominance had declined (Thompson, 1963, 2). 
An understanding of the social power of the landed elite is essential to an un-
derstanding of the role of landowners in British society in the 19th century, but 
the basis of this power is more difficult to define. It was linked to political and 
economic power but was more than this: 
"land possessed a symbolic significance that stretched far beyond its economic 
or political significance" (Newby, 1980, 35). 
It can, perhaps, best be understood with reference to Weber's social theory (Gerth 
& Mills, 1970). Weber differentiated between status groups and classes within 
society. Whilst classes are defined by economic activity, a status group can be 
identified by the following characteristics: the ownership of property for consump-
tion rather than production, a characteristic lifestyle, intermarriage within the 
group and distinctive moral and social values. The power of a status group is 
based on inherited wealth rather than economic success and on its exclusiveness. 
Many f~atures of the British landed elite appear to confirm that they were a status 
group. For instance, the 15th Earl of Derby listed the attractions of landowner-
ship in the following (decreasing) order of importance: political influence, social 
importance (territorial possession and visible wealth), power (within the estate), 
residential enjoyment, sport and lastly income (Douglas, 1976, 17). Stone (1984, 8) 
identifies the English landed elite as enjoying great wealth, a lavish and educated 
lifestyle, a country house and an inherited right to exercise authority in politics. 
The social power enjoyed by the landed elite also depended on the recognition of 
their superior status by other sections of society. Not only was the social status 
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of the landed elite recognised, it was also aspired to, for although membership of 
the landed elite was exclusive, it was not a closed group. The means of entry to 
the landed elite was through the acquistion of a landed estate or marriage into 
a landed family, and the adoption of the characteristic lifestyle described above. 
Thompson (1963, 20) points out that admission to the landed elite was mostly 
through marriage. In the 19th century many marriages took place between the 
landed elite and daughters of bankers, lawyers, brewers and even plantation owners.[! 1 aJ 
Those who could not aspire to the landed elite could aspire to join the landed 
gentry, a group who emulated the landed elite in a smaller and less ostentatious 
way. The landed gentry were a more fluid class, and inter-married more freely 
with non-landed classes, particularly with the professional classes: the clergy and 
merchants, for instance (Thompson, 1963, 21). Younger sons of the landed gentry 
took jobs in the church, army, civil service, the law and in trade, and thus repre-
sented a reverse flow from landed society to non-landed society (ibid., 22). The 
intermixing of the landed interest with other interests prevented the isolation of 
the landed gentry from the rest of society. The landed gentry also protected the 
landed elite, acting as a 'buffer' class between the aristocracy and the workforce. 
The power of the British landed elite can be better understood when compared to 
other European landed elites. The British landed elite differed in several respects 
from their European counterparts. First, the power of the British landed elite was 
firmly based in the countryside and, in England at any rate, most landowners were 
resident on their estates (Spring, 1971, 11). The Prussians were the only other 
landed elite to value residence on the estate. The Russian elite, for example, were 
largely absentee, preferring town to country life. This factor, plus the absence 
of a powerful peasant landowning class in Britain, prevented the emergence of 
land-based opposition as occurred in France and Russia (ibid., 6). Second, the 
relative social 'openness' of the British landed elite in comparison to their European 
counterparts prevented the emergence of major social divisions in society whilst, 
in addition, the admission of members of the industrial and business classes to 
landed society brought not only capital but also expertise and innovation to estate 
management. Third, the British landed elite was not solely a rentier class, it took 
a leading role in 19th century economic development (ibid., 1971, 13). Thus the 
British landed elite was a status group, but not in the strict weberian sense. The 
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overlap with over social and economic groups preserved its strength long after the 
power of other landed elites in Europe had declined. 
There is no doubt that Britain in the early 19th century ·was dominated by a 
landed interest, and ruled by a landed elite. The power of the landed elite rested 
on the hierarchy of the landed interest. The dominance of the landed elite was 
protected by the land law which prevented the sale of estates, and legislation which 
guaranteed their right to rule. Although the landed elite was a status group rather 
than an economic class, it was not as isolated from the rest of society as were 
other European landed elites, a fact whose significance will emerge in the following 
discussion of the decline of the landed interest. 
2.3 The Decline of the Landed Interest 
Over the late 19th century and the early 20th century the power of the landed 
elite declined, as did their territorial control, with the break-up and sale of many 
landed estates. By 1850, all the conditions on which the power of the landed 
elite had been based were gone (Thompson, 1963, 2). Agriculture was no longer 
the dominant source of employment, Britain was no longer a rural society and 
landowners were no longer the only wealthy members of society. The actual decline 
of the political power of the landed elite and their territorial possession, however, 
took place gradually over a long period. The main period of land sales was not 
until the 1920s. Between 1920 and 1922 it is estimated that more than one quarter 
of the agricultural land area of England and Wales changed hands (ibid., 1963, 
332). The decline of the landed elite was, therefore, a long drawn out process. 
This section will look at the factors which caused the decline of the landed elite, 
and the processes by which the decline took place. 
The decline of the landed interest has been studied and interpreted in a variety 
of ways. The major study, from the point of view of the landowners, is that by 
Thompson (1963); whilst Douglas (1976), Offer (1981) and Lindert (1987) con-
centrate on the political attacks on landownership in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Massey and Catalano (1978) interpret changes in landownership within 
a marxist framework of analysis. The main arguments and findings of these works 
will be discussed in the following analysis. 
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Thompson (1963) asserts that the key feature of the decline of the English landed 
elite was the willingness, and even participation, of landowners in their own demise. 
This factor is often concealed by the political attacks on landownership which were 
made in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and which were more popularly 
attributed to be the cause of the decline. In a sense, the events of the early 20th 
century were paradoxical; what was thought of as the beginning of the decline: 
"may more profitably be seen as the natural culmination of the whole trend of 
the preceding generation" {Thompson, 1963, 325). 
The primary cause of the decline of the landed elite in Thompson's view, as was 
stated above, was economic. Over the 19th century the economic value of agricul-
ture declined in relation to other sectors of the economy. The repeal of the Corn 
Laws in 1846, which opened up the British market to foreign imports, symbolised 
an acceptance that agriculture could no longer receive preferential treatment in the 
economy [18]. The economic effects of the repeal were delayed by the economic 
boom in the world economy in the mid-19th century (Perry, 1974, 19). Indeed, the 
mid-19th century was a time of great prosperity in British agriculture, the period 
of so-called 'High Farming' (Chambers & Mingay, 1976, 170). It was not until the 
1870s and the onset of a world recession (the so-called 'Great Agricultural Depres-
sion') that the full impact of foreign competition on British farmers was felt [19]. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the gradual decline of wheat prices over the century, and the 
low prices during the 1880s and 1890s. Thompson {1963, 317) points out that 
the impact of the depression varied geographically. The arable areas of lowland 
England were hardest hit. Landowners in pastoral areas of the country were less 
affected, although this may partly be attributable to the fact that the incomes of 
many landowners in northern and upland Britain were supplemented by mineral 
rents. 
Although the economic basis of the landed elite's power had gone by the mid-
19th century, the removal of their political and territorial power was a much more 
difficult process. Both sources of power were protected by the law, and reform 
had to be initiated by the landed elite themselves. The political power of the 
landed elite was only gradually eroded over the 19th century. The Reform Acts 
of 1832, 1867 and 1884, and the Local Government Acts of 1888 and 1894, were 
both important steps in the democratisation of national and county politics, which 
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Figure 2.2- UK Wheat Prices, 1800 to 1966 
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culminated in the abolition of the supremacy of the House of Lords in 1911 [20]. 
Not until 1885, however, did the number of MPs from commercial backgrounds 
overtake those from landed ones (Thompson, 1963, 276). Somewhat ironically, over 
the whole period of parliamentary reform the peerage actually expanded (ibid., 
1963, 49). The number of hereditary peers in the House of Lords increased from 
350 in 1832 to 570 in 1914, although many of the new peers did not come from 
landed backgrounds. 
Legal reform was also required to break the hold of the landed elite on the land 
resources of the country. It was recognised by the mid-19th century that many fea-
tures of the land law actively obstructed agricultural improvement (Caird, 1968). 
In particular, the practice of entailing estates, by which each successive owner was 
prevented from selling any part of his estate, meant that many estates were irre-
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vocably encumbered with debts (Garnier, 1908, 459). The lack of security of the 
tenantry under the prevalent system of yearly tenancies was also seen as a barrier 
to improvement; farmers were unwilling to invest capital with such a short-term 
interest ( Caird, 1968, 503). In 1875, the first Agricultural Holdings Act was passed 
to give greater security to farm tenants (Orwin & Whetham, 1971, 171) [21]. The 
Settled Land Act of 1882 abolished the power of entails to prevent land sales and 
thereby opened up the opportunity for free trade in land (Thompson, 1957) [22]. 
The passing of this act did not, however, result in an immediate growth of the land 
market (although Thompson claims that many landowners would have put land 
on the market if there had been sufficient demand to buy) [23]. 
Massey and Catalano (1978) analyse the break-up of landed estates within a 
marxist economic framework. Like Thompson, they ascribe a more active role 
to landowners. They argue that landowners were capitalists in their economic 
role. By mixing with the emerging capitalist industrial classes of the 19th century, 
landowners retained a degree of political power which enabled them to con~inue 
to influence the nature of change undergone by political institutions (Massey & 
Catalano, 1978, 5). Therefore the decline of the landed interest was economically 
induced, but by controlling this decline themselves, the landowners managed to 
retain a greater power than would otherwise have been possible. 
The more visible and dramatic political attacks on the landed elite of the late 
19th and early 20th centuries have been popularly attributed as being the main 
cause of their downfall (Douglas, 1976, 20). The 'land question' took the form of 
calls for the nationalisation of land, and for the imposition of taxes on land values 
(Bateman, 1988). The introduction of death duties in 1894 added to the financial 
burdens faced by many landowners [24]. The culmination of the land question 
was the 'People's Budget' of 1910 (see Appendix A). The relative significance of 
political attacks and economic change as causes of the decline of the landed interest 
is debated by Howell (1977). He sees the political attacks on the landed elite of the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries as being founded not on fact but on the need 
to make political capital. Landlords were generally not 'political tyrants' as they 
were often portrayed. Misrepresentation of landlords was particularly prevalent in 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales because of the strength of separatist feelings in these 
regions. Howell writes: 
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"It is contended that the 'Welsh Land Question' - the agranan indictment 
against the landowners- was largely the invention of Welsh Nonconformist Rad-
icalism towards achieving political democracy and national fulfilment" (Howell, 
1977, 149). 
This leads to another significant point. Politics may not have been the root cause 
of the break-up of landed estates, but this does not undermine the significance of 
political action as an catalyst of change, even if change was inevitable. Although· 
their arguments were largely based on ideology rather than fact, the politicians of 
the time reflected or manipulated public opinion. Certainly the attacks did much 
to undermine the confidence of the landed elite in the future of landownership. 
Lindert (1987) argues that the importance of the land question can only be under-
stood with reference to the specific conditions of the period. In the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries land could be directly equated with wealth. The hegemony of 
landed power could not survive once the vote was extended to a wider, non-landed 
population. After the Second World War, the wealthiest sections of the population 
were not necessarily landowners, whilst ownership of land broadened (especially 
through the growth of owner-occupied housing). Land, therefore, lost its political 
significance. The People's Budget of 1909 would not have been politically feasible 
thirty or forty years on. 
Douglas' (1976) analysis of the People's Budget of 1910 supports the contention 
of Howell (1979) that the land question was exploited by politicians as a source of 
political capital. Financially, the taxation of land values was the least important 
aspect of the budget, but politically it proved to be an explosive issue. Like Lindert, 
Douglas sees the period between 1910 and 1914 as a period when land reform and 
taxation were the main political issues, ended dramatically by the First World 
War: 
"By the time that war came to an end, all the apparently fixed points of politics 
had shifted beyond recognition" (Douglas, 1976, 166). 
After the war, land no longer attracted the political interest that it had beforehand 
[25]. 
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Thompson (1963, 323) is sceptical of the importance of the land reformists in the 
decline of the landed elite. The sudden spate of estate sales between 1910 and 
1914 was as much due to a new demand for land as to fears over the taxation of 
land values. Improvements in the agricultural market made farm tenants more 
willing to buy their holdings, and many estates were broken up and sold piecemeal 
to the sitting tenants. The First World War induced further sales and is seen by 
Thompson, like Douglas, as a catalyst of change in British society. Many landed 
families lost elder sons and heirs in the war. The introduction of higher taxes 
after the war, and the fear of further political attacks on land, undermined the 
attraction of landownership even more. 
By the end of the First World War, all the laws which had enforced the political 
power of the landed elite had been reformed, and in the new post-war political 
climate land was no longer a burning issue. Precipitated, perhaps, by the spate 
of land sales in the early 1920s, there was a long overdue reform of the land 
law with the 1925 Property Acts [26]. Amongst the many reforms achieved by 
these acts were the abolition of tithes and customary and copyhold leaseholds, the 
introduction of land registration and further measures to simplify the transfer of 
land (Holdsworth, 1927, 319). 
Thompson (1963, 337) suggests that the land sales which took place in the early 
1920s were not as dramatic as they appeared. In fact much land that was sold 
consisted of outlying estates. Those landowners who retained their estates were 
probably in a stronger position in the inter-war period than they had been before. 
Many landowners emerged from this land crisis with rationalised estates and more 
diversified income sources. However, the general economic depression of the 1930s 
led to further falling incomes and was followed by another spate of estate sales 
after the Second World War. 
2.3.1 Summary 
This analysis of the causes of the decline of the landed interest and the processes by 
which it was achieved, rais~ some significant points about the relationship between 
landowners and the rest of society, and the nature of change in landownership 
structures. The power of the landed elite in the 19th century was based on social, 
economic and political factors. It is important to distinguish between these sources 
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of power since, although interrelated, they played different roles in the decline of 
the landed elite. It was the economic power base which was first undermined, with 
the relative decline of agriculture in comparison to other sectors of the economy, 
and which is generally attributed to be the root cause of the decline. 
However, economic change was not enough to undermine the power of the landed 
elite at once, because of their control of the political and legal order, and the social 
importance of landownership. There was, therefore, a time lag between the actual 
cause of change and its effect. Many reforms had to be carried out before the social 
and political power of the landed elite was also undermined. Another factor in the 
time lag between cause and effect was the acquiescence, and even participation, 
of the landed elite in their own demise. This enabled them to retain some control 
over the nature and pace of reform. 
It is important to be aware of the difference between ascribed cause and actual 
cause in the decline of the landed elite. The actual cause was economic, but has 
been popularly ascribed to political action. Both explanations are necessary to the 
analysis, however, for while politics was not the root cause of the decline of the 
landed interest, it was a powerful and necessary catalyst in this decline. It is also 
important to note how slow landownership structures are to react to social and 
economic changes. A widespread change in the landownership structure did not 
take place until landowners had relinquished their hegemonic political influence. 
Part of the reason for this was the barrier to the land market of strict settlements. 
Reforms of the land law were required to free the land market and enable change 
to take place. 
The question of the decline of the landed interest is, therefore, very complex. 
Change in the external structure of landownership followed changes in landed in-
fluence. It can be observed that the economy, society and the political and le-
gal order changed at different rates. The political and legal order lagged behind 
economic and social change, and could only be reformed once they had become 
generally recognised as unworkable. The decline of the landed interest was not an 
even process. It can be seen as periods of gradual change interrupted by shorter 
periods of rapid change. 
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~.4 Changes in Landownership Post 1945 
World War Two marks a turning point in this discussion of landownership and 
its position in society. The discussion of the post-war period is carried out in a 
very different context to the preceding account of the pre-war period. Agricul-
ture has been transformed into a thriving industry through the intensification of 
production. Agricultural policy in the post-war period has been a major factor in 
the capitalisation of the industry, and has played an important role in changing 
the landownership structure. This section will look at the emergent pattern of 
landownership in the post-war period, and will examine the causes behind the 
development of new forms of landownership and the processes by which these 
changes have taken place. The question will also be asked: do landowners exert 
any political, social or economic influence on British society today and, if so, what 
form does this take? 
Today 90% of the agricultural land area of Britain is still privately owned, com-
pared to 95% in 1873 (see Table 2.4), but, in contrast to the 19th century, the 
owner-occupied farm rather than the landed estate is the dominant model of 
private ownership. Between 1914 and 1960, the percentage of agricultural land 
owner-occupied as opposed to rented rose from 12% to over 50% (see Table 2.5). 
Landowners~p by government agencies has increased and now, together with tra-
ditional landowning institutions, accounts for 8.5% of the total agricultural area. 
In 1978, 1.2% of the agricultural area was owned by financial institutions, one of 
the newest and most controversial forms of landownership to have emerged in the 
post-war period. Although copyhold and customary land tenures were abolished 
under the 1925 Property Acts, common lands have been protected by legislation 
since the late 19th century [27]. It is estimated that there are 600,000 hectares of 
common land remaining in England and Wales (Aitchison, 1987). 
Because of the dearth of statistics relating specifically to landownership (see Ap-
pendix A), the contemporary structure oflandownership can only be inferred from 
MAFF data relating to land holdings, sales, and purchases, on income data from 
the Inland Revenue, and from one-off surveys. Figure 2.3 shows the distribution 
of farm holdings by size in England, Wales and Scotland. It can be observed that 
the majority of farm holdings are less than 200 hectares in size, but it is significant 
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Table 2.4- Agricultural Landownership in Great Britain, 1978 
Category of Landowner Area• Owned %of Total 
- (million hect.ares) -
Public, smni-public & tradi tiona! institutions 1.5 8.5 
Financial ins tit u tious 0.2 1.2 
Private individuals, COlllJHLUiml & trusts 16.0 !)0.3 
All owncrH 17.7 100.0 
Source: Northfield (1979, 63) 
Table 2.5 - Agricultural Land Tenure in Great Britain, 1908 to 1985 
- Rented/Mainly Rcuted - Owned/Mainly Owned -
Year %Area %Holdings %Area %Holdings 
1908 88 88 12 12 
Hl22 ·82 86 18 14 
1950 62 GO 38 40 
1960 51 46 49 54 
1!)70 45 42 55 58 
1977 44 37 56 63 
198() 39 30 61 70 
Sources: MAFF (1966, 1978, 1985) [27a] 
to note that holdings of over 700 hectares are recorded, particularly in Scotland. 
Although inferences about ownership based on holdings data should be made with 
utmost caution, it would appear that the holdings figures underestimate the size of 
the landownership structure. This inference is supported by an independent sur-
vey of landownership in Scotland, which found that 140 individuals and companies 
own almost half the land area of the Highlands, and just 56 own 33% (MacEwan, 
1975). 
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Figure 2.3 - Distribution of Holdings by Size in the UK, 1985 
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Source: MAFF: Agricultural Statistics, 1985. 
Not only would it appear that the landed estate has survived, but it also seems that 
land is still a considerable source of private wealth. Table 2.6 shows the distribution 
of wealth by assets in 1975. 27% of people in the highest wealth category, with 
assets worth more than £200,000, are landowners. Since land forms only 6% of 
the total private assets, it can be seen that landownership is still an exclusive form 
of property ownership. This raises the question whether change in the structure 
of landownership has been as significant as is popularly believed? The following 
section looks in more depth at the different forms of landownership. 
2.4.1 Owner-Occupation 
Owner-occupation as a landownership form has expanded in response to both neg-
ative and positive factors. In the early 20th century expansion took place largely 
through the break-up of landed estates. Because of the depression in the land 
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Table 2.6- Landownership by Private Individuals, 1975 
Range of Percentage held No of Holders Percentage held No of Holders 
Wealth (£) in each group ('OOOs) in each group ('OOOs) 
> 200,000 27.4 13 6.4 29 
100,000 - 200,000 19.4 25 5.8 69 
50,000 - 100,000 23.7 53 9.6 252 
20,000 - 50,000 20.4 106 22.0 1,412 
< 20,000 9.0 164 56.2 19,259 
(Bets e. d. on. evlclence prc.se.nt.ecl b~ \:::he. Tre.c:>..SI.A~ to l;h e N octh.~··eLcl 
Com,....i.~t.ee.; i"c.\~.<des v..rbctn tc.~d o..s we..LL 'l.S ~n:e-..~.lb.Arc..L) 
Source: Northfield (1979, 58) 
market at that time, many landlords sold to sitting tenants. This was, therefore, 
a negative response to economic circumstances. Since 1945, two other negative 
factors have contributed to the expansion of owner-occupation. 
Taxation has encouraged owner-occupation at the expense of tenanted land. Post-
war fiscal policy has differentiated between working farmers and landlords. Estate 
duty allowed all landowners (whether farmers or landowners) a tax rebate of 45% 
on agricultural land and property, but the rebate for landlords was withdrawn by 
the introduction of Capital Transfer Tax ( CTT) in 197 4. Capital Gains Tax ( CGT) 
was introduced in 1962 (Northfield, 1979, 71 ). Again, working farmers are eligible 
to a tax rebate of 50%, but landlords are liable to the full amount. Landlords have 
sought a variety of ways to minimise their tax liabilities. Many landlords have 
reduced their tenanted land holdings by either selling land, or taking it in hand as 
tenancies fall vacant (Northfield, 1979, 73). 
Landlords have also reacted against landlord-tenant legislation. Since the 1875 
Agricultural Holdings Act, a series of Agricultural Holdings Acts have increased 
the rights of the tenant against the landlord, culminating in the 1976 Act which 
guaranteed tenants security of tenure for three generations (Marsden, 1986, 135) 
[28). As a policy to help tenants, it has completely misfired. Landlords, fearful of 
53 
being unable to evict troublesome tenants and of becoming liable to huge compen-
sation claims, have again either sold land or taken farm holdings in hand as they 
fall vacant {ibid., 1979, 223). 
Figure 2.4- Land Prices in Great Britain, 1983 
Price per ha (1000£s) 
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The price differential between tenanted and vacant possession land in the market 
has also led to a reduction in the tenanted sector. The lower value of tenanted land 
reflects its perceived disadvantages. The difference in price is known as the 'vacant 
possession premium' (see Figure 2.4). To a large extent, therefore, the expansion 
in owner-occupation has been due to the government policies which have been 
directed against private landlords. It is significant to note in this context that 
much of the expansion in owner-occupation has been due to landlords taking land -
in hand. 
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The one factor which has positively encouraged the expansion of owner-occupation 
has been agricultural policy. Post-war agricultural policy has shown a strong 
ideological commitment to owner-occupation, and many policies have aimed at the 
expansion of this ownership form (Marsden et al., 1986a). Since 1945, credit for 
farmers has become more readily available, and many farm improvement schemes 
have enabled farmers to equip and modernise their holdings (see 3.4.1). There is 
no doubt that many owner-occupiers would not have been able to enter the land 
market without the intervention of the State. 
2.4.2 Landed Estates 
The landed estate (under private and traditional institutional ownership) has sur-
vived as a significant landownership category, but not without changes in its inter-
nal and external form. Many of the trends in landed estates have been a response 
to the same factors which have encouraged owner-occupation. Massey and Cata-
lano (1978) argue that there has been a trend towards taking land in hand, an 
increase in private forestry, (both of which can be seen as tax avoidance measures) 
and a more commercial attitude to the management of urban property. 
Tax avoidance has become a full-time occupation with private landlords (Harrison, 
1981, 153) and several new legal forms of ownership have been devised in an at-
tempt to minimise tax liability. The general trend in the redefinition of traditional 
landownership is for greater flexibility and informality: 
"as the legal regime becomes more rigid, so the forms of ownership will become 
more informal" (Harrison, 1981, 129). 
The result is more of an external redefinition of private landownership than the 
emergence of a new group of landowners. Trust ownership has been the most 
widespread response and a whole variety of trust forms have been devised {Har-
rison, 1981, 114) [29]. A trust enables the family to remain in possession of the 
estate without owning the legal title to it. For instance, the landlord may occupy 
the estate as a life tenant and one of the trustees may be a member of the family. 
It is estimated that at least 35% of the agricultural area is held in trust owner-
ship, and that 70% of estates over 405 hectares are trusts (ibid., 1981, 118). The 
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expansion of trust ownership is another way in which the true extent of landed 
estates is obscured. 
To avoid the strictures of formal tenancy agreements, both traditional landlords 
and financial institutions have also looked towards less formal forms of land oc-
cupancy. Agricultural licences have become a popular alternative. As long as the 
licence is for less than one year the licensee can claim no legal security in the land. 
The tenant must depend on the goodwill of the landlord for his security, but con-
versely the landlord benefits from having someone else farm his land. The land 
also retains its vacant possession premium (Harrison, 1981, 202). 
2.4.3 Public Landownership 
Public landownership is the most direct expression of public control over land. The 
expansion of public ownership of land began at the turn of the 20th century (Gibbs 
& Harrison, 1973). The government has had two main aims in assuming direct 
control of land. First, it has been a response to the need to expand and control 
vital national resources such as timber and water. For instance, the Forestry 
Commission was established in 1919, following the First World War which had 
exposed the vulnerability of Britain's timber supplies (Stamp, 1962, 174). Second, 
as in the case of coal, nationalisation was necessary because of the inefficiencies 
caused by private ownership. The private ownership of coal was thought to greatly 
add to the expense and trouble of coal-mining [30). 
Table 2. 7 shows the extent of landholdings by public bodies whilst Table 2.8 shows 
landownership by traditional (semi-public) institutions (the traditional institu-
tional estates fall between the public landownership category and the landed estate 
one). The largest public landowner is the Forestry Commission, with almost one 
and a quarter million hectares of land, mostly in Scotland. Of the traditional insti-
tutions, the Crown has the largest agricultural estate, followed by the universities 
and colleges and then the Church Commissioners. The three main government 
agencies owning land are the Ministry of Transport (375,000 hectares), the Min-
istry of Defence (237,240 hectares), and the Water Authorities (231,495 hectares). 
The county councils also own a considerable estate (155,186 hectares). An impor-
tant function of public landownership earlier in the century was the provision of 
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Table 2. 7 - Landownership by Public Bodies in Great Britain 
LANDOWNER (Date) AREA (hectares) 
FORESTRY COMMISSION (total holdings, 1986) 1,165,590 
England 285,685 
Wales 147,751 
Scotland 732,154 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (total holdings, 1971) 855,486 
Ministry of Defence 237,240 
Ministry of Transport 375,000 
Department of Trade & Industry 2,636.6 
MAFF 12,264.5 
OAFS 186,680, 
COUNTY COUNCILS (smallholdings, 1976) 365,000 
NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES (total holdings, 1971) 448,996 
British Airports Authority• 2,524 
British Rail 91,666 
British Water Board* 5,416 
National Coal Board • 111,742 
Water Authorities• 231,495 
Central Electricity Generating Board 1,916 
British Gas• 4,237 
RESEARCH COUNCILS (1971) 7,546 
NATURE CONSERVANCY COUNCIL (total holdings, 1980) 33,333 
England 7,368 
Wales 1,878 
Scotland 24,087 
* indicates that this industry has been privatised since the survey was carried out. 
Source: Gibbs & Harrison (1973); Forestry Commission (1985/86); Nature Con-
servancy Council (1979/80); Hodge (1988). 
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Table 2.8- Landownership by Semi-Public Bodies 
LANDOWNER (Date) AREA (hectares) 
THE CROWN (total holdings, 1986) 139,750 
England 71,589 
Wales 363 
Scotland 39,882 
Unenclosed Waste 27,916 
CHURCH COMMISSIONERS (1971) 6,875 
UNIVERSITIES & COLLEGES (1971) 86,555 
NATIONAL TRUST (England & Wales, 1976) 71,371 
NATIONAL TRUST FOR SCOTLAND (1976) 15,690 
Source: Gibbs & Harrison (1973); Crown Commissioners (1985/86); National Trust 
(1976). 
smallholdings by county councils [31]. The aim of these smallholdings was to pro-
vide an entry into the farming industry for young farmers (Northfield, 1979, 190), 
but in recent years most local authority holdings have been sold off (Hodge, 1988). 
Indeed, public landownership is the landownership form most susceptible to gov-
ernment policy. The last ten years have seen a diminution in the extent of public 
landownership because of the change in government policy. The British Airports 
Authority, National Coal Board and recently the Water Authorities have been 
privatised, whilst privatisation of the CEGB is imminent at the time of writing. 
2.4.4 Financial Institutions 
Financial institutions have aroused the most interest of all the new landowners 
(Munton, 1976; Newby et al., 1978; Whatmore, 1986). The financial institutions 
which have been looking to enter the land market are pension funds, property unit 
trusts and life assurance companies. Financial institutions have had an interest 
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in the land market for some time as providers of credit or mortgages, but only 
recently have they taken on the role of landowners (Massey & Catalano, 1978, 
123). Their venture into landownership followed the rapid inflation in land values 
in the early 1970s, when land became a profitable long-term investment. These 
institutions have concentrated their activities in the agriculturally most profitable 
areas of the country. Between 1972 and 1974, they spent 83% of their money in 
East Anglia and the mid-south of England (Munton, 1976). Financial institutions 
have also invested on a smaller scale in commercial forestry. Although the growth 
of this form of ownership has been seen as a return to the landlord-tenant system 
of farming (Massey & Catalano, 1978, 140), financial institutions have introduced 
more flexible forms of tenancy, such as the sale and leaseback arrangement, where 
the institution buys land from a farmer and allows him to remain in occupation 
whilst he buys back the land over a period of time (Northfield, 1979, 126). 
4.5 Common Land 
Because of the peculiar nature of common land rights and the legislation by which 
common land has been protected since the late 19th century, there has been little 
change in the extent of this form of landed control. However, by the mid-20th 
century many commons, particularly those around metropolitan areas had fallen 
into disuse. In 1955, a royal commission was held into common land, with the 
intention of reassessing the role of this land resource in 20th century Britain [31). 
The first recommendation of the royal commission was to carry out a registration 
of the extent, ownership and other common rights of all the commons in England 
and Wales, as a preliminary to drawing up new legislation as to the use and 
management of these lands. The Commons Registration Act was passed in 1965, 
and the registers are still being finalised. The next stage is in progress at present 
with the Common Land Forum (see 7.4). 
4.6 Summary 
It would appear from this brief overview of landownership forms in the post-war 
period that the structure has diversified rather than undergone a complete trans-
formation, although trends identified from official statistics should be treated with 
caution. Changes in the structure of landownership are far more complex than 
official statistics suggest. The growth of owner-occupation began as a response to 
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economic forces, but has since continued due to government policy. Indeed, gov· 
ernment policy has been a major cause of change in the national landownership 
structure, not only in the expansion of public landownership, but also in precipi· 
tating new legal forms of trust ownership. Only the entry of financial institutions 
into the land market appears to be a pure response to market forces. Although 
this is perceived to be a significant change in the structure of landownership, as yet 
the extent of financial landownership is limited and it is difficult to draw definite 
conclusions. Moreover, the low annual turnover of land (about 2%) means that 
trends are slow to emerge (Munton, 1976) . 
. 5 A Structuralist Interpretation 
The processes underlying these changes in the post· war structure of landownership 
have been analysed within a political economy theoretical framework (Massey & 
Catalano, 1978; Marsden et al., 1986a; Whatmore, 1986). According to political 
economy theory, land is an essential prerequisite for any economic activity, but in 
agriculture land is an integral part of the means of production. Whilst changes 
in the methods of agricultural production and the landownership structure can 
be seen as a response to capitalism, agriculture and private landownership do not 
fit easily into the capitalist formation. Firstly, when land is rented the owner 
does not create surplus value himself but appropriates a part of the profits merely 
from his position as owner. Rent is therefore a redistribution of surplus value, 
and the fact that landlords may earn their income from rents distinguishes them 
from other property owners in capitalist society. Secondly, the organisation of 
capitalist society is based upon an ever increasing centralisation of capital and 
concentration of ownership. Land presents a barrier to this process, since land is 
always owned in a fixed geographical location. Political economy theory therefore 
interprets changes within methods of agricultural production and the structure 
of landownership as a response to the attempts by capital to overcome the bar· 
riers posed by landownership to the centralisation and accumulation of capital. 
Whatmore (1986) identifies three ways in which landownership has changed in 
response to capitalism in the post World War Two period. First, the natural 
differentials of land quality have been reduced through the industrialisation of 
agriculture, with massive injections of capital into the land. This process has been 
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aided by agricultural policy. It can be seen as a way of minimising the importance of 
land as a factor of production. Second, owner-occupation can be seen as a response 
to the contradictions posed by rent, since the owner-occupier is both owner and 
producer. He is, therefore, a capitalist rather than a rentier. Third, the barrier 
to the concentration of capital posed by landownership is being overcome by the 
capitalisation of higher stages in the food chain. Large agribusinesses are gradually 
taking over the processing and marketing stages of the production process, and 
thereby reducing the autonomy of the farmer (Marsden et al., 1987). 
Massey and Catalano (1978) agree that the underlying process of change is cap-
italism, but argue that different groups of landowners have reacted in different 
ways: 
"all forms of landownership will have effects on the process of accumulation, 
but the nature of these effects will vary with the specific form of landownership 
and the associated forms of rent" (Massey & Catalano, 1978, 52). 
They classify landowners into three groups based on their relation to capitalist 
society: former landed property, industrial landowners and financial landowners. 
Former landed property includes the traditional privately owned and institutional 
landed estates. The changes in the nature of this group, noted above (2.4.2), can 
be considered as adaptations to the capitalist system rather than products of the 
system: 
''the overwhelmingly dominant characteristic of this group and the basis on 
which its other economic activities depend and are designed, is the ownership 
of land" (Massey & Catalano, 1978, 78). 
The industrial landownership group includes those landowners who derive their 
income directly from the land, i.e. owner-occupiers (tenant farmers could also 
be placed in this group). The main features of owner-occupation are: a high 
level of capital inputs in the land, small farm sizes (although holding sizes are 
gradually increasing) and an absence of other external sources of capital. The 
main advantages of owner-occupation to the capitalist system are, therefore, the 
greater willingness and ability of owner-occupiers to invest capital in their land 
in comparison to tenant farmers, the fact that they are direct producers, and the 
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flexibility a small farmer has to respond to market forces. Most owner-occupiers 
use family labour and so have low labour costs. 
Owner-occupiers are, however, by no means a homogeneous group, and the na-
ture of owner-occupied farming is constantly changing. Marsden and his associates 
(1987) identify several recent changes in the structure of family farming which they 
ascribe to the capitalist process. They suggest a four-fold classification of family 
farms based on the degree of capitalisation on the farm and ties with outside cap-
itals (such as credit institutions and agribusiness companies). The first category, 
the marginal closed unit, includes the traditional family farm, where capital costs 
are minimal and links with outside capital few or non-existent. Generally, these 
farmers pursue a 'survival strategy' in order to maintain economic viability. The 
second category, the transitional dependent unit, refers to farms where the farmer 
has developed some outside financial ties and where his independence of decision-
making begins to be 'subsumed' by outside financial obligations. These farmers 
also operate on the margin of economic viability, but are taking positive action 
to improve their position, often through off-the-farm diversification. The third 
category, the integrated unit, includes family farms which have built up complex 
business ties with outside capitals and are expanding. These farmers follow an 
accumulation strategy on the farm and may also be developing off-farm sources of 
capital. Finally the subsumed unit represents the extreme situation where family 
ownership has given way to corporate ownership and management. This is the 
most capitalist form of family farm. 
The third category, the financial institutions, are seen by both Massey and Cata-
lano (1~78) and Whatmore (1986) as the most recent phase in the capitalisation 
of agriculture. These institutions buy land not for its short-term agricultural yield 
but for its long-term financial returns. They thus represent a fusion of landed with 
banking capital (Harvey, 1982, 367). 
The emergence of owner-occ~pation in the post-war period has, therefore, been 
a response to the capitalist process, but also to the intervention of the State. 
The combination of State intervention and the contradictions posed by land to 
capitalist society have had some unforeseen and undesirable consequences, which 
now threaten the future of this landownership form. 
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Figure 2.5 - UK Land Values 
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One of the major effects has been an inflationary rise in land values. Figure 2.5 
shows the trend of land values from 1790 to 1980. Land has always fluctuated in 
value, but until 1940 land values fluctuated around a average value of about £60 a 
hectare. Since the 1940s, and particularly since 1970, land values have rocketed to 
an average, in 1978, of over £2,000 per hectare. During the 1970s, land values rose 
faster than the rate of inflation (Northfield, 1979, 92). Munton (1976) attributes 
the escalation of land values to two main factors. First, land was seen to be a 
safe long-term investment at a time when other sectors of the economy looked 
unstable. At the time there was general optimism in the agricultural industry. 
Second, landowners selling land on the urban fringe for development were entitled 
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to 'roll-over' tax relief, providing the money was reinvested in agricultural land 
within a certain time period. Thus demand for agricultural land suddenly rose, 
but the supply remained constant and land values spiralled upwards. Despite the 
high value of land it continues to remain a price-inelastic commodity. High land 
values have not led to any upsurge in the land market. Financial institutions have 
been popularly blamed for this inflation, but it seems more likely that the entry 
of financial institutions into the land market is a symptom rather than a cause of 
the rising value of land (Munton, 1976). 
Although the inflation of land values has increased the wealth of farmers on paper, 
land values now bear no relation to the agricultural productivity of the land or 
to farm incomes (see Table 2.9). The discrepancy has grown even greater in the 
1970s and 1980s. It means that owner-occupiers can no longer afford to buy land 
to expand their holdings, and the number of young people entering the farming 
industry is very low. Many owner-occupiers now face serious debts, having over-
borrowed when prospects looked brighter. 
2.5.1 Summary 
What can be concluded from this discussion of landownership in the post World 
War Two period? At an empirical level, it has been observed that the structure of 
landownership has diversified but has not been transformed. Many of the changes 
have been adaptations of existing landownership forms. Change in landownership 
structures takes place on two levels: internal adaptation and external change. 
Landownership forms may adapt internally whilst retaining the same external form. 
Conversely, landownership structures may alter externally whilst the internal form 
remains unchanged. Both these forms of change show why official statistics may be 
misleading as indicators of trends in landownership. The discussion has indicated 
that, although broad landownership groups can be identified, there is much internal 
variation within each group. Furthermore, different forms of landownership will 
respond in different ways to the same external influences. Thus, while it is possible 
to generalise about the forces causing change and to generalise about new forms of 
ownership at the national level, in reality, at the local level change is much more 
complex and geographically uneven. 
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Table 2.9 - Index of Farm Incomes & Land Values, 1937 to 1966 
Year Index of Vacant Po cession 
- Farm Income £/hectare Index 
1937 - 9 - 13 34 
1940- 2 - 17 46 
1943- 5 - 23 60 
1946 - - -
1947 63 34 91 
1948 74 - -
1949 96 - -
1950 101 40 106 
1951 89 - -
1952 108 40 106 
1953 111 35 92 
1954 110 35 95 
1955 100 38 100 
1956 112 36 97 
1957 109 35 93 
1958 120 39 104 
1959 106 46 122 
1960 116 55 147 
1961 126 55 147 
1962 136 58 155 
1963 144 70 187 
1964 130 93 249 
1965 152 100 265 
1966 149 103 273 
Index bwed on 1955 values 
Source: Clayton, Harrison & Hill (1967, 7) 
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Tenanted -
£/hectare Index 
10 47 
12 57 
13 65 
- -
18 86 
- -
- -
19 94 
- -
18 90 
17 84 
18 90 
20 100 
20 98 
17 82 
22 108 
28 139 
28 137 
34 165 
32 157 
41 200 
52 257 
63 306 
64 314 
Explanation of the processes underlying post-war landownership change from a 
political economy perspective, reveals that change has been induced by a combi-
nation of capitalism and State intervention. There has been a strong ideological 
commitment to the owner-occupier. As a result of market forces and government 
policy, much capital has been invested in agriculture and land values have soared, 
which in turn have induced further changes in the structure of landownership. 
Despite legal reforms which have removed barriers to the transfer of land, land 
still remains a price-inelastic commodity and changes in landownership are slow 
to emerge. 
Political economy theory enables changes in the structure of landownership to be 
related to the wider economy, and provides a theoretical explanation of change 
over time. It provides a macro-level framework, but has limited explanatory value 
for changes on a micro-scale. 
So far, the discussion has focussed on landownership structures without mention 
of landed influence. The next section will consider whether landowners exert an 
influence on national politics today and, if so, what form this influence takes. 
Landed Power in the 20th Century? 
The Farming Lobby 
With the democratisation of local and national politics, the decline of agriculture 
as the major economic sector of the economy, the urbanisation of the population 
and the break-up of so many landed estates, landowners are no longer able to exert 
such a strong or direct political influence as they did in the 19th century. Critical 
analyses of rural society and land use politics (Cox et al.; Lowe et al., 1986; Sho.rd, 
A. 
1987) suggest that, whilst landowners have certainly lost their hegemonic position 
in urban and industrial issues, they still exert a powerful, if less direct, influence 
in rural areas. This power, it is claimed, is asserted at local and national level 
through the control of the formulation and implementation of land use policies. 
Nowhere is this power more evident than in the formulation of agricultural policy 
(Self & Storing, 1962; Cox et al., 1986). Agriculture is the only industry to 
have its own government department (MAFF), and MAFF is the only ministry in 
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which lobby groups have such a direct role in policy-formulation (Cox et al., 1986, 
189). Moreover, the agricultural industry receives more government funding than 
any other state-supported industry (Boddy, 1982, 1) and yet farmers are subject 
to only minimal controls over their actions. Agriculture and forestry also enjoy 
privileged positions in relation to local rating and planning controls compared to 
other land uses. 
In order to understand how the agricultural lobby obtained and maintains its 
powerful position, it is necessary to look at the actions of their two main lobby 
groups: the National Farmers Union (NFU) and the Country Landowners Asso-
ciation (CLA). Both groups were founded at the beginning of the 20th century, 
the NFU in 1908 and the CLA in 1907. Today, the NFU is the larger and more 
powerful group with 140,000 members, the CLA having 50,000 members (Lowe et 
al., 1986). The membership and political affiliations of the two groups differ. The 
NFU traditionally represents working farmers, whilst the CLA represents the more 
traditional landowning interest, but there is some overlap in the membership of 
the two groups. Scotland has always had its separate organisations (the Scottish 
Farmers' Union and the Scottish Landowners' Association), whilst Welsh farmers 
broke away from the NFU in the 1950s to form their own Un.~ort .• In 1982, a Tenant 
Farmers' Association was formed (Marsden, 1986, 140), but none of these smaller 
groups pose a real threat to the NFU and CLA. 
Ll\.~~.t.~c.e. 
These two groups exercise o. co~ide.r~lc.. i\ over the formulation of agricultural 
policy (Cox et al., 1986, 181). They have a statutory right (enshrined in the 
194 7 Agriculture Act) to advise government, especially in the annual price review 
(ibid., 184). The relationship between MAFF and the agricultural lobby has var-
, corpeor~b~"' • 
iously been described asA.'sym6iotic', a 'closed policy community' and 'clientelism' 
(ibid., 184). Although the power of the agricultural lobby is most directly seen in 
its relationship with MAFF, it has also infiltrated other institutions such as the 
European Community, local government, parliament and the mass media (Lowe 
et al., 1986, 88). Massey and Catalano (1978) found that the CLA has close links 
with the House of Lords, and that financial institutions have powerful interests in 
the House of Commons. 
The continuing influence of the NFU and CLA depends upon their maintaining 
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the support of their members and their being able to present a unified front on 
policy issues. Although it might be expected that the interests of the CLA and the 
NFU would differ on certain issues, in practice conflict has rarely surfaced. The 
unified front which the agricultural lobby has managed to preserve has depended 
upon satisfying the diversity of interests that it represents. This has largely been 
possible through an efficient and active organisation. Both the CLA and NFU 
have county branches which offer free advice and support to their members. 
It can be concluded that a 'landed interest' has been replaced by an 'agricultural 
interest', consisting of both farmers and landowners. The power of the agricul-
tural influence is more narrowly based than that of the landed interest in the 19th 
century, and the exercise of power has changed from informal patronage to formal 
political lobbying. The influence of farmers and landowners on contemporary rural 
society at local level will be considered in the following chapter, but Newby and his 
colleagues (1978) found that farmers in East Anglia occupied a disproportionate 
number of positions on the local councils, especially 'key' decision-making posi-
tions. They concluded that, whilst the external form of local control had changed, 
its nature had not: 
"there has been a slow but progressive shift in the mode of authority of the 
traditional rural elite from that arising out of tradition and custom towards 
that vested in formal office" (Newby et al., 1978, 226). 
The same could be said, in relation to rural politics at least, of the influence of 
farmers and landowners on national politics. 
2.6.2 The Environmental Lobby 
An important explanation for the success of the agricultural lobby has been the 
absence of any effective opposition group. The main opposition to the farming 
lobby in rural areas is the environmental lobby. In contrast to the agricultural 
lobby, this is an 'open' policy community, has no direct representation in parlia-
ment and has suffered from a lack of financial resources. Recently, however, the 
strength of the environmental lobby has grown and is now seen as a real threat by 
the agricultural interest. 
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There are several reasons for the recent gains in the strength of the environmental 
lobby. The agricultural surpluses of the 1980s have attracted public and me-
dia attention to the environmentally destructive practices of the farming industry 
(Waller, 1986, 51). The media in particular have been sympathetic to the environ-
mental cause and have given it much publicity (North, 1987). In addition, recent 
efforts to co-ordinate and integrate public intervention measures in the countryside 
(see 3.4.4) have exposed the power and organisational self-interest of the agricul-
tural policy community (Cox et al., 1986, 181). There is now increasing pressure 
to widen the basis of decision-making in rural areas. 
Perhaps the most serious threat to the power of the agricultural lobby are the divi-
sions which have begun to appear amongst their members. There is, for instance, 
a growing divide between 'corn' and 'horn' (arable versus livestock interests), as il-
lustrated by the furore over the sudden imposition of milk quotas in 1984 (Browne, 
1985). 
How has the agricultural interest responded to these threats? Cox and his col-
leagues (1986) argue that it has been seen to make concessions on many of the 
issues demanded by the environmentalists in order to control the way these con-
cessions are implemented, and to protect two fundamental rights which it certainly 
does not wish to lose: the autonomy of MAFF in formulating agricultural policy, 
and the autonomy of the farmer in making production and land use decisions. 
This strategy is remarkably reminiscent of the way landowners in the 19th century 
presided over their own demise (see 2.3). 
What concessions has the farming interest made to the environmental lobby? The 
CLA has been the more willing of the two groups to embrace conservation issues, 
but only those which exclude the public (Newby et al., 1978, 241). It has played 
on the ideology of stewardship, claiming that some of the most beautiful parts of 
the countryside have been preserved by the care of landlords. Much of the CLA's 
involvement in conservation is for reasons of self-interest (Lowe et al., 1986, 105). 
For instance, landowners justify the continuation of game shooting on the basis that 
it conserves the landscape. The annual Game Fair, instituted by the CLA in 1958, 
has been highly successful in promulgating the conservation ethic. Landowners 
have tended to ally themselves to those conservation groups which wish to exclude 
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the public from the countryside, such as the RSPB and the NCC. The NFU has 
also made concessions to the conservation interest but none of these concessions 
is enforceable. Most take the form of advice (on environmentally sound practices) 
and voluntary schemes (see 3.4.4). 
One of the most serious threats which the environmental lobby poses for the agri-
cultural interest is their campaign for greater public access to the countryside. It is 
perceived by the agricultural interest as a direct infringement of private rights, and 
r-
by the environmental interest as a fundamental public right (Shoad, 1987, 537). 
A 
On this question, as will be illustrated later, the farming interest is ill-prepared to 
make concessions. 
7 Continuity or Change? 
This chapter has looked at the structure of landownership in the 19th century and 
the political, social and economic influence of landowners at the national level; and 
the processes by which the structure and influence of landownership has changed 
over the 19th and 20th centuries. Several important points have emerged from this 
analysis. 
The structure of landownership is related to the influence of landowners at national 
level. In the 19th century, Britain was dominated by a landed elite. Its influence 
was based on the ownership of land, its control of the nation's land and mineral 
resources gave it economic power. Its influence was also based on the social status 
attached to the ownership of land, and its control of all the major political insti-
tutions of British society. The dominance of the landed elite was legitimised by 
the legal and political order. It was possible because, at the beginning of the 19th 
century, Britain was still a predominantly rural, agricultural society. The majority 
of the population were dependent in some way upon the land. Agriculture was the 
most powerful source of wealth in the country. 
The relationship between landed influence and the landownership structure is also 
apparent in the simultaneous decline of the power of the landed influence and the 
break-up of the great landed estates at the beginning of the 20th century. The 
dominance of the landed elite was undermined by economic, social and political 
events. Two factors should be recognised in a consideration of the decline of the 
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landed interest. First, there was a time lag between the causes of change and 
their realisation. Second, because of the time lag between cause and effect there 
are two levels of explanation: ascribed cause and actual cause, both of which are 
important. The root cause of the decline of the landed interest was economic, but 
politics was an important catalyst of change. 
The effects of economic restructuring on landed power were delayed by several 
factors. First, the general economic boom of the mid-19th century delayed the 
impact of the repeal of the Corn Laws on the British agricultural market. It was 
not until the agricultural depression of the late 19th century that the impact was 
brought home. Second, land retained a social value long after its economic value 
had declined, so that the acquisition of a landed estate remained the aspiration of 
those with new wealth, hoping to achieve social and political distinction. Third, 
because landed power was protected by the political and legal order, political and 
legal reforms were needed to achieve change. In particular, the protection of landed 
estates afforded by the land law acted as a barrier against land sales. Legal reform 
was needed to open up the land market. Finally, the fact that the landed elite 
themselves co-operated in and even instigated many of these political and legal 
reforms, enabled them to retain control over the nature and pace of change, unlike 
many of their European counterparts. 
The factors popularly ascribed to the decline of the landed interest: the anti-land 
movements, and the People's Budget, should be seen more as catalysts of change 
than causes of change. The First World War was also a catalyst of change, not 
only in landownership but in British society as a whole. Between the First and 
Second World Wars many landed estates were broken up. Further long overdue 
reforms of the land law were effected by the 1925 Property Acts. 
The Second World War also marked another turning point, with the establishment 
of a new social, economic and political order. Britain is now an urban, industrial, 
and supposedly democratic state. New forms of landownership have emerged in the 
post-war period. Owner-occupation is now the dominant form of ownership, but 
recently financial institutions have entered the land market. Public landownership 
serves a specific purpose and, while an important new form of ownership, is not 
likely to expand. Change in the post-war period can be explained at two levels. 
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At an empirical level, the changing structure of landownership can be ascribed 
to the market and State policy. Agriculture has become a thriving industry, and 
the effect, intended or unintended, of State policy and legislation has been to 
encourage owner-occupation and discourage the rented sector. The appearance 
of financial institutions is attributed to rising land values, which make land and 
property attractive investment propositions. Trends in landownership are slow to 
emerge, however, because of the low annual turnover of land. There is still a time 
lag between cause and effect in landownership change. 
On a theoretical level, the emergence of owner-occupation and financial landowner-
ship can be seen as the progress of capitalism [33]. They are forms oflandownership 
more amenable to the centralisation and accumulation of capital, but because of 
the contradictory position oflandownership within a marxist interpretation of cap-
italist society, and the intervention of the State in market forces, owner-occupation 
as a landownership form is facing many economic pressures and must change to 
survive. Already, internal change within this ownership form is taking place. Fi-
nancial landownership is seen the a ownership form most amenable to capitalist 
society. 
Despite the emphasis on change, a high degree of continuity is evident in the 
landownership structure of Britain. Many landed estates have survived, although 
their true extent is disguised by the widespread adoption of a trust ownership 
form and the taking of tenanted land in hand. Landed estates have adapted 
internally and externally to survive against external pressures. Thus, although the 
landownership structure has diversified, it has not changed out of all recognition. 
The contemporary political influence of landownership is harder to establish. Cer-
tainly, the hegemonic political power of the landed elite in the 19th century has 
gone. However, in a more narrow sphere, landowners still exert a large degree of 
power, albeit in different form to the 19th century. An agricultural rather than 
a landed interest can be identified, which effectively controls the formulation of 
agricultural policy and the nature of rural land use politics. Its power is based 
on an organised political lobby which has close links with the government. This 
power until recently has been unquestioned, but in the last few years questions 
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about the role of agriculture in rural development and the growing power of an 
environmental lobby have challenged the agricultural interest. 
What factors can be identified from this chapter which can be included in the con-
ceptual framework? Different forms of landownership have been identified: private 
and traditional institutional landlords, owner-occupiers, financial institutions and 
public landowners. The processes which have affected continuity and change in 
these landowning groups have also been identified: the agricultural market and 
technological innovations in farming methods, legal and political reform, agricul-
tural policy, taxation, the land market and land values. Changes in the structure 
of landownership are closely linked to changes in the political influence of landown-
ership, which in itself is linked to changes in the wider economy and society. The 
framework must recognise these interrelationships. The concept of a time lag be-
tween cause and effect, the differing roles of actual and ascribed cause in initiating 
change and the concept of 'internal' and 'external' change in landownership form 
should be incorporated within the framework. External continuity does not mean 
that change is not occurring internally and, conversely, external change does not 
imply internal change. 
Other factors have been touched on in this chapter but have not been fully exam-
ined. For instance, it has been implied that continuity and change in the landown-
ership structure, and the nature of landed influence at local level is geographically 
uneven. It has also been implied that different forms of landownership are dif-
ferentially affected by the same external factors, and that even within the same 
landownership group, different landowners will respond to a given situation in dif-
ferent ways. A consideration of landownership and landed influence at national 
level cannot explain the infinite variety of circumstances found at local levels. 
Chapter Three will, therefore, move on to look at the importance of landowner-
ship form and individual motive in estate management at the local level, and will 
look in more detail at landed influence and the development of upland Britain. 
Notes 
1. Landowners were divided into the following categories by Bateman: 
• Peers & Peeresses: titled landowners. 
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• Great Landowners: with estates of over 1,250 hectares (or with an annual rental 
of over £3,000). 
• Squires: with estates between 416.6 and 1,250 hectares. 
• Greater Yeomen: with estates between 125 and 416.6 hectares. 
• Lesser Yeomen: with estates between 41.6 and 125 hectares. 
• Small Proprietors: with estates of 0.3 to 41.6 hectares. 
• Cottagers: with under 0.4 hectares. 
2. Further information about the history of Highland landownership can be gained 
from Carter, 1980; Hunter, 1976; and Darling, 1955. 
3. Simpson (1961, 1-23) dates the origins of Crown ownership to the Norman Con-
quest and the establishment of feudalism. Lands were granted by the Crown 
in return for military or other services. Lands would be forfeited to the Crown 
as a punishment for treason. During the Medieval period, there were constant 
legal battles between the Crown and the landowners over the level of payments 
due to the Crown as incidents of tenure. Feudal exactions were abolif'hed under 
the Commonwealth and forfeiture was abolished in 1870 (33 & 34 Viet, c.23). 
Holdsworth (1927, 128) states that by the 18th century an abstract right of 
ownership was recognised by the law. 
4. Strictly speaking, sporting and mineral rights belonged to the Lord of the 
Manor, but most large landowners also owned manorial interests. 
5. See Simpson (1961, 229-238) and Clay (1985, 212-230). Originally, the lessor 
required feudal services or payment in kind from the lessee, but after the demise 
of the manorial system these came to be replaced by money rents. By the 19th 
century, the standard agricultural lease was the yearly tenancy. 
6. See for example Kerridge (1969, 38); Clay (1985, 198-208); Simpson (1961, 
146-160). Copyhold and other customary tenures originated in the feudal pe-
riod. Lands were held from the Lord of the Manor in exchange for services 
or payments in kind. These tenures were controlled by the manor courts and 
were not recognised by the common law courts. During the 14th century, most 
of these payments in kind and services were converted into money payments, 
which improved the status of the tenants. The term 'copyhold' comes from 
the practice of alienation. The land would be surrendered to the Lord of the 
Manor, who would re-grant it to the in-coming tenant. A copy of the trans-
action was made in the manor court rolls. The tenant was said to hold 'by 
copy of the court roll'. The copyholder was normally required to pay a fine on 
taking over the property equal to one or two times the annual rent. 
7. See for example Kerridge (1969, 41-47); Thompson (1976, 325-360); Simpson 
(1961, 20) and Holdsworth (1927, 131). Three regions of Britain had their 
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own peculiar customary tenures: Wales ('free customary tenure' or 'husbandry 
hold'); Cornwall ('tenants in free conventionary'); the Scottish Lowlands and 
Northern England ('tenant right'). Two other distinct forms of customary 
tenure were 'gavelkind' (partible inheritance, which was practised in Kent), 
and 'borough English' (where the inheritance went to the youngest son). 
8. Three general rules governed the inheritance of landed estates (Stone, 1984, 
109): 
• Males took priority over females, although transfers to women became more 
common in thr: 18th century. 
• The property passed downwards in preference to upwards or outwards. The or-
der of inheritance was (in descending order): eldest son, younger sons, nephews, 
uncles. If all these failed, then the search would move to the paternal grandfa-
ther and his branch of the family. 
e The strength of claims to inheritance diminished with the antiquity of the 
hranch of the family. 
9. Simpson (1976, 31) gives a contemporary example of how three estates can exist 
simultaneously in the same piece of land. 'A' (the owner of the fee simple) 
makes a grant to 'B' for life and then to 'C' in tail. 'B' then receives a life 
estate, he is in possession, but 'C' has the estate in remainder when 'B' dies. 
'A' still holds a reversionary interest in the land, since the land will revert back 
to him or his descendants if 'C"s specified class of descendants die out. 
10. Common rights antedate the idea of private property in land (Hoskins & 
Stamp, 1963, 6). There are six generally recognised rights of common, the 
most important of which is the right of grazing (Campbell, 1971, 7). The other 
rights are: 
• pannage (to graze stock in woodlands). 
e Estover (to take underwood for fuel). 
• Turbary (to dig peat or turf for fuel). 
e Piscary (to fish in another man's lake or stream). 
• Common in soil (to take sand, gravel, stones and minerals for the commoner's 
personal use). 
11. Three general enclosure acts were passed in the early 19th century: in 1801, 
1836 and 1845 (Tate, 1967). The aim of these acts was to facilitate the process 
of enclosure, and reflected the national perception at the time of the need to 
increase the cultivated area. 
12. Simpson (1976, 18) defines overriding interests as "certain rights and liabilities 
which it is not practicable to register on the title deeds to a property, but which 
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nevertheless retain their validity". 
13. A tithe was the tenth part of the annual produce of agriculture which was paid 
to support the priesthood. Originally tithes were paid in kind, but most were 
converted to money payments by the 19th century. Tithes could be commuted 
in three ways (Evans, 1976, 95}: 
• by giving the tithe owner an allotment of land in lieu. 
• by a straight cash payment. 
• by exchanging payments in kind for variable payments, which were tied to the 
prevailing price of grain. 
14. See L. & J. Stone (1984, 128}. If no male heir was found there was a danger 
that the family name would die out. If a daughter inherited the estate she 
would assume her husband's name. If the estate passed to a male relative 
through the female line the surname would also change. Landed families often 
used to cheat in order to preserve the family name, by producing surrogate 
heirs. The heir might take on the family name as a first name; where a daughter 
inherited the estate her husband might have to assume her name as a condition 
of marriage; the names of the husband and wife might be linked as a double-
* [14-a] barrelled surname. 
15. See B. & S. Webb (1924, 373}. The position of Lord Lieutenant was generally 
held for life. It demanded little expense and few duties, but carried with it 
powers of patronage and social status. The High Sherrif, on the other hand, 
was usually appointed for a year. He had to attend the Judges of Assize and 
incur considerable expense. It was not, therefore, a desirable position. 
16. The ownership of minerals was clarified by a law passed in 1688, which stated 
that only mines of gold and silver belonged to the Crown, all other minerals 
belonged to the owner of the surface (Spring, 1971, 17}. 
17. The role of landownership in industrial development is clearly illustrated by the 
Durham coal industry (Spring, 1971b, 18}. Some of the principal landowners 
in the county (Sidney & Edward Wortley, Thomas Ord, Sir Henry Liddell & 
George Liddell, George Bowes and William Cottesworth) formed a partnership 
in 1726 for 99 years, to work certain collieries on the Tyne in order to obstruct 
t [l7a.J competition and to control output. They were known as the 'Grand Allies'. 
18. See Orwin & Whetham (1971, xix-xx). Corn Laws were brought in to protect 
British farmers following the Napoleonic Wars. They were repealed by Sir 
Robert Peel in 1846 (9 & 10 Viet c.22}. 
19. Perry (1974, 53} ascribes three causes of the agricultural depression: 
• The influx of cheaper foreign imports onto the British market. 
• A general world economic depression linked to falling gold prices. 
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• A series of bad harvests in the late 1870s. 
20. Several Reform Acts were passed in the 19th century, and the right to vote was 
extended only gradually. The 1832 Act gave only farmers paying more than 
£40 per annum rent the vote; the 1867 Act extended the vote to householders in 
towns; and the 1884 Act gave householders in the countryside the vote ( Orwin 
& Whetham, 1971, 42). County Councils were established under the 1888 Local 
Government Act, whilst urban and rural district councils and parish councils 
were set up under the 1894 Act. See Douglas (1976, 148) for a description of 
the 1911 Parliament Act. 
21. The 1875 Agricultural Holdings Act (38 & 39 Viet c.92) gave tenants the right 
to claim for unexhausted improvements, although landlords were not bound 
to accept the claim. The 1883 Act (46 & 47 Viet c.61) made compensation 
compulsory (Orwin & Whetham, 1971, 171). 
22. The Settled Land Act ( 45 & 46 Viet, c.38), 1882 gave full powers of manage-
ment (including the right to sell) to the life tenant. It made it impossible to 
keep landed estates within a family by the traditional method of a strict family 
settlement (Simpson, 1961, 258). 
23. Thompson (1957) quotes the Duke of Marlborough as saying in 1885: 
"were there any effective demand for the purchase of land, half the land of 
England would be in the market tomorrow". 
24. Estate duty was introduced by the 1894 Finance Act (Cragg & Marchant, 
1901, 988). It consisted of three taxes: estate, legacy and succession duty. 
Succession duty had been introduced in 1780, but until 1853 was charged only 
on personal property. Probate duty had also been charged only on personal 
property (Brodrick, 1881, 250). 
25. Paradoxically, it was also a Liberal Government under Lloyd George which 
abolished land valuation in 1920 (Douglas, 1976, 179). 
26. 15 & 16 Geo V, c.20 (Law of Property) 1925. There were in fact seven acts 
dealing with different aspects of reform (Simpson, 1976, 45): 
• Law of Property Act . 
• Settled land Act . 
• Trustee Act . 
• Land Charges Act . 
• Administration of Estates Act . 
• Land Registration Act . 
• Universities & Colleges Estates Act . 
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27. There was a change in legislative emphasis in the late 19th century (Campbell, 
1971, 5). In the 30 years following the 1845 Inclosure Act, strong economic and 
social forces began to work against enclosure. The Metropolitan Commons Act 
of 1866 and the Commons Act of 1876 were passed to protect and preserve the 
*~1c,... remaining common lands. 
28. Successive Agricultural Holdings Acts have increased the rights of the ten-
ant against the landlord. The 1906 Act prohibited the inclusion of land use 
covenants in the tenancy contract so long as the fertility of the soil was main-
tained (Orwin & Whetham, 1971, 300). The Acts of 1910 and 1914 gave tenants 
the right to claim disturbance costs if a tenancy was terminated by the sale of 
the holding. Full security of tenure was granted to farm tenants by the 1947 
Act, whilst the 1976 Act granted tenants the right of succession for three gen-
erations. This provision has been amended by the 1984 Act, so that tenancies 
created since 1984 offer security only for the lifetime of the tenant. 
29. A trust is formed when the legal title to an estate is vested in a body of trustees 
who hold the land for another's benefit (Simpson, 1976, 34 ). The beneficiary 
of a trust estate holds an equitable interest in the land (equitable interests are 
enforceable against other persons but do not exist in law as rights in the land 
itself). Trusts originated in the 13th century with the Franciscan monks. They 
were prohibited from owning any property, and so relied on benefactors to allow 
them to live on estates. Private landowners soon saw the advantages of the trust 
form of ownership, and also began to adopt this ownership form. The most 
common form of trust is a discretionary trust. Other ownership arrangements 
which have been adopted by private landowners include strict settlements, fixed 
interest trusts for sale, accumulation and maintenance trusts, charitable trusts 
and employee trusts (Harrison, 1981, 120). 
30. The Samuel Commission reported that, on average, to open up a mine a com-
pany had to obtain leases from no fewer than five mineral owners (Massey & 
Catalano, 1978, 15). 
31. County Council Smallholdings were established by three acts (Northfield, 1979, 
190): the Smallholdings Act, 1892; Land Settlement Act, 1919; and the Small-
holdings and Allotments Act, 1926. Between 1908 and 1914, over 83,333 
hectares were acquired by county councils and over 14,000 smallholdings were 
created (Offer, 1981, 356). 
32. Report of the Commission on Common Land in England €3 Wales (1957 /58). 
Cmnd 462. London, HMSO. 
33. The claim that owner-occupation is a capitalist form of landownership has 
been criticised (see Winter, 1981). It is a very varied landownership group, 
which includes subsistence peasant proprietors as well as capitalist farmers. 
140. The nature of the landed elite, and the reasons for its decline, have been the 
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subject of recent academic debate (see Anderson, 1987; Daunton, 1989; Rubin-
stein, 1981 & Wiener, 1981). More recent research on 19th century financiers, 
merchants, industrialists and landowners has produced evidence which ques-
tions some of the propositions made by Thompson. It would seem that the 
class structure of 19th century Britain was far more complex than generally 
believed, and did not in fact fit neatly into the vertical interest groups identi-
fied by Thompson. 
]lA. 16. Recently the Stones ( 1984) and Rubinstein ( 1981) have questioned the open-
ness of the landed elite. They suggest that fusion of landed and financial 
interests only took place after the Great Agricultural Depression of the 1880s, 
and that inter-marriage was a consequence rather than a cause of this fusion. 
[)~ :fl, The 'rented' category includes only land let on full agricultural tenancies for 
a period of less than 30 years. Lands held in partnership, occupied by the 
beneficiary of a trust, held on short-term grazing licences or held on a lease 
of over 30 years are classified as owner-occupied (Northfield, 1979, 41). The 
number of farm holdings combining rented and owner-occupied lands doubled 
between 1950 and 1977. The majority of farm holdings now fall into the 'mixed 
tenure' category (ibid., 49). Official statistics should, however, be treated with 
caution as they do not allow for the complexities of land tenure arrangements. 
Rose et. al. (1977) found that farmers in East Anglia had entered land held 
under similar tenurial arrangements inconsistenly. Interestingly, they found 
that the real extent of owner-occupied land was under-estimated in the official 
figures. 
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Chapter III 
Landownership, Rural Society and the State 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will analyse the relationships between landownership, rural society 
and rural development in individual rural localities, although, as has earlier been 
stated, localities cannot be studied in isolation from the national context. The 
analysis in Chapter Two was concerned with continuity and change in the na-
tional landownership structure, and in the political influence of landowners at 
national level. National trends are the aggregated effect of many individual deci-
sions, and, inevitably, hide the variety of circumstances and experiences found at 
smaller scales. In an analysis of continuity and change in landownership and landed 
influence at a smaller scale; new factors, processes and relationships become appar-
~nt which fit into and complement the conceptual framework. An understanding 
of landownership and rural development at the micro-level should also add to an 
understanding of the operation of national-level processes. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 3.2 looks at the direct influence of 
landowners on rural development, through estate management and landownership 
decision-making. It examines the many factors which influence the way land is 
managed, and pays particular attention to the importance of landownership form 
and motive. Section 3.3 analyses the structure of rural society, and the changing 
role of the landowner within rural society over the 19th and 20th centuries., The 
final section (3.4) looks at the role of the State in the rural development of upland 
Britain. Particularly since 1945, the State has come to play a larger role in the 
affairs of rural areas. Today, landownership decision-making and rural society 
cannot be understood without reference to public intervention. As in Chapter 
Two, continuity and change, in the nature of estate management, and in the role 
of landownership in rural society, are important themes, although the role of the 
State is largely a feature of the post-war period. 
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A comprehensive consideration of rural society and rural development problems 
in upland and lowland Britain, and of the decision-making frameworks of all the 
landownership forms identified in Chapter Two is, for reasons stated in the in-
troduction, beyond the scope of this thesis. The analysis will, therefore, focus on 
the issues which will be developed later on in relation to the North Pennines: the 
management of landed estates; the rural society of upland Britain; and public poli-
cies for the development of upland Britain. Much of the material used, however, 
relates to lowland Britain, and many of the processes which will be identified are 
equally applicable to upland and lowland Britain. 
3.2 Landownership Decision-Making 
In Chapter Two, different categories of landownership were identified on the basis 
of ownership form and economic strategy. It was indicated that these groups are 
characterised by differing attitudes to landownership, and are differentially liable 
to external influences, but that within each group individuals will vary in their 
behaviour and circumstances. This section will look in more detail at the factors 
which influence how individual landowners manage their estates, and the extent 
to which generalisations can be made about landownership decision-making. 
Landownership decision-making and estate management in the 19th century has 
been studied by contemporary writers and agricultural historians (for instance 
Caird, 1851; Spring, 1963; Robinson, 1988), and in the 20th century by agricul-
tural geographers and economists ( Gasson, 1973; Ilbery, 1983), land economists 
(Denman, 1957; 1959; 1972), and rural sociologists (MacGregor, 1988). Most 
studies have conceptualised decision-making as an individual choice made within 
a framework of possibilities and constraints. Choice is therefore constrained, but 
the final decision reflects the individual motive of the decision-maker. Obviously, 
the factors involved in the decision-making process will vary according to the time 
scale and issues involved [1], but all studies agree that non-economic factors play 
an important role in the decision-making process. 
This section will address three interrelated questions. First, what factors should 
be included in the decision-making framework, and to what extent can they be 
generalised? Second, to what extent can generalisations be made about landown-
ership motive? Third, what are the implications of land management decisions 
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for rural society? The findings should not only enable a better understanding of 
the implications of landownership for rural development, but should also further 
an understanding of the processes of continuity and change in different forms of 
landownership. 
3.2.1 The Proprietorial Land Unit 
The almost infinite variety of possible decision-making situations relating to land 
management makes it extremely difficult to develop a single conceptual model. 
The model would need to encompass the many legal combinations of ownership 
and control by which land can be held, the different types of owner, and the range 
of physical environments in which an estate can exist. 
One model which meets these requirements is the Proprietorial Land Unit, devised 
by Denman and Prodano (1972). In order to avoid the preconceptions attached 
to frequently used terms, Denman and Prodano have developed their own termi-
nology for the various components of the model. The basic unit of management is 
the Proprietary Land Unit (PLU) [2]. The PLU consists of legal, ownership and 
geographical variables which, together, form a decision-making framework. An 
adapted version of this framework is illustrated in Table 3.1 
The 'possibilities' consist of abstract and physical 'attributes'. There are two sorts 
of physical attribute: the physical resources contained within the PLU (including 
the land and its fixed equipment, timber, water, minerals and other physical re-
sources), and the existing organisation and use of these resources. The resource 
use within the PLU may be homogeneous (in that it is dominated by one use), or 
heterogeneous (multiple land uses). 
The abstract attributes consist of three components. The first factor is the geom-
etry of the unit: its size and shape. A compact estate will be easier to manage 
than one that is scattered, particularly if scattered over a wide area. The second 
factor concerns the number and nature of legal land rights possessed by the pro-
prietor. This obviously affects his degree of control over the land. The third factor 
is the 'proprietorial character form' itself, the legal title to the land. Denman and 
Prodano identify three separate, but not exclusive, proprietary forms: simple, fic-
titious and fiduciary (Denman & Prodano, 1972, 31 ). The simple form corresponds 
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to private individual ownership. The fictitious form corresponds to ownership by 
trusts or shareholders (the ownership form is 'fictitious' in that the owner of the 
title is, for legal purposes, immortal). Finally, fiduciary ownership is where the 
holder of the legal title to the land, as a condition of ownership, is obliged to use it 
for the benefit of another. This corresponds to ownership by trusts and charities 
[3]. 
Together, these physical and abstract elements of the PLU form the positive el-
ements of the decision-making framework. These are balanced by constraints. 
Denman and Prodano identify five main constraints within the decision-making 
framework: two arising from the PLU itself, and three external constraints. The 
internal constraints upon the proprietor's freedom of decision-making result from 
the existence of other legal interests in the PL U and historical inertia. In the first 
case, derivative interests (leases and tenancies) act as constraints upon the propri-
etor (Denman & Prodano, 1972, 75) [4]. In the second case, the legacy of former 
owners and management practices are termed 'predisposing functions' (ibid., 99). 
Ancient land rights which have lost their original function but are still binding 
on the present owner, such as common rights, are a form of predisposing function 
termed 'collateral rights' (ibid., 104). Other predisposing functions might include 
financial burdens inherited from a former owner; ancient legal conditions attached 
to the proprietorship; or leases granted before the commencement of the present 
proprietorship. 
The three external constraints upon the proprietor's freedom of decision-making 
relate to other land units surrounding the PLU, the position of the PLU within 
the proprietor's total property portfolio, and the influence of public policy. Neigh-
bouring land units (either horizontal, or vertical where ownership of minerals is 
separated from surface ownership) may affect decisions relating to the PL U. These 
are termed 'contiguous' rights (ibid., 52). If the proprietor commands other ex-
ternal sources of capital ('consociate wealth'), decisions relating to the PLU will 
be taken in a wider context. Contiguous wealth also includes estates which are 
managed separately from the PLU (ibid., 145). Finally, all forms of public pol-
icy which impinge directly or indirectly on land use and landowners constrain the 
landowner's options and are termed 'universal constraints' (ibid., 136). 
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The nature and range of alternative strategies open to the decision-maker are, 
therefore, the product of opportunities offered by the PL U, plus constraints arising 
from and imposed upon it. The final decision, however, will reflect the proprietor's 
individual motive. Denman and Prodano do not analyse the question of motive 
in depth, but state that proprietors will have varying attitudes to their property 
in terms of consumption and production. For instance, proprietors may identify 
with particular physical assets within the unit (the 'soil affinity' factor), such as 
a house or parkland, and wish to preserve it, even if it could more profitably be 
turned to another use (Denman & Prodano, 1972, 47). 
The main value of this model is the light it throws on how the legal structure 
of ownership affects land management in practice. It shows that it is important 
to look not just at ownership but also at control. Land management is not only 
affected by the structure of ownership and control within an estate, but also by 
the ownership and control of surrounding estates. The fact that past management 
decisions can fundamentally affect present decision-making, emphasises the need 
for a historical perspective in order to understand contemporary land management. 
It is also important to be aware of the proprietor's total property portfolio, as the 
possession of consociate wealth may affect the decision-making framework. The 
model certainly highlights the number of possible influences on decision-making. 
So many variables are involved indeed, that, at a detailed level of analysis, the 
decision-making framework will be different for every individual landowner. The 
model also points out that estates should be classified not only by their legal and 
ownership form, but also by physical characteristics, such as shape and size and 
resource use (these two factors will be discussed below). 
As an explanatory or predictive model, however, the PLU is of little value. The 
generality of the concepts means that it is far removed from actual decision-making 
situations. This may account for the scant attention paid to landownership mo-
tive, and also to the effects of universal controls on decision-making. It does not 
indicate the relative importance of the different variables on the decision-making 
process, nor the relative significance of different factors for different landownership 
forms. These are, naturally, contingent upon each particular situation. It can 
be concluded that the some of the concepts put forward in the model could help 
towards an understanding of landownership decision-making, but these concepts 
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need to be tested against actual case studies. The emphasis of the PLU on the 
individuality of each situation should be complemented by studies which look for 
more general patterns of decision-making. 
t2 Defining and Describing an Estate 
It is evident that a working definition of an estate is required, since ownership 
alone may not be sufficient criteria. Does a landowner with many geographically 
dispersed properties own one estate or several? An estate can be classified in many 
ways, depending on the purpose and scale of the study. Denman's earlier works 
(1957; 1959) on the management of landed estates in England pay more attention 
to the classification of estates by size, shape and resource base. 
Denman (1959, 132) considered that management structure is an important factor. 
If geographically scattered estates are managed as a single unit under the same 
management, then they can be treated as a single estate. If the various proper-
ties are managed independently, then they should be treated as separate estates. 
These three situations are illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 3.1. However, it 
should be remembered that in the latter case, the other estates will form part of 
a landowner's cousociate wealth, and, therefore, will still have au influence on the 
management of the estate in question. Generally, the larger the estate, the more 
complex the management structure, although estates with multiple resource bases 
may also require complex management structures. 
The term 'estate' can, therefore, be used descriptively to refer in general terms 
to a landowner's total landholdings, but for a more detailed study should only be 
used to refer to a discrete management unit. 
Estates can also be classified according to resource use. Denman (1957, 141), for 
example, identified four categories of lauded estate in his survey: au agricultural 
l 
estate; a residential estate (containing a family seat and/ or a village); a silicultural 
estate (where over 25% of the estate's value lies in standing timber); and a mixed 
estate. This classification is merely illustrative of the way estates can be described, 
it does not cover the whole range of possible estate resource types. 
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Figure 3.1 - Defining an Estate 
complex 
simple 
separated 
3.2.3 Estate Structure and Management in the 19th Century 
It is not surprising, given the landownership structure in 19th century Britain, 
that most studies of land management have concentrated on the landed estate 
(Spring, 1963; Thompson, 1963; Caird, 1967; Howell, 1979). An analysis of these 
studies enables some observations to be made about the factors influencing the 
management of landed estates at this time. 
The vast size of the great landed estates required a complex management structure. 
Spring (1963) recognised three forms of estate organisation based on estate size. 
On the smallest estates of under 5,000 acres (2,083 hectares), the landowner himself 
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usually took a leading role in management (Spring, 1963, 5). He might employ 
a bailiff who was usually one of his tenant farmers. As the century progressed, 
many smaller landowners paid professional firms of land agents or surveyors to 
help with the management of their estates (Thompson, 1963, 178). These firms 
would manage several such small estates and were cheaper than the employment of 
a full-time resident agent. Normally, these smaller estates would be geographically 
compact and so lend themselves to a simple administrative structure. 
The second group of estates ranged between 5,000 and 10,000 acres (2,083 to 4,167 
hectares) in size and were characterised by a three-tiered management structure. 
On these estates, the daily managerial role would normally be devolved from the 
landowner to a resident full-time land agent, with a bailiff under him to liaise with 
the tenant farmers. These estates were normally large enough for workmen to be 
employed full-time (Spring, 1963, 6). 
The third group, the so-called 'great estates' of over 10,000 acres (4,167 hectares), 
demanded a much more complex administrative structure, not only because of their 
larger size, but also because these estates normally consisted of geographically 
dispersed properties, and often a diversity of resources. On these estates, the 
landowner presided over a chief land agent or auditor, who in turn presided over 
land agents on the various properties, with bailiffs and workmen below them (ibid., 
10). The landowner and chief agent would be responsible for long-term structural 
decision-making, whilst the sub-agents would take responsibility for short-term 
management decisions. 
Landlords of estates with diversified resource bases, including mines or urban prop-
erty foJ: example, would require the aid of specialist agents. Depending on the 
amount of work involved in the management of these resources, these agents would 
be employed full-time on the estate or would act as occasional outside consultants 
(Thompson, 1963, 171 ). To protect the family's legal interests and to settle legal 
disputes over land rights, a solicitor would be required, again either on a full- or 
part- time basis. The solicitor rarely resided on the estate. 
The landed estate in the 19th century could be a large, complex business. The 
'actors' in 19th century estate administration were, in decreasing order of status: 
the landowner; the land agent; the solicitor and the specialist agent; the bailiff, the 
87 
tenant farmers; and finally the estate labourers and workmen. The management 
requirements of an estate depended on its size, shape and resource base. 
The turn of the 19th century marked a general change in the management of landed 
estates. In the 18th century, estates were regarded more as units of consumption 
than production (Thompson 1963, 153), but as the 19th century progressed estate 
management became a more professionalised and efficient activity. 
There were several inducements to improve estate management. The parliamen-
tary enclosures of the 18th and early 19th centuries brought more land into agricul-
tural production and enabled a rationalisation and improvement of farm holdings 
on many estates (Chambers & Mingay, 1966, 79). Estate management and agri-
cultural improvement became fashionable interests and many landowners entered 
enthusiastically into the 'spirit of improvement' (Orwin & Whetham, 1971, 28). 
In 1839, the Royal Agricultural Society was established, which did much to en-
courage and diffuse agricultural innovation (Ernle, 1961, 359). The period from 
1840 to 1870 is known as the period of 'high farming', when many estates were im-
proved by land drainage, farm enlargement and the introduction of better quality 
stock (Caird, 1967, 15). These improvements were facilitated by the introduction 
of public loans, introduced to overcome the barrier posed by strict settlement to 
the improvement of land (see 2.3). The Board of Inclosure Commissioners, set up 
under the 1845 Inclosure Act, were also given the powers to oversee agricultural 
improvement schemes (Spring, 1963, 158). The Improvement of Land Act of 1864 
enabled landowners to borrow from any source, public or private. By 1882 and 
the Settled Land Act, it was estimated that altogether about £15 million had 
been spent on agricultural improvement schemes, of which £8 million had been 
advanced by the State and £7 million by private companies. A fifth of the land in 
need of draining had been drained with the aid of loans (Caird, 1967, 82). 
The two major barriers to the improvement of land were generally recognised to 
be strict settlement and lack of tenant security (Garnier, 1911, 447). As has been 
stated earlier (see 2.4), the effect of strict settlement was that many estates were 
heavily encumbered with debt, leaving little or no capital free for agricultural 
improvement. This obstacle was partly overcome by the introduction of loans, but 
it was not until the Settled Land Act of 1882 that the obstacle was finally removed. 
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In England, the normal practice was to grant tenancies from year to year ( Caird, 
1967, 104). Although tenants were rarely evicted at the end of the year, they had 
no long-term legal security in the land, and consequently were loath to expend 
capital on agricultural improvement. In Scotland, where leases were often granted 
for 21 years, Caird (1967, 99) observed that the farms were of a superior standard, 
although, as the lease drew to an end, it was difficult to induce the tenant to 
maintain his holding. It was generally agreed that legislation was needed to give 
the tenant more legal security. The 1875 Agricultural Holdings Act was the first 
step towards this goal. 
Tithes and other land charges were also identified as constraints upon estate invest-
ment. Although the burden of tithes was lessened by the Tithe Commutation Act 
of 1836, tithes and other rent charges were still felt to be an unwelcome financial 
burden [5]. 
Despite these general trends, estate management also depended on the individual 
motive of the landowner. The background of the landowner was important. Howell 
(1979, 56) observes that towards the end of the 19th century, many landed gentry 
had professional backgrounds in banking, the law or industry, and owned an estate 
for its status rather than income value. Those landowners who had come from 
business backgrounds, however, tended to base their relations with tenants on 
far more commercial and less paternalistic lines. Management also depended on 
the financial circumstances of the landowner. The small landowner with no other 
income source would seek to maximise the profit from his estate. 
Caird (1968, 493) emphasised the importance of both the landlord and the agent 
in the management of the estate: 
"An experienced sensible agent, with the aid of a willing tenantry, will effect as 
much with £100 as an inexperienced or incompetent man can with £ 200" 
Estates were not always owned for their agricultural function. Orwin & Whethan 
(1971, 46) noted that game shooting grew in popularity over the 19th century. 
Some estates were neglected by their owners, particularly if the owner was absentee. 
Research on landed estates in Wales and the Highlands of Scotland (Howell, 1976; 
Hunter, 1976; Carter, 1980) indicates that landowners in the uplands were more 
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often absentee than their lowland counterparts. On the Highland estates, the factor 
(land agent) wielded a considerable amount of power (Hunter, 1976, 121). 
There has been little analysis of the estate management policies of institutional and 
charitable landowners in the 19th century. Robinson (1988), in a comparison of 
decision-making by different landowners during the Great Agricultural Depression, 
suggests that resource base was a more important explanatory factor of estate 
management policy than ownership motive. The estate structure of Guy's Hospital 
(a charitable estate) did not differ markedly from neighbouring private estates 
(Robinson, 1988, 125), although he goes on to add that landlords could exert an 
important influence over their tenant farmers (ibid., 145). 
The market unquestionably had an important influence on the management strate-
gies of landowners. All landowners faced financial difficulties during the last quar-
ter of the 19th century, but the arable lowland estates fared worse than the upland 
pastoral areas (ibid., 120). The Great Agricultural Depression put economic pres-
sure on landowners to seek more efficient methods of estate management. 
The power of landowners to influence society, both at the local and national level, 
was noted by Caird (1968, 493): 
''the landlord's influence for good or evil extends to his tenants and labourers, 
and in its general results regulates, in no unimportant degree, the productiveness 
and welfare of the country". 
He went on to point out that although the responsibility of the landed interest was 
enormous, landowners received no specialist training, and there were no public 
regulations as to how estates were managed. 
This brief discussion has shown that the size and diverse resources of many 19th 
century estates demanded a complex management structure. As the century 
progressed, changing fashions and changing economic circumstances resulted in 
landowners placing far more importance on efficiency and production, and less 
and less emphasis on consumption. However, the landowner was rarely the sole 
decision-maker, and it is important to be aware of the influence of other actors 
in the decision-making process. Although widespread agricultural improvements 
were achieved, the strict family settlement, lack of tenant security and financial 
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burdens on the land all acted as constraints to improvement. Individual motive 
was also important. Some landowners owned their estates for their recreational 
rather than their agricultural function, and absenteeism was seen to be associated 
with poor estate management. 
3.2.4 Estate Management in the 20th Century 
More information is available for the 20th century about the factors which in-
fluence different types of landowner in their decision-making, and about estate 
management in specific areas of the country. 
In an earlier study (1957) of the management of landed estates in England, Den-
man compared three types of landowner: the private landlord, charitable trust 
and corporate business. The study provides some interesting conclusions about 
the decision-making framework in general, and differences in the motives of these 
landowners. 
The aim of the study was to analyse the economic efficiency of landed estates, and 
to identify factors which could explain differing levels of efficiency. The estates were 
classified into three groups: competent, partially competent and incompetent. This 
classification was based on the ability of an estate to generate enough income to 
meet normal out-goings (such as maintenance costs, taxes, rates, management and 
insurance) and to invest in estate improvements. Estate income was measured as 
rental earnings (actual rent received plus the estimated rental values of any farms 
and other lands in hand). All other sources of income and capital were classified 
as consociate wealth (including revenue from estate resources managed in hand as 
well as interest on stocks, shares and other non land based income sources). The 
income of each estate was calculated from average earnings over a ten year period 
to iron out the inevitable yearly fluctuations in income. 
Denman found that only 21% of the estates in the survey were competent whereas 
45% were incompetent. Therefore the majority of the estates were either neglected 
or were subsidised by outside sources of capital (Denman, 1957, 45). On the incom-
petent estates, rent levels had not kept pace with the rising costs of maintenance 
(ibid., 50). He found that consociate wealth was essential for the maintenance of 
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most estates over the short-term. Indeed, 80% of the estates were supported by 
an external fund in the same ownership (ibid., 64). 
Denman then looked at the decision-making frameworks of the landowners, to 
identify the main factors which could explain differing levels of estate competence. 
He found certain factors were common to all landownership groups, whilst other 
differences could be attributed to landownership motive. Two major constraints 
on estate investment experienced by all landowners were taxation (Denman 1957, 
93) and tenant right (ibid., 91). Landlords in the survey said that they feared that 
improvements to farm holdings would only lead to higher claims for compensation 
from out-going tenants at the end of the tenancy. The necessity to maintain good 
relations with the tenantry, and fear of arbitration, meant that landlords were 
reluctant to raise rents following improvements, although the costs of maintenance 
had risen rapidly (ibid., 100). The low short-term return on capital invested in 
land was also identified as a constraint. Landowners wishing to make short-term 
gains preferred to invest their money elsewhere (ibid., 89). 
Three general incentives to invest were identified. First, tax rebates were an im-
portant incentive. Under the 1945 Income Tax Act, landlords were entitled to a 
tax rebate of a tenth of the capital invested in agricultural improvements over a 
ten year period, and were entitled to a 45% rebate on agricultural land farmed 
in hand (ibid., 57). Second, government grants for agricultural improvement had 
encouraged capital investment. Third, land was perceived to be a secure long-
term investment. An interesting point which emerged from the survey was that 
the Agricultural Holdings Acts have introduced minimum acceptable standards 
of estate management, and have to some extent ironed out differences between 
landlords (ibid., 75). 
The most competent estates were those owned by companies (ibid., 155). There 
was an inverse relationship between the level of personal identity with the estate 
and level of commercialisation. Thus, privately owned estates were, in general, 
the least competent. There was also an inverse relationship between the amount 
of consociate wealth and level of competence (ibid., 69). Some private landlords 
admitted that old age and apathy were reasons for lack of investment, whilst 
many cited other non-economic factors such as commitment to residence, historical 
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tradition, social responsibility, moral duty and a simple love of the land (ibid., 98). 
Length of title was also a factor. 'Old titles' were generally more traditional than 
new ones (ibid., 151) [6] . On the other hand, some privately owned estates were 
highly competent. Many private landlords were trained in land management and 
took a professional interest in their estates (ibid., 109). 
Differences in sources of consociate wealth were also attributable to landownership 
form. Corporate landowners were prepared to take greater financial risks with their 
capital. They tended to invest mainly in farm stock and non-farm based business 
enterprises (Denman, 1957, 155). Private landowners predominantly invested in 
farm stock (on the home farm) and stocks and shares. Private landlords were the 
only group in the survey to invest in sporting enterprises. Charitable landlords 
were found to prefer investments in stocks and shares, reflecting their need for 
financial security rather than profit maximisation. 
Charitable landlords also expressed a strong attachment to their estates arising 
from a sense of historical tradition, but their main motive towards owning land 
was financial (ibid., 173). Charitable estates were found to have the lowest out-
goings and to be the most deficient in investment. For instance, on charity estates 
outgoings formed 38% of the annual revenue, of which only 21% went on im-
provements (the corresponding figures for non-charity estates were 97% and 27% 
respectively). Charitable landlords also expressed a preference for financing im-
provements to farm holdings themselves, and charging the tenant interest. This 
practice avoided liability to subsequent claims for tenant improvements. This cau-
tious management of estate and investment capital is attributed to a charity's 
overriding need for long-term financial security. Charitable ownership is 'fidu-
ciary', in that it places a requirement on the owner to use the estate income for a 
specific purpose (see 3.2.1 ). The charity's function as a landowner is secondary to 
its charitable function. 
As well as differing individual motives, the three landowning groups were also found 
to be differentially affected by certain external constraints. For instance, liability 
to taxation depends on the form of ownership. Charity estates were exempt from 
both income tax, surtax and estate duty (ibid., 173). Companies were liable to 
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taxation on revenue but, of course, avoided death duties (ibid., 157). Private 
landlords, however, were liable to both forms of taxation. 
The analytical approach adopted in this study has many similarities with the model 
of the Proprietorial Land Unit, and shows how, by applying a conceptual model of 
constraints and opportunities made up of 'estate' factors and 'external' factors to 
actual case studies, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of the decision-
making process. The study shows that differences in estate management may be 
attributed partly to the nature of the estate itself, and partly to the ownership 
form, although in the end a decision may only be comprehended by looking at the 
individual landowner. Nevertheless, Denman does point out some general char-
acteristics of different landownership groups concerning attitudes to investment, 
profit-making, risk, and landlord-tenant relations. There are differences in the mo-
tives of these different landowners in owning land, and they are differentially liable 
to external influences. 
3.2.5 Estate Management in the Highlands 
Denman's 1957 study of landed estates was not a geographic study in that it 
did not study any one particular area. Other studies of landownership decision-
making have looked at the interaction of landownership and the environment in 
the determination of land use in specific areas. MacGregor (1988) looks at own-
ership motivation and land management in the Scottish Highlands. This study 
is of particular relevance to this thesis for two reasons. First, parallels may be 
drawn between the Highlands and the rest of upland Britain. Second, MacGregor 
evaluates land management policies in terms of their implications for rural soci-
ety. Although the uniformly harsh environment of the Highlands restricts land use 
opportunities, MacGregor has found that many landowners do not manage their 
estates to their full potential. 
Twenty seven privately-owned estates were surveyed and were classified into four 
estate types according to the dominant land uses: 'crafting' (where more than half 
the land is under crafting tenure); 'sheep' (where sheep rearing is the dominant 
activity); 'sporting' (with a high deer cull intensity); and 'mixed' (with a medium 
to high intensity of grazing for both sheep and deer). MacGregor found that 
non-economic motives were stronger than economic ones amongst the landowners 
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surveyed. 69% of the landowners cited sport for private enjoyment as their main 
motive, while only 41% claimed they owned land for its agricultural function or 
as a capital asset. The profit motive was strongest on mixed and sheep estates, 
whilst amenity and environmental factors scored more highly on sporting estates. 
The profit motive was more important on estates recently purchased, however, 
which indicates that rising land values are pressurising new purchasers to generate 
mcome. 
MacGregor explains this general absence of a profit motive among Highland landown-
ers by the following factors. First, absenteeism would appear to be significant. 52% 
of the landowners are absentee so that daily management decisions are left to the 
factor {land agent). Absentee landowners take less interest in their estates, espe-
cially owners of sporting estates. Most of the landowners also own land elsewhere, 
mainly outside the Highlands. These are generally managed separately, and on 
more commercial lines. The Highland estates are, therefore, 'outlier' estates and 
not economically important to the owner. This is particularly true for owners of 
sporting estates, who are found to possess large external sources of capital. The 
sporting estates are units of consumption rather than production, often subsidised 
by external capital (consociate wealth). Government policies to encourage agricul-
tural improvement have had little impact on these estates. 
Although most of the landowners recognised that their estate offered potential for 
development, few had plans to realise these opportunities. Tourism, sheep rearing, 
forestry, angling, fish farming, permanent grass, deer forest and cattle rearing were 
all mentioned as possible developments. When asked why they had no plans to 
develop new resources, lack of capital, old age, apathy and lack of interest were all 
given as explanations. 
It seems that in the Highlands most landowners possess enough consociate wealth 
not to have to manage their estates on commercial lines. MacGregor points out 
the serious implications of this under-use of land for the population of the High-
lands. Land which could be put to more profitable uses is tied up in these estates. 
MacGregor's study is a clear example of how landownership can affect rural devel-
opment in negative ways. The Highlands are, perhaps, an extreme case, but the 
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study indicates that much land in upland Britain may be tied up in large, absentee 
estates which are managed for recreational rather than commercial purposes. 
Absenteeism was also found to be associated with under-use of land in southern 
Spain. Maas (1979) compared land use intensity in two areas with similar en-
vironments in southern Spain (Seville and Cordoba). Cordoba had much higher 
productivity levels than Seville, although both had similar resources and a similar 
landownership structure. Maas found that absenteeism appeared to be a signifi-
cant explanatory factor. A much higher percentage of landowners in Seville were 
absentee and took less interest in their estates. 
A summary of the external factors and landownership motives identified by Den-
man and MacGregor as acting as inducements and constraints on the efficient use 
of estates, is given in Table 3.2. Estates managed by landowners who are able 
and motivated to invest are likely to change, but estates whose owners are either 
unwilling or unable to invest, are likely to display a high degree of continuity over 
time. It would appear that private landlords are more likely to be influenced by 
motives of continuity, and corporate landowners by motives of change. Traditional 
institutional and charitable landowners fall somewhere in between. 
The findings of Denman and MacGregor are corroborated by Massey and Cata-
lanos' (1978) analysis of landownership. They observed that owners of 'former 
landed property' (traditional institutional and private landlords) are, primarily, 
motivated by a symbolic attachment to their land: 
"Landownership is not a question simply of owning land, but of owning spe-
cific tracts of land with which they have a historical connection" (Massey & 
Catalano, 1978, 79). 
They also observe the tendency by private landlords to turn to sporting activities. 
This, from a marxist perspective, is a significant point. Sport is not a form of 
production in the capitalist sense, but, rather, involves the consumption of prop-
erty. It is interpreted as a fusion of the landed and non-landed bourgeoisie classes 
(ibid., 1978, 78). 
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Table 3.2- Landlord Motive & Estate Investment 
CONSTRAINTS INDUCEMENTS 
Tenant right Legislative standards 
Taxation Tax rebates 
Lack of capital Consociate wealth 
Old Agef Apathy Entrepreneurship 
{Absenteeism) {Residence) 
Short-term planning Long-term planning 
Consumption:private enjoyment Production:profit motive 
Social responsibility 
-
Moral duty 
-
High level of personal identity Low level of personal identity 
Old title: historical tradition New title 
3.2.6 Summary 
This discussion of landownership decision-making has been wide-ranging, and has 
touched on many factors which are of relevance. How an estate is managed depends 
upon the ownership form; the legal and ~anagerial division of ownership and 
control within the estate; the estate geometry; th.e resource base; the liability of the 
owner to external influences (including the influence of neighbouring estates); the 
owner's total property portfolio; State policy; and the market. Estate management 
cannot only be analysed with reference to the present; historical inertia is an 
important influence on management policy, especially on those estates which have 
been within the same ownership for a long period. Past management decisions 
affect present options which, in turn, will affect future management choices. These 
are general factors, applicable to any estate at any point in time, although their 
precise nature and influence will of course vary. 
These factors form a framework of possibilities and constraints, but the final deci-
sion depends on the motive of the landowner. To a certain extent, generalisations 
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can be made about the behaviour of different forms of landowner, but the final 
decision depends on many individual factors which cannot be predicted. 
There are many points of similarity between the decision-making frameworks of 
landowners in the 19th and 20th centuries. In both periods, tenant right, taxation, 
and lack of capital for investment have been factors of constraint, whilst public 
loans have encouraged investment. In the 20th century, however, tenants have 
gained a greater legal security; taxation levels have risen; and the costs of mainte-
nance have risen much faster than rent levels. There is a greater degree of public 
influence as to how land is managed. The general trend in estate management over 
the 19th and 20th centuries has been towards a more efficient use of resources, but 
this is not true of all areas of the country. In upland areas, many estates are owned 
for their recreational function, and this would appear to be an expanding trend in 
contemporary private landownership. 
It can be stated with certainty that the best interests of the local community are 
not given a high priority in the decision-making framework of most landowners. 
This is particularly true of the sporting estates in the Highlands, where vast areas 
of land are withheld from productive use. 
To conclude, it can be said that the management of land can materially affect the 
development of an area, but decisions relating to land management are often influ-
enced by factors which bear little or no relation to the local area. The significance 
of landownership on land use in any one locality will depend on the structure of 
landownership (how many estates are there in the area?); and the dependence of 
the area's inhabitants upon these estates. There may be other economic activities 
of equal or greater importance to the local community. This leads on to the ques-
tion of political influence and social structure within the community, which will be 
addressed in the following section. 
3.3 Landownership and Rural Society 
The second way in which landowners have the potential to influence rural devel-
opment in a locality is through the exercise of local political power. The degree 
to which landowners exert an influence on local politics in any particular society, 
and the form that this takes, will depend on the structure of the society and the 
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issue in question. This section will discuss the position of landowners within rural 
society, and the influence of landowners upon rural society and rural politics, in 
the 19th and 20th centuries. As far as possible the discussion will focus on the 
uplands, although much of the material is drawn from studies of lowland Britain. 
3.3.1 Landowners and Rural Society in the 19th Century 
There is no question that landowners exerted a visible influence on rural society 
in the 19th century. Just as the landed interest enjoyed a hegemonic control over 
society at the national scale in the 19th century, so too was their right to govern 
at county level unquestioned (see 2.2.3). However, below county level, landed 
control was less hegemonic. Landed estates did not cover the whole of the country, 
and areas outside the control of an estate developed very differently. Mills (1980) 
argues that from 1750 to 1850 there was a direct relationship between rural social 
structure and the pattern of landownership: 
"There were two kinds of rural England, one interwoven with the other spatially 
and sectorally, yet each distinct and recognisable" (Mills, 1980, 134). 
This two-fold division he terms the 'estate system' and the 'peasant system'. Areas 
under the control of one or two landowners belonged to the estate system, whilst 
areas with no dominant landowners belonged to the latter system. Mills coins the 
terms 'open' and 'closed' to differentiate between settlements within the estate 
(closed) and peasant (open) systems [7]. Open and closed settlements were char-
acterised by marked differences in population size, housing, employment, religion, 
political and social control (see Table 3.3). 
Open villages tended to be associated with large, rapidly growing populations, 
whilst the populations of closed villages tended to be static and small. This differ-
ence is attributed largely to the Poor Rate, and could be enforced by the landlord's 
control of the housing stock [8). The Poor Rate was levied on occupiers of prop-
erty, and the amount of the rate depended on the number of poor within the 
parish or township (Mills, 1980, 25). Obviously it was in the interests of landlords 
to keep down the poor rate on their properties (since then tenants could afford 
to pay higher rents). Where a landlord had a monopoly control of the housing 
in a village he could easily control the housing supply and literally exclude the 
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Table 3.3 - A Summary of Open and Closed Characteristics 
SUMMARY OF OPEN AND CLOSED TOWNSHIP CHARACTERISTICS 
OPEN 
Large populations 
High population density 
Rapid population increases circa 1851 
Many small proprietors 
Peasant families 
Small farms 
High poor rates 
Rural industries and craftsmen 
Shops and public houses plentiful 
Housing poor, but plentiful 
Non-conformism common 
Radicalism and independence strong 
in politics and social organisations 
II CJ 
Source: Mills (1980,~) 
Poachers 
CLOSED 
Small populations 
Low population density 
Slow population increases 
Large estates 
Gentlemen's residences 
Large farms 
Low poor rates 
Little industry and few craftsmen 
Few shops and public houses 
Housing good, but in short supply 
Strong Anglican tradition 
Deference strong in politics 
and social organisations 
Gamekeepers 
poor from the village. In open villages where housing was owned by many small 
landlords, such exclusion was neither possible nor always desired (many landlords 
might be small property developers). The poor tended to 'collect in these villages 
and, consequently, the poor rates were much higher. The differences in housing 
quantity between open and closed villages were also reflected in housing quality 
(Mills, 1980, 124). 
The two societies differed in their economic structure. Closed villages were pre-
dominantly farming communities. The economy of open villages, however, was 
more diverse. Open societies were associated with manufacturing and mining as 
well as agriculture. Dual employment was prevalent in open communities. For 
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instance, many residents combined farming with a second activity (Mills, 1980, 
120). On the arable lowlands, open and closed villages were economically interre-
lated. The exclusion of the poor from closed villages meant that at harvest time 
there was a shortage of labour. Open villages acted as pools of casual labour for 
the estates. This temporary importing of labour was known as the Gang System 
(Clemenson, 1980, 82) [9]. 
Not only could the landlord control employment, housing and, therefore, popula-
tion levels on his estate, he could also influence the social lives of the inhabitants, 
by controlling the provision of such village institutions as public houses, schools 
and reading rooms (Mills, 1980, 127). Allegiance to the Church of England was far 
greater in closed villages. There was a strong alliance between the Church of Eng-
land and landed society, and many church livings were in the hands of landowners 
[10]. The inhabitants of open villages often turned to non-conformist religions as 
a form of social protest against the establishment (Mills, 1980, 125). Although the 
secret ballot was introduced in the early 19th century, deferential voting was still 
associated with closely controlled estate villages. Rural protest tended to erupt in 
open communities, but no direct correlation has been identified. Hobsbawn and 
Rude (1969), in their study of rural unrest and the Swing Riots, found that resi-
dence by the landlord was far more significant than size of estate in the enforcement 
of social control [11]. 
Landownership was not the only factor which determined the nature of rural soci-
ety; the geographical environment and historical legacy were also important factors. 
The characteristics of open and closed villages differed geographically. Mills qual-
ifies his model by a further division of England into 'champion' and 'hamlet' areas 
(Mills, 1980, 17). Champion England included areas of early settlement, mainly in 
lowland England, which were associated with nucleated, tightly knit communities. 
These areas had a historical legacy of a strong common field tradition and tight 
manorial control. Hamlet England included areas of later settlement, mainly in 
upland areas, but also on other marginal lands. In these areas, settlement was 
dispersed and tight social control more difficult to enforce. The characterisics of 
open and closed villages thus varied geographically. It is apparent from Table 3.4 
that hamlet England tended towards a more open society. Even closed settlements 
within hamlet England displayed open characteristics. 
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Table 3.4- A Typology of Rural Society in 19th Century Britain 
A TYPOLOGY OF RURAL SOCIETY IN 19th CENTURY BRITAIN 
OPEN HAMLET SYSTEM CLOSED HAMLET SYSTEM 
- Preponderance of open communities - Scarcity of closed communities 
- Large parishes and townships - Extra parochial areas common, also 
derived from wood pastures and lost villages deparochialised 
moorland settlement -
- Common field and manorial systems - Absence of a common field 
weak tradition 
- Late survival of common lands - No common lands except in the special 
-
sense of grazing in royal forests, etc 
- Economy based on pastoral farming - Economy based on pastoral farming 
and rural industries or late establishment of arable 
OPEN CHAMPION SYSTEM CLOSED CHAMPION SYSTEM 
- Mixture of open and closed hamlets - Mixture of open and closed hamlets 
- Importance of settlement laws - Importance of settlement laws 
- Large townships with nucleated - Small compact townships with strong 
villages and dispersed populations manorial tradition 
- Parliamentary enclosure usual - Early enclosure usual, lost villages 
- Late survival of common lands - Loss of commons at an early period 
- Economy based on arable farming - Economy based on general arable 
with labour-intensive specialities farming 
Source: Mills (1980, 117) 
Mills (1980) and other writers (for instance Caird, 1967; Orwin & Whetham, 1971) 
have observed a fundamental difference in class structure between upland and 
lowland Britain. In lowland Britain, the estate system was associated with a 
three-tiered social structure. Landowners formed the upper class, but beneath 
them was a substantial middle class of tenant farmers. Some tenant holdings, 
particularly on the arable lowlands, were of a considerable size. These tenant 
farmers might hire their own labourers and not engage in manual work themselves 
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(Hobsbawn & Rude, 1969, 33; Mills, 1980, 28). The uplands, on the other hand, 
were characterised by a dual social structure of a landowning upper class and a 
farming working class (Howell, 1979; Mills, 1980, 171 ). There was thus a wider 
social gulf between landlord and tenant in the uplands, but less or no social divide 
between the farmers and agricultural labourers. 
Howell's (1979) study of landownership in rural Wales indicates that rural com-
munities, both within and outside estates, were predominantly open. Farm sizes 
were much smaller than in champion England. Farms both within and outside 
estate areas were under-capitalised, and provided little more than a subsistence 
living. Howell attributes the poor condition of the farms on Welsh estates to four 
factors. First, tenant farmers often lacked capital to stock their holdings. Sec-
ond, farm tenants lacked any incentive to improve their holdings; they would not 
receive compensation at the end of the tenancy and would probably face higher 
rents. Third, the farmers were motivated by a 'peasant mentality', their aim was 
to farm as cheaply as possible with low expenditure and low rents (Howell, 1979, 
150). Landlords also lacked any incentive to invest in the estate, since there was 
always a demand for smallholdings. A land hunger was generated by rapid pop-
ulation growth coupled with a low turnover of farm holdings. Once in possession 
of a holding, families rarely left them. In Howell's opinion, therefore, accusations 
that Welsh landowners were absentee and neglected their estates were exaggerated 
(ibid., 45) [12]. 
In contrast to lowland England, Welsh rural communities were characterised by a 
dual employment structure. Many farmers supplemented their farm income with a 
second .employment, often in the quarries (ibid., 69). Most farms relied on family 
labour, although Howell notes the somewhat surprising number of live-in servants 
in these small households (ibid., 94) [13]. There was little social demarcation 
between the farm family and the farm servants. It was an arrangement with many 
advantages for the small farmer. Livestock farms required labour to be constantly 
on hand, and live-in servants could be paid partly in kind. 
Non-conformism was widespread in both estate and non-estate areas. Howell (1979, 
11) attributes this to the social and cultural divisions between landowners and the 
established Church on the one hand, and the rural population on the other. The 
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social divide was accentuated in rural Wales by a language barrier (ibid., 42). Non-
conformist preachers usually came from the local area, and filled the vacuum of 
leadership in the community due to the absence of a middle class. Non-conformist 
preachers were active in inciting tenant unrest against the landlords. 
Many of Howell's and Mills' observations are corroborated by other studies. Ap-
pleton & Symes (1986), in a study of an upland farming area in Yorkshire, found 
that the family farm was the dominant farm business form, but, like upland Welsh 
communities, many farms had resident servants. They also observed a remarkable 
continuity in the 'core' farm families, in contrast to the periodic incursions of non-
farming households into the area which were associated with mineral extraction. 
Similar observations can be made about 19th century rural society in the Highlands 
of Scotland. It was also characterised by a wide social gulf between landlord and 
tenant, and an absence of a middle class. The crofts that were laid out after the 
Highland clearances were smallholdings and most crofters supplemented their in-
come with a second employment, either kelping (Carter, 1980), or fishing (Darling, 
1955, 109). Many of the Highland landlords were absentee, and were perceived 
to be remote and exploitative figures (Hunter, 1976, 120). Living conditions in 
the crafting communities were poor and, not surprisingly, the rise of evangelism in 
the 19th century was a symbol of protest against the establishment (Hunter, 1976, 
96). Rural unrest over the poor conditions on the Highland estates was widespread 
(Douglas, 1976) [14]. 
From these studies, it would seem that the relationship between landownership 
and rural society was less direct in the uplands than the lowlands, and was ex-
pressed in different ways. The upland economy and society in the 19th century 
displayed marked differences to lowland areas. In the 18th and 19th centuries, 
the uplands were important areas of mineral production (Collins, 1978, 18). For 
instance, in 1850 over half the world's production of copper, zinc, lead and iron 
came from Britain. In addition, many manufacturing industries, such as textiles, 
initially located in the uplands to use water power (Hoskins, 1985, 217). The indus-
trial character of much of upland Britain could account for the dual employment 
structure, land hunger and rapid population growth. 
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Mills admits that the open and closed model is highly generalised in comparison 
to the diversity of social conditions that existed in reality. The estate and peas-
ant systems represented two opposite ends of a spectrum. Pure open and closed 
societies were, in fact, rare (Mills, 1980, 94). Most parishes displayed a mixture 
of open and closed characteristics. For instance, an open village was often sur-
rounded by landed estates, and was therefore not entirely free from their influence 
(Hobsbawn & Rude, 1969, 183). Although a village might be free from the control 
of a landlord, politics at county level was controlled by the landed interest (see 
2.2.3). 
As Hobsbawn and Rude (1969) point out, residence by the landlord was a major 
prerequisite for the enforcement of social control. The harsher physical environ-
ment, the more industrial character, and the different historical legacy of the 
uplands, made it harder for landlords to enforce the tight social control which 
was possible in the lowlands. The upland-lowland divide seems to have been as 
important as the estate-peasant divide in the rural society of 19th century Britain. 
3.2 Changes in Rural Society in the 20th Century 
Profound social and economic changes have taken place in rural society since the 
mid-19th century as a result of the social and economic restructuring of Britain 
(see 1.1). The changes which have taken place in rural society have not all been 
beneficial; many new socio-economic problems have emerged, and these have been 
exaggerated in the uplands. Although the total population of upland Britain 
has increased since the 19th century (see Figure 3.2), large areas of the up-
lands have experienced depopulation (Dunn, 1976, 21; Collins, 1978, 14). The 
population density of many upland areas in the 19th century was much higher 
than it is today. The causes of depopulation were largely economic. As Britain 
expanded her trade with overseas colonies, upland mineral producers could no 
longer compete with cheaper foreign imports. Mining declined, and manufactur-
ing moved to other locations as water power was replaced by coal. In addition, 
the remote and inaccessible nature of most upland areas discouraged industrial 
activity because of high transport costs. The uplands failed to respond to the de-
cline in their traditional economies, with the result that no new significant forms 
of employment were created to replace traditional activities (Collins, 1978, 23). 
105 
Figure 3.2 - The Population of Upland Britain & GB, 1801 to 1961 
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Employment decline and depopulation have had knock-on effects in the uplands. 
Settlements have not been able to support essential services such as schools and 
shops (Cloke, 1983, 26). Upland agriculture suffers from a legacy of small, under-
capitalised farm holdings. The poor farm structure, coupled with the harsh physi-
cal environment, has meant that upland farming remains an economically marginal 
activity. 
A counter-trend to the depopulation of rural Britain has been selective repopula-
tion. The countryside around urban centres has become a commuting hinterland. 
Villages in the rural-urban fringe have experienced an infiux of mainly middle class 
'immigrants', who have upset the former social structures of these villages and have 
created a new local elite group. This 'urbanisation' of the countryside has created 
new social divisions within rural communities [15]. 
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In upland Britain, particularly in the more scenic areas, the growth of tourism 
has led to social change in some communities. A controversial trend has been the 
growth of second home ownership, which has been a source of conflict between 
holiday-makers and local residents (Phillips & Williams, 1984, 110). 
Opinion is divided as to the role of landowners in contemporary rural society. 
Newby and his associates (1978), based on their findings in East Anglia, assert that 
landowners and farmers are stil an identifiable and politically dominant class, and 
effectively control the local political process. Their assertion has been challenged 
by Barlow (1986) and Hoggort and Buller (1987, 239), however, who suggest that 
property ownership rather than land ownership structures rural class relations. 
Farming is no longer the main economic activity in most rural areas, and ownership 
of non-agricultural property may be more significant. This is particularly the case 
on the rural-urban fringe. They argue that East Anglia is atypical of contemporary 
rural Britain, being still an important agricultural area. Barlow (1986) argues that, 
even in the 19th century, rural settlements were sometimes controlled by industrial 
capital or an alliance of landowning and industrial interests [16). 
It would appear that, as at national level (see 2.6), a landowning interest has been 
replaced by a farming interest in local politics. Landownership today is, therefore, 
only potentially an important factor in rural society. Its influence depends on the 
structure of the local economy, and the presence or absence of other property-
owning groups within the rural population. The influence of landownership would 
appear to be greatest in agricultural, peripheral regions of the country .. 
Another way in which to assess the importance of landownership within contem-
porary rural society is to examine the actual process by which decisions concerning 
land use and local planning are made; to look not only at who occupies key po-
sitions on local councils, but also at how decisions are made and whose interests 
they serve [17]. The analysis of situations of conflict and consensus in the rural 
politics of East Anglia by Newby and his colleagues {1978), provides a significant 
insight into the balance of power in local politics, and the mechanisms by which 
that power is enforced. 
Newby and his colleagues (1978, 232) found that local councillors, farmers and 
other property owners in East Anglia had a common interest in preventing housing 
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development. Their reasons were, undoubtedly, ones of self-interest: to keep down 
the rates, prevent rises in local wage levels, and to preserve an attractive living 
environment for themselves. The justification used for this policy was, however, 
that the preservation of the countryside was in the national interest. The local elite, 
therefore, used an ideological argument to justify personal self-interest (ibid., 240). 
This 'anti-growth' policy acts to the disadvantage of the rural workforce, by raising 
the cost of local housing and limiting employment opportunities. 
Three strategies are identified by which the local elite avoid opposition to their 
interests. First, most local councillors adhere to the ethos that politics should 
be kept out of local government. According to this view, the independence of 
local government can only be maintained by preserving harmony, agreement and 
reasonableness. Hence, the local council tends not to be politicised. Secondly, the 
workforce fail to assert their interests because of the anticipation of failure (Newby 
et al., 1978, 262). The political apathy of the rural population is indicated by 
low turn-outs in local elections. Thirdly, decisions by local government tend to be 
made informally by personal contact and patronage rather than formally through 
the democratic process (ibid., 267). 
This analysis suggests that rural societies are characterised by conflicts of interest, 
but that these conflicts are rarely expressed. Newby and his colleagues (1978) 
identify three situations in which conflict can develop. The first situation is where 
a split develops within the ruling elite. For instance, the farming and property-
owning groups may conflict over environmentally damaging farming practices. This 
type of conflict, however, never undermines the essential alliance of interests of 
these two groups. The second situation can be described as 'tactical' conflict, 
where the local elite allows conflict to develop over some minor issue to hide more 
fundamental sources of conflict: 
"the more fundamental the issue, the less likely it is to manifest itself into a 
political conflict" (Newby et al, 1978, 274). 
This tactic is reminiscent of the strategy employed by the CLA and NFU to make 
small concessions in order to maintain overall control (see 2.6). The third situa-
tion in which conflict can develop is where an outside agency interferes in local 
affairs. In this case, all sections of the rural society may unite in their opposition 
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to the 'external threat'. The rural society is bound together by an 'ideology of 
community'. This is propagated by the local elite to emphasise: 
"common interests based upon a common area of residence" (ibid., 269). 
The ideology of community fosters a local distinction between 'insiders' and 'out-
siders' and is called into play when outside interests threaten the interests of the 
local elite. This is the only situation where the working class are involved in the 
decision-making process, although this involvement may be somewhat illusory. 
The inability of the rural workforce to become involved in the local planning process 
has been noted by others (for instance White, 1980; Hoggart & Buller, 1987, 186). 
It appears that resistance to change and adherence to a traditional way of life are 
important contributory factors, and may explain why an ideology of community is 
so easily created. 
This analysis of rural elites and power in East Anglia implies that rural societies 
have a considerable degree of local autonomy over their own development, and that 
it is in the interests of elite groups to prevent development. This is not always the 
case. Markusen (1980) point outs that, in more industrial rural areas, the elite 
may wish to encourage development in order to further their interests. Barlow 
(1986) adds that the means of production in rural areas may not be locally owned, 
in which case decisions will be taken outside the local political arena. 
Hoggart & Buller (1987, 192) distinguish between three types of locally initiated 
development. First, where the initiative comes from the local community, but 
outsiders are used as a resource. Second, when the initiative comes from the 
local elite. Third, when the whole community are involved in the decision-making 
process. With the growth of public intervention in rural areas, however, many 
decisions relating to rural land use and planning are now taken at a national level. 
.3 Summary 
In the 19th century, variations in rural society in Britain could be attributed to the 
structure of landownership, the geographical environment and differing historical 
legacies. Landownership certainly was a powerful influence on rural society m 
lowland Britain, but could not exert such a direct influence on upland Britain. 
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In the 20th century, landowners no longer exert the direct power which they enjoyed 
in the 19th century, but are able to influence the local political process by formal 
and informal means. Today, landowners are not the only powerful group in the 
countryside. The hegemonic power of the landed interest in the 19th century has 
been replaced by a more fluid alliance of property owners. Alliances between these 
elite groups vary according to the issue in question. Possible alliance groupings are 
illustrated in Figure 3.3. In most cases, the working classes are excluded from the 
decision-making process, except when all groups come together to fight an external 
threat. 
Figure 3.3 - Alliances of Interest in Local Politics 
ALLIANCES OF INTEREST 
Policy- Makers 
L ~ 
Farming Interest Immigrants 
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Workforce I 
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There are visible socio-economic differences in the rural societies of upland and 
lowland Britain, partly attributable to historical divisions, but also the result of 
new processes. Instead of the open and closed model of 19th century Britain, a 
distinction can be made between rural societies in which local issues are decided 
by a local elite, by an external elite, and by outside agencies. In all cases, however, 
it is important to look at the class structure of the rural society in question in 
order to understand the development of that society. 
In upland Britain, which faces the most serious socio-economic problems, many 
decisions relating to land use and development are now taken at national level. 
The final section of the chapter will look at public intervention in upland Britain, 
and its role in rural society and rural development. 
3.4 Public Intervention and the Development of Upland Britain 
The intervention of public agencies in the rural development of upland Britain has 
grown in the post-war period as the socio-economic position of the uplands relative 
to the rest of the country has worsened. Public attitudes to, and conceptions of, 
the upland 'problem' and its solution have changed over this time, and a whole 
variety of different policies have been launched with varying degrees of success. 
Although responsibility for rural development has been moved from the local to 
the national level, this does not necessarily mean, however, that decisions are made 
in favour of the rural workforce, or that it is unnecessary to take the structure of 
the local society into account in the analysis of local development. Often, public 
policies reflect the interests of local elite groups, since their representatives at 
national level influence the formulation of policy (see 2.6). Neither are upland 
areas free from conflicts over land use and rural development. This final section 
of the chapter critically analyses public intervention measures for the uplands, to 
assess the impact which these measures have had, which sections of the population 
have benefitted, and what effect the local society can have on the formulation and 
implementation of policy. 
As was stated in the introduction, public intervention measures cover a whole 
spectrum of policies. Public intervention varies greatly in nature, aims and effects. 
A broad classification of public intervention measures is given in Table 3.5. First, 
policies can be classified according to policy-orientation. Policies either promote 
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growth or prevent it. Policies may be sectoral, in that they are concerned with only 
one aspect of rural development, or integrated, dealing holistically with a whole 
range of issues. Second, the scale at which policies are formulated and implemented 
is also important. Policies may be formulated at the national, regional or local level. 
A policy formulated and implemented at national level is likely to have a different 
impact to one formulated and implemented at the local level. Third, policies may 
be uniform, in that they do not differentiate between regions and/or members of 
the eligible population, or they may be targetted to specific regions and/ or specific 
sections of the eligible population. Fourth, policies may be permissive, in that 
they enable development (usually with financial aid), or restrictive, in that they 
prevent actions. Fifth, a policy may be voluntary, giving the eligible population 
the choice as to whether or not to participate, or compulsorily enforced. Policies 
of all these types have been directed at one time or another to the uplands. 
Table 3.5 - Classification of Public Policy 
POLICY- Pro-Growth Anti-Growth 
ORlENTATION Sectoral Integrated 
SCALE Local/Regional National 
AIMS Target ted Uniform 
APPROACH Permissive Restrictive 
POWERS Voluntary Compulsory 
Although the plight of upland farmers and upland communities was recognised in 
the 1930s (Stapledon, 1937), the upland problem did not gain official recognition 
until after World War Two (Collins, 1978, 16). Before the war, public intervention 
in the uplands was confined to national resource development needs. The Forestry 
Commission acquired a large estate in upland Britain, particularly in the Highlands 
(see Figure 3.4) [18]. 
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Early planning measures to facilitate rural development in upland Britain were 
taken within the national planning framework. This framework was established by 
three acts passed in the late 1940s: the Town and Country Planning Act (1947); the 
Agriculture Act (1947); and the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 
(1949). From the beginning, a sectoral approach to rural planning was adopted. 
Public intervention was divided into three separate areas of development: rural 
settlements, agriculture and the environment. 
3.4.:1 Agricultural Policy and the Uplands 
Of the three strands of rural policy, agricultural policy has probably had the great-
est impact on upland Britain, for the main reason that agricultural policy-makers 
have commanded the greatest financial resources and exercised the greatest politi-
cal power (see 2.6). In line with the aims of the 1947 Agriculture Act, the solution 
offered by policy-makers to the problems of upland farmers has been to modernise 
and capitalise the farm structure. A programme of subsidies and grants for the 
improvement and modernisation of farm holdings was launched by the 1947 Act, 
and has continued ever since. In 1984/5, £137 million of public money was spent 
on upland agriculture (Whitby, 1986, 44). 
Before Britain's entry into the European Community, the main policy directed 
at upland farmers was the system of headage payments [19]. In addition, upland 
farmers were able to claim grants for improvements to farmland and buildings 
under the AHDS scheme [20]. Since entry to the EEC, the main plank of upland 
policy has been the designation of Less Favoured Areas (LFAs) [21], within which 
farmers are eligible for higher rates of subsidy. The first LFAs were designated in 
1975, but in 1982 and 1986 they were further extended, and now cover 53% of the 
agricultural area of Britain (see Figure 3.5). 
What have been the effects of agricultural policy on upland farmers? Agricultural 
policy has been criticised on social, economic and environmental grounds (Bowers 
& Cheshire, 1983, 133). Although the LFA scheme has social objectives, in prac-
tice it has acted, in Britain at least, to increase inequality amongst the farming 
community. The lion's share of the payments have gone to larger farmers on the 
edges of the LFAs. 4% of eligible farms have received 22% of the payments in the 
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UK (Robinson, 1988, 221). So-called farm 'improvement' schemes have had dis-
astrous consequences for the landscape of upland Britain (Boddy, 1982, 78). Old 
stone barns have been replaced by new farm buildings, and stone walls have fallen 
down through neglect and field amalgamations. The headage payments have en-
couraged farmers to increase their stock levels. The area of pasture has expanded, 
but over-grazing has also resulted (Countryside Commission, 1983b ). The effect 
of modernisation policies has been to put farmers on a 'technological treadmill' 
(Dexter, 1977). 
Agricultural policies for the uplands have led to a paradoxic3:l situation, whereby 
supposed 'development' has actually led to degeneration and decline (Lowe et al., 
1986, 333). Although the farming interest enjoys so much power at national level 
(see 2.6), the national farming interest has not served the best interests of upland 
farmers. The effects of agricultural policy on upland farmers have been to increase 
their dependence on State support and other external sources of capital (Marsden 
et al., 1986a). 
3.4.2 Rural Settlement Planning and the Uplands 
Whilst agricultural policy has been criticised for its effectiveness, rural planning has 
been criticised for its ineffectiveness. The Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 
set up a hierarchical planning structure for rural settlements, with the Secretary of 
State for the Environment, the county councils and the district councils all having 
a say in the final plan (Cloke 1983, 79) [22]. Although it differentiated between 
rural and urban planning needs, the act assumed an urban model of development 
(ibid., 85). This has led to a predominantly centralist approach to rural planning, 
whereby investment has been concentrated in central locations (key settlements), 
from which benefits have been expected to somehow spread out to the surrounding 
communities [23). This policy approach has, naturally, discriminated against the 
sparsely populated uplands, and has not prevented the further closure of rural 
services. 
As well as the closure of services, another problem of rural areas is that of housing 
(Rogers, 1983, 122). The 'country cottage' fashion has been criticised for causing 
a reduction in the housing stock available for local residents (Capstick, 1979). The 
demand for second homes has raised local house prices and forced local residents 
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out of the housing market (Cloke & Park, 1985, 244 ). Local authorities, dominated 
as has been seen in the last section by elite interests, are unable or unwilling to 
respond to the rural housing problem (Shucksmith, 1980). 
The centralist approach to rural settlement planning has been widely criticised 
(Cloke, 1983, 86; HoggGrt & Buller, 1987, 212). First of all, benefits do not neces-
sarily spread outwards to surrounding villages. Secondly, planners have lacked the 
powers to implement their policies. Development in the countryside is still largely 
dictated by private investment. Planners can only react to the demands of the 
private sector (Cloke & Park, 1985, 415). Planning policies have been largely re-
strictive and 'anti growth' in orientation, in sharp contrast to agricultural policies . 
. 3 Conservation Policy and the Uplands 
The National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act of 1949 was a recognition 
of the growth in public demand for recreation in the countryside, and the need for 
statutory protection of the environment against increasing pressures for develop-
ment. The act introduced the concept of preserving spatially designated rural areas 
(MacEwan & MacEwan, 1981, 13). The task of designating and managing these 
areas was given to the newly established National Parks Commission (reformed in 
1968 as the Countryside Commission). 
The 1949 National Parks Act established a two-tiered system of environmental 
protection. The highest protection was given to National Parks. Ten National 
Parks were designated between 1950 and 1955, nearly all in upland areas (Shoad, 
1987, 464). A lesser degree of protection was afforded to Areas of Outstanding 
Natural Beauty (AONBs). Thirty six AONBs had been designated by 1985 (see 
Figure 3.6). These are areas of great landscape value, but which are not thought 
suitable for national park status (Countryside Commission, 1983a). In addition, 
the 1949 Act gave the newly established Nature Conservancy the power to desig-
nate National Nature Reserves and Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSis) [24]. 
By 1986, 4,842 SSSis had been designated, covering 132,555 hectares, 6% of the 
I" 
land area of England and Wales (Shoad, 1987, 439). 
A 
Responsibility for planning and agriculture within National Parks initially re-
mained with the local authorities and MAFF, but m 1973 the management of 
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National Parks was improved by the setting up of an authority for each park, con-
sisting of members of the local authorities concerned, but with separate funding 
(Blacksell & Gilg, 1981, 208). Each authority was required to submit a run-
ning five year management plan to the Countryside Commission. This was the 
first time that land use within National Parks could be planned in an integrated 
fashion. Since 1950, special controls over agricultural land (LASDOs) operate in 
National Parks [25]. Public controls over land use within AONBs are extremely 
limited. Responsibility for settlement planning within AONBs remains with the 
local authorities, and agricultural land use is unaffected by the designation. 
The effects of National Parks on upland Britain have been greater than the 
AONBs. Within the parks, recreation and tourism have greatly increased, bring-
ing with them new land use problems and pressures (MacEwen & MacEwen, 1981; 
Cloke & Park, 1985, 187). 
The two main agencies controlling the conservation of the countryside are the 
Countryside Commission and the Nature Conservancy Council (NCC). The Coun-
tryside Commission has three main responsibilities: to conserve landscape beauty, 
to develop and improve facilities for recreation and access to the countryside, and 
to advise government on matters concerning the countryside. The main functions 
of the Nature Conservancy Council are to establish and maintain SSSis, to ad-
vise government on nature conservation policy and to advise and inform all other 
interested parties {Rogers et. al., 1985, 33). Both bodies are smaller and less 
powerful than MAFF (MacEwen & MacEwen, 1981, 17; Rose, 1986, 67). 
Conservation policy in Britain has been criticised from a number of different an-
gles. First, conservation has taken a backseat in national land use priorities to 
agriculture and economic development. This can be seen in the relative powers and 
financial resources of MAFF, the local authorities and the Countryside Commis-
sion. The Countryside Commission, even within National Parks, has little control 
over the activities of landowners and farmers (MacEwen & MacEwen, 1981). A 
second criticism is that all conservation policies which involve some form of con-
straint on a landowner's management options, have pandered to the landowning 
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interest by offering compensation. For example, landowners and farmers are enti-
tled to compensation for management or access agreements made over their lands 
[26]. The hypocrisy of compensation is pointed out by Cloke and Park (1985, 
400). It is paying landowners for not doing something which they probably would 
not have done anyway without government subsidy. This can involve a consider-
able waste of public money. The most extreme example of this hypocrisy was the 
provision of the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act that the NCC negotiate man-
agement agreements with all landowners within SSSis (Rose, 1986, 57). Under this 
provision, landowners were entitled to claim for foregone land uses. The original 
cost of the consultation procedure was estimated at £1.2 million, but by 1983 the 
NCC had already spent £18 million in compensation. 
A third criticism is that conservation by zoning does not adequately protect the 
r-
countryside (Shoa,..d, 1987, 464). It merely diverts public attention away from the 
rest of the countryside whose preservation is equally important . 
. 4 Critique of the Sectoral Approach 
Public intervention in the development of rural Britain has displayed schizophrenic 
tendencies under this sectoral approach. On the one hand, agricultural and forestry 
policies have sought to modernise upland agriculture and expand the area of com-
mercial forestry; on the other hand, conservation policy has tried to preserve the 
countryside in the interests of the environment, and to promote recreation and 
tourism. In the middle, local authorities have had little impact on upland ru-
ral communities, and have not been able to stem socio-economic decline in these 
areas. Part of the problem has been that the administrative areas over which plan-
ning agencies have control often bear little or no relation to geographical factors 
(Harrison, 1981, 224). 
The sectoral approach has been criticised for the lack of co-ordination and even 
outright contradictions in the policies of the main agencies. Policies have tended 
to increase rather than resolve conflict, by moving land use issues from the local to 
the national agenda (Cloke & Park, 1985, 421). Upland Britain, characterised by 
multiple land uses, has been the scene of many conflicts between competing land 
use interests. 
120 
Conflict in upland Britain has generally arisen between the growth and anti-growth 
lobbies, between the agricultural and environmental interests, but also between en-
vironmental and mining and forestry interests. Three situations can be identified 
where conflict can develop. First, conflict may arise over a local issue between 
national agencies, reflecting the national power struggle between agricultural and 
environmental interests discussed in the previous chapter (see 2.6). Conflict may 
also develop when the national representatives of a local elite group fail to protect 
their local members' interests. Finally, conflict can develop when a rural commu-
nity protests against a national policy, causing an insider-outsider split. 
In recognition of the failure of the existing planning framework to tackle the prob-
lems of rural communities in the uplands and to solve land use conflicts, there 
have been calls for a more integrated approach to rural development. The idea of 
integrated rural development (IRD) has been coined from third world development 
theory (Lea & Chaudri, 1983), but has been applied in Britain in modified form. 
The key features of IRD is that it is a multi-faceted project bringing together 
many different interests, power is decentralised and involves local participation. 
Integrated policies have placed as much emphasis on social as on economic objec-
tives. 
The most famous IRD project in Britain is the Highlands and Islands Development 
Board (HIBD). Set up in 1965, the HIDB was given greater powers than any 
other public agency to promote socio-economic development in the Highlands of 
Scotland. It was given powers of land control, and the financial backing to fund 
development projects (Carter, 1975). At the time, the HIDB was seen as offering 
real potential to solve the problems of the Highlands, and its work has been praised 
(Clout, 1972; Blacksell & Gilg, 1981), but it has also been criticised for failing to 
live up to its promise (MacGregor, 1985). Apart from the help which the HIDB 
has given to the fishing industry, the HIDB has failed to provide any sustainable 
or locally-controlled development. Most significantly, it has not used its powers of 
land control to seek improvements in the way privately owned land is managed. 
Another policy which could be classed in this category is the Rural Development 
Programme (RDP), administered by the Development Commission [27]. Although 
the Development Commission was established in 1909, its remit has altered in the 
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last thirty years to include more explicitly social goals (Haggart & Buller, 1987, 
175). In 1984, rural areas with particularly severe socio-economic problems were 
designated as Rural Development Areas (RDAs), (see Figure 3.7). These areas are 
eligible for higher rates of grant aid, and the RDP represents an attempt to find an 
integrated solution to problems of employment and service provision (Development 
Commission, 1984 ). 
With signs of change in the balance of power at national level (see 2.6), the agri-
cultural policy community may be forced to make concessions to environmental 
interests. In 1986, the EEC approved an Environmentally Sensitive Area Scheme 
(ESA) at the instigation of Britain (see Figure 3.8). The ESA scheme combines 
agricultural and conservation objectives. It pays farmers to farm traditionally, and 
as such is a revolutionary departure for MAFF. To date, ten ESAs have been des-
ignated covering almost 300,000 hectares, and the scheme has received widespread 
approval (see 7. 7.3). 
l.5 A Critique of Public Intervention in Upland Britain 
Despite recent moves towards more integrated, socially-aware planning schemes, 
their ability to achieve real progress in rural development has been questioned. 
Hoggert and Buller (1987. 176) claim that these schemes are merely: 
"conscience-absolving palliatives for the problems of peripheral rural localities, 
rather than serious attempts to alter their socio-economic standing". 
MacGregor (1985) identifies private landownership as being the root of the rural 
development problem, and argues that no public agency has yet produced any 
policy which fundamentally challenges the hegemony of private interests in the 
countryside, especially those of landowners. This goes back to the question of estate 
management and land use (see 3.2.5). To date, landowners have largely succeeded 
in protecting their interests against those of the public. This situation reflects, 
firstly, the influence of landowning lobby groups in the policy-making process, and 
secondly, the alliance between landowners and planners at the implementation 
level. 
Carter (1980) goes further, and argues that the fundamental ideology underly-
ing public policy towards the Highlands in particular, but which can be extended 
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to upland Britain in general, is imperialist. Successive governments have misin-
terpreted the nature of upland problems, and therefore have offered the wrong 
solutions. Far from upland areas being backwaters which have missed out on the 
economic development of lowland Britain, the uplands are products of that very 
development. The relation of upland to lowland Britain has always been one of 
dependency: 
"The economic history of the upland zone therefore is reflective of changes in 
the structure of the national economy and in the pattern of international trade" 
(Collins, 1978, 16). 
The uplands have never been able to control their own development. Moreover, 
development policies have failed because they only recognise one model of economic 
development based on the western experience. Carter (1980) argues that there are 
alternative economic models. For instance, the structure of the kelping industry in 
the Highlands of 19th century, although archaic in appearance, was a commercial 
response to a given situation [28]. In Carter's view, the application of a western-
style development model to upland areas will only act to: 
"increase underdevelopment rather than promote development, smce present 
underdevelopment is itself the result of just those market forces that dual econ-
omy theorists see to be an economic panacea" (Carter, 1980, 369). 
The only real solution to the problems of the uplands, according to this view, is 
to break away from the influence of the central state and internalise development 
along appropriate lines. This involves some form of land reform, or even land 
nationalisation (Sillars, 1975). 
3.4.6 Summary 
This consideration of public intervention has shown the complexity of the pro-
cesses by which rural development takes place. Decisions relating to land use and 
development in the uplands have been decided in the national interest, or in the 
interests of local elites (campaigning at national level through their representative 
organisations). Public intervention has done little to alter class divisions within 
rural societies at the local level, neither has it avoided conflicts over land use. In-
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creasingly, as the environmental lobby grows in strength, the uplands are becoming 
a battle ground on which national power struggles are fought. 
Public intervention in the development process has failed to achieve any long-
lasting improvements in the rural economy and society of upland Britain. It is 
becoming increasingly apparent that the existing structure of public intervention 
is inappropriate and even harmful to the interests of rural communities. Solutions 
to the failure of past planning policies range from more integrated development 
measures, to a radical challenge to private property rights. In the uplands, private 
property is still seen to be a fundamental barrier to development. 
3.4. 7 Landownership and the Rural Development Process 
The relationships between landownership and rural society, and the processes which 
have caused continuity and change over the 19th and 20th centuries in Britain, 
have now been discussed at the macro and micro levels. Is it possible, from this 
wide-ranging discussion, to develop one conceptual model which contains all these 
components, and which can be applied to actual case studies? Rather than one 
conceptual model, a series of linked conceptual models would appear to provide a 
better working framework. It has been established, that the development process 
in any one locality is contingent upon the relative importance of landed control 
and land management in the local economy and society, as opposed to non-landed 
activities and social groups, and upon the division of power over local affairs be-
tween local and national levels. Landownership, rural society and the State are 
linked in many complex ways. 
The first conceptual model is that of the landownership decision-making process 
(see 3.2). The decision-making framework can be conceptualised as consisting 
of factors of constraint and factors of opportunity. The final decision, however, 
reflects the individual motive of the decision-maker. The factors which make up the 
framework come from both within the estate and from the outside. There are many 
points of comparison between the decision-making frameworks of landowners in the 
19th and 20th centuries, although many of the internal and external factors have 
altered in nature. The discussion has also illuminated the processes of continuity 
and change in landownership structures. It has shown that internal adaptation in 
estate structure can take place without any change to the external form. External 
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factors will differentially affect different landownership groups, and, to some extent, 
generalisations can be made about the motives of different landowners. Finally, the 
historical inertia of land rights and other legal burdens is a fundamental constraint 
upon change in estate form. 
The second conceptual model is that of landownership and rural society (see 3.3). 
Again, the nature of rural society and the local political process have, apparently, 
altered out of all recognition; but the analysis has shown that the essential dis-
tribution of power in rural society has remained constant. In the 19th century, 
geographical variation in rural society could be explained by landownership, the 
physical environment, and the historical legacy. Landowners enjoyed a hegemonic 
control of politics at county level, but their power at local level was uneven. The 
unquestioned authority of the landed interest in the 19th century has been replaced 
by more fluid alliances of power in the 20th century. The role of landownership 
in rural society and local politics today depends on the importance of agricul-
ture in the local economy, and the presence or absence of non-landed elite groups. 
Landowners will assert their interests more forcefully over issues which directly 
concern them. There are still geographical variations in rural society, which reflect 
both past divisions and new socio-economic forces. The decline of traditional rural 
industries, the depopulation of the countryside, and now the reverse movement of 
urbanites into the countryside, are all important processes. 
The third conceptual model is that of public intervention and the development 
process. This represents a loss of local autonomy over development. Today, the 
development of upland Britain cannot be understood without the consideration 
of public intervention. Alliances of interest can be identified between local elite 
groups, and their representatives at national level. The influence of landownership 
is seen most clearly in issues of direct concern: agriculture, the environment, and 
public access; but, despite the plethora of policy types which have been formulated 
for the uplands, no policy has yet been implemented which threatens the interests 
of the landowning and property owning elites. Public intervention to date has 
been unco-ordinated, sometimes contradictory, and even downright harmful in its 
results. There is no consensus as to the causes of rural problems or their solution. 
Attitudes to rural development can be classified into three broad groups: those 
against any form of change to the traditional upland economy (traditionalists), 
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those who wish to prevent environmentally damaging development and promote 
the public enjoyment of the countryside (conservationists), and finally those who 
believe that sensitive development can be combined with conservation and tourism 
(pragmatists). 
What processes can be identified which link these three models, and which can 
link development processes at the micro scale to the national level? Four main 
links can be identified. First, the local structure of landownership can affect the 
local power structure. Localities dominated by large estates, particularly where 
the landowners are resident, are likely to have a local elite dominated by a landed 
or farming interest. Second, how landowners manage their land can materially 
affect the lives of the population dependent for their livelihood on the land. Third, 
the interests of the local elite are supported by their representatives at national 
level. Fourth, government policy and market forces affect both the decision-making 
framework of landowners and the socio-economic development of rural localities. 
Although landownership is not the only factor of importance in the rural devel-
opment process, on certain issues, and in certain areas, landownership can have 
a fundamental impact. In the uplands of Britain, rural society has been less in-
fluenced by the influx of new social elite groups, and agricultural land uses still 
dominate the rural economy. Although the intervention of the State is greatest 
in upland Britain, public policy has failed to present any direct challenge to pri-
vate property rights. It can be concluded, therefore, that landownership would 
appear to be a factor of fundamental importance in the understanding of rural 
development in upland Britain. 
Notes 
1. Robinson (1988, 250), for instance, distinguishes between two levels of decision-
making: long-term structural decisions, and short-term management decisions. 
2. 'Proprietor' replaces 'owner' and 'land unit' replaces 'estate'. 
3. A landowner can possess all these three characteristics. For example, a Bishop 
is an individual and has a personal interest in the estate, and yet the Church is 
immortal and therefore is a fictitious owner. Finally, the Bishop is required to 
manage the estate to meet certain purposes so the ownership is also fiduciary. 
Ministers of State as owners of Crown lands also combine all three functions 
(Denman & Prodano, 1972, 33). 
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4. Conversely, it can also be said that the lessee faces constraints from the superior 
interest. 
5. Caird (1967, 132) observed that landlords actually benefitted from tithe com-
mutation. After the Commutation Act, tithe payments were linked to the 
septennial average of wheat prices, but the amount was based on the 1836 
value and production level of each holding. Between 1836 and 1878, it was 
estimated that land rentals had increased by 50%. This represented a loss to 
the Church of about £2 million. Brodrick (1881, 245) adds that many of the 
local rates were paid by the occupiers rather than the owners of property, he 
did not believe that these could constitute a serious obstacle to investment. 
6. In his 1957 survey, Denman defined an old title as one which dated from before 
1900. 
7. 'Open' and 'closed' were originally terms used by the Poor Law Commissioners 
to classify settlements outside and within estates (Mills, 1980, 23; Clemenson, 
1982, 81). 
8. The Poor Rate was a tax developed in the Tudor period for maintaining the 
poor (Hobsbawn & Rude, 1969, 49). The rate was locally administered, but 
was reformed in 1834 when a central authority was set up to regulate the local 
administration. The Poor Laws had been abused in the late 18th century. 
Many farmers employed labour on wages so low that the workers also qualified 
for poor relief. Thus farmers used the Poor Rate to subsidise their labour costs. 
This practice caused great poverty amongst the agricultural labour force and 
reduced productivity. After 1834, the practice was prohibited and receivers of 
poor relief were required to enter the workhouse (Ernie, 1961, 330). 
9. The Gang System became a matter of public moral concern, and ultimately 
led to a parliamentary commission in 1867 into the employment of women and 
children in agriculture (Clemenson, 1982, 82). 
10. Many of the Church livings controlled by landowners were given to younger 
sons, to provide them with a safe income source (Bourne, 1986, 86). 
11. The Swing Riots (called after a legendary 'Captain Swing') broke out in the 
1830s (Hobsbawn & Rude, 1969). It was an agricultural labourers' movement, 
but protest took many forms, from arson and assaults on employees to the 
destruction of farm machinery. The rioters demanded a higher minimum wage 
and an end to rural unemployment. The riots were concentrated in the south 
eastern counties of England. 
12. Howell (1979, 45) points out that absenteeism grew less frequent as the 19th 
century progressed. Railways improved access between Wales and London, so 
enabling Welsh landowners to spend more time on their estates. 
13. Howell (1979, 94) notes that the practice of having live-in servants was found 
129 
in Scotland and in Northern England, but had disappeared from the rest of 
England in the early 19th century. However, the custom continued in many 
Devonshire farm households until World War Two (Bouquet, 1985, 76). 
14. See Douglas (1976, 60-96) for a full discussion of the Highland 'Land War'. 
It was caused by the insecurity of tenure and poverty amongst the crafting 
communities. Disturbances took place throughout the 1880s. In 1883, the 
Napier Commission reported on the state of the Highland communities, as a 
result of which a Crofters Commission was set up in 1886 to ensure fair rents 
and security of tenure for the crofters. 
15. Pahl (1965, 72), in his study of Hertfordshire villages, identified the following 
impacts of in-migration on rural society: 
• a segregation in housing type. 
• A new middle class (in-migrants were mainly from the mobile middle classes). 
• A collapse of former geographical and social hierarchies within the society and 
a polarisation of interests. 
16. Barlow (1986), in a study of Glemsford in Suffolk, found that by 1851, more 
of the working population were employed in manufacturing (weaving) than in 
agriculture. The weaving industry was owned by London-based capitalists, but 
there was also some locally-based manufacturing. In the second half of the 19th 
century a 'business aristocracy' emerged through a fusion of local capitalists 
and landowners. Many landowners were involved in housing development for 
the expanding industrial base. 
17. Newby and his colleagues (1978, 243) state that it is legitimate to infer interests 
contextually. What people say to be in their interests may not actually be in 
their interests. This may be intentional, or they may be unaware of alternatives. 
18. The Forestry Commission was established in 1919, with the general duty of 
promoting the interests offorestry (the development and expansion of Britain's 
forests and the production and supply of timber). The duties of the Forestry 
Commission have been amended by the 1967 Forestry Act and the Wildlife & 
Countryside Act Amendment (1985). These later acts place on the Forestry 
Commission the duty to endeavour to achieve a 'reasonable' balance between 
the interests of forestry and those of the environment. 
19. In the 1940s, subsidies for hill cattle and sheep were introduced. In 1968, the 
Hill Cow subsidy was replaced by the Beef Cow subsidy. Since entering the 
EEC, this has been replaced by a Suckler Cow Premium. In 1980, the Sheep-
meat Regime was brought in to raise production levels. Farm modernisation 
has been aided by the Hill Farming and Livestock Rearing Grant, introduced in 
1946. This policy met 50% of the costs of capital expenditure on improvements 
to the social and economic fabric of upland farms. This was replaced by the 
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Hill Land Improvement Scheme in 1967, and the Farm Capital Grant Scheme 
in 1970. 
20. The Agriculture and Horticulture Development Scheme provides preferential 
rates for buildings and fixed equipment. The farmer must enter into a farm 
management plan for up to 6 years (Robinson, 1988, 219). 
21. LFAs were established in 1975 under EEC directive 75/276. Within ESAs, 
farmers are eligible for Compensatory Allowances which are paid per head of 
cattle. 
22. Modern planning legislation has its roots in the Public Health and Housing 
Acts of the 19th century (Cloke, 1983, 74-79). The 1947 Town and Country 
Planning Act was influenced by three government reports: the Barlow Report 
on urban areas {1940); the Scott Report on rural areas (1942) and the Uthwatt 
Report on compensation and betterment (1942). The 1947 planning frame-
work was reformed in 1968 by a new Town and Country Planning Act. This 
replaced the old county-level development plan with a dual-scale planning pro-
cess. County councils draw up a broad structure plan which must be approved 
by the Secretary of State, and the district councils are responsible for more 
detailed local plans. 
23. The 'key settlement' concept is a broad term covering a whole range of differ-
ent policies (Cloke, 1983, 95). It has generally been applied by counties with 
high levels of rurality rather than those with strong pressures for development. 
The most infamous and extreme key settlement policy was Durham County 
Council's 'D' village policy of village rationalisation in the 1950s (Barr, 1979). 
24. In 1973, the Nature Conservancy was reformed and divided into two bodies: 
the Nature Conservancy Council (whose role is mainly managerial) and the 
Institute of Terrestrial Ecology (concerned with scientific research). Rose (1986, 
67) claims that the NCC has been hi-jacked by the farming and timber interest. 
Most of its directors come from the private landowning lobby. 
25. Landscape Special Development Orders (LASDOs) were introduced in the 
1950s in National Parks to reduce the exemptions from planning usually granted 
to agricultural- and forestry-related developments. LASDOs have been used 
successfully on only three occasions (Cloke, 1983, 290). Since 1986, farmers 
and landowners wishing to construct buildings or roads must first notify their 
national park authority, and may be required to meet national park building 
specifications (Shoad, 1987, 461). 
26. Under part V of the 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act, 
a local planning authority is allowed to make an access agreement with a 
landowner. In return, the landowner or occupier is entitled to claim compensa-
tion for disturbance. Access agreements may only be made over open country 
(mountain, moor, heath, down, cliff or foreshore). In 1968, the Wildlife and 
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Countryside Act broadened the definition of open country to include wood-
lands, rivers and canals. Local authorities have, in theory, powers of com-
pulsory acquisition, but, in practice, these are rarely used (Gibbs & ·Whitby, 
1974). 
27. At first, the Development Commission concentrated on agricultural research. 
In 1921, a Rural Industries Intelligence Bureau was set up to encourage rural 
industry, which was replaced by CoSIRA in 1968. The Development Commis-
sion has also been responsible for setting up RCCs to encourage community 
level development (Development Commission, 1983/84). In 1984, the Develop-
ment Commission was re-established as a Grant in Aid body, and merged with 
CoSIRA in 1988 to be renamed the Rural Development Commission. 
28. Kelp is an alkaline ash obtained by burning seaweed, and was used in the 
manufacture of fertiliser, soap and glass. The kelping industry was labour 
intensive. The crofts were subsistence smallholdings, provided by the landlords 
to retain the workforce. Subdivision of crofts was encouraged to maximise the 
workforce (Carter, 1980, 372). 
29. Figure 3.2 shows only the total population of upland Britain. A breakdown 
of the figures is given in Collins (1979), which shows that in certain areas of 
upland Britain there has been a absolute decline in population. Although the 
total population has increased, it has grown at a much lower rate relative to 
the total population of Britain. 
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Part II 
Case Studies from the North Pennines 
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Chapter IV 
Landowners and Rural Society in the 19th Century 
4.1 Introduction 
This second part of the thesis will examine case studies of landownership and 
rural development from the North Pennines over the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Using the conceptual framework developed in Part One, it is aimed to test the 
value of this approach as a method of understanding rural development. Not only 
should the findings throw new light on the development of the North Pennines, 
they should also add to a more general understanding of continuity and change in 
landownership structures, and of the motives of different landownership forms. 
The analysis is divided into three time periods: the early 19th century to the late 
19th century (Chapter Four); the late 19th century to the mid-20th century (Chap-
ter Five); and the mid-20th century to the present day (Chapter Six). Chapter 
Seven is concerned with public intervention and the contemporary development 
problems of the North Pennines. 
As has been earlier stated (see 1.3), this is not a comprehensive analysis of the 
development of the North Pennines, but a selective examination of case studies of 
landownership within the region. There are two aims in the analysis: to gain a 
deeper understanding of the region's development and to test the general concepts 
proposed in Part One. In Chapters Four and Five, the analysis focuses on three 
landed estates in the North Pennines under different forms of ownership. The 
experiences of these estates are evaluated '!"ithin the context of the wider devel-
opment of the region and the national experience. In Chapter Six, the analysis 
broadens with a consideration of four privately owned landed estates, common 
land and public landownership. Finally, in Chapter Seven, the analysis focuses on 
the public intervention measures which have most directly affected landownership 
interests in the region. 
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4.1.1 An Introduction to the North Pennines 
The North Pennine region is a part of upland Britain. It is a geological rather than 
an administrative region, so that the boundaries must be somewhat subjectively 
fixed. In the definition used by this thesis, the North Pennines covers an area 
of approximately 2,320 square kilometres (see Map 3.3) [1]. It stretches about 58 
kilometres from north to south, and 40 kilometres from east to west; from the Tyne 
Gap in Northumberland to the edge of the Yorkshire Dales National Park, and from 
Hamsterly Forest in County Durham to the Vale of Eden in Cumbria. The North 
Pennines extends over three counties: Durham, Cumbria and Northumberland, 
although the largest part, 50%, lies in County Durham. Before the reorganisation 
of local government in 1973, the North Pennines spanned five counties: Durham, 
Cumberland, Westmoreland, Northumberland and North Yorkshire. In the 19th 
century, the region was divided into ecclesiastical parishes, chapelries and town-
ships, but following the Local Government Act of 1888 these were reorganised into 
civil parishes (see Appendix B). 
The geology of the North Pennines is carboniferous (250 - 300 million years BP). 
Carboniferous limestone is overlaid by millstone grit, and in places thin seams of 
coal lie between the limestone and the millstone grit (Ra.istrick, 1968, 34). The 
modern geological structure has also been formed by subsequent earth movements 
and the ice age. The whole area is tilted in an easterly direction. A faultline runs 
north to south along the western edge to form a steep escarpment, dropping down 
to the Eden Valley. Localised doming of the rocks at Alston has caused rock-
fracturing and mineralisation. In this mineralised area, lead, zinc, iron, quarz, 
calcite, fluorspar and barite deposits are found (Raistrick, 1968, 43}. At the end of 
the carboniferous period the Great Whin Sill was formed. This is a band of doleritic 
rock which runs across the Pennines in a north-easterly direction (Smailes, 1968, 
273}. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the relief and river pattern of the present day landscape. The 
landscape of the North Pennines region today consists of two main components: 
the fells (high moors), and the dales (river valleys). The fells are capped by 
millstone grit, and lie between 300m above sea level and 893m at the highest point 
on Cross Fell. The soils on the fells are sandy, acidic and infertile (Ra.istrick, 1968, 
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46). On the highest fells, patches of arctic alpine vegetation are found, but the 
characteristic vegetation of the fells is cotton grass (on poorly-drained plateaus 
associated with peat deposits), and heather on the better drained moors. 
The dales dissect the fells, and lie below 210m. Here, the soils are more fertile 
(clays, sands and gravels). Six main rivers drain the area: the South Tyne, the 
West and East Allen, the Derwent, the Wear and the Tees. These rivers give their 
names to the main dales: South Tynedale, West and East Allendale, Derwent 
Valley, Weardale and Teesdale respectively. All the rivers rise near the summit of 
Cross Fell and all but the first three flow eastwards (the South Tyne, East and 
West Allen flow northwards), (Dunham, 1948, 1). 
Climatic conditions are harsh, with high rainfall all year round and heavy snow in 
winter. Rainfall is highest on the western edge. Cross Fell receives over 1,500mm 
per annum, while Stanhope and Middleton receive about 900mm (Raistrick, 1968, 
49). Similarly, snowfall is heavier on the western edge, lying for 100 to 140 days 
a year on Cross Fell. The high relief and harsh climate of the North Pennines are 
severe constraints on agricultural activity, particularly so in the highest central 
area. At Moor House in Upper Teesdale (561m) the length of the growing season 
is 165 days, whereas below 210m it is over 200 days (ibid., 49). Agricultural 
activity is concentrated in the dales, where the soils can be improved for pasture 
and meadow land. Crops can only be grown on the lower, eastern edge of the 
region. Further up the valley sides and on the fells, the soils become rapidly less 
improveable, and these areas are used largely for extensive rough grazing (Smailes, 
1968, 277). 
4.1.2 Economy and Society in the 19th Century 
"The soil of the greater part of this lead mine district is poor and thin, in places 
being composed of vegetable substances imperfectly decomposed. It presents u.s 
with large tracts of peat, in which we find every here and there, from want 
of draining, wet spongy fiats, provincially called mosses or flows. Here all is 
wild and uncultivated. It cannot be called an agricultural district. The lettings 
are very small and the moors not half stocked. The chief dependence of the 
inhabitants is upon the mines, the care or cultivation of the land is with them 
a minor consideration. A horse to bring coals for the family, a cow to supply 
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milk, or a few sheep, if he borders on the common, is all that the householder 
desires" (Bell, 1856, 92). 
At the turn of the 19th century, the North Pennines had a dual economy based on 
lead mining and farming. Of the two industries, lead mining dominated the socio-
economic development of the region in this period, and it is the lead industry which 
dominates the literature about the region (Hughes, 1963; Raistrick & Jennings, 
1965; Hunt, 1972). From the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the 1880s, lead mining 
in the North Pennines was at its height (Dunham, 1948, 4). Figure 4.2 shows lead 
ore output in the North Pennines and the UK. Between 1845 and 1913, Durham 
and Northumberland alone were responsible for nearly a quarter of the total lead 
ore production of the United Kingdom (Burt et al, 1983, ix). Some indication of 
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the scale of the lead industry is given by the following statistics: in 1810 in County 
Durham there were reported to be 4 working lead mines in the Derwent Valley, 38 
in Weardale, and 48 in Teesdale (Bailey, 1810, 38). On Alston Moor, there were 
62 working mines in 1822 (Neasham, 1893, 228), whilst in Allendale, 12,000 bings 
of ore were raised in 1797 with a value of £50,000 (Bailey & Culley, 1797, 21) [2]. 
At the peak of mining activity, over 4,000 men were employed in the lead mining 
industry (Smailes, 1968, 278). An understanding of the organisation and control 
of the lead industry would, therefore, appear to be essential to an analysis of the 
rural development of the North Pennines at this period. 
Table 4.1- Total Recorded Production of Metallic Minerals, 1666 to 
1938 (tons) 
District Lead Zinc Copper Iron Barytes Fluorspar 
Escarpment 25,832 - - - 61,900 -
Alston Moor 817,137 190,757 1,583 52,021 1,043 987 
West Allendale 208,791 56,561 - - - -
East Allendale 305,594 90 - - - -
Weardale 920,136 - - 1,480,519 1,838 608,120 
Derwent 51,429 - - - - 15,269 
Teesdale 377,228 737 - 3,981 150,751 -
Haydon Bridge 143,990 - - - 397 -
TOTAL 2,850,137 248,145 1,583 1,536,521 215,929 624,376 
Source: Dunham (1946, 6) 
The lead ore field is located in the central, highest part of the North Pennines 
around Alston Moor, Allendale, Upper Weardale and Upper Teesdale (see Figure 
4.3). Although lead has been the most sought after mineral; zinc, copper, iron, 
barytes and fluorspar have also been mined. Table 4.1 shows the total mineral 
output from the North Pennines from 1666 to 1938. Lead has been mined in 
the region since Norman times, but in the mid-18th century, lead mining was 
transformed from a small scale activity to an organised, highly productive industry 
(Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 183). 
What role did landowners play in the lead mining industry, and how did the 
industry affect the lives of the inhabitants? The ownership of all minerals excepting 
gold was vested in the lords of the manors (see 2.2.2). Owners of manorial interests 
in the lead mining area were, potentially, in a very powerful position. From Figure 
4.4, it can be seen that ownership of the manorial rights over the lead mining 
area was dominated by four landowners: the Blackett-Beaumonts in Allendale [3], 
Greenwich Hospital on Alston Moor, the Bishops of Durham in Weardale and the 
Earl of Darlington in Teesdale [4]. Smaller owners of mineral rights included Lord 
Crewe's Charity in the Derwent Valley, and the Earl of Strathmore south of the 
River Tees in North Yorkshire. 
All these landowners were involved to some extent in the lead mining industry, 
but the strategies adopted for exploiting the lead varied from active exploitation 
to arms-length control (Hughes, 1963). The Blackett-Beaumonts were the only 
landowners to take direct control of their lead, controlling the whole process from 
extraction and processing to marketing. As well as their lead in Allendale, they 
also leased the mineral rights in Upper Weardale from the Bishops of Durham. 
Allendale and Upper Weardale, being contiguous areas, could be managed as a 
single unit. Smelt mills were built at Allenheads, Rookhope and Dukesfield to 
process the ore from Allendale and Weardale before marketing. 
Greenwich Hospital adopted a partly capitalist, partly rentier strategy towards its 
lead resources on Alston Moor. \Vhen Greenwich Hospital acquired the Alston 
Moor estate in 1735, it was in a very dilapidated condition [5]. The Hospital's first 
policy was to grant many small mining leases and divide the control of the lead. 
At first, therefore, mining was carried out on a small scale, unco-ordinated basis, 
with minimal direction from the Hospital. In 1760, the Hospital took over the 
processing of the lead ore, and so assumed greater control over the lead (Hughes, 
1963, 54). In 1767, they built a smelt mill at Langley to process not only their own 
lead, but lead ore purchased from other concerns. They also attempted to improve 
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the extraction of lead by commencing work on the Nent Force Level in 1776 [6]. 
In 1768, there were 119 active mines on Alston Moor with an annual output of 
20,610 bings (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 144). 
The other owners of lead in the North Pennines all adopted a rentier position, 
devolving all rights to extract, process and market the lead to mining companies. 
The major mining company, apart from the Blackett-Beaumonts, was the London 
Lead Company. This quaker-owned company was formed in 1692 (Ra.istrick, 1977, 
10). It also acquired mineral interests in Wales and Derbyshire, but after 1790 
consolidated its operations in the North Pennines. The London Lead Company 
was the major lessee on Alston Moor, but because of Greenwich Hospital's policy of 
granting many small leases, the London Lead Company could only slowly expand 
its interests there. In 1765, the company managed 35 separate leases. Management 
was simplified in 1820 when the Hospital decided to rationalise its leasing system, 
and granted the London Lead Company two large leases (Raistrick & Jennings, 
1965, 188). The London Lead Company also leased the lead mines in the Derwent 
Valley from the trustees of Lord Crewe's Charity until the early 1800s. In 1753, 
the company took the lease of the Teesdale mines from the Earl of Darlington, and 
in 1800, the lease of the mines and smelt mills at Stanhope and Bollihope from 
the Bishops of Durham. The Teesdale lead ore was smelted at Eggleston. 
The degree to which landowners benefitted financially from the lead depended 
on the balance of ownership and control. Both the capitalist and the rentier 
approaches offered advantages and disadvantages. Direct control of the mining 
process by the landowner entitled him to appropriate the full profits, but provided 
no safeguards in times of depression. Where ownership and control of the lead 
were divided, the lessor was assured of a regular guaranteed income, but only a 
share of the profits in times of prosperity. The standard mineral lease consisted of 
a certain rent, which the lessee paid every year regardless of the production level, 
and a royalty rent, which was linked to production. The lessee then had to pay 
a duty on the amount of ore raised of up to a fifth. The lessors could control the 
activities of the mining companies to some extent by attaching conditions to the 
lease. For instance, Greenwich Hospital stipulated that each lessee work his mine 
for at least nine months a year (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 192). 
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The Blackett-Beaumonts and the London Lead Company dominated lead produc-
tion in the North Pennines [7]. There were many other smaller mining ventures, 
but none challenged the supremacy of the two main companies. The lead industry 
carried unavoidable financial risks, due to the frequent fluctuations in prices (see 
Figure 4.2). Lead prices were generally high during the first thirty years of the 
19th century, but from 1831 to 1841 there was a depression due to competition 
from Spain, and prices dropped dramatically. The larger mining companies were 
better able to survive than small mining concerns during these slumps in the lead 
market, having greater capital resources to draw on [8]. During the 1830s depres-
sion, for example, two thirds of the mining operations on Alston Moor were halted 
(Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 302). 
The Blackett-Beaumonts and the London Lead Company were at the forefront of 
technical advances in the industry [9]. However, the geological conditions in which 
lead ore occurs constrained the organisation of the industry (Hughes,· 1963, 60). 
Lead mines were small, and mainly located high up the hillsides in the upper dales. 
Despite the virtual monopoply over the industry exerted by the two big companies, 
the industry retained a high element of entrepreneurship. Miners worked in small 
groups of not more than twelve men. They negotiated bargains with the mining 
company at quarterly intervals, when the company would grant the men a vein to 
mine and would agree a payment in advance based on the expected value of the 
vein. The bargain system was mutually beneficial to the mining companies and the 
miners (Hunt, 1972, 35). For the mine owners, it gave the miners an incentive to 
work hard, it spread the financial risks (the miners had to speculate as well as the 
owners), and it maintained a very flexible workforce. For the miners, they retained 
their independence and sometimes, if they were lucky, the vein would prove to be 
richer than expected, and they would make a profit. 
The two main mining companies required complex management structures. The 
Blackett-Beaumonts employed a chief agent based in Newcastle, and under him 
three agents based in Weardale, Allenheads, and Coalcleugh (Hughes, 1963, 56). 
The London Lead Company had a similar system, with a chief agent at Nent Head 
and agents based at Nent Head, Stanhope, Hilton, Dufton, and Lunedale (Raistrick 
& Jennings, 1965, 262). During the 19th century, the companies imposed more 
regulated working practices on the miners in the interests of greater efficiency 
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and control (Hunt, 1972, 47). Miners had to work regular hours and mines were 
inspected frequently by the agents. 
Over the course of the 19th century, the mining companies and landowners invested 
large amounts of capital in developing a transport network to link the mining areas 
to the surrounding lowlands. In the 18th century, the lead had had to be carried by 
pony along drovers' tracks, which were often impassable in winter [10]. In the early 
19th century, roads were constructed along all the lead mining dales. Between 1815 
and 1865, the London Lead Company spent £25,000 on road building (Raistrick 
& Jennings, 1965, 272). Later, in the 1850s and 1860s, a more limited rail network 
was developed, with branch lines terminating at Stanhope (1834), Alston (1852), 
Allenheads (1856), and Middleton (1867). Because of the difficulty of constructing 
roads over the fells, few transport links were developed between the dales. Besides, 
the landowners and mining companies were more interested in expanding their links 
with the outside, than with their neighbours within the region. 
Lead mining had a fundamental impact on the structure of farming (Smailes, 
1968, 276). Although lead mining was the major sector of the economy, farming 
played an important economic and social role in many mining households. The 
harsh climate and poor soils placed strict limits on the agricultural potential of the 
region. It is likely that much of the mining area would have remained unenclosed 
but for the land hunger generated by the mining population. Perhaps because of 
the extensive organisation of the lead industry, whereby settlements were small 
and scattered, and perhaps because of the need to ensure a food supply in such an 
inaccessible region, the custom grew up amongst the miners of combining farming 
with mining. These farms were generally little more than smallholdings. They 
provided a subsistence living for the miner and his family and were a safeguard 
against times of depression (Hunt, 1972, 147). 
The custom was encouraged by the landowners, who were thus able to let land for 
which, in normal circumstances, there would have been no demand. Granger ( 1794, 
21) noted that miners were prepared to take smallholdings at extravagantly high 
rents. The custom was also encouraged by the mining companies, since it increased 
the security of the workforce. Those miners that could not afford a smallholding 
had a garden (Hunt, 1972, 159). The London Lead Company provided each house 
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in the mining village of Nenthead with a garden. The land hunger generated by 
the miners was undoubtedly a factor behind the enclosure of much of the region in 
the late 18th and early 19th centuries (see Figure 4.5) [11]. Enclosure resulted in 
an extension and reorganisation of the farmed area (Hunt, 1972, 152). The harsh 
environment of the region, however, limited the amount of land which could be 
enclosed, and most of the fell tops remained unenclosed as common grazing lands. 
The lead mining industry had a major impact on the population of the North Pen-
nines. The population over most of the region grew dramatically over the first half 
of the century (see Figure 4.6). The particularly high rate of population growth in 
the lead mining field reflects the growing employment needs of the industry in the 
first half of the 19th century. Altogether, the population of the lead mining area 
increased by over 75% between 1801 and 1831 (Hunt, 1972, 189). Different areas 
of the lead mining field developed at different rates (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 
281). Production at Allendale and Alston Moor peaked in the 1820s; in Weardale 
peak production was from 1840 to 1860; whilst in Teesdale production did not peak 
until the 1850s, and remained high until 1870. The population growth associated 
with the mining industry influenced the settlement pattern. The existing market 
towns in the region, Allenheads, Stanhope, and Middleton, all grew, but also new 
mining villages grew up closer to the mining areas in the upper dales. The min-
ing companies took an active role in the provision of housing for their employees. 
The villages of Nent Head and Garrigill were planned and developed by the Lon-
don Lead Company [12], whilst the Blackett-Beaumonts developed Allenheads and 
Coalcleugh. The location of the lead mines explains the high altitudes, of between 
1,000 and 1,500 feet (304.8 and 457.2 metres), at which these mining settlements 
were located (Hunt, 1972, 161). One farmstead in Teesdale was situated at over 
2,000 feet (609.6 metres). 
What kind of society developed under such conditions'? The highly concentrated 
ownership and control of land and lead, together with the extensive nature of 
the mining industry and settlement pattern, produced a somewhat contradictory 
mixture of open and closed characteristics. The mining companies exercised a 
strong influence over the social lives of their employees. This was particularly true 
of the London Lead Company, which practised a: 
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"comprehensive social policy derived from a marriage of Quaker philosophy and 
sound business principles" (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 292). 
In the village of Nenthead, the company showed their enlightened paternalism 
by providing a water supply, baths and public washhouse for the miners, plus a 
ready money shop selling goods at subsidised prices, a school, reading room, post 
office, library and public house (Raistrick, 1977, 138). The company provided 
free schooling and medical services for all their employees' families. The Blackett-
Beaumonts seem to have followed the example set by the London Lead Company, 
by providing schools, libraries and medical services (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 
321). 
The predominant features of this society were, however, open. The rapid popu-
lation growth, a dual employment structure and an under-capitalised farm struc-
ture, all correspond to the open model (see 3.3.1). In addition, non-conformism 
was widespread. Methodism arrived in the North Pennines in the 18th century 
[13], and by the mid-19th century most mining settlements supported Wes~an, 
Primitive Methodist and Quaker chapels. The London Lead Company obviously 
encouraged the spread of quakerism, but the growth of the other religions was a 
reaction against the Establishment. This was particularly true on the estates of 
the Bishops of Durham in Weardale, where the Church was regarded as a remote 
and exploitative institution. The Rector of Stanhope was reportedly the best paid 
parish priest in the country, with a salary in 1835 of £4,875 (Hunt, 1970, 217). 
He was absent from the parish most of the time and apparently appropriated the 
income for his personal enjoyment. 
The following passage indicates the strong attachment of the lead miners to the 
region, despite the harshness of the miners' lives: 
"the natives of the dale grow up with an attachment to their native land and 
their own people which nothing can overcome. Hence it is that, although by 
removing only 20 miles down into the coal country a young man might nearly 
double his income, and have the prospect of adding many years of health and 
strength to his life, he cannot remove. He clings to his beloved dale, and follows 
an occupation which in most instances allows but a short life, the last years of 
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which are spent in sickness and sorrow" (Poor Law Commission Report, 1842, 
722; quoted from Hunt, 1970, 194 ). 
Average life expectancy for a miner was only 30 years. During depressions in the 
lead trade, great distress was caused in the mining communities. Before the 1834 
Poor Law Act, distress was compounded by a ruling of 1816, which exempted 
the proprietors of the lead mines from the payment of poor rates (Raistrick & 
Jennings, 1965, 297). The burden of maintaining the unemployed miners thus 
fell on the occupiers of lands. The mining companies and landowners did often 
relieve short-term distress, by providing distress work in land improvements or 
road building (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 303). In 1832, Greenwich Hospital 
even subsidised the passage of 124 miners emigrating to Canada. 
Not all the estates were equally dependent on lead mining, however. The Raby 
estate, for instance, was predominantly an agricultural estate. A report on this 
estate by Caird in 1851 indicates that in the midst of the rapid changes associated 
with the mining industry, agriculture had changed very little. He was critical of 
the management policy of the Duke of Cleveland. Although on the surface the 
policy of the Duke appeared benevolent (rents had not been raised for 50 years, 
tenancy was hereditary and the landlord maintained the estate in good condition), 
in practice this approach led to 'indolence' on the part of the tenantry. In Caird's 
view, the estate's resources were under-utilised. The continuity ofthis estate stood 
in stark contrast to the changes in County Durham as whole. Rapid population 
growth due to the coal-mining industry had created a large demand for food and 
should have provided an incentive to increase agricultural production: 
"In the midst of this activity and industry we find a great estate standing nearly 
still for half a century, the landlord declining to prevail himself of the natural 
and legitimate benefits of his property" (Caird, 1968, 349). 
4.1.3 Summary 
This brief overview of the physical geography of the North Pennines and of its 
economy and society in the early 19th century, provides a context for the following 
detailed case studies. The North Pennines is a geological rather than a political 
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region. Although linked by a common economy, there was little social interaction 
between the dales: 
111n human terms, the area consists not of one unit, but of several distinct units 
of similar type" {Smailes, 1968, 270). 
In the 19th century, the region was divided by administrative boundaries and by 
the estates of the major landowners and the control of the mining companies. The 
ownership of land and lead, the two principal resources in the North Pennines, was 
concentrated in a few hands. The region was dominated by landed estates under 
private {Raby, Allendale and Strathmore); institutional {Greenwich Hospital and 
the Bishops of Durham); and charitable (Lord Crewe's Charity) ownership. These 
landowners were in a powerful position with respect to the lead, but adopted 
different strategies of exploitation. The lead mining industry is an example of the 
role of landed capital in the development of industry (see 2.2.3). Where the mineral 
rights were leased, the mining company exerted as much, if not more, influence 
over the lives of the inhabitants. 
In the early 19th century, the North Pennines was experiencing a period of pros-
perity, but little of the profit accrued to the working population. The economy was 
unstable due to the frequent fluctuations in the price of lead and it was the miners 
who were the first to suffer during periods of depression. Lead influenced the farm-
ing structure and the society of the region. Farming was characterised by small, 
under-capitalised holdings, although on the outskirts of the mining area farming 
played a more important role. Despite the concentrated ownership of land and 
lead, the society displayed many open characteristics. A wide social gulf existed 
between the miners on the one hand, and the landowners and mining companies 
on the other. 
The lead mining field did not cover the whole of the North Pennines, however, and 
it would be expected that the influence of lead-mining would have been less on the 
margins. It can be seen from Figure 4.6, for example, that the rate of population 
growth was lower around the edge of the region. Little has been written about the 
socio-economic conditions, or the role of landownership, in these border regions. 
Neither has much been written about farming in the region at, and after, enclosure. 
The estate case studies which form the core of the following three sections of 
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this chapter aim to redress this imbalance. They were selected to represent the 
diversity of landownership forms and estates found throughout the whole region. 
The Wemmergill estate, owned by the Earls of Strathmore, is located on the edge 
of the lead mining area, and is an example of private ownership. The Blanchland 
estate, owned by the trustees of Lord Crewe's Charity, is an example of charitable 
ownership in a declining lead mining area whilst, finally, the Stanhope estate, 
owned by the Bishops of Durham, represents institutional ownership at the centre 
of the lead mining area. 
The following analysis concentrates on the landowners rather than the mining com-
panies, and the effect of ownership form and estate structure on estate manage-
ment. The conceptual models of landownership decision-making and rural society 
outlined in the previous chapter provide a framework for the analysis. 
4.2 Case Study One: The Wemmergill Estate 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The private estate which has been chosen as a case study is the Wemmergill estate, 
belonging to the earls of Strathmore [14], a. Scottish family, whose ancestors, the 
Lyons, were granted the thana.ge of Glamis in the 14th century. Glamis Castle be-
came the family seat, and in 1677 the family were awarded an earldom, afterwards 
being known as the earls of Strathmore. The link with County Durham was forged 
in the 18th century, when the 9th Earl of Strathmore married Mary Eleanor Bowes. 
The Bowes were a Durham landowning family who had made their fortune in the 
coal trade. The mineral-rich estate of Gibside in North Durham was bought in 
the 17th century by Sir William Bowes; and his son, George Bowes, was a founder 
member of the Grand Alliance (see 2.2.3). George Bowes' daughter, Mary Eleanor, 
was an only child and so inherited her father's estates on his death in 1760. The 
inheritance was conditional upon Mary Eleanor's husband assuming the surname 
Bowes, a request that was readily met by the 9th Earl, who thereafter was known 
as John Bowes [15]. John and Mary Bowes took up residence at the Bowes family 
seat, Streatlam Castle. They had two sons: John and Thomas. John inherited the 
Scottish and English estates on his father's death in 1776, and in 1815 received 
the title Baron Bowes of Strea.tla.m Castle and Lunedale. 
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4.2.2 The Strathmore Estates 
Table 4.2 shows the extent of the family's landholdings in 1873. The Strathmores 
were, without doubt, one of the great landowners of the 19th century (see 2.2.1). 
The size, geographical distribution, and varied resource base of their landholdings 
required a complex management structure (see 3.2.2). The estates fell into two 
blocks: the Scottish estates and the English estates. The Scottish estates were 
managed by a land agent based at Glamis Castle. The Streatlam, Gibside, and 
Yorkshire estates were under the control of a land agent based at Streatlam Cas-
tle. However, the management demands of the Gibside estate differed to such an 
extent that it should be treated as a separate estate [16]. Although the Streatlam 
and Yorkshire estates were controlled by the same land agent, for all administra-
tive purposes they were treated as separate estates and so will be divided in this 
analysis. 
Table 4.2 - The Strathmore Estates, 1873 
Estate Area (has) %total area Annual Value (£) % total value 
Forfar 9,417 33.3 24,280 49 
Perth 113 0.4 455 0.7 
Sussex 7 0.02 298 0.6 
Herts 750 2.7 3,569 7.2 
Yorks NR 14,536 51.4 5,283 10.6 
Durham 3,464 12.2 15,788 31.8 
TOTAL 28,286 100 49,573 100 
Source: Bateman {1883) 
The Yorkshire estate was known as the 'Wemmergill' or 'Highland' estate. It was 
located south of the River Tees and covered about 12,500 hectares (see Figure 
4. 7). It can be seen from Table 4.2 that the Wemmergill estate formed over half 
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of the family's total landholdings by area, but contributed only 10% to the total 
income. Economically, it was of minimal importance compared, for example, with 
the Durham estates which were situated on the coal field, but the size of the 
Wemmergill estate gave the earls of Strathmore political and social control over 
a considerable area, especially as the estate lay adjacent to the Streatlam estate, 
forming a large compact block of control. 
In the early 19th century, the Wemmergill estate lay within the ecclesiastical parish 
of Romaldkirk (see Appendix B). The parish was subdivided into eight manors, 
over seven of which the earls of Strathmore owned manorial rights: Lune, Lon-
ton, Holwick, Crossthwaite, Cotherstone, Mickleton and Hunderthwaite [17). As 
Lords of the Manor, the earls owned mineral, sporting and customary land rights 
over the whole estate [18). In addition, they were the principal landowners and, 
therefore, commanded a virtual monopoly of control over the estate. Each manor 
was administered separately as a subunit of the Wemmergill estate. Most of the 
tenanted farmholdings were located in the manors of Holwick and Lune, and the 
following analysis will concentrate on these two units, as they were of greatest eco-
nomic importance to the earls, although their development will be placed within 
the wider framework of the Wemmergill estate and, where appropriate, the other 
estates. 
4.2.3 The Wemmergill Estate, 1800-1830 
At the turn of the 19th century, the lOth Earl of Strathmore was the landlord of 
Wemmergill and the land agent was George Colpitts (see Appendix C). The first 
30 years of the 19th century saw great changes on the Wemmergill estate. Between 
1811 and 1820, the whol~ estate was enclosed. Separate awards were made for the 
manors of Lune, Holwick, Romaldkirk, Mickleton, Cotherstone and Hunderthwaite 
(D/St/E3/I9/77, 78). 
Table 4.3 sets out the lands in Lune and Holwick which were to be divided and 
enclosed, a total area of almost 3,000 hectares. As the principal landowner, the 
lOth Earl of Strathmore was entitled to the largest share of the land to be enclosed, 
but altogether 35 claims were submitted for allotments on Lune Moor, 11 claims 
were made for Thringa.rth Pasture, and 13 for Sleights Pasture (D/St/E3/19/95). 
The enclosure award also made provisions for the commutation of tithes, The 
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Table 4.3 - The 1820 Enclosure Award 
Area to be Enclosed Hectares 
Lune Moor 1,399 
Lune Town Fields 17.5 
Thringarth and Sleights Pasture 225 
Holwick Moor 1,096 
Holwick Town Fields 104 
TOTAL 2,842 
Source: D/St/E3/19/78. 
Rector of Romaldkirk being awarded land in lieu [19]. The award was carried out, 
apparently, with the consent of most proprietors. The main bone of contention 
was over the rectorial allotment [20]. 
Enclosure provided an opportunity for the lOth Earl to rationalise and enlarge 
the leasehold farm holdings on the estate. The number of tenanted holdings was 
increased by three [21], and the total area of leasehold land was increased by the 
enclosure of allotments on Lune Moor, which were later divided and added to the 
existing holdings. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the size of the Lunedale farms before 
(1810) and after (1821) enclosure. There were 31 farm holdings, ranging in size, 
in 1821, from 2. 7 to 290.8 hectares, although most of the holdings were under 
25 h_ectares. There was little change in farm size between 1810 and 1821, but 
by 1860 it can be seen that most of the holdings had increased in size. Table 
4.6 enables a comparison to be made between the farm structures of the different 
subunits of the Wemmergill estate in 1860 (the exact hectarages of the Holwick, 
Mickleton, and Hunderthwaite farms are given in Appendix D). It shows that the 
Lunedale, Holwick and Mickleton farm structures were all dominated numerically 
by smallholdings (under 25 hectares). 
It took some time, following the award, for the division of the allotments at 
Lunedale to be completed. Much work and expense was involved in building stone 
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Table 4.4- Lunedale Farm Sizes 
FARM 1810 1821 1841 1860 1911 1920 -
- - - - - - Allotment Enclosed 
Close House 10.5 38.4 23.5 47.0 51.5 147.9 68.3 
Arngill 28.2 - 27.9 - - - -
Lune Head 59.8 59.8 58.2 58.4 58.2 86.2 24.1 
Wythes Hill 17.5 9.8 202.5 202.1 187.5 162.0 52.9 
Grains 0' Beck 39.7 39.7 63.6 87.3 86.4 63.7 47.0 
Scar House 21.2 21.2 23.6 - - - -
Old Gate 21.5 21.5 - - - - -
Blake House 14.7 16.6 18.1 36.4 36.4 31.6 35.4 
Dow Hill 20.5 20.5 20.5 - - - -
Scar Head 17.7 17.6 25.7 25.7 30.7 5.8 35.8 
Stackholme 2.8 29.4 54.3 66.1 66.1 - 66.2 
Cor bush - 6.5 11.6 - - - -
Intake 26.5 13.3 - - - - -
Low Wemmergill 9.7 39.7 78.7 69.8 69.4 - 72.5 
High Soulgill 15.7 15.7 15.7 15.7 15.7 32.5 16.2 
High Grain 8.7 18.9 56.7 33.3 28.4 - 33.3 
Low Soulgill 15.3 - 18.7 - - - -
Sources: D/St/E3/19/78; 11/3; 13/17; 11/6; IR/1/146; E3/9/33. 
walls and improving the land. By 1821, only Low Wemmergill farm had increased 
significantly in size (from 10 hectares to 40) [22]. The total area of tenanted hold-
ings increased from 895.1 hectares in 1810, to 951.6 in 1821, and 1,317 hectares in 
1841 (see Tables 4.4 & 4.5). The enclosure award initiated changes which were to 
continue throughout the century. 
Although the purpose of the enclosure award was to improve the value ofthe estate, 
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Table 4.5- Lunedale Farm Sizes 
FARM 1810 1821 1841 1860 1911 1920 -
-
-
- - - -
Allotment Enclosed 
Wemmergill Hall 100.5 90.1 87.5 78.6 77.7 87.0 76.6 
Grassholme West 6.9 14.1 25.5 53.7 13.3 20.8 12.0 
Grassholme Mill 21.5 2.7 - - - - -
Stack 8.3 9.7 34.7 34.7 33.6 - 35.0 
Rigg 8.8 8.8 9.4 9.4 12.5 - 29.5 
Grassholme East 6.9 6.3 25.5 25.5 15.4 - -
Grassholme Middle - 19.0 - - - - -
East Close 5.6 5.6 5.1 5.6 - - -
West Stake Hill 14.8 14.8 15.8 25.7 29.6 10.8 20.4 
East Stake Hill 9.3 9.7 9.7 - - - -
West Park 24.6 24.8 24.8 24.8 46.2 25.4 22.0 
Thringarth 10.5 8.4 8.9 8.7 - - 9.1 
East Park 69.8 70.9 70.9 75.8 62.2 - 64.5 
Chapel House - 7.3 8.3 8.0 3.5 - 5.0 
Cronkley 277.6 290.8 291.6 291.6 295.8 251.2 29.5 
TOTAL 895.1 951.6 1,317.0 1,284.5 1,228.8 924.9 755.3 
Sources: D/St/E3/19/78; 11/3; 13/17; 11/6; IR/1/146; E3/9/33. 
the realisation of this aim was impeded by two events which occurred immediately 
after the completion of the award: one internal and one external to the estate. 
The first event was the death of the lOth Earl in 1820. He had never married, 
but had produced a son, John, by his mistress Mary Milner of Stainton [23]. They 
married shortly before the Earl's death, but too late to secure the legitimacy of 
his son's claim to the inheritance. The Scottish branch of the family disputed 
John Bowes' claim to the earldom, and in 1821 the case was referred to the House 
of Lords. John Bowes lost his case, but he was awarded the right to enjoy the 
Durham and Yorkshire estates during his lifetime [24]. The earldom and control of 
the Scottish estates passed to his father's younger brother Thomas, and the title of 
Baron Bowes was extinguished. At the time of his father's death John Bowes was 
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Table 4.6 - Size Distribution of the Wemmergill Farms, 1860 
Farm Size (has) Lunedale Holwick Mickleton H underthwaite 
< 25 6 14 6 3 
25- 50 8 2 2 1 
50- 75 4 1 1 0 
> 75 5 3 2 4 
TOTAL 23 20 11 8 
(In the following tables acres have been converted into hectares to one decimal 
place). 
still only 9 years old and so too young to come in to his inheritance. The estates 
were, therefore, managed for an interim period by trustees until 1832 when John 
Bowes came of age [25]. 
The second occurrence was the onset of a national depression in agriculture fol-
lowing the end of the Napoleonic Wars [26]. This depression, coinciding with the 
enormous costs of enclosure and the death of the lOth Earl, placed a considerable 
financial burden on the estate. 
Three reports written soon after the enclosure award suggest that there were con-
flicting views as to the best use of the estate's resources. These reports not only 
discuss estate management strategies, but also describe the state of the farm hold-
ings at the time and the extent of agricultural distress during the depression. 
Specialist advice was sought by the trustees immediately after the award from the 
surveyors Thomas Bell and Edward Clint [27]. They were obviously 'improvers', 
and made several suggestions as to how the value of the estate could be increased. 
Specifically, they recommended that the tenants reduce the land under tillage and 
turn it over to stock, as the land was too poor for arable; and that altogether 16 
farm holdings be amalgamated, thereby reducing the total number of farm holdings 
by almost 50% [28]. They saw two advantages in the amalgamation of the farm 
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holdings. First, all the farm buildings were found to be in a very poor state of 
repair. The cost of repairing and improving all the holdings would be astronomical 
as well as time-consuming. It would be more efficient to concentrate resources on 
a few holdings. Second, they wished to see a better class of tenantry on the estate, 
and felt that this could be achieved with the creation of viable full-time holdings: 
"We feel the more convinced that to insure the future letting of this property to 
advantage etc considerable sacrifice must be submitted to, for unless buildings 
and fences are erected, gates and gate posts supplied, much draining done and 
plantations judiciously placed for shelter and profit, we fear a more substantial 
and improving tenantry cannot be induced to take the Highland farms, nor can 
the small farms be united or laid to others with that prospect of advantage we 
anticipate" (D/St/E3/11/3). 
They criticised the existing tenants, who were mainly miner-farmers, for managing 
their holdings at subsistence level: growing potatoes and corn for their own con-
sumption without improving the land. They also lacked the capital to stock the 
moors to their full capacity. Bell and Clint illustrated the benefits to the estate of 
commercial farming, by praising the new tenants of Low Wemmergill farm for: 
"conducting this farm in a superior manner, shewing the necessity of selecting 
tenants capable of similar improvements and by their example stimulating others 
to a like creditable course of management" (D/St/E3/11/3). 
The ensuing agricultural depression probably cast a different light on Bell and 
Clints' proposals. In 1825, Joseph Watson, the Lunedale bailiff and himself a 
farm tenant on the estate, carried out a farm valuation and survey, and came up 
with very different recommendations (D/St/E3/11/5). He argued that the class 
of farmer envisaged by Messrs Bell and Clint would never take a farm in Lunedale 
because of the harsh climate. Of Cronkley farm in the upper dale he wrote: 
"its remote and lonely situation, the difficulty in getting to it, {and even danger 
when the brooks are swollen, the tenant's life having been more than once in 
peril in attempting to get home), the climate also, and distance from market, 
render it not at all a desirable farm" (D/St/E3/11/5) 
He pointed out that the tenants at Low Wemmergill had only taken the tenancy 
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at a proportionately lower rent, and resided outside the area. Miner-farmers, 
on the other hand, were prepared to rent grassland at higher rents than could 
otherwise be obtained. Watson made three practical recommendations as to how 
land management could be improved within the existing farm structure. First, 
he agreed with Messrs Bell and Clint that the area of tillage should be reduced, 
and that the growth of subsistence crops be confined to the tenants' gardens. 
Second, he advised that the pastures be improved by the application of lime in the 
proportion of 360 to 480 bushels per hectare [29]. Third, that trees be planted on 
the worst lands and river banks to act as wind breaks and to bind and fertilise the 
soil. 
Watson described the economic effects of the depression. Rent rebates had been 
allowed to the tenants in 1821, 1822 and 1823. Farms in the upper dale had 
suffered the most (reflecting the harsher environment). The lowland farmers had 
been given rebates of 20%, 22%, and 25% respectively over the three years, whilst 
the highland farmers had received a 25% rebate each year. The prices of the 
principal agricultural products on the lowland farms, compared to 1820 prices, 
had fallen by 20% in 1821 and by over 30% in 1822. For the Highland farms the 
fall had been even greater, although the depression weighed most heavily on those 
farmers with tillage land. 1823 was the worst year, with low prices compounded by 
a bad season. In 1824 there was a slight improvement in prices to 12% below the 
1820 level for the lowland farms, and 20% below for the Highland holdings. Most 
landlords, Watson observed, recognised that farmers would require two or three 
seasons with good prices to restore the damage done before conditions returned to 
normal. He felt that allowances to the tenants were essential to sustain: 
1
'that proper feeling of attachment to their landlords and their farms, so con-
ducive to the general good management and prosperity of the whole concern". 
Watson in fact spent some time discussing the importance of management, both 
by landlord and tenant. For instance, the value of a farm depended not only on 
farm prices, but also on the quality of management. He commented that even 
within five years: 
11a great change may be occasioned (by good or bad management) in the letting 
value of land". 
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Many tenants had managed their holdings in a superior manner despite the de-
pression. It was, however, also the responsibility of the estate to ensure good 
management. The farm holdings were still in a poor condition. The buildings and 
fences had been "formerly neglected" and "gone to decay from age". Good fences 
were essential for the proper management of the farms [30]. Watson criticised 
Messrs Bell and Clint for advising that tenants be responsible for the upkeep of 
fences: 
"on most large estates where a consistent and liberal administration prevails, 
the tenantry are generally willing to contribute towards any permanent improve-
ments projected on their farms" 
Perhaps his comments on the responsibility of landlords were made for the benefit 
of the trustees. Although Watson states that the trustees allowed rent rebates 
during the worst years of the depression, their leniency only stretched so far. It 
was estate policy in bad cases of tenant debt to evict the tenant and reclaim 
the debts by an auction of farm stock. This obviously soured landlord-tenant 
relations. One particularly publicised eviction took place in the 1820s at Holwick 
(D/St/E3/9/103). A Mr Ancaster took the tenancy of Step Ends Farm in 1822 for 
an annual rent of £320. The farm consisted of 73 hectares of enclosed land, plus 
208 hectares grazing on Crossthwaite Pasture and grazing rights on Mickle Fell. 
From the beginning, Mr Ancaster faced economic problems due to the depression 
and the poor quality of his land. He asked for a reduction of the rent which Bell 
and Clint, following a valuation, advised against, although they found the farm to 
be worth only £282: 
"It is evident that nearly all the tenantry are much worse off than the tenant 
of Step Ends. He should be treated the same as all the tenants" (Bell & Clint 
to Richard Dobson, 25/3/1823) 
Confusion followed, Mr Ancaster claiming that the second valuation gave him a 
right to a rent reduction. By 1828 he owed an arrears of £510. He was duly evicted 
and his farm stock auctioned. The tone of the following letter from Mr Ancaster 
suggests anything but clemency on the part of the trustees: 
"If you quit me now you ruin me, and I think from what all parties say that 
you have it in your power to save me. It is possible you may find another 
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tenant but I am sure there is not one in this neighbourhood that has a capital 
sufficient to stock it and manage it as it ought to be, he may indeed take it 
and, like my predecessor, run it out for a year or two and then leave it very 
much in debt and in the wilderness-like state I found it, or you may let it to a 
stranger. He like me may be deceived by the surface and not duly considering 
the many disadvantages belonging to this farm, but if he take it on my original 
rent he like me will in a few years find his capital wasted and himself ruined and 
should you have to reduce the rent, had you not better give me an opportunity 
of saving myself alive'? There can be no pleasure arise to the mind of a landlord 
on reflecting that one man after another is ruined upon the estate and I am sure 
Sir John you will not find a tenant more diligent or anxious to do his duty to 
the land and everything belonging to the estate than is your obedient servant" 
(Mr Ancaster to Sir John Paul, 19/10/1827). 
Mr Ancaster died shortly after this incident. Had he lived, he might have derived 
some satisfaction from the knowledge that in 1859 the rent of Step Ends was still 
only £332 (see Appendix D). 
Obviously, great distress was caused by the disruption arising from enclosure and 
the agricultural depression. The farms were in a very dilapidated condition at this 
time. The conflicting views of Bell and Clint on the one hand, and Watson on 
the other, not only reflect the different light which the agricultural depression cast 
on the estate's potential, but also differing motives towards estate management. 
Bell and Clint were professional surveyors, and adhered to the improvers' school. 
Watson, on the other hand, was himself a tenant of the estate and so spoke from 
local knowledge and self interest. However, his arguments would seem to have 
been based on sound principles. Notwithstanding the agricultural depression, the 
physical constraints posed by poor land quality and harsh weather conditions, were 
too great for any fundamental change in the estate structure. 
In the end, a compromise strategy was adopted. Some rationalisation was achieved 
by multiple letting [31], thereby keeping the option open to subdivide the holdings 
again in future. Gradually, these multiple lets acquired a greater permanency, re-
sulting eventually in amalgamation. Tables 4. 7 and 4.8 show that despite enclosure 
there was a high level of continuity in the farm tenants. On 13 holdings there was 
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no change of tenant between 1810 and 1821, and on 8 holdings, the same family 
remained in occupation from 1810 to 1841. There was some movement of farm 
tenants within the estate. For instance, Francis Smith, the tenant of Wythes Hill 
in 1810, moved to Grassholme East. Bell and Clint's plans to attract a "substan-
tial and improving" tenantry were not realised. Messrs Clarke, the tenants they 
praised in 1823, had left the estate by 1841. 
Despite the agricultural depression and the dilapidated condition of the estate, 
Table 4.9 shows that rents on nearly all the farms in Lunedale were raised in 1821. 
In 1810, total rental income from the Lunedale farms came to £796. 70; in 1821 
it had risen to £1,478.65. Certain repairs were carried out to the farms in the 
1820s. A new dwelling house and stable were built at Grassholme Mill in 1824, 
and repairs made to three byres at a cost of £137. In 1827, building work was 
in progress at Soulgill, Lune Head and Thringarth Park. Improvements to Stack 
farm were completed in 1831 at a total cost of £323. 
Agriculture was the dominant land use and the main source of income on the 
Wemmergill estate. Timber was not a significant resource. In Lunedale, the largest 
plantation was at Wemmergill Hall (20 hectares), and there is no evidence that 
the estate sought to expand the area of timber. The Wemmergill estate lay to the 
south of the main lead ore field (see Figure 4.3), and although there were some 
lead deposits under the estate, lead mining was never an important resource on 
the estate. There was one lead mine in Lunedale at Lune Head at the top of the 
dale, and the London Lead Company leased the lead rights for most of the 19th 
century. 
4.2.4 Estate Development: 1830 to 1880 
Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 show the layout, land use and land values of the Lunedale 
farms in the mid-19th century. Comparing the figures with Tables 4.5and 4.6, it 
can be seen that there was a gradual increase in farm size from the lower to the 
upper end of Lunedale. The main reason for this geographical pattern was land 
quality, which deteriorated up dale. For instance, pasture land at Lune Head was 
valued at 60 pence to £1.20 per hectare, whereas lower down the dale it was worth 
£1.80 to £2.40. Similarly, meadow land valued at £1.44 to £2.40 per hectare at 
166 
Table 4.9 - Lunedale Farm Rents, 1810 to 1880 
FARM 1810 1821 1825 1859 1860 1870 1875 1880 
Close House & Arngill 41.90 48.00 42.35 62.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 78.00 
Lune Head 51.80 55.00 53.20 67.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 
Wythes Hill 45.4 55.30 129.25 131.45 150.00 150.00 150.00 150.00 
Grains 0' Beck 32.6 57.00 56.70 139.70 164.70 164.00 164.00 164.00 
Scar House 36.65 69.65 42.8 - - 61.00 - -
Old Gate 
-
- 23.55 - - - - -
Blake House - 32.30 33.70 70.35 82.75 82.00 82.00 82.00 
Dow Hill 21.45 26.00 25.75 - - - - -
Scar Head - 38.10 40.00 49.50 61.05 61.05 61.00 61.00 
Stackholme 29.65 39.30 45.90 99.05 112.00 112.00 112.00 112.00 
Cor bush 11.10 11.60 11.45 - - - - -
Intake 
- 0 26.35 23.15 - - - -
Low Wemmergill - 114.60 158.20 138.85 153.00 153.00 153.00 153.00 
High Soulgill 
-
32.00 30.85 40.00 43.40 43.00 50.00 50.00 
High Grain 24.75 33.00 34.85 71.95 87.50 87.00 87.00 87.00 
Wemmergill Hall 
-
216.35 - 88.50 138.00 216.00 138.00 138.00 
Grassholme West 42.60 32.05 30.30 97.85 118.00 118.00 133.00 133.00 
Grassholme Mill 34.40 27.85 - - - - - -
Stack 
-
35.00 55.40 75.20 81.00 81.00 81.00 81.00 
Rigg 
-
26.65 25.35 29.35 31.50 31.00 31.50 42.00 
Grassholme East 23.2 - 63.2 60.25 70.25 70.00 70.00 70.00 
Grassholme Middle - 64.70 - - - - - -
East Close 
-
16.25 16.75 17.60 18.75 19.00 18.70 18.70 
West Stake Hill 30.10 43.45 43.65 77.70 91.75 90.00 91.70 91.70 
East Stake Hill 26.4 25.1 - - - - - -
West Park 46.65 75.05 72.25 79.90 91.30 93.00 93.40 93.40 
Thringarth 41.00 32.40 31.30 32.00 40.60 41.00 40.60 40.60 
East Park 126.15 152.45 151.00 169.95 189.00 174.00 173.00 173.00 
Chapel House - 34.50 30.30 41.50 46.50 37.00 36.90 24.18 
Cronklcy 130.90 85.00 88.30 83.65 110.00 110.00 110.00 110.00 
TOTAL 796.70 1,478.65 1,362.70 1,746.45 2,039.05 2,151.05 2,034.80 2,032.58 
Sources: D/St/E3/19/78; 11/3; 11/5; 11/6; 9/47 (In the following tables pounds, 
shillings and pence have been converted into decimal currency). 
167 
go 
LOWER LUNEDALE; 
LAND USE, 1860 
0 mi 1es 1 
Pasture 
~< £1.20 ,.,, ha I~ .. r2.40- £3.60 ..,,..., per ha £1.20- £2.40 .. - £3.60- £4.80 per ha · · · per ha 
Meadow 
~£ 1.20- £2.40 per ha £2.40- £3.ou per ha 
~3.60- £4.80 
per ha 
£4.80 per ha 
Mixed crops 
t"lj 
-· (Jtl 
= '1 (!) 
"'"' CXl 
0' 
..0 
MIDDLE LUNEDALE, LAND USE, 1860 
(::::::::;] Wood Ian d 
See Map 4.7 for key 
0 miles 1 
/ ' \ 
L---_L --~ 
"''j Gil. 
e 
tD 
Jl:>. 
e 
._. 
0 
0 
Ri"er Lune Head Mines 
1 mile 
UPPER LUNEDALE, 
LAND USE, 1860 
Pasture 
< £1.20 per ha I ,.;""I 
£1.20- £2.40 per ha ..., "+ 
Meadow. 
£1.20- £2.40 per ha t/j1 
£2.40- £3.60.per ha. 'f2SJ 
•Mt 
-. .. , 
"" ... ,, 
.... 
""''' 
'Tj 
&q· 
= "1 
('!) 
~ 
1-' 
0 
the top of the dale, was worth over £2.40 further down. Hence farms at the top of 
the dale were compensated for the poorer quality of the land by larger quantities. 
An additional land resource available to the tenant farmers was the land which 
remained unenclosed. After enclosure, the Wemmergill estate still contained three 
major open moorland areas: Lune Forest and Moor (about 4,688 hectares), Holwick 
Fell (1,085 hectares) and Cotherstone Moor (2,500 hectares), a total of approxi-
mately 8,273 hectares. These areas were high (from 350m to over 700m on Lune 
Forest), and unimprovable. In addition, several smaller pastures of better quality 
land, such as Crossthwaite Pasture and Mickle Fell, remained unenclosed. 
These unenclosed moors and pastures played an integral role in the farming econ-
omy, and were managed by stinting agreements [32]. Table 4.10 shows the dis-
tribution of stints between the Lunedale farms in 1825 and 1858, and Table 4.11 
the distribution of stints on the Holwick farms in 1852. The moors were grazed 
by many farmers, whilst the pastures were grazed more selectively. For instance, 
Crossthwaite Pasture was grazed by two tenants and Mickle Fell by three. The 
farms that rented stints were those with greatest ease of access to the moors, situ-
ated in the middle and upper dale. Cronkley farm, with a total area of almost 290 
hectares, was an atypically large holding for the Wemmergill estate because rough 
grazing was incorporated within the farm holding. 
Stint rents were included in the total farm rent. The Wemmergill farms consisted 
of three resource components: improved land, allotment land and stints. The rent 
of a farm, therefore, did not reflect land quantity alone, but also the quality of the 
lands and the number of stints. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show the composition of land 
resources and rent on all the Wemmergill farms in 1920. Although the figures relate 
to a later period, they show clearly how farm size can be a misleading indicator of 
the value of a farm in the North Pennines [33]. It can also be seen that the balance 
of the three land elements varied between the farms. Allotment lands and stints 
were more important to the farms in the upper dale. 
By the end of the 1820s, the agricultural depression was lifting and the following 
forty years of agricultural prosperity enabled the much needed improvements to 
be carried out, with resulting rental increases. In 1836, arrears of rent totalled 
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Table 4.10- Stint Levels, Rents & Fines at Lunedale, 1810 to 1860 
FARM 1825 Rent 1858 - Fines 1876 1890 1920 Rent 
- no. (£) no. allowed (£) no. no. no. (£) 
Close House & Arngill 50 25.00 160 50 0 80 80 80 70.00 
Lune Head 50 25.00 96 50 13.95 90 70 70 61.05 
Wythes Hill 20 10.00 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 
Grains 0' Beck 40 20.00 144 96 14.40 142 100 60 57.50 
Scar House 56 28.00 - - - - - - -
Blake House 25 12.30 100 40 18.00 85 85 70 61.05 
Dow Hill 15 7.25 - - - - - - -
Scar Head 15 7.30 63 15 14.40 55 55 55 48.10 
Stackholme 25 12.30 81.5 45 10.95 80 60 60 52.50 
Cor bush 5 2 - - - - - - -
Intake 15 7.30 
- - - - - - -
Low Wemmergill - - 60 100 0 80 40 40 35.00 
High Soulgill 30 15.00 34.5 30 1.35 54 54 54 47.25 
Low Soulgill 20 10.00 54 30 7.20 50 50 50 43.75 
Wemmergill Hall 50 25.00 - 50 120.00 80 80 80 70.00 
Grassholme Mill 0 0 28.5 15 4.05 25 0 0 0 
Stack 25 12.00 48 25 6.90 45 35 35 30.60 
Grassholme East 15 7.30 30.5 15 4.65 25 20 20 17.50 
West Park 10 5.00 22 10 3.60 25 0 0 0 
Thringarth 8 4.00 24 20 1.20 16 - - -
West Stake Hill 15 7.30 17.5 - - - 20 - -
TOTAL 489 134.35 964 591 220.65 952 749 674 594.30 
Sources:D/St/E3/13/5; E3/13/9 
£1,186.80, but by 1855 the arrears were down to £50.05, indicating more prosper-
ous conditions. A continuous set of estate accounts provides detailed information 
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Table 4.11 -Stint Levels at Holwick, 1852 to 1894 
FARM 1852 - 1870 - 1894 - -
- allowed occupied allowed occupied present reduced compensation (£) 
Holwick Head 20 23.5 45 62.5 43 11.2 20.95 
Hield House 20 24.5 26 37.5 30 11.2 12.30 
Mire House 10 9.5 10 13 10 6 2.60 
Mizzies House 25 26 25 23 20 7.8 8.00 
Pikestone (main) 15 12.5 25 31 15 15 -
Close House 12 8.5 12 12.5 2 2 -
Pikestone (small) 15 12 15 16.5 17 9.4 4.95 
Castles - - 5 5 5 5 -
Holwick West (small) 15 12.5 25 34 25 11 9.15 
Holwick West (main) 15 22 33 44.5 26 7.2 12.30 
Holwick Cottage - - 10 8 10 8.2 1.15 
Holwick Middle - - 40 19.5 40 39.6 0.25 
Holwick East - - 30 28.5 10 10 -
Hungry Hall 20 25 40 31.5 30 17 8.50 
Park End 20 9.5 20 4.5 - - 0.75 
TOTAL 250 256 361 371.5 283 80 80.90 
Sources: D/St/E3/13/5; E3/13/9 
on the Wemmergill estate budget from 1841 to 1885 (see Table 4.12) which, m 
conjunction with other documents, enables the development of the estate over the 
mid-19th century to be pieced together [34]. 
Table 4.12 and Figure 4.13 show that, between 1840 and 1860, expenditure was 
particularly high on the Wemmergill estate. Indeed, in 1850 and 1860 expenditure 
exceeded the income from the estate. It appears that John Bowes was an active 
improver. Between 1836 and 1840, almost £300 was spent on drainage on the 
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Figure 4.11 -Resource Composition of Lunedale Farms, 1920 
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Lunedale farms (see Table 4.13), and a further £251 was expended on drainage 
on the Wemmergill estate in 1841. Wemmergill may have been the first of John 
Bowes' estates to be drained. He made use of external funds to finance the drainage, 
although was reportedly dissatisfied with the cost of obtaining a loan [35]. However, 
in 1849 he entered into an agreement with the newly formed Lands Improvement 
Company (see 3.2.3) to take out a loan of £5,000 (D/St/E4/13/3). The loan was 
initially intended for the Wemmergill estate, but in 1851 £1,800 was substituted 
for the Cockfield estate (D/St/E4/13/8). The loan was paid back in half-yearly 
installments of £93. 
In 1856, John Bowes was praised by Thomas Bell for the improvement of his English 
estates (JRAS, 1856, 115). Almost £43,000 had been spent on the improvement 
of land and buildings between 1842 and 1853 (see Table 4.14). Of the Streatlam 
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Figure 4.12 - Rental Composition of Lunedale Farms, 1920 
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estate Thomas Bell wrote: 
"This estate many years ago had, from various causes, got into a very bad 
condition during the lifetime of the late Earl of Strathmore, and the Trustees, 
during Mr Bowes's minority, laid out from £20,000 to £30,000 upon the estate, 
previous to and altogether irrespective of the above liberal outlay by Mr Bowes 
himself... Not another word need be added to set forth the laudable attention 
of this gentleman to the improvement of that portion of the county of Durham 
which belongs to him" 
As well as drainage, improvements were also made to farm buildings and fences. 
Fencing was obviously a considerable expense: allotments had to be subdivided 
and existing fences maintained. A land use survey of the Lunedale farms in 1841 
suggested that some of the larger enclosures be subdivided to encourage land im-
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Figure 4.13 - The Wemmergill Estate Budget, 1841 to 1885 
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provement (D /St/E3/13/17). In 1860, it was reported that fences had been much 
altered since the last survey of the estate (in 1841 ?), and several new intakes had 
been made (Thomas Bell to Ralph Dent, 1/10/1860). 
The bulk of the estate income was made up of farm rents. Rents from the cus-
tomary _leaseholds, from timber and from lead mining were low and variable. As 
stated above, there were no plans to expand the area of timber, and the poten-
tial to expand the lead mining was limited. A report by Thomas Sopwith (the 
Blackett-Beaumont's mineral agent) in 1867 concerning a mining lease, found that 
the London Lead Company had lost £2,600 in 1866, and £5,000 had been lost 
over the previous five years. Over the past 23 years, annual production of lead 
ore had not exceeded 250 tons per annum in Lunedale (D/St/B2/100). Therefore, 
John Bowes looked to increase his income from the farms. 
The capital invested in the farm buildings and land was reflected in higher earnings. 
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Table 4.13- Expenditure on Drainage, 1836 to 1840 
FARM AMOUNT(£) 
Close House & Arngill 27.25 
Lune Head 1.40 
Grains 0' Beck 9.60 
Scar House 6.00 
Blake House & Cote House 29.70 
Scar Head 8.60 
Stackholme 1.50 
Low Wemmergill 21.50 
High Grain 13.90 
Low Soulgill 21.60 
Wemmergill Hall 43.50 
Stack Farm 28.00 
Grassholme West & Mill 19.15 
Grassholme East 11.55 
Stake Hill 13.15 
West Park 4.95 
East Park & Bowbank 6.10 
TOTAL 267.45 
Source: D/St/E4/13/2 
In 1860, Thomas Bell was requested to survey and value the farms, as a result of 
which farm rents were raised considerably. Between 1860 and 1865, the total 
income from farm rents increased from £4,832.85 to £5,619.05. Farm rents on the 
Lunedale farms increased from £1,746.45 to £2,039.05 and rent levels continued 
to rise until 1885. 
The other main expenses on the estate were taxes, rates and management costs. 
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Table 4.14- Estate Investment, 1842 to 1853, by John Bowes 
Streatlam Estates Buildings 12,074 
- Drainage 11,198 
Gibside Estate Buildings 7,716 
Hylton Estate Buildings 3,176 
-
Drainage 8,777 
- TOTAL 42,942 
Source: Bell (1856) 
A bailiff was employed on a salary of £80 per annum, but the agent's salary was 
paid from the Streatlam account. By far the largest payment, however, was the 
remittance paid to John Bowes as a personal salary. This was paid twice yearly to 
John Bowes' bankers in London. It was never less than £2,500, and in 1880 was 
almost £6,500. 
Although revenue from sporting leases was not recorded in the Wemmergill ac-
counts at this time, sporting rights were leased in the 1860s. At this time John 
Bowes was living in Paris and so could not shoot the moors himself. The moors 
were let in three -main leases: Wemmergill (Lune Forest and Moor), Cotherstone 
and Holwick. Wemmergill was the most prestigious shoot, with 4,688 hectares of 
open moorland and 1,917 hectares of enclosed lands. It was generally let with 
Wemmergill Hall for use as a shooting lodge (D/St/E3/20/1). Cotherstone Moor 
was generally let in two sections: the low moor (833 hectares) and the high moor 
(1,667 hectares). Finally, the Holwick shoot covered 4,833 hectares. 
The Wemmergill shooting lease was taken by a Mr F.A. Milbank in 1867 for £250 
in the first year, and £350 per annum thereafter (D/St/C2/15/51) [36]. In 1866, 
the Holwick shoot, plus Mickle Fell and Close House, was let to a General Hall for 
£200 for the first year and for 4 years thereafter for £300 a year (D/St/E3/20/l). 
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4.2.5 Landlord-Tenant Relations and Rural Society 
The dispute over ownership in the early part of the century was followed by a pe-
riod, from 1840 to 1880, of remarkable stability in the management of Wemmergill. 
John Bowes was landlord for 65 years (including the period of interim trusteeship), 
from 1820 until 1885, whilst the agent, Ralph Dent, held office for 32 years from 
1840 to 1872 (see Appendix C). Even the Wemmergill bailiff, George MacKenzie, 
served for at least the 30 years from 1851 to 1881. 
As has been observed, John Bowes took an active interest in the improvement of 
his estates. At the beginning of his landlordship he was also involved in national 
and local politics. He was elected as MP for the South Durham Division in 1832, 
and was re-elected in 1841 and 1846 (D/St/C1/16/275). After 1850, however, he 
left politics and spent little time on his estates, for in 1854 he married a french 
actress (Josephine) and they settled in Paris. 
Landlord-tenant relations appear to have been generally cordial except on the 
question of the stinted moors. Possibly due to the more prosperous conditions of 
the mid-19th century, several farmers in both Lunedale and Holwick exceeded their 
stint allowances (see Tables 4.10 and 4.11). There were found to be 6 over-stints 
on Holwick Fell in 1858 and 10.5 in 1870. On Lune Moor and Forest the problem 
was more serious. In 1858, 964 stints were counted, an excess of 373 over the 
agreed number (D /St/E3/13/5). William Collinson, tenant of Close House and 
Wemmergill Hall farms, at first refused to give a return on his sheep numbers, but 
was found to have an excess of 60 stints (D/St/C2/15/42). The estate objected to 
the over-grazing, not only because they did not receive rents for the extra sheep, 
but also because over-grazing damaged the heather. The moors were used for both 
sheep grazing and grouse shooting, and a balance had to be maintained between 
the two requirements. 
John Bowes and Ralph Dent decided that stricter regulations were called for, and 
in the 1860s and 1870s new rules of management were issued for Lune Moor and 
Forest (1868), Holwick Fell (1871), and Cotherstone Moor (1873) [37]. Although 
differing in detail, all imposed fines for over-stocking. For example, in 1858, fines 
on over-stints in Lunedale cost the offending farmers £220.65. As well as tighter 
restrictions, the trend in the second half of the 19th century was towards a decrease 
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in the number of stints. Table 4.11 shows that after 1870, the number of stints 
allowed on Holwick Fell declined. In 1894, Holwick Fell was actually re-stinted to 
reduce the number of stints from 283 to 80, due to the "rapid deterioration and 
threatened extinction of the ling upon Holwick Fell" (D/St/E3/13/9). The farmers 
received 15 pence compensation for every head of sheep lost. 
In addition to the reasons given above for the tighter restrictions on grazing, two 
other possible factors suggest themselves. First, it is possible that the area of the 
moors had been reduced by further intakes, although no reference to this has been 
found. A reduction in the area would obviously reduce the carrying capacity of the 
moors. Second, a more likely explanation is that grouse shooting was becoming a 
more important activity on the estate, and the interests of the shooting lessees were 
given priority over the interests of farmers. A sporting lodge for the use of shooting 
parties was built at Holwick by a consortium of lessees in the 1860s (Respondent 
A) and it was the Holwick shooting tenant who instigated the reduction of stints 
in 1894. 
Disputes between tenants over stints were also common. For instance, a letter from 
George McKenzie to Ralph Dent in 1871 reports that William Dent of Grains 
0' Beck and Henry Dent of Low Wemmergill had argued over sheep heafs [38]. 
Apparently Henry Dent: 
"bought some 40 or 50 sheep at William Alderson's sale and has bred them up 
and now he finds they are pinched for room on the heaf they formerly had and 
has been driving William Dent's sheep off the ground which they have had for 
a long period. I have tried to make peace between them and have failed ... I am 
inclined to think that a great number of our Lune tenants are further wrong in 
regard to their stints that the Holwick people were, and I would suggest that you 
give them the' same treatment and I think that will settle them for some years 
to come ... " (Mackenzie to Dent, 20/5/1871). 
Considering the difficulty of managing the stinted moors, and the small income 
that stint rents brought in, it is not surprising that the estate was urged to do 
away with stints by Thomas Bell: 
"We are of the opinion that the more of the stinting that can be done away with 
the better it will save much trouble and annoyance" (Bell to Dent, 11/8/1860) 
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Contrary to this advice, however, in 1866 an act of parliament was obtained to 
turn Cotherstone Moor into a regulated pasture (D/St/E3/19/144) [39]. 
The Wemmergill estate displayed a mixture of open and closed characteristics (see 
3.3.1). Table 4.15 shows that the populations of all six manors in the Wemmergill 
estate remained relatively stable. The populations of both Lunedale and Holwick 
increased steadily until 1871. The most marked growth was at Mickleton, where 
the population increased from 330 in 1801 to 651 in 1871. It is likely that the 
population growth in Lunedale, Holwick and Mickleton was linked to the lead 
mining industry across the river in Teesdale. Table 4.16 indicates that the influence 
of mining was stronger in Holwick than Lunedale, and was probably strongest in 
Mickleton. 
Table 4.15 - Population Change on the Wemmergill Estate, 1801 to 
1871 
Date Lunedale Hal wick Mickleton Cotherstone H underthwaite Romaldkirk 
1801 307 196 330 636 334 276 
1811 283 182 337 688 320 302 
1821 265 201 356 706 313 377 
1831 308 208 500 631 297 380 
1841 339 205 513 566 280 338 
1851 321 237 653 607 239 357 
1861 389 253 688 561 304 327 
1871 400 232 651 583 302 312 
Although lead mining was not economically important to the estate, it provided 
many of the inhabitants with employment and fulfilled a social role from the point 
of view of the estate. In 1867, Thomas Sopwith advised John Bowes to renew 
the lease to the London Lead Company with lower rates of duty because of the 
strategic importance of retaining its presence on the estate: 
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Table 4.16- Employment in Lunedale & Holwick, 1851 & 1881 
- 1851 
-
1881 
-
OCCUPATION Lunedale Holwick Lunedale Holwick 
Farmer: - - - -
> 12.5 hectares 26 14 31 14 
4-12 .5 hectares 12 7 8 6 
<4 hectares 2 1 1 -
Lead Miner 11 35 11 25 
Lead Washer/ Dresser/ Smelter 1 - 1 2 
Shopkeeper/ Tradesman - 2 1 1 
Blacksmith - 1 - 1 
Tailor/ Shoe/Clogmaker 2 4 - -
Dressmaker/ Straw Bonnets 2 - 5 4 
Labourer/ Mason/ Joiner etc 5 4 8 3 
Agricultural Labourer 17 12 14 3 
Gamekeeper 1 2 3 1 
Female Servant/ Housekeeper 16 14 14 14 
Mine/ Quarry Agent 1 - 1 -
Land Agent/ Bailiff 1 - 1 -
Schoolteacher 1 1 1 1 
Vicar 2 - 1 -
Doctor/ Nurse - 1 - -
Policeman - - - -
Widow (head of house) 1 3 1 1 
R1·tired Male (head of house) 2 - 2 2 
Toll Bridge Keeper - 1 - -
Railway workers 
- - -
4 
Number of Households 54 45 60 42 
Males 158 106 166 128 
Females 163 101 160 122 
TOTAL POPULATION 321 237 326 250 
Source: Census Enumerators Books 
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"the discontinuance of the present works would to a certain extent be disad-
vantageous to the inhabitants of the district - but on the other hand a large 
extension of mining operations would be highly beneficial. A mining population 
under the judicious control of the Lead Company would be a material addi-
tion to the value of property and the more so as it is well known in what an 
admirable manner that Company has promoted the well being of the workmen 
employed by it and the education of their children" (D/St/82/100). 
On all the manors within the Wemmergill estate there was a separate farming 
class. They enjoyed a better standard of living than the miners, although they 
did not form a separate social class. The constraints of the environment were too 
severe to attract a more prosperous tenant class. The 1851 census indicates that 
the inhabitants of Lunedale conformed in several respects to the observations on 
upland society made in 3.3.1. Family continuity was the norm on the farm holdings 
(see Tables 4.7 and 4.8). Several of the farms had live-in farm servants (Wemmergill 
Hall, Stackholme, Thwaite, Stack, and East Park). Household size was generally 
large (for instance Wemmergill Hall had 13 inmates, Thwaite 11 and West Park 
10). Some of the smaller farmers are noted in the census as having a second 
employment (for instance Joseph Sowerby, Thringarth, and Thomas Addison, East 
Close, were also stone masons). At West Park, two sons were employed as lead 
miners, but dual employment was the exception rather than the rule on the larger 
farm holdings. The most influential tenant in Lunedale was William Collinson, who 
rented Wemmergill Hall and Close House farms and was recorded as employing 7 
labourers as well as having 2 live-in servants. 
The farms provided a subsistence living as well as an income. The land use surveys 
of 1825 and 1841 show that the predominant land uses were, as today, pasture and 
meadow. However, many farmers cultivated a field of vegetable and cereal crops, 
presumably for home consumption. Farming was based on livestock rearing (cattle 
and sheep), and dairying, but most farms also kept pigs, hens, horses and geese. 
In 1860, Lune Head farm was reported as having a hen loft, pig house, goose house 
and a three-stalled stable as well as three byres for cattle (D /St/E3/11/6). 
Donations and patronage were required of John Bowes as a landlord. In 1875, 
for instance, £124 was spent on local activities: including a subscription to the 
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schools and clothing fund, the organ fund, to Holwick and Mickleton schools, 
to Cotherstone school, Grains 0' Beck school and Carlbeck school, to the Hury 
tup show and the Middleton-in-Teesdale Agricultural Society and, finally, to the 
Reverand Cleveland to be distributed in charity (D/St/E3/5/78). 
4.2.6 Summary 
Many changes took place on the Wemmergill estate during the first half of the 19th 
century. The enclosure of the estate enabled farms to be enlarged and improved, 
but the environment placed constraints on the extent to which the farm sector 
could be modernised. Although distress was caused in the 1820s by the simul-
taneous disruption and expense caused by enclosure, the onset of the agricultural 
depression, and the legal dispute over ownership; in the mid-19th century the value 
of the estate was greatly increased. 
The Wemmergill estate was primarily an agricultural estate, and although mining 
was an important source of employment, it was not a major factor in the estate's 
decision-making framework. The society seems to have conformed in several re-
spects to the features identified in other studies of upland societies, although there 
was a separate full-time farm sector and the population was relatively stable. Re-
lations between the estate and the tenants seem to have been cordial, except over 
the regulation of the stinted moors and pastures. 
4.3 Case Study Two: The Blanchland Estate 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Lord Crewe's Charity takes the name of its founder, Nathania! Lord Crewe, who 
lived from 162.3 to 1721. During his lifetime, Lord Crewe combined a career in 
the Church with considerable political opportunism, to obtain a high degree of 
influence in the court of King Charles II, and later King James II (Stranks, 1976, 3). 
He rose from the post of fellow at Lincoln College, Oxford, to the post of Rector at 
the College, and then to the position of Bishop of Oxford in 1671. In the following 
year, Lord Crewe was offered, and accepted, the Bishopric of Durham, which he 
held until his death. As well as presiding over the Durham Bishopric estates in his 
official capacity, Lord Crewe was also a landowner in his own right. He inherited 
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his brother John's estate at Newbold Verdon in Leicestershire, and the barony and 
estate of Steane in North Yorkshire. Through his second wife, Dorothy Forster, 
he inherited lands at Bamburgh and Blanchland in Northumberland, which were 
later to form his charity. These estates had been acquired by the Forster family 
after the Reformation, and by the 18th century were so heavily encumbered that 
the Court of Chancery was petitioned to sell them in order to discharge the debts 
(Stranks, 1976, 5). Instead, Lord Crewe intervened and purchased the estates, 
probably already with the intention of founding his charity. 
Lord Crewe seems to have been a controversial character. The following description 
does not fit the image of the founder of a charity: 
"The meanness of Bishop Crewe's political conduct is well known to have thrown 
a deep and lasting shade over his many splendid qualities" (Surtees, quoted in 
the Viet. Hist. Northumberland, 1893, Vol. 1, 166) 
The charity was, perhaps, a means of atoning for his sometimes questionable con-
duct. 
4.3.2 The Charity: Structure and Administration 
Detailed instructions as to the purpose, income sources, and administration of 
the charity were set down in Lord Crewe's will. A consideration of the will is, 
therefore, essential to the analysis of the charity. The charity's income was to 
be derived from Lord Crewe's Northumberland estates, the annual value of which 
in 1721 was estimated at £1,312. Lord Crewe intended the charity to reflect 
his life and work, by supporting primarily educational and religious institutions 
located in the dioceses of Durham and Newcastle; Lincoln College, Oxford; and 
Newbold Verdon. The guaranteed annual charitable payments came to over £776. 
In addition, up to £200 of any surplus income was to be given to the Chancellor 
of Oxford University to be disposed of for charitable purposes, and up to £100 
was to be given to the City of Durham to help poor apprentices. All the income 
from the estates, therefore, after the deduction of necessary expenses, was to be 
directed towards charitable purposes [40]. 
The charity had close links with the Church. Lord Crewe stipulated that the 
charity be administered by five trustees, in whom the legal title to the estates 
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was vested. The first five trustees named by Lord Crewe were all churchmen [41], 
and all trustees appointed thereafter were to be churchmen, one always to be the 
Rector of Lincoln College, Oxford. The appointment of officers to administer and 
manage the estates was left to the discretion of the trustees. Although allowed 
no personal interest in the estates, the trustees were entitled to recoup expenses 
incurred whilst carrying out their duties. 
The charity inherited a diverse property portfolio; including fisheries, mines, mills 
and quarries as well as farmlands. It owned the manorial rights to the manors of 
Bamburgh and Blanchland, and held the church livings of Bamburgh and Shot-
ley (which entitled the trustees to the tithes of these two parishes). There were 
eight estates which were located geographically in two areas: the Northumberland 
coast and the North Pennines. The areas and incomes of these estates in the late 
19th century are set out in Table 4.17 [42]. The Bamburgh, North Sunderland, 
Shoreston, Fleet ham and Thornton estates were all located on the N orthumber-
land coast, and together made up 72% of the charity's total income in 1877. There 
were three contiguous estates in the North Pennines: Blanchland (1,995 hectares), 
Heatheryburn (119 hectares), and Hunstanworth (1,789 hectares). Despite their 
size, these estates together contributed only 26.6% of the total charity income in 
1877. For administrative purposes, the eight estates were divided into two units: 
Bamburgh and Blanchland, and will be referred to by these names in the following 
analysis. 
Bamburgh Castle was established as the administrative centre of the charity in 
the late 19th ·century, following the restoration of the castle by Dr John Sharp 
[43]. Here, the trustees met at least twice a year to discuss the charity's business. 
The meetings were chaired by one of the trustees (a chairman was elected each 
year), and a quorum of three was required at each meeting. The main business of 
the charity was carried out by a secretary and a receiver. The former decided the 
business of each meeting and took the minutes, whilst the latter was responsible for 
the collection of the estate rents and the charity accounts. Two land agents were 
employed to manage the estates: one at Bamburgh and one at Blanchland. They 
were assisted by bailiffs. It was the responsibility of the bailiffs and the agents to 
inform the secretary at Bamburgh of matters concerning the estates to be discussed 
by the trustees. The trustees' approval was required for all management decisions; 
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Table 4.17- Lord Crewe's Charity Estates: Area & Income 
ESTATE AREA (has) RENTALS(£) -
- 1896 1877 1896 
Bamburgh - 2,049 4 
North Sunderland 183.5 1202 783 
Shoreston 197 981 600 
Fleetham 236.5 846 683 
Thornton 559 1,984 1,576 
Blanchland 1,992.9 1,424 1,302 
Heathery burn 118.7 100 76 
Hunstanworth 1,787.6 1,091 851 
Tithes - 136 576 
Harbour Dues - - 632 
Interest on Investments - - 3,130 
TOTAL 5,079 9,813 10,213 
Source: 1877 Account; 452/C5/44 
such as the selection of new tenants, repairs and improvements to the estate, rent 
levels, and the resolution of disputes. However, from the evidence in the minute 
books, it would appear that the trustees concerned themselves mainly with the 
charitable functions and left the practicalities of estate management to the agents. 
It would also seem that by the early 19th century, the trustees had adopted certain 
features of private landlordism. For instance, since 1794 they had taken it in turns 
to reside at Bamburgh Castle in order to supervise the various activities carried 
on in the castle and to entertain the estate tenants. For this purpose a coach was 
put at their disposal. 
4.3.3 The Blanchland Estate Structure and Income Sources 
The Blanchland estate is located in the Derwent Valley (see Figure 4.14). Al-
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though no figure has been found of the farm layout in the 19th century, a fairly 
accurate picture can be gained from Figure 4.15 which shows the farm layout of 
the Blanchland estate in the 1950s [44]. 
The economy of the Blanchland estate in the early 19th century was based on 
rents from farms, mines and timber. The estate was already enclosed in 1800 [45]. 
The farm structure is shown in Table 4.18 There were fourteen full-time farms and 
several smallholdings. For instance, the occupiers of the Baybridge Inn also rented 
9.8 hectares of land. Nookton was by far the largest holding with over 800 hectares. 
There were two holdings of over 400 hectares (Acton and Cowbyers), and two of 
over 300 hectares (Birkside and Buckshott ). Farm holdings on the Blanchland 
estate were on average larger than those on the Wemmergill estate. This can be 
explained by the fact that at Blanchland, rough grazing land was incorporated 
within the farm holdings. 
As well as the farms, there were three stinted pastures where villagers could graze 
cattle. Park and Shildon pastures were located near Blanchland village, whilst 
Close Pasture was located at H unstanworth. No reference to the Park and Close 
pastures has been found until 1839. Part of the Park Pasture (about 13 hectares) 
was formed on the eviction of a tenant, Joshua Bienek, from Cowbyer cottage in 
1839 (B.a.2, 1/2/1839). 
Lead was an important resource on the estate in the 18th century, but ownership 
of the lead was divided. When the estate was forfeited to the Crown in 1709, the 
lead rights were sold to a certain Mr Skottowe's ancestors, although the lands were 
bought by Lord Crewe. Mr Skottowe's ancestors retained the ownership of the 
lead found under the land which was at the time unenclosed, although Lord Crewe 
owned the lead found under the ancient enclosures (452/E3/3). The trustees, 
therefore, did not command total control of the lead under their estate although, 
as owners of the surface, they owned the smelt mills. The division of ownership 
was to cause problems at a later date. 
In 1708, the London Lead Company had taken on a lease of mines at Shildon 
and Jeffrey's Rake from the Forsters, and opened up two new mines at Ramshaw 
and Whiteheaps (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965). The company also built two smelt 
mills: Acton in 1710 and one near Jeffrey's Rake in 1713. By 1800, the lease 
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Table 4.18 - Blanchland Farm Structure, 1896 
FARM SIZE (hectares) 
Acton 486.4 
Birkside 301.5 
Burntshieldhaugh 398 
Cotehouse 74.4 
Cowbyer (main) 482.6 
Cowbyer (smallholding) -
Fellgrove 12.7 
Penny Pie 108.6 
Allenshields (main) 367 
Allenshields ( smallholding) 6.9 
Buckshott 373 
Bale Hill 14.8 
Gibralter 11.9 
Nookton 824.3 
Heathery burn 117.2 
COMMON PASTURES 
Park Pasture 37.6 
Shildon Pasture 2.1 
Close Pasture 24.5 
PLANTATIONS 
Blanchland 65.8 
Heathery burn 1.2 
Hunstanworth 52.9 
Source: 452/C5/44 
had lapsed for some years, but a lease of the mines and the mills was taken up 
in 1805 by Easterly Hall and Company, who were later reformed as the Derwent 
Mining Company. They rented Allenshields farm from 1810 until 1835 and used 
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the farmhouse as the company office. Until1850, the certain rent of the mines and 
smelt mills came to £150 per annum. A royalty rent was also charged of 1/7 of 
total production. 
Three plantations were managed in hand: 52.9 hectares at Hunstanworth, 1.2 
hectares at Heatheryburn and 65.8 hectares at Blanchland. The lead mining in-
dustry created a local demand for timber and the Derwent Mining Company was 
the main purchaser (46]. Timber was also needed for repairs on the estate. The 
remaining income from the Blanchland estates came from cottage rents and grouse 
shooting rents. Grouse shooting was not an important estate resource at this time, 
but a gamekeeper was employed to clamp down on poachers [47]. In 1837, shooting 
over the manor of Blanchland was let with 'reasonable' rights of shooting reserved 
to the trustees (B.a.2, 28/4/1837). 
4.3.4 Estate Management 
As is clear from Table 4.19, the bulk of the income from the Blanchland estates 
came from farm rents. The Blanchland estates were, apparently, prospering at 
the turn of the century, due to the inflation in agricultural prices following the 
Napoleonic Wars. Between 1800 and 1815, the total farm rental almost doubled. 
This prosperity is reflected in the high level of investment in the estate at this time. 
Between 1813 and 1818, almost £3,500 was expended on repairs and improvements 
to the farms and the village (see Table 4.20). A new school was built and a road 
to the village. £2,000 was expended in 1815 alone (see Table 4.21). 
The sharp decline in rents between 1815 and 1820 indicates the onset of the early 
19th century depression. Rents were reduced on most farms in 1818 ( 452/E2/37). 
The rent of Acton farm was initially reduced by over 50% to £60, but this was 
also due to the re-opening of Acton smelt mill [48]. Most of the farms were held on 
yearly tenancies, but a few were held on longer leases, and on these holdings rent 
reductions were delayed. A six year lease for Nookton farm was taken in 1813 at an 
annual rent of £182. The farm's value was increased by extensive improvements 
between 1813 and 1818 totalling £251 (see Table 4.20} and the rent was still £182 
in 1820, but by 1815 it had fallen to £146. Allenshields farm was leased by the 
Derwent Mining Company in 1815 for three years at a rent of £176. When the 
lease was renewed in 1818, the rent was reduced to £135. 
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FARM 
Acton 
Cowbyer (main} 
Cowbyer (small) 
Penny Pie 
Burntshieldhaugh 
Birkside 
Cotehousc 
Allenshields (main) 
Allenshields (small} 
Fellgrove 
Heathery burn 
Nookton 
Gibrn.lt.er 
Bale Hill 
Buckshott 
SUBTOTAL 
Timber sales 
Game rents 
Mines & Smelt Mills 
TOTAL RECEIPTS 
1800 
50.00 
100.00 
-
30.00 
95.00 
55.00 
42.00 
45.00 
-
-
33.00 
120.00 
-
-
60.00 
630.00 
-
-
75.00 
1,654.60 
1805 1810 1815 1820 
80.00 80.00 125.00 80.00 
130.00 170.00 150.00 125.00 
- - 20.00 20.00 
30.00 30.00 30.00 26.00 
130.00 130.00 151.50 100.00 
55.40 80.00 90.00 75.00 
50.00 50.00 66.00 74.00 
52.51 172.00 173.25 136.:W 
40.00 - - -
16.70 16.70 17.50 17.50 
33.40 50.00 51.00 66.00 
120.00 180.00 182.00 182.00 
5.60 12.00 13.70 11.00 
- - - -
60.00 135.00 100.70 75.00 
803.60 1.105.70 1,170.65 987.00 
- - 208.75 49.75 
- - - -
75.00 175.00 175.00 100.00 
1,799.65 2,324.80 3,113.00 2,678.00 
~-~ 
1825 1830 1835 1845 
72.00 72.00 72.00 72.00 
100.00 90.00 75.00 75.00 
16.00 16.00 16.00 16.00 
23.40 23.40 23.40 23.40 
85.00 85.00 85.00 85.00 
68.00 77.00 77.00 77.00 
66.00 66.00 66.00 66.00 
136.20 76.20 76.20 115.00 
- - - 21.00 
13.50 13.50 15.00 15.00 
56.00 36.00 56.00 70.00 
146.00 146.00 167.00 167.00 
11.00 11.00 11.00 11.20 
- - - 10.00 
67.50 67.50 67.50 68.00 
860.60 779.60 807.10 891.50 
134.65 73.00 482.00 131.00 
- - - -
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
3,057.00 1,410.85 2,302.40 2,048.85 
1850 1855 
72.00 72.00 
75.40 76.00 
32.00 25.00 
25.40 25.40 
85.40 85.40 
77.40 77.40 
76.00 77.10 
122.00 136.25 
21.40 21.40 
16.70 16.70 
70.00 70.00 
132.00 173.20 
13.40 13.40 
10.00 10.00 
60.00 77.70 
889.10 957.35 
23.00 251.00 
- 80.00 
100.00 100.00 
2,295.75 2,000.00 
1860 
77.15 
74.10 
26.10 
26.00 
85.50 
78.70 
79.10 
150.00 
21.40 
16.70 
70.00 
175.70 
13.00 
10.00 
80.00 
983.85 
282.00 
100.00 
135.00 
2,325.45 
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Table 4.20 - Expenditure at Blanchland, 1813 to 1818 
WORK EXPENSE(£) 
Expended in building a bridge & making an access road 741.30 
Expended at the Inn 490.85 
Expended at the Church 473.70 
Expended at the new school 20.00 
Estimate for the necessary repairs of the 1,289.50 
farm houses (exclusive of cottage repairs) 
-
Paid towards the above repairs 1,255.20 
Yet to finish 43.30 
Expended at Nookton farm in building walls 251.00 
Expended in draining Buckshott, Acton, Allenshields 144.40 
& Cotehouse farms 
-
TOTAL 3,410.75 
Source: 452/E2/37 
The depression continued into the 1820s, and farm rents continued to fall. In 1822, 
the tenants were granted a return on their last two years' rents. The trustees also 
recommended that: 
"the tillage ground be reduced in each farm to the proportion of one third of the 
inclosed ground, or as near thereto as circumstances will admit, and that such 
assistance be given to the tenants towards laying down the tillage lands as Mr 
Fenwick (the agent) shall think fit" (B.a.2, 16/10/1822). 
This implies that much land had been ploughed up during the inflated demand of 
the war period, but once normality was restored, the marginal quality of the land 
was not economic for arable production [49]. Distress amongst the tenantry in the 
1820s is indicated by the high levels of rent arrears. In 1823, arrears amounted 
to £877 (452/E2/35), but in 1828 the total arrears were reduced to £298. By 
the late 1820s, the worst of the depression seems to have passed. After 1830, rent 
levels slowly picked up, although in 1860 they were still below the level in 1815. 
In 1846, rent arrears amounted to only £57 ( 452/B.b.5). 
Despite the reduced income in the 1820s, necessary repairs and improvements were 
carried out. In 1819 the trustees decided that: 
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Table 4.21 - Expenditure at Blancbland, 1815 to 1865 
- 1815 1820 1825 1830 1835 1845 1850 1855 1865 
REPAIRS & IMPROVEMENTS 638.40 255.60 290.00 146.35 122.55 218.80 180.15 655.55 750.55 
DRAINS & WALLS 263.00 52.60 30.70 54.65 35.95 76.80 140.25 47.15 242.85 
PLANTATIONS 77.05 122.95 75.55 55.45 121.70 80.05 94.50 135.15 212.35 
CESSES & TITHES 188.05 24.35 19.00 8.70 6.85 9.95 9.20 4.70 52.05 
SCHOOL - 101.30 80.55 81.45 74.10 79.90 78.80 81.70 105.70 
INCIDENTS 328.35 289.95 306.70 208.35 269.50 303.90 217.50 336.85 182.15 
MISC 548.85 175.55 182.65 - 46.50 72.45 36.75 - 79.55 
TOTAL 2,043.70 1.022.30 985.15 554.95 677.15 841.85 757.15 1,261.10 1,625.20 
Source: 452/B.b.3-B.b.6; E2/45-51 
"a sum not exceeding £BOO be applied for putting the farm holdings upon the 
estate at Bamburgh and Blanchland into sufficient repair and when a tenant 
shall apply for any new buildings that he be required to pay after the rate of 7% 
for the money expended upon such additional buildings" (B.a.2, 25/11/1819). 
There were several other sources of expenditure as well as the upkeep and improve-
ment of farm buildings and farmland. The plantations had to be maintained and 
salaries had to be paid as well as rates, tithes and other miscellaneous charges. 
The high payment on rates and tithes in 1815 can be attributed to the heavy taxes 
that were imposed during the Napoleonic Wars. After 1815, this was a minor 
expense. Table 4.22 shows the estate employees and their salaries in 1825. The 
bailiff succeeding Edward Blenck, William Colpitts, was dismissed in 1841 for mis-
conduct, and the schoolmaster, Thomas Hey, was appointed as bailiff on an annual 
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salary of £20 in addition to his salary as schoolmaster. Miscellaneous payments 
included disbursement of taxes, expenditure on the church, the new road, water 
works, irrecoverable debts, and improvements to the stinted pastures. Between 
1845 and 1849, a total of £313.50 was spent on the improvement of the Park 
Pasture. ( 452/E2/38-44) 
Table 4.22 - Salaries of Blanchland Employees, 1825 
NAME POSITION WAGE(£) 
Edward Blenk Bailiff 36.40 
Thomas Elliot Gamekeeper 25.00 
Thomas Fenwick Agent 100.00 
John Herring Schoolmaster 25.00 
John Bienek Ditto 25.00 
Jane Wright Schoolmistress 10.00 
Mary Ireland Ditto 10.00 
Source: 452/B.b.4 
The balance remrumng after maintenance and management expenses were de-
ducted went towards the charitable payments. It can be seen from Tables 4.19 
and 4.21 that even during the depression the balance of income and expenditure 
remained positive. As the agricultural economy improved in the mid-19th century, 
the trustees were again in a position to improve the farm holdings. In 1860, the 
trustees requested Mr Henry, the Blanchland agent, to make a full report on the 
condition of the Blanchland farms. The resulting survey of 1861 (452/E3/21), 
comments on the poor state of many of the farms and the urgent need to carry 
out repairs. For instance, Heatheryburn farm was in such a bad state of repair, 
Mr Henry recommended that the farmstead be resited and rebuilt: 
"There is a cowbyer for eight cows and a stable with two stalls. The dwelling 
house is above the cowbyer and stable, with very imperfect flooring, consequently 
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the stench from the cattle when housed in winter makes a very unwholesome 
dwelling, a new house is much needed here". 
The report also describes the poor state of the farm buildings, such as the following 
description of Acton farm: 
"They (the tenants) would like new pig houses, the present ones dark and with-
out ventilation and damp. The byer is bad, the stable loft is bad in places" 
The harshness of the weather caused buildings to dilapidate rapidly, as a later 
report records: 
"The repairs on the Blanchland estate generally will be large as the situation is 
high and many of the houses and buildings are in exposed positions and suffer 
much from the weather" (452/E3/24). 
Some of the repairs, however, Mr Henry attributed to the poor quality of former 
repairs: 
"if the principal timbers of the rooves etc had been of foreign timber and properly 
ventilated they would have lasted many years longer" ( 452/E3/21 ). 
Following the survey, repairs and improvements were carried out to the farm build-
ings and lands (see Table 4.23). As was normal practice, the tenants were required 
to pay interest of 5% on improvements. Land drainage was obviously a major 
task, for although £378 was expended on drains and walls between 1864 to 1865, 
it was estimated in 1867 that a further £600 was needed to complete the necessary 
drainage [50]. Part of the money was met by a loan from the Lands Improvement 
Company (B.a.2, 22/4/1863). Once the soil had been drained, lime and artificial 
manure had to be applied to improve its fertility. The trustees usually gave the 
tenants an allowance towards these inputs on request (B.a.2 24/10/1865). 
Figure 4.16 shows land use and land values at Acton farm, circa 1860. The figure 
shows four fields newly laid to pasture which indicates that these lands had recently 
been drained. A surprisingly large area (9 hectares) is under root and cereal crops 
(turnips, barley and clover). This could be for consumption b~ farm stock, 
or the lands could be in the process of being turned over to grass [51]. The value 
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Table 4.23- Dilapidation Account, 1867 
PROPERTY REPAIRS(£) IMPROVEMENTS(£) 
Acton 160 -
Cowbyer 50 -
Cowbyer Cottage 5 -
Penny Pie 50 
-
Cotehouse 100 150 
Birkside 240 140 
Burntshieldhaugh 50 
-
Fellgrove 2 -
Blanchland Inn 448.50 130 
Heathery burn 200 -
Nookton 20 -
Allenshields 80 70 
Allenshields Cottagi' 2 
-
Buckshott 80 70 
Gibralter 15 -
Bale Hill 70 -
Various Cottages 155 -
TOTAL 1,727.50 560.00 
Source: 452/E3/21-24 
of pasture land varies from 60 pence to £1.80 per hectare; whilst the best meadow 
land is valued at £3.60 per hectare. 
In 1855, legal advice was sought by the trustees over the management of the lead 
mines. The Derwent Mining Company wished to continue the lease of Jeffrey's 
Rake and Shildon mines. The mines were no longer worked, but the company 
wished, apparently, to block out competition from other companies. It transpired 
Figure 4.16 
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in the course of these negotiations that the last lease had expired in 1826, but the 
company had continued to act as lessees and had paid an annual rent of £100. A 
further problem was that Mr Skottowe was found to have transgressed his rights by 
building a smelt mill at Jeffrey's Rake. The lawyer advised the trustees to renew 
the lease because: 
"It is not desirable for trustees to allow mineral property which might turn out 
to be of great value to be held by tenants without a regular lease" ( 452/E3/3). 
The outcome of this dispute was that the lease was renewed and Mr Skottowe was 
granted ownership of the smelt mill. 
4.3.5 Landlord-Tenant Relations and Rural Society 
The Blanchland estate, being the more geographically isolated of the charity es-
tates, was rarely visited by the trustees. Contact between the trustees and the 
Blanchland tenants was limited to the twice yearly rent days, and the ceremonial 
riding of the manor boundaries [52]. Unlike the Wemmergill estate, the incorpora-
tion of rough grazing into the farm holdings at Blanchland meant that no conflicts 
arose over stinting. The Park Pasture was managed by a committee of stintholders 
(452/B.b.80). Two stewards were appointed to regulate the grazing. Most of the 
stintholders grazed cattle, which indicates that the pasture was of reasonable qual-
ity, and that it was used by smallholders. In 1880, 80 pence was charged for each 
stint. The total number of stints on the pasture was 30, each stintholder being 
allocated from one to six. 
The influence of lead mining was strong on the inhabitants of H unstanworth and 
Blanchland. The population of both settlements increased over the first half of the 
19th century (see Table 4.24). The increase was most dramatic at Hunstanworth, 
where the population grew from 215 in 1801 to 778 in 1861. It can be seen from 
Tables 4.25 and 4.26 that the employment structures of both settlements were 
dominated by lead mining. Many of the miners rented a smallholding, or grazed a 
few cattle on the stinted pastures. For instance, in 1870 there were 15 smallholders 
at Jeffrey's Rake, with holdings ranging in size from 9.6 to 1.2 hectares. In 1880, 
18 stintholders grazed 30 stints on the Park Pasture. 
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Table 4.24- Population Growth At Blanchland & Hunstanworth 
Date Blanchland H unstanworth 
1801 366 215 
1811 518 186 
1821 481 411 
1831 514 511 
1841 532 567 
1851 559 615 
1861 523 778 
Although both the Blanchland and Hunstanworth estates had a separate farm 
sector, many of these farmsteads had cottages which were often occupied by miners. 
In 1851, for example, Allenshields farm had four adjoining cottages: two lived in 
by miners, one by a lead ore carrier, and the last, Allenshields smallholding, was 
occupied by two brothers. One managed the farm, the other was a smelt mill agent. 
Nookton farmstead had three adjoining cottages, two lived in by mining families 
and one by a shepherd. Therefore it would seem that the mining and farming 
families were closely integrated. However, it was only the smaller farm holdings 
where a second income source was necessary to support the family. For example, 
the son and daughter of Joseph Bulman, Bale Hill, worked as a blacksmith and a 
grocer. John Lambert at Gibralter was also a slater and quarryman. 
Tables 4.27 and 4.28 show that there was a remarkable continuity amongst the farm 
tenants over the period 1800 to 1865. Most farms seem to have been passed down 
from father to son. The Pickering family occupied Acton farm from 1805 to 1860 
and the Johnson family occupied Cotehouse farm throughout this whole period. 
The 1851 census shows that several of the farms had live-in servants (Cowbyer, 
Acton, Cotehouse, Allenshields, Buckshott and Nookton). 
At Blanchland, the Church appears to have played a prominent role in the com-
munity. The vicar often reported cases of poverty and distress to the trustees, and 
organised the distribution of beef and coals to the poor of Blanchland at Christmas 
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Table 4.25 - Employment at Blanchland, 1851 & 1881 
OCCUPATION 1851 1881 
Farmer: - -
> 12.5 hectares 9 7 
4-12.5 hectares 3 2 
<hectares 2 2 
Lead Miner 72 13 
Lead Washer /Dresser /Smelter 29 3 
Shopkeeper /Tradesman 8 15 
Blacksmith 4 5 
Tailor /Shoe /Clogmaker 7 4 
Dressmaker/Straw Bonnets 7 3 
Labourer /Mason/Joiner etc 17 17 
Agricultural Labourer 6 14 
Gamekeeper 2 2 
Woodman 1 1 
Shepherd 1 3 
Female Servant/Housekeeper 11 24 
Mine/Quarry Agent 2 3 
Land Agent /Bailiff 1 1 
School teacher 1 3 
Vicar 2 1 
Non-conformist Preacher 1 0 
Doctor/Nurse 3 1 
Policeman 0 1 
Widow (head of house) 17 13 
Retired Male (head of house) 3 6 
Number of Households 104 78 
Males 284 205 
Females 275 165 
TOTAL POPULATION 559 370 
Source: Census Enumerators Books 
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Table 4.26 - Employment at Hunstanworth, 1851 & 1881 
OCCUPATION 1851 1881 
Farmer: - -
> 12.5 hectares 10 10 
4-12.5 hectares 7 11 
< hectares 1 6 
Lead Miner 111 48 
Lead Washer /Dresser /Smelter 40 21 
Shopkeeper /Tradesman 4 7 
Blacksmith 11 6 
Tailor/Shoe/Clogmaker 2 2 
Dressmaker /Straw Bonnets 3 6 
Labourer /Mason/Joiner etc 19 32 
Agricultural Labourer 10 7 
Gamekeeper 1 
-
Woodman - 1 
Shepherd 3 4 
Female Servant/Housekeeper 23 20 
Mine/Quarry Agent 6 -
Land Agent/Bailiff 1 1 
Schoolteacher 3 1 
Vicar - 1 
Non-conformist Preacher - 2 
Doctor/Nurse - -
Policeman - 1 
Widow (head of house) 13 9 
Retired Male (head of house) 4 6 
Number of Households 104 109 
Males 330 265 
Females 285 237 
Total Population 615 502 
Source: Census Enumerators Books 
204-
en 
0 
s:: 
'"I ("l 
~ 
~ 
CJ1 
1:,:) 
--ttl 
0"' 
~ 
I 
ttl 
?" 
~ 
FARM 
ACTON 
COWBYER (main) 
COWBYER (small) 
PENNY PIE 
BURNTSHIELDHAUGH 
BIRKS IDE 
COTEHOUSE 
ALLENSHIELDS (main) 
ALLENSHIELDS (small) 
FELLGROVE 
HEATHERYBURN 
NOOKTON 
GIBRALTER 
BALE HILL 
BUCKSHOTT 
- - - - -
1800 1805 
Joshua Archer T. Makepiece & H. Pickering 
Joseph Makepiece T. & R. Makepiece 
- -
Robert Makepiece Matthew Robson 
Michael Hutchinson ditto 
John Curry ditto 
Cuthbert Johnson ditto 
Robert Colpitts ditto 
- Robert Graham 
- Messrs Hutchinson & Smith 
John Oliver ditto 
Matthew Fairless ditto 
- James Clement 
- -
William Rochester ditto 
- ---------
L__ ------ --- -----
1810 1815 1820 
ditto ditto Henry Pickering 
ditto ditto R. Makepiece 
- Joshua Blenk ditto 
ditto ditto ditto 
ditto John Whaley Thomas Saunderson 
Mary Curry ditto Robert Curry 
ditto ditto ditto 
Easterly Hall & Co Messrs Moore & Co Derwent Mining Co 
- - -
ditto ditto W. Dean & Smith 
ditto ditto George Oliver 
ditto Jobbing & Surtees ditto 
T.& J. Charlton Thomas Char It on John Lambert 
- - -
_ E.& J. C~pitts ___ George Rolland Matthew Robson 
--- --------
L_ 
-- ---
1825 
ditto 
William Adamson 
I 
ditto 
I 
ditto 
ditto I 
John Curry 
ditt· 
diHu 
-
William Dean 
J .& W. Graham 
ditt." 
ditto 
-
ditto 
--- - --- -
~ 
r::r ;-
~ 
. 
~ 
--i 
~ § 
(') 
=-
-~ Q.. 
~ 
s 
~ 
= ~ 
= .... 
IZI 
"' 
"""' 00 
0 
0 
.... 
0 
"""' 00 
~ 
"' 
0 
co 
00 
...-1 
0 
..,a 
0 
M 
00 
...-1 
... 
Cll 
~ 
= ~ 
a 
~ 
"0 ] 
~ (.I 
~ 
-Ill 
I 
00 
N 
-.it 
..s 
,.Q 
~ 
FARM 
ACTON 
COWBYER (main) 
COWBYER (small) 
PENNY PIE 
BURNTSHIELDHAUGH 
BIRKSIDE 
COTE HOUSE 
ALLENSHIELDS (main) 
ALLENSHIELDS (small) 
FELLGROVE 
HEATHERYBURN 
NOOKTON 
GIBRALTER 
BALE HILL 
BUCKSHOTT 
1830 
H. Pickering 
William Adamson 
Joshua Bienek 
Widow Robson 
Thomas Saunderson 
George Carr 
Cuthbert. Johnson 
Derwent Mining Co. 
-
William Dean 
William Graham 
Surtees & Jobbing 
John Lambert 
-
Matt.hew Robson 
-· 
1835 1845 
ditto G. & H. Pickering 
Robert Bell Widow Bell 
ditto William Colpitts 
John Brown ditto 
ditto Widow Saunderson 
ditto ditto 
ditto Robert Johnson 
ditto Jasper Stephenson 
- R. & W. Price 
T. Morpeth & W. Dean Thomas Morpeth 
ditto William Cooke 
William Stephenson Jasper Stephenson 
ditto ditto 
- Joseph Bulman 
ditto Widow Robson 
---------
.. 
1850 1855 
ditto ditto 
Ann Bell ditto 
ditto ditto 
ditto ditto 
Jane Saunderson ditto 
ditto ditto 
ditto ditto 
ditto Thomas Robson 
ditto ditto 
ditto ditto 
ditto ditto 
ditto ditto 
ditto ditto 
ditto ditto 
ditto Matthew Keenleyside 
1860 
ditto 
ditto 
Elizabeth Colpitts 
ditto 
ditto 
ditto 
ditto 
George Collinson 
ditto 
ditto 
ditto 
ditto 
ditto 
Rev John Gibson 
Phoebe Keenleyside 
I.C 
..ci 
o:i 
I 
..;< 
..ci 
c:o 
.......... 
C"'' 
I.C 
..;< 
(I) 
u 
'"" = 0 
U1 
co 
0 
C"'' 
(B.a.2 4/12/1832). 
4.3.6 Summary 
Few changes took place to the structure of the Blanchland estate in the early 
19th century. The estate was already enclosed. The estate was based primarily 
on agriculture, but lead mining, although economically of little importance to 
the charity, was a major influence on the society. The 19th century saw rapid 
population growth, particularly at Hunstanworth. There were full-time farms on 
the estate, although farming families lived side by side with mining families, and 
the value of the farms was increased in the mid-19th century by land and building 
improvements. The charity had close connections with the Church, and the Church 
played an important role at Blanchland. There would appear to have been few 
points of conflict between the tenants and the trustees over this period. 
4.4 Case Study 3: The Stanhope Estate 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The Stanhope estate [53] differs markedly from the former two case studies in 
ownership form, land control and estate and management structure. It could, 
perhaps, be better described as a case study of land control than of an estate in 
the normal sense of the word. The development of the Stanhope estate in the 
19th century cannot be understood without reference to the historical origins of 
the ownership form and land control. 
Durham was, until 1836, a Palatinate kingdom [54] over which, until the 16th 
century, the Bishops of Durham ruled with powers equivalent to the Crown [55]. 
The Bishops were also great landowners and owned extensive estates in the county. 
In 1662, the annual income of Bishop Cosins came to almost £4,000 (see Table 
4.28) [56]. The estates were administered for the purposes of collecting the rents 
in five units: Darlington, Chester, Easington and Stockton Wards, and the High 
Forest of Weardale. Rentals from these estates produced an annual income of 
£2,129, plus another £536 from the Bishopric desmesne lands. As well as land 
rents, the Bishops received rents from coal mines, quarries and urban property in 
London. They therefore commanded a diverse resource base. 
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Table 4.29 - The Bishopric Estates: Certain Annual Income, 1662 
INCOME SOURCE ANNUAL RENTAL(£) 
Darlington Ward 728.45 
Chester Ward 459.90 
Easington Ward 431.55 
Stockton Ward 341.55 
The High Forest of Weardale -
with the three parks of Wolsingham, 169.65 
Evenwood & Bedburn 
-
Subtotal 2,131.10 
Old escheat lands 0.75 
Foreign receipts 5.20 
Rents of coal mines 280.00 
Rents of stone quarries 2.00 
Rents upon Tyne Bridge 3.00 
Pensions of churches 62.00 
Stamfordham impropriation 26.65 
rent of Creake manor 51.45 
Subtotal 431.05 
Desmesne lands reserved to the Bishop: 
Bishop's meadow & pasture at Frankland 36 
Desmesnes at Auckland 160.00 
Desmesnes at Stockton 280.00 
Deerpark at Auckland 60.00 
Subtotal 536.00 
Howdenshire estate 430.00 
London: Durham House & the new Strand exchange 240.00 
Uncertain annual prerequisits -
& profits belonging to the Bishop* about 200 
TOTAL 3,968.15 
* includes prerequisits £4 fine.~ from the ten halmote courts, the county court 
'from the assises & sessions. f4 from chancery. & forfeitures from various crime~ 
Source: Bishop Cosin's Survey 
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The Stanhope estate lies within the manor of Wolsingham, over which the Bishops 
of Durham owned manorial rights. The estate was, at the turn of the 19th century, 
divided into four quarters (see Figure 4 .17, overlay). The High Forest of Weardale, 
alluded to above, included the Park and Forest quarters in the upper dale. The 
High Forest originated as a deer forest and hunting ground for the Bishops [57]. 
Within the forest, an enclosed park stretched from Eastgate to Westgate and was 
used by the Bishops for stock breeding (Drury, 1987, 72). The Bishops maintained 
a castle at Westgate as a hunting lodge. The Park and Forest quarters were 
controlled by a forest court, and developed quite separately from the other two 
quarters of the estate: Stanhope and Newlandside. These were located lower down 
the dale, and were controlled by a halmote court. 
Until the union of Scotland with England in 1707, the northern border of Weardale 
formed part of the border between the two countries (Kerridge, 1969, 43). It was 
a wild, unsettled area, subject to raids. The Stanhope estate therefore served 
military and sporting purposes, and these two functions influenced the nature of 
early land settlement and tenure. 
Early tenancies in the area were granted by the Bishops in order to secure military 
protection for the border, and assistance with the management of the hunting. 
Surplus grazing within the park was let on a seasonal basis from May Day to 
Michaelmas. The grazing was managed by a Master Forester (Drury, 1987, 72). 
These lettings required military and hunting services as a condition of tenure [58]. 
The following passage describes a hunting expedition in the 16th century: 
"He (the Bishop) was accompanied by a great retinue and by the numerous 
freeholders and others his vassals, who held their lands in various parts of 
the County Palatine by this service and attendance amongst other rents and 
services, on the great chase or hunting in Weardale and lived and kept open 
house in Baronial splendour in his then Castle at Westgate in Stanhope Park" 
(1828 Case) 
By the 1500s, the Bishops' use of the park had declined and gradually these sea-
sonallettings took on a greater permanency. The park walls and Westgate Castle 
were demolished, and the forest court was held at very infrequent intervals (1828 
Case). 
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In its early history, therefore, the Bishops of Durham had shown little inclination 
to develop the Park and Forest quarters, or to consolidate or actively exercise their 
rights. At the same time, the tenants gradually increased their control of the land. 
They occupied their estates on a form of customary tenure called tenant right or 
ancient freehold [59]. Under this customary tenure, the tenants enjoyed the right of 
inheritance (subject to a nominal fine on entry paid to the forest court), and, apart 
from an annual quit rent paid to the Bishop, had the same powers as freeholders 
over the surface lands [60]. The balance of control over the land of Weardale thus 
tipped slowly towards the side of the tenants. This was not a satisfactory situation 
for the Bishops. Even before the Union of Scotland with England obviated the 
need for military services, the Bishops attempted on several occasions to reassert 
their control over these ancient freeholders, not just to gain economically, but also 
to increase their political control over the inhabitants. In 1511, Bishop Ruthall 
carried out a survey of all holdings in the Park and Forest, and tried to convert 
the customary tenures into ecclesiastical leaseholds (Drury, 1987, 76). This policy 
of coercion backfired on the Bishop. The matter was contested in court, and the 
customary rights of the tenants upheld. The position of the tenants thus changed 
in the 16th century from one of customary privilege to legal right (ibid., 1986, 94). 
Some tenants, under obligation to the Bishops or hoping to obtain favours from 
them, agreed to accept ecclesiastical leaseholds [61]. Furthermore, nearly all the 
estates granted by the Bishops from the 16th century onwards were granted by 
this tenure. Ecclesiastical leaseholds were granted for either 21 years or 3 lives. In 
the latter case, 3 persons were nominated by the lessee to act as 'lives'. The lease 
continued for the duration of these lives. On the death of a life, a new life could 
be instated for a fee. 
The lands in Newlandside and Stanhope quarters were largely held on copyhold 
tenure (see 2.2.2), regulated by a halmote court. In addition, the Bishops owned 
some freehold lands. The right to work the minerals was leased to a Moor Master at 
a fixed rent of £150 per annum. This position was held by the Blackett-Beaumont 
family from 1698 onwards. The lease was for three lives, again subject to a fine on 
the renewal of each life (Hughes, 1963). 
Two political events in the 16th and 17th centuries altered the ownership and 
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management of the Bishopric estates. The first event was the Reformation in 
1536. All church lands were appropriated by the Crown, and returned to their 
owners with strict conditions attached as to their management. Every property 
was valued, rent levels agreed and set down in a schedule (Musset, 1987). The 
purpose of these schedules was to regulate the powers of the Church, and balance 
the income and expenditure requirements for each Church estate. Perhaps to avoid 
further antagonising the Crown, church leaders took these schedules as financial 
blueprints, and despite subsequent inflation, maintained the rents of their properies 
at the 1541 levels. 
The second event was the creation of the Commonwealth in the 1640s (Clay, 1985, 
156). All Church and Crown lands were sequestered by Parliament and sold to 
laymen [62]. Following the restoration of the Monarchy in 1660, the Church lands 
were returned, but this period must have greatly undermined the control of the 
Bishops over their estates. 
:l.4.2 The Early 19th Century: Ownership and Control 
At the close of the 18th century, approximately 5,000 hectares of the Stanhope 
estate out of a total of 29,000 hectares were enclosed. Of the enclosed lands, about 
208 hectares were held by freehold tenure, 250 by copyhold, 2,083 by customary 
freehold and 2,458 by leasehold tenure (Barrington to Mowbray, 30/10/1797). The 
enclosed lands were located adjacent to the villages on the valley floor and sides 
and were reported to be let for £4.80 to £7.20 per hectare or even more (Bernard 
to Barrington, 19/9 /1796). The unimproved parts of the estate consisted of stinted 
pastures on the upper valley sides, and common lands on the open fells. Grazing 
on the stinted pastures was controlled, and the pastures were fenced in large 
allotments. The commons were subject to general grazing and other rights of 
common (see 2.2.2). Despite its vast size, the total value of the estate was reported 
to be only £3,760 (Mowbray to Barrington 9/10/1797). 
Bishop Barrington, moreover, received only a fraction of the full value of the estate 
in rents because of the system of land tenure which had developed. The fixed 
annual rents from the customary properties within the Park and Forest came to 
only £47.15 and £33.25 respectively, whilst the fixed rents from the leaseholds 
came to £36.55; the amount set by the 1541 schedule. The leasehold rents were 
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supplemented to a certain extent by fines. To recompense the Church for the ever 
dwindling value of the fixed leasehold rents, a system of fines had been devised 
(Musset, 1987). A fine was a payment made on the renewal of a lease, equal to 
about one and a half times the market rental value of the property. Fines could, 
therefore, be raised to keep pace with inflation. However, even this system did not 
fully reimburse the Church, for fines could only be charged at a renewal which took 
place every seventh year, in the case of twenty one year leases, and on the death or 
replacement of a life. With rising life expectancy, the length of these leases for lives 
also increased. Ecclesiastical leaseholds were, therefore, not only far longer than 
normal agricultural tenancies, they also granted the lessee practically full security 
of tenure [63]. 
As well as depriving the Bishops of their full potential income from the estates, 
the leaseholds were accused of obstructing good estate management (Bell, 1856). 
Because the annual income from fines was so variable, it was almost impossible 
for the Bishops to set an annual budget. Despite the security of tenure which the 
lessees enjoyed, neither lessor nor lessee had any incentive to invest in the land. 
The Bishops were reluctant to invest any capital since they would not benefit from 
the full increased rent. On the other hand, the lessees had no incentive to improve 
their estates, for then the fine payable on the next renewal would be higher. The 
timber on the leasehold lands was reserved to the Bishops, so that the lessees took 
no interest in planting their lands either (Bell, 1856, 97). 
The financial disadvantages of ecclesiastical leaseholds had been recognised by 
Bishop Cosins back in the 16th century. In his 1662 survey of the Bishopric estates, 
he urged his successors to reform the leaseholds: 
~'/ direct my successor to take special notice hereof and wait till all the lives of 
those tenants leases become void, which will be a great advantage to him and a 
just, if he maketh use of his rights to let the leases". 
An insuperable barrier to the reform of the leaseholds, however, was the nature of 
ownership itself. Each successive Bishop depended on the rental from the estates 
for his personal income. The phasing out of the leaseholds would have involved 
a short-term loss of income whilst the leaseholds lapsed, and since each Bishop 
held only a life interest in the estate, no Bishop could afford to, or was prepared 
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to, forego his personal income for the benefit of his successors. A report into 
church leaseholds in 1837 (c. 692), found that Bishop Thurlow (1787 to 1791) 
had exchanged many lives on the best properties in order to improve his personal 
income. His successor, Bishop Barrington (1791 to 1826), therefore earned very 
little income from the renewal of lives. When Bishop Van Mildert took office in 
1826, the lives had grown old again and so he benefitted from fine payments. 
The customary freeholds and ecclesiastical leaseholds, therefore, posed major prob-
lems for the Bishops, and were to be a recurring theme in the history of this estate 
in the 19th century. Another problem faced by the Bishops related to the lead 
mines. By the end of the 18th century, the Blackett-Beaumonts were reaping vast 
profits from the lead mines, of which but a fraction was paid to the Bishops. Arthur 
Mowbray (Bishop Barrington's receiver) estimated that from 1778 to 1798, not less 
than 20,000 bings of lead per year had been raised, which must have yielded them 
an annual net profit of £63,000 [64]. Of this, the Bishops received only the £150 
annual fixed rent plus a low rate of duty. 
In order to increase their control of the estate and income from it, the Bishops 
needed to reform the leaseholds, instigate major land improvements, and renego-
tiate the lead mining lease with the Blackett-Beaumonts. Of these three aims, 
the first was not attempted, the second was attempted through enclosure, and the 
third met with some measure of success. 
4.4.3 The Weardale Enclosure A ward 
The Weardale enclosure award was initiated in 1799 by Bishop Barrington. The 
size of the area to be enclosed (altogether over 8,000 hectares), together with the 
numerous interests involved, meant that the enclosure was a long drawn out process 
and was not finalised until 1815. 
The main purpose of the enclosure was to improve the quality and value of the 
land. The Bishop's motives appear to have been altruistic. It was going to be of 
benefit to all the occupiers of Weardale and to the rest of the county: 
"I am convinced that the enclosure of Weardale will add to the prosperity and 
plenty of the County of Durham by the great quantity of land which it must 
bring into cultivation" (Barrington to Mowbray, 21/12/1797). 
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Arthur Mowbray (who offered his services as an inclosure commissioner free of 
charge) estimated that the value of the lands could be increased by over fourteen 
times to the region of £44,000 by enclosure (Mowbray to Barrington, 9/10/1797). 
The Bishop also had his own interests in mind, no doubt hoping to win back some 
of the control which had been lost over the estate. The Bishop's main concern was 
the size of the allotment he would receive in compensation for the loss of manorial 
rights [65]. Mowbray replied that the Bishop, as Lord of the Manor, was entitled 
to a sixteenth part of the unregulated commons, but not to the stinted pastures 
(Mowbray to Barrington, 19/9/1797). He pointed out that the size of the allotment 
should not be the primary concern. The main advantage of enclosure to the Bishop, 
would be the opportunity to ascertain the exact extent and value of the leaseholds 
and, through the improvements which enclosure would bring, to increase the fines 
chargeable on these properties (Mowbray to Barrington, 9/10/1797). Mowbray 
estimated that the fines would more than double in value. It was important, 
therefore, in the Bishop's view, to ensure that the leaseholders enjoyed enough 
security of tenure to fully improve the allotments which they would receive from the 
award. He suggested that Mowbray meet privately with one of the longest serving 
and most loyal leaseholders, to discuss the possibility that the leaseholders buy 
their allotments from the Bishop for nine years purchase (Barrington to Mowbray, 
21/12/1797). The delicacy of relations between the Bishop and the leaseholders is 
indicated by the emphasis the Bishop places that the suggestion should be seen to 
come from the leaseholders rather than the Bishop. 
Another problem was to obtain the agreement of all the proprietors in Weardale 
to the enclosure. Although the majority were in favour, there was, inevitably, 
some suspicion that the Bishop would attempt to reduce their rights. In order 
to overcome this opposition, Mowbray suggested to the Bishop that they obtain 
the support of Colonel Beaumont. He, being the most influential proprietor in 
Weardale, would, they thought, bring the other dissenters round (Mowbray to 
Barrington, 22/1/1798). There was also the question of tithes. The Bishop was 
anxious that the tithe payments be commuted into money payments, or that land 
be given to the Rector of Stanhope in lieu. The latter option was thought to be 
the more acceptable, as it would not burden the other proprietors with ~xtra pay-
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ments, but the Rector was initially opposed to this idea. (Barrington to Mowbray, 
21/12/1 i9i). 
Finally, the agreement of all concerned was obtained a.nd the a.wa.rd went a.hea.d. 
The stinted pastures which were divided under the a.wa.rd a.re listed in Table 4.31, 
together with the number of cla.ima.nts for allotments a.nd the existing stint levels on 
the moors. The costs of enclosure were met partly through the sale of Westernhope 
a.nd Swinhope moors (see Table 4.30). Allotments were awarded in proportion 
to existing land rights and stint levels, a.nd Bishop Barrington was thus given 
equal treatment with the other tenants. The a.rea.s which were decided to be 
unimproveable, a. total of 5,33i hectares, were restinted according to rules laid 
down in the a.wa.rd [66]. The a.wa.rd, therefore, ga.ve Bishop Barrington only 52 
hectares plus 32 2/3 stints [6i]. Enclosure did not materially improve the Bishop's 
landed control in Wea.rda.le. 
Table 4.30 - Areas to Remain Undivided 
AREAS TO REMAIN UNDIVIDED 
Killhope, Wellhope & Spark Shield 
Middlehope Moor 
Sunderland Moor 
Linzgarth Moor 
Redburn Moor 
Eastgate Pasture 
Sunderland Pasture 
AREAS TO BE SOLD BY PUBLIC AUCTION 
Westernhope Moor 
Swinhope Moor 
4.4.4 Reform of the Mineral Lease. 
Bishop Barrington ha.d more success in his attempt to win back control over the 
lead mines. In 180i, whilst the Wea.rda.le enclosure wa.s still in progress, Bishop 
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Table 4.31 -The Weardale Enclosure Award, 1815 
STINTED PASTURES (to be divided) HECTARES NO OF CLAIMANTS STINTS 
Billing Pasture 425 9 226 
Westernhope Moor* 1378 10 813 
Easter-Lee Pasture 143 8 82 
Wester-Lee Pasture 144 12 65 
Swinhope Moor 555* 17 ? 
Windyside Pasture 129 17 61.5 
Windyside Moor 210 14 217 
Chapel Pasture 170 22 71 
Chapel Moor 284 23 164 
: 
Harthope Moor 380 10 195 
lreshope Moor 834 21 286 
Burnhope Pasture 125 18 80 
Burnhope Moor 1663 22 333 
Moss Moor 153 19 40 
Puddingthorne Moor 313 10 120 
Burtree Moor 327 18 186.5 
Sedling Pasture 101 14 75 
Sedling Moor 311 14 176 
Newhouse Pasture & Moor 205 15 197 I 
Carrbrow Pasture & Moor 221 54 185.5 
Westgate Height 131 13 58 
Westgate Side 15 8 -
TOTAL 8218 
- -
* excluding the areas to be sold by public auction (see below) 
. . .. , - ·- .. .... .... ' .. .. 
.. 
... ~ . , 
Source: Durham Chancery Records 
Barrington brought a law suit against the Blackett-Beaumonts over the level of 
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composition payments (Hughes, 1963, 47). The Blackett-Beaumonts decided to 
settle out of court, and agreed to pay a rate of composition of £4,000 per annum, 
plus a lump sum of £70,000 to cover short-falls in previous years. This action 
substantially improved the income of the Bishops. By 1859, the Bishops were 
receiving £7,700 per year from the lead mines (although the Blackett-Beaumonts' 
profits were still well above this). 
4.4.5 Income Sources and Management 
Figure 4.17 shows the location of the main settlements, the unenclosed moors, 
and the working lead mines on the Stanhope estate in the mid-19th century. A 
survey of the Bishopric estates in 1859 [68] found that the ecclesiastical leasehold 
properties covered 3,245 hectares (see Table 4.33) and the Bishopric freehold estate 
was 460 hectares (see Table 4.34). There were also 210 properties held on ancient 
freehold tenure, leased by 172 persons ( CC 134875). 
Table 4.32. - Stanhope Shooting Leases, 1859 
MOOR TENANT AREA (hectares) ANNUAL VALUE(£) 
Bollihope John Hilyard esq 3,039 150 
Ireshope, Burnhope William Fenwick 1,903 100 
Harthope & Moss Moor ditto 
- -
Reahope & Stanhope ditto 3,190 -
Middlehope & Sedling Fell ditto 512 -
Puddingthorne Samuel Parker 179 5 
Hangingwells Fell, George Curry 250 10 
Small burn & N orthgate ditto - -
Chapel Fell George Gregson esq 292 5 
Wolfcleugh & Redburn W.B. Beaumont 1,675 40 
TOTAL - 11,040 310 
Source: Stanhope Report (1859) 
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Lane head 
-
Burtrecford Mill 
High of the Park 
Lintzgart.h 
Killhope. Wcllhopc 
& Spark Shields 
Lodgefield 
Long Lee 
New Park 
Parrock 
Spring House 
Sunderland 
Sunderland 
Wear head 
Windysidc 
Stanhope Park 
House & garden 
TOTAL 
TENANT ANNUAL FIXED DATE OF 
- RENT(£) LEASE 
John Robinson & others 4.00 1850 (lives) 
Robert Robinson 0.40 1847 (lives) 
.Joseph Beck 0.40 1849 (years) 
Messrs Bainbridge 9.05 1837 (lives) 
T.W. Beaumont. 0.30 1824 (lives) 
T.W. Beaumont. 1.85 1824 (lives) 
- - -
Wilson Lee & Co 0.20 1848 (lives) 
Henry Maynard & others 2.65 1852 (years) 
Henry Maynard & others 5.00 1855 (years) 
Walton & Wooler 0.50 1846 (lives) 
Messn; Curry 1.20 1852 (lives) 
.loseph Featherstone 1.65 1848 (years) 
Mary Redsham 1.65 1853 (years) 
Joseph Harrison 1.00 1850 (years) 
Mrs Walton 0.40 1853 (years) 
Miss Sowerby 5.25 1853 (years) 
Thoma.c; Dobson 0.05 1847 (years) 
- - -
SIZE ANNUAL 
SIZE (hectares) VALUE(£) 
225.7 225.40 
2.0 17.75 
1.3 37.15 
336.4 600.00 
212.6 148.15 
1,714.3 467.90 
- -
11.3 28.85 
50.2 129.85 
101.8 205.00 
1.6 16.50 
23.7 54.50 
78.8 76.00 
48.2 38.90 
8.6 26.4 
5.7 28.55 
132.2 198.8 
- 5.00 
2,954.4 2,304.70 
RENT(£) 
(date) 
-
-
43.00 (1814) 
580 (1823) 
18.00 (1820) 
282.00 (1824) 
-
20.50 (1820) 
150.00 {1817) 
250.00 (1819) 
16.60 ( 1817) 
80.00 ( 1817) 
90.00 (1835) 
76.70 (1824) 
33.55 ( 1817) 
44.05 (1817) 
140.45 (1817) 
-
-
SIZE 
(hectares) 
-
-
1.5 
331 
3.7 
876 
-
9.5 
46.2 
100.3 
1.5 
18.2 
70.6 
45.8 
7.5 
38.1 
131.6 
-
-
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Table 4.3 4- The Bishop's Freehold Estates, 1859 
ESTATE SIZE (hectares) ANNUAL RENTAL(£) 
St Andrews Auckland 990.3 2,888.50 
Ryhope 215.5 1,566.75 
Stockton 200.1 1,050.00 
Stanhope 460.5 513.00 
Stanhope: individual farm holdings - -
Oliver 187.7 180.00 
Bowman & Madison 146 135.00 
Hoggett & Forster Little 59.5 104.00 
Dawson 2.5 13.05 
Watson 1.3 16.10 
Robinson 5.9 23.10 
Dawson 7 42.00 
Stinted Pasture 49.80 -
Newton & Darlington 473.6 1,524.00 
Woodham 439.7 714.00 
Sherburn 119.6 552.00 
Shotton 90 168.75 
Cassop 121.2 217.00 
TOTAL 3,110.6 9,194.00 
Source: CC 60/31609 
As well as the farms and the lead mines, the estate contained certain plantations 
which were managed in hand: 172 hectares on the Stanhope Castle estate and 93 
hectares in Upper Weardale and Rookhope. The lead industry, of course, stimu-
lated an enormous demand for timber. The Bishops processed their timber at a 
sawmill in the town of Stanhope. Shooting rights were let over 16 moors and, in 
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1859, shooting leases generated an income of £310 (see Table 4.32). 
There were 18 leasehold properties, of which 11 were held on leases for 3 lives, 
and the rest for 21 years. It can be seen from Table 4.33 that these properties 
ranged in size from smallholdings to sizeable estates. They were frequently valued 
by the Bishops' agents in order that fines could be accurately calculated. All 
were surveyed by Thomas Davison, the successor of Arthur Mowbray, between 
1817 and 1824, shortly after the enclosure. A comparison of the values of these 
estates in the early 19th century and 1859 provides inconclusive evidence as to the 
trend in the value of the leasehold estates over this period. It is noticeable that 
some of the properties had altered in size, making comparison difficult (both the 
estates leased by Colonel Beaumont had increased in size, as had the property at 
Windyside). There is no doubt, however, that two properties, Long Lee and New 
Park, decreased in value. This decrease in value was probably due to neglect by 
the lessee. Both properties were leased by a Mrs Ann Smith. In 1834 Thomas 
Davison wrote of Long Lee: 
"Since the above survey (no date) was made the river has washed away (as near 
as I can judge) about 7 acres of land and land bed .... and I apprehend a further 
waste as the lessee, who it is presumed has only a life interest in the estate, 
does not expend any money in piling and jettying to prevent it" (1817). 
Of New Park, Davison wrote: 
"The farm ... is still capable of further improvement if the lessee ... could give the 
tenant a sufficient term to induce him to lay out his money in improvements" 
(1819). 
Subleasing was common practice on the leasehold properties, and this example 
illustrates the problems associated with this form of tenure. 
The largest leasehold property was the Killhope, Wellhope and Spark Shield estate 
at the top of Weardale, which was granted to Sir Thomas Blackett in 1662 for 
three lives. Table 4.35 illustrates the fine system, by showing fines charged on the 
exchange of lives on this estate. It can be observed that the fines increased in the 
first quarter of the 19th century, indicating the rising value of this estate. In 1824, 
the estate covered 876 hectares (118 hectares of enclosed lands, and 762 hectares 
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of stinted moors). It was divided into 16 smallholdings (see Table 4.36 aBe Figare 
4:+8). The rental of all these holdings rose between 1820 and 1824, from £242 to 
£280. Considering that this was a period of agricultural depression in the region, 
it is likely that the rental increase was due to the prosperity of the lead mines and 
the land hunger associated with population growth. 
Table 4.35 - Lives & Fines on the Killhope, Wellhope & Spark Shield 
Estate 
DATE LIFE AGE FINE(£) 
1736 Fenwick Bowman 47 -
1736 Walter Blackett 24 -
1736 Ralph Clark 26 -
1762 George Robson 19 82.10 
1783 William Sykes 30 260.95 
1783 Richard Brooke 24 -
1802 Thomas Bayldon 17 183.20 
1805 Joseph Widdop 16 276.05 
1824 Christopher Bird 8 350.75 
Although the documentation relating to the leasehold properties is limited to these 
periodic valuations, it would appear from the rental evidence that no significant 
improvements in land quality were achieved in the early 19th century. 
The enclosure award did not put an end to the legal disputes over land rights on 
the Stanhope estate. In 1828, the ancient freeholders brought a case against Bishop 
Van Mildert, arguing that under the terms of the award they were now entitled to 
all mines (excepting lead), quarries, timber and sporting rights over their lands. 
Legal opinion was sought by the Bishop [69]. The lawyer, James Griffiths, found 
that the enclosure award left several finer points of tenure unresolved. It could be 
stated with certainty that the Bishop was entitled to all the lead, and the right 
to make wayleaves for working and carrying away the lead. It was also certain 
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Table 4.36 - The Killhope, Wellhope & Spark Shield Estate, farm 
holdings 
TENANT FARM SIZE (hectares) STINTS 1820 RENT (£) 1824 RENT(£) 
J. Batey 3.1 4 4.50 6 
T. Peart 3.9 10 8 10 
T. Peart 4.1 11 10 12 
J. & W. Graham 2.8 12 10 12 
T. Peart (jnr) 6.1 18 14 15 
Widow Peart 11.4 28 21 24 
J. Vickers 0.6 5 4 5 
C. Vickers 19.1 32 23 26 
J. Vickers 28 30 25 28 
J. Kidd 1.2 11 6 7 
T. Emmerson 10.3 19 11.50 14 
Messrs English & Garrick 14.6 30 24.50 28 
T. EmmP.rson 25.4 30 24.50 28 
J. Elliot & J. Milburn 15.9 10 17 20 
I. BatP.y 6.6 10 10 13 
H. Rain 16.4 40 29 32 
Source: HC MlO 321764 
that the owners of the new allotments and the owners of the stints on the stinted 
moors and pastures had sole enjoyment of these lands. The award also gave the 
owners of the allotments the right to get coal, stones, slates and clay from their 
allotments and to cut timber. He concluded that even if the Bishop did technically 
retain a residual interest in these lands, so many provisos were contained in the 
award that, in practice, the Bishop's interest was so constrained as to be, for all 
practical purposes, extinguished. As for the sporting rights over the newly enclosed 
allotments and over the stinted moors and pastures, these were dependent on past 
custom, whether the Bishops had kept up their ancient rights of sporting. 
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4.4.6 Landlord Tenant Relations and Rural Society 
Lead mining was the dominant influence on the economy and society of Stanhope 
in the early 19th century, particularly in the upper dale. Table 4.38 shows the 1851 
employment figures for four hamlets in the upper dale, and clearly illustrates the 
importance of lead mining. It is surprising that only two farmers were recorded by 
the census. Several of the miners were probably smallholders, but only their main 
occupation was recorded. The total population of Stanhope grew rapidly in the 
first half of the 19th century (see Table 4.37), from 5,155 in 1801 to 8,882 in 1851, 
an increase of 72%. Population growth was especially rapid in the forest quarter, 
which was the main mining area. 
Table 4.37 - Population Growth in Stanhope, 1801 to 1851 
DATE FOREST PARK NEWLANDSIDE STANHOPE 
1801 2,143 1.169 604 1,239 
1821 2,987 1,321 693 1,375 
1831 3,735 1,259 763 1,584 
1841 3,531 851 854 1,827 
1851 4,358 991 988 2,545 
Because of the great influence of mining, the Blackett-Beaumont family must have 
exerted as great an influence as the Bishops, if not greater, over the inhabitants 
of the dale. It is difficult to state with certainty what were the feelings of the 
inhabitants towards these two landlords. Relations between the Bishop and the 
Blackett-Beaumonts, however, seem to have been strained. The following account 
from Arthur Mowbray to Bishop Barrington paints a very poor picture of the 
mining lessee: 
"Some of the Colonel's agents in Weardale are old, born on the spot and (I 
have been told} think it best to keep that part of the county, where their chief 
mines are, as much in darkness as possible and also to prevent the inhabitants 
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Table 4.38- Employment in Upper Weardale, 1851 & 1881 
OCCUPATION 1851 1881 
Farmer 2 8 
Lead Miner 152 78 
Lead Washer/ Dresser/ Smelter - 11 
Shopkeeper/ Tradesman 2 5 
Innkeeper 
-
2 
Blacksmith 5 1 
Tailor/ Shoe/Clogmaker 3 2 
Dressmaker/ Straw Bonnets 1 3 
Labourer/ Mason/ Joiner etc 11 21 
Agricultural Labourer 
- -
Gamekeeper 1 -
Woodman - -
Shepherd - -
Female Servant/ Housekeeper 17 11 
Mine/ Quarry Agent 1 1 
Land Agent/ Bailiff 
- -
Schoolteacher 2 9 
Vicar 1 1 
Non-conformist Preacher 
- -
Doctor/ Nurse - -
Policeman 
- -
Widow (head of house) 11 14 
Retired Male (head of house) 
- 3 
Number of Households 106 101 
Males 291 218 
Females 287 243 
TOTAL POPULATION 578 461 
*Cowshill, Burtreeford, Heatherycleugh & Kilhopt 
Source: Census Enumerators Books. 
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from turning themselves to agriculture, but continue, as many of them now 
are little if any better, than slaves and dependents" (Mowbray to Barrington, 
15/2/1798). 
Undoubtedly, the life of the miners and their families was harsh. In 1818, the 
miners petitioned Walter Beaumont for a rise in wages, claiming that many could 
no longer afford to support their families, and 400 had had to accept parish relief 
(Hunt, 1972, 260). 
Bishop Barrington seems to have genuinely had the best interests of the inhabitants 
at heart during the enclosure process. He was anxious that provisions be made 
in the award for the erection of chapels and schools (Barrington to Mowbray, 
30/10/1797). He later suggested that the Rector of Stanhope, whose income would 
be vastl~ improved by the enclosure, should apportion some of this income for the 
support of churches and the incomes of ministers in the parish. 
It appears, however, that Bishop Barrington was more benevolent than his succes-
sors. He used the money awarded from the dispute with the Blackett-Beaumonts 
over the mineral lease to establish schools throughout the county, and to provide 
a fund for poor clergymen and their widows (Whellan, 1894). Bishop Barrington 
was, perhaps, able to show his benevolence since he enjoyed a personal income of 
£12,000 per annum as well as his income from the Bishopric estates (Cmd. 692, 
1837). As with private landlords, every Bishop adopted a different approach to 
the management of their estates. 
4.4. 7 Summary 
Although the Bishops were, in theory, the principal landowners in Stanhope, m 
practice they had very little control over the estate because of the strength of 
collateral rights. The division of ownership and control of the estate's resources 
seems to have had a negative influence on the development of the estate. Great 
changes were effected by the enclosure award, but it seems that the award did not 
lead to any significant improvement in the value of the farmlands. 
Lead mining dominated the economy and society of the Stanhope estate. It was 
the principal income source for the Bishops and the major source of employment. 
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Although little information is available about the lives of the inhabitants, it seems 
that the society displayed many open characteristics. 
Because of the strength of collateral rights, and the nature of the Bishops' interest 
in the estate, the management policy adopted by the Bishops was short-term and 
exploitative, although each individual Bishop varied. However, despite the ineffi-
ciency with which the Bishopric estates in County Durham were managed, their 
vast size meant that, in 1856, Bishop Longley's annual income (on an average of 
three years) was still £21,991 (Bell, 1856). Together with the Dean and Chapter 
estate, the Church in Durham was receiving an annual income of £71,431. Thus 
the Church dominated the landownership structure in County Durham and was a 
very powerful institution. In the first half of the 19th century it must have been a 
major barrier to the region's economic development. 
4.5 Landownership and Rural Development in the 19th Century 
This consideration of the development of the North Pennines in the 19th century, 
under three landownership forms, has highlighted several points relating to the 
landownership decision-making framework and the nature of rural society in this 
upland region of Britain. It has also indicated some of the processes by which 
continuity and change in landownership over this period took place. The three es-
tates have been considered separately in the analysis so far. In this final summary, 
comparisons and contrasts between the estates will be made to bring out the more 
general significance of the findings. 
Similarities and differences in the structure and development of the three estates 
have been observed. What internal and external factors can be identified which 
have.infiuenced the development of all three estates, and what factors can explain 
differences between the estates? Can differences be attributed to ownership form 
and, finally, what factors have influenced the nature of rural society on each estate? 
Comparisons can be drawn between the estates. All three formed part of a wider 
property portfolio which included lowland estates, so that decisions relating to the 
North Pennine estates were taken in a wider context. The economy of all three 
estates was based on the same resources: land, lead, timber and grouse. The rural 
society of all three estates displayed a mixture of open and closed characteristics. 
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At a more detailed level of analysis, however, differences between the estates out-
weigh the similarities. Significant differences have been observed in resource use, 
estate development and rural society. 
Although all three estates formed part of a larger property portfolio, the total 
landholdings of the three landowners differed in scale and structure. The earls 
of Strathmore were great landowners, and their estate was scattered over sev-
eral geographically separate locations. The Bishops of Durham were the principal 
landowners in County Durham, but owned no significant estate outside the county. 
Both landowners, incidently, held interests on the Durham coalfield. The estate of 
Lord Crewe's Trustees was much smaller. It was confined to the North East, and 
the Blanchland estate was also the smallest of the three case study estates. 
The ownership form of the three estates differed. The Wemmergill estate was held 
by private ownership (except for a short period of trust ownership). The Stanhope 
estate was owned by an institution and Blanchland by a charity. Using Denman 
and Prodanos' (1972) classification of ownership, the ownership of Wemmergill 
was simple, the ownership of Stanhope was both simple, fictitious and fiduciary, 
whilst the ownership of Blanchland was fictitious and fiduciary. The ownership 
form had an influence on management. John Bowes had the greatest freedom of 
management (although this freedom may have been limited by a settlement). He 
depended on the estate for a personal income, and so profit was an important short-
term goal; but, although only holding a life interest in the estate, his management 
policy was influenced by the longer-term wish to preserve the estate within the 
family for his successors. The Bishops of Durham held only a life interest in their 
estates and depended on the income from their estates for their private salary. 
Short-term profit was, therefore, the primary factor in their management policy. 
Although the Bishops held fiduciary responsibilities, these were not laid down, and 
the paternalism of the Bishops depended to a large extent upon the individual. 
The fiduciary element was uppermost in the management policy of Lord Crewe's 
Trustees. The latter held no personal interest in the estate. 
Land control was also an important factor in estate management, and control 
was related to past and present ownership forms. Although all three landowners 
owned manorial rights over their lands, the earls of Strathmore and Lord Crewe's 
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Trustees were also the principal landowners and enj~yed almost entire control of 
their estates. The Bishops of Durham, on the other hand, were the principal 
landowners in Stanhope in theory, but not in practice. On this estate, derivative 
interests had gained dominance over the principal interest. This loss of control on 
the part of the Bishops had historical origins back in the Medieval period. The 
ownership form prevented the Bishops from reforming the ecclesiastical leaseholds. 
No Bishop could afford to forego his short-term income to benefit his successors. 
Lord Crewe's Trustees did not suffer unduly from collateral rights, since their estate 
had been founded at a later date, and had been, previous to the foundation of the 
charity, within private ownership. 
As well as the role of the landowner, the role of others concerned in the management 
of the estates was also important. The landowners relied on land agents, lawyers 
and surveyors for advice, and these agents could have a considerable influence 
on the management policy of the landowner. Occasionally, the landowners would 
receive differing advice from their advisors. The surveyors and the estate bailiff 
clashed, for example, in the 1820s as to how to manage the Wemmergill estate. 
To what extent was estate management policy dependent on the environment and 
resource base, and to what extent did ownership form, land control and manage-
ment structure affect the management of the three estates in practice? Certain 
differences in the economy of the estates can be attributed to the resource base. 
The greater reliance of the Stanhope and Blanchland estates on lead reflected the 
fact that these two estates lay within the lead mining area, whilst the Wemmergill 
estate lay on the edge. Differences in farming, however, can be attributed to es-
tate policy. The environment obviously placed basic parameters on the farming 
systems, but it was the result of estate management that the Blanchland and 
Wemmergill estates both had a separate full-time farm sector, whilst the Stanhope 
estate had a farm structure of small, under-capitalised holdings. 
Both the Wemmergill and the Stanhope estates were enclosed at the turn of the 
19th century, but the experience of enclosure and its effects were very different on 
the two estates. The process of enclosure in the former estate was controlled by 
the earls of Strathmore. Farms were enlarged and rationalised, and the enclosure 
initiated changes which eventually led to a substantial improvement in the value 
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of the estate. On the latter estate, in contrast, whilst Bishop Barrington initiated 
the enclosure, he had no control over its implementation, and had no power to 
instigate land improvements. The value of the Bishops' leasehold lands remained 
static, or even declined, in the period following enclosure. 
On the Wemmergill estate, it was in the interests of the earls of Strathmore to 
maximise the value of the farm sector, as this was their principal resource and 
income source, although the environment placed constraints on the farm structure. 
The farm structure on the Blanchland estates was inherited from the former owner 
and few changes were made to it. On the Stanhope estate, the Bishops had little 
control over the farm structure of their leasehold properties. Many of the leaseholds 
were sublet and subdivided by the lessees. 
Although both estates had full-time farms, the farm structure of the Blanchland 
and Wemmergill estates differed. On the former, rough grazing land was included 
within the farm holding whilst on the latter, the open moors were grazed in com-
mon by the tenants according to stinting agreements. The unenclosed moors in 
Stanhope were also stinted but, whereas on the Wemmergill estate the stints were 
owned by the earls of Strathmore, on the Stanhope estate the stints were owned 
by the farmers. The earls of Strathmore could, therefore, exercise some control 
over the grazing of the moors. This enabled the earls to retain some degree of 
flexibility in the management of the farms, and the moors served a dual purpose 
as both grazing resource and grouse breeding habitat. The management of the 
stinted moors was, however, the principal source of conflict on the estate. 
Two general points have emerged from this analysis about land management in 
an upland environment. First, farm size is a misleading indicator of farm value. 
Indeed, large farms tended to be composed chiefly of poor quality grazing land. 
The stinted moors provided an extra land resource in addition to the farm holding. 
Second, upland resources are interrelated. Lead mining was closely related to the 
farming economy, due to the practice of dual employment. The lead industry 
generated a demand for timber and the open moors could be used for rough grazing 
and grouse shooting. 
Although all the societies on the three estates displayed a mixture of open and 
closed characteristics, the balance between the two varied. None of the estates were 
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free from the influence of lead mining, but lead mining dominated the Blanchland 
and Stanhope estates to a greater extent than the Wemmergill estate. The lead 
industry was the main cause of 'open' characteristics. It was asociated with rapid 
population growth, small, under-capitalised farm holdings, ill health, poverty, un-
employment and non-conformism. The Wemmergill and Blanchland estates, which 
had a separate farm sector, had a core population which was stable. In contrast to 
the mining population, the farming population displayed a great continuity. The 
farmers on both estates, although more secure than the miners, were of the same 
social class. The farms were family farms and there were close links between farm-
ing and mining households. There was a wide social gulf on both estates between 
the landlord on the one hand and the tenants on the other. On the Stanhope es-
tate, many of the ecclesiastical leaseholders formed an intermediate rentier middle 
class. This was not beneficial to the development of the region as the leaseholders 
displayed little paternalism towards their tenants. 
Absenteeism was not an important factor in determining the degree of openness 
and closedness on the estates. All the landowners were absentee, although John 
Bowes lived for much of the time on the neighbouring estate of Streatlam. Contact 
between landlord and tenant was rare on all the estates, and was least on the 
Stanhope estate. Far more important were differences in resource use, land control 
and motive. 
So far, the analysis has looked at factors specific to the landed estates and the 
North Pennines. What were the influence of external factors on the estates? The 
economy had an important influence on the management of all three estates, but 
differentially affected their development. The 1820s agricultural depression affected 
the Wemmergill estate more than the Blanchland estate. The Wemmergill estate 
had fallen into a dilapidated condition and the process of enclosure had only just 
begun. The Blanchland estate, on the other hand, had benefitted from the high 
prices at the turn of the century and was in a much better position to ride out the 
depression. One effect of the depression, on both the estates, was to reduce the 
area under tillage. The economy of the Stanhope estate was more dependent on 
the lead market than agricultural prices. 
The values of the Wemmergill and the Blanchland estates were increased during the 
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economic prosperity of the mid-19th century by investments to the farm buildings 
and lands. Although the influence of the State was minimal in the 19th century, 
both John Bowes and Lord Crewe's Trustees made use of public loans to finance 
drainage improvements on their estates. For reasons stated above, the Bishops 
neglected the farms on the Stanhope estate in favour of the lead. It appears that 
the burden of taxes was higher on the Wemmergill than the Blanchland estate, 
although whether this was due to to ownership or other factors is unclear. 
What can be concluded about the processes of continuity and change in the three 
landownership structures in the early 19th century? The dominant feature of Lord 
Crewe's Charity and the Blanchland estate was continuity. There were no major 
changes in the estate structure or the administrative and charitable functions of 
this estate. Its charitable structure effectively prevented change. This inertia 
does not, however, seem to have had any negative effects on the development of 
the estate. The ownership form of the Stanhope estate prevented any changes to 
the structure of control (with the exception of the reform of the lead lease), but 
ownership did not, indeed could not, prevent changes in the economy and land 
use of the estate. Changes did take place on the Wemmergill estate under the 
direction of John Bowes, and conform most closely to the model of 19th century 
landownership outlined in section 3.2.3 
Finally, it can be concluded that the main barriers to change at this period were 
collateral and derivative rights, fiduciary and fictitious ownership forms, short-term 
motives and economic depression. The main factors which instigated change were 
entire ownership and control, enclosure, agricultural prosperity and a long-term 
outlook. Notes 
1. This definition includes the area designated as an AONB and the Durham 
Dales (Weardale, Teesdale & the Upper Derwent Valley). 
2. A bing = 8 cwt. 
3. The Allendale estate belonged to the Blackett family, but in the early 19th 
century Diana Blackett married Thomas Beaumont, and the two surnames 
were joined. 
4. The owners of the Raby estate have received several titles, including the Earls 
of Darlington, the Dukes of Cleveland, and Lord Barnard. 
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5. This estate formerly belonged to the Earls of Derwentwater, but their lands 
were forfeited to the Crown because of their part in the Rising of the North. 
The estate was given to Greenwich Hospital in 1735 (Hughes, 1963, 17). 
6. The Nent Force Level was a 5 mile long underground channel which was built 
in order to improve underground drainage and to open up new lead veins. The 
level was begun in 1776, but work was stopped in 1830 because of the expense 
(Hughes, 1963, 55). 
7. In the second half of the 19th century the Blackett-Beaumonts and the London 
Lead Company together produced 70% of the total output of Northumberland 
and Durham; about 1/7 of the total UK output (Burt et al, 1983, x). 
8. The miners suffered more than in mining companies during this depression. 
For instance, between 1820 and 1834 the London Lead Company's output was 
reduced by 20%, but the labour force was cut by 40% and wages by 20% 
(Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 279). 
9. Innovations introduced during the 19th century included the hydraulic engine; 
'cross cut levels'; and underground haulage levels (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 
202). 
10. This was called carriage work, and was mostly undertaken by part-time farm-
ers. Transport was seriously disrupted during the harvest (Hughes, 1963, 68). 
11. See Appendix F for tables of enclosure. 
12. A detailed description of the building of Nenthead is given in Raistrick (1977) 
Two Centuries of Industrial Welfare. 
13. Wesley preached at Blanchland in 1747 (Hunt, 1970, 218). 
14. The Strathmore family tree and tables of landlords and agents at Wemmergill 
are given in Appendix C. The background information about the earls of Strath-
more is taken from Durham County Council (1980) Streatlam & Gibside: the 
Bowes and Strathmore Families in County Durham. 
15. This is an example of how 'surrogate heirs' were created (see 2.2.3). It is likely 
that the 9th Earl was pleased to change his surname, since Thompson (1963, 
11) notes that Scottish peers were eager to obtain an English peerage. 
16. The Gibside estate was on the Durham coalfield. 
17. The Rector of Romaldkirk owned the manorial rights to Romaldkirk Manor. 
18. In the manors of Lune, Mickleton and Holwick several properties were held 
on longleaseholds. These were granted for 1,000 years at a small reserved rent 
of 1 to 6 old pence a year. In Cotherstone and Hunderthwaite, the earls of 
Strathmore also owned several customary leaseholds. These ancient tenures 
were financially of minimal benefit to the earls, although as lords of the manor 
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they were entitled to a fine on the death or change of a tenant worth 20 years 
reserved rent, similarly on the death of the lord of the manor. 
19. The Rector was awarded an allotment on Lune Moor worth £210 a year, but 
exchanged this with the trustees for lands at Mickleton. The allotment was 
divided between the Lunedale farms, part going to Wythes Hill. 
20. See Evans 1976 {106). 
21. The estate acquired the freeholds of Blake House, Stack and Low Wemmergill 
farms, which had formerly been held on customary longleaseholds. 
22. Wemmergill Hall, Low Wemmergill and Corbush farms were kept in hand. Low 
Wemmergill and Corbush were both let by 1823, but Wemmergill Hall was still 
in hand in 1825. The Hall was kept as a shooting lodge, but part of it was later 
let out as a farm. 
23. Mary Milner was an employee at Wemmergill Hall. 
24. It was somewhat ironic that, had the case been tried in a Scottish court John 
Bowes might have had a legitimate claim to the whole inheritance, because of 
differences in the Scottish legal system. 
25. The trustees were Mary, Countess of Strathmore (John Bowes' mother), Henry 
Jadis, James Blackburn, James Farrer, James Dundas, James Steadman and 
John Dean Paul {D/St/11/4/1). 
26. Ernie (1961, 319) ascribes three main causes to the agricultural depression: 
• an artificially high demand for food during the war, stimulating agricultural 
production and inflating land values and wage levels. 
• A post-war drop in prices as trade returned to normal. Between 1812 and 1815, 
the value of farming stock declined by almost 50%. The depression first hit the 
corn-growing districts, but later spread to pastoral areas. 
27. Thomas Bell was the surveyor for the enclosure of the Wemmergill estate, and 
took over from John Roddam as the Inclosure Commissioner on the latter's 
death. 
28. Their specific proposals were to: 
• Amalgamate Intake farm with Stackholme. 
• Convert the eastern half of Wemmergill Hall from a public house into a farm. 
• Add 29.1 hectares to Slack farm from Sleights Pasture. 
• Add 16.6 hectares to Stackholme farm from the Cocklake Allotment and to let 
the rest of the Cocklake Allotment {1,038.7 hectares) as a stinted pasture. 
e Amalgamate Arngill House with Grains 0' Beck. 
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• Amalgamate Scar Head and Corbush farms. 
• Consider whether to let Old Gate and Scar House Farms with Grains 0' Beck. 
• Amalgamate Dow Hill with Blake House. 
• Let Grassholme Mill Farm and West Farm together. 
e Amalgamate the Rectorial Allotment with Wythes Hill Farm. 
• Divide Rigg Farm between adjoining farms. 
• Let East Close and West and East Stake Hill Farms together. 
• Divide Thringarth farm between adjoining holdings. 
• Amalgamate Bowbank West Wood, West House, East Farm and Chapel House 
holdings. 
29. Liming was necessary after draining. After four to five years, Watson reported, 
the annual value of the land would increase from 24 pence to £1.20 per hectare, 
and the benefits would last for about twenty years. 
30. Watson reported that many of the Highland farms lacked gates, openings to 
fields being blocked by a temporary wall, a piece of old house timber or some 
brush wood. He recommended that all farms be supplied with gates by the 
landlord. 
31. Throughout most of this period the following farms were let together, although 
minor changes took place: 
• Close House & Arngill. 
• Grains 0' Beck, Scar House & Old Gate. 
• Blake House & Dow Hill. 
• Stackholme, Corbush & Intake. 
e High Grain & Low Soulgill. 
• Grassholme West & Grassholme Mill. 
• Rigg, Grassholme East and Grassholme Middle. 
• West Stake Hill & East Stake Hill. 
32. Denman, Roberts and Smith (1967, 466) define stinting as: 
"a term used in a traditional manner to quantify the number and kinds of 
animals a common right holder is entitled to put on a common". 
• Hoskins and Stamp (1963, 6) note that lowland commons were regulated before 
the upland commons, due to the greater abundance of land in the uplands. 
Land use pressures were less. 
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33. This finding is corroborated by other studies of upland farming (see Stapledon, 
1937, 74; Howell, 1979, 69). 
34. The estate accounts were sampled at roughly five-yearly intervals. This pro-
vides a broad view of the estate budget over this period, although it hides 
yearly variations. 
35. In 1840, Philip Pusey passed a public bill to 'Enable the Owners of Settled 
Estates to Defray the Expenses of Draining the Same'. John Bowes applied for 
a loan of £8,000 under the Act, but incurred £740 in procedural costs (Spring, 
1963, 143). 
36. Mr Milbank had definite views about the sport of grouse shooting, which he 
expressed in the following letter to Ralph Dent: 
"!do not approve of the wholesale slauqhter of grouse by driving, it is certainly 
not sport as long as birds can be got any other way, that is, a legitimate way by 
shooting to dogs. Most certainly, grouse driving ought not to take place before 
the middle of September ..... ! look upon driving grouse in August, indeed before 
the 15th September, as murder" (Milbank to Dent, 23/8/1871). 
37. The stinting regulations for Holwick, Wemmergill and Cotherstone Moors are 
printed in full in Appendix G. 
38. A heaf or heft is an unmarked unit of grazing on a common. The boundaries 
of heafs often follow natural boundaries such as watersheds. 
39. The freehold of Cotherstone Moor was not owned by the earls of Strathmore. 
It was converted into a regulated pasture under the Act of 1866. 4,494. 75 stints 
were awarded (one stint=one ewe), of which John Bowes received 281. It seems 
that regulation was necessary to solve conflicts over grazing. 
40. The first trustees appointed were John Montague (Lord Crewe's nephew), Rev. 
John Dolben, Rev. John Morley (Rector of Lincoln College), Rev. William 
Lupton and Rev. Thomas Eden. 
41. The charitable payments of 1721, 1896 and 1974 are listed in Appendix H. 
42. The 1896 data can be taken as being representative of the estate structure at 
the beginning of the 19th century except in one respect; the Bamburgh estate 
was sold shortly before this survey was carried out. 
43. Dr John Sharp was a trustee from 1772 to 1792. He is famous for instigating 
many improvements to the charity; in particular, for restoring Bamburgh Castle 
so that it could be used for charitable purposes. A school was set up in the 
castle, and a weekly surgery was held there. Its most famous use was as a base 
for the rescue of shipwrecked sailors and their cargoes (Stranks, 1976). John 
Sharp bequeathed much of his own property, including a valuable collection of 
books, to the charity on his death. This is managed as Dr. Sharp's Fund. 
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44. The farm layout has changed little over the course of the 19th and 20th cen-
turies. The figure does not, however, show Nookton, Heatheryburn or Gibralter 
farms, which were sold in the 1920s, nor the stinted pastures which had, by the 
1950s, been amalgamated with the full-time farm holdings. 
45. There was an act in 177 4 for the enclosure of the manors of Bamburgh, Shore-
ston and Sunderland which also contained provisions for settling the boundaries 
of the manors of Hexham and Blanchland (Tate & Turner, 1978). However, 
no copy of the act survives. It is likely that some enclosure at Blanchland 
took place at an earlier period, possibly whilst the estate was under monastic 
control, since certain documents refer to ancient enclosures. 
46. In 1825, for instance, the Derwent Mining Company purchased £134.65 of 
timber and in 1835 paid £112 for timber. 
47. In 1828, the Blauchland gamekeeper was instructed by the trustees to draw 
up a list of all persons seen shooting on Blanchlaud Moor, and to warn anyone 
found shooting without permission to desist (B.a.2 21/11/1828). 
48. This was due to the fumes from the mill. Rent reductions due to disturbance 
from fumes were also noted by Hunt (1972, 142). 
49. During the Napoleonic Wars much land in Western Durham was ploughed up 
for arable, but the fall in prices after the wars resulted in much of this land 
being turned back to pasture (Hodgson, 1979, 95). 
50. The expense of drainage depended on the type of soil and availability of stones 
to fill the drainage channels. An outlet was built at the bottom of the field to 
carry off the water. Once built, drains had to be maintained against blockage. 
The shallow method of constucting drains was used on the Blanchland estate 
until 1850, but by the 1860s had become unusable (Martin, 1864, 14). 
51. Bailey (1810, 180) describes the process of laying land to grass. On moist 
soils a crop of wheat is sown after summer fallow, together with red, white 
and yellow clover, rib grass and rye grass. On dry soils, first turnips and then 
barley are planted. 
52. The custom of riding the boundaries was a considerable expense. In 1839, one 
riding cost £305.85 (Martin, 1864, 12). 
53. The definition of the Stanhope estate used in this thesis refers to all the lands 
of the Bishops of Durham located in the present day parish of Stanhope. This 
was not an estate unit recognised by the Bishops, however. In early records, 
the lauds in the Park and Forest quarters were variously referred to as the 
'High Forest', 'Park and Forest' or 'Alta Foresta', whilst the lands in Stanhope 
and Newlaudside quarters were included in Darlington ward. When the Eccle-
siastical Commissioners took over the administration of the Bishopric lands, 
Stanhope was administered as a separate estate. 
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54. A Palatinate is a territory within a state. The ruler of a Palatinate is not the 
sovereign of the state but enjoys equivalent powers. There were three Palati-
nates in England: Durham, Chester and Lancaster, but the former survived 
longer than the latter two. The Durham Palatinate extended beyond the 1844 
borders of County Durham to include the manors of Craike in North Yorkshire 
and Nor hamshire and Bedlingtonshire in Northumberland. The Bishops ruled 
their kingdom from the castle at Bishop Auckland. (Vickers, 1988, 9). 
55. The Bishops of Durham enjoyed the following powers of sovereignty: 
• 'in imperio': the Bishops were head of civil government and had the right to 
lands forfeited for treason. 
e 'In domino': all landowners were tenants in chief under the Bishops. 
• 'In jurisdictione': the Bishops had judicial authority over Palatinate courts 
(Vickers, 1988). Many Palatinate powers were abolished by Henry VIII. In 
1536, the powers of criminal jurisdiction were transferred to the Crown, and in 
1570 the right to forfeited land was also transferred to the Crown. 
56. A list of the Bishops of Durham is given in Appendix E. 
57. The Bishopric forest originally stretched as far as Bedburn, and contained 
three parks, at Stanhope, Wolsingham and Bedburn. 
58. The tenants were required to do 14 days military service, to keep constant 
watch upon the border, to pay rent to the Bishop twice a year and to serve at 
the Forest Court (Weardale Chest, item 44). 
59. Tenant right is the general term applied to customary tenures in the North of 
England. Ancient freehold was the form of tenant right practiced in Weardale. 
60. They did not own mineral rights and their claim to the sporting rights was 
later disputed ( 1828 Case). 
61. Two of the earliest ecclesiastical leaseholds to be granted were Horsley Head 
(1507) and Eastgate (1507), (Drury, 1987, 75). 
62. The Manor of Wolsingham was purchased by Sir Arthur Hesilrige in 1650. He 
also tried to reform the ancient 
freeholds, but had no more success than the Bishops had done. He had misinter-
preted the legal nature of the estate which he had bought (Drury, 1980). 
63. Only if a leaseholder was badly in debt was he evicted. It was reported that 
a farmer, who owned a freehold property contiguous to his church leasehold, 
had channelled all the profits from the latter property into the former, and was 
duly evicted (1837). 
64. Mowbray to Barrington, 18/12/1798. He arrived at this figure by calculating 
the gross profit, which at 4 guineas a bing was 84,000 guineas, minus 20,000 
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guineas for the costs of working and payment of wayleaves. 
65. It was usual for the lord of the manor to be awarded an allotment equal to 
one sixteenth of the area still unenclosed after the award had been made in 
compensation for his loss of manorial rights. 
66. See Appendix G for stinting regulations. 
67. These lands and stints were divided between Westernhope Moor, Swinhope 
Moor, Windyside Pasture, Burnhope Moor, Newhouse Pasture and Newhouse 
Moor. 
68. This surwy was carried out by Smiths Gore on behalf of the Ecclesiastical 
Commissioners on taking over the control of the estate. 
69. Case on behalf of the Lord Bishop of Durham respecting his Lordship's rights 
upon and over lands within and parcel of the Park and Forest of Weardale. 
W.L. Tindal, Lincoln's Inn (10/10/1828). 
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Chapter V 
Continuity and Change 
5.1 Introduction 
Over the period from the late 19th century to the mid-20th century, the North 
Pennines has undergone major socio-economic changes. It has also been a pe-
riod when, at national level at least, the structure of landownership has altered 
dramatically. This chapter analyses continuity and change in the landownership 
structures and estate management policies of the three case study estates over this 
period, and examines the role that landownership has played in the transformation 
and decline of the North Pennine economy. 
The decline of lead mining in the late 19th century was rapid and dramatic. Per-
haps the worst conditions were faced in the 1880s. A depression in lead prices due to 
foreign competition from Spain, Rumania and Germany, coincided with the Great 
Agricultural Depression, causing distress in both sectors of the upland economy. 
Whereas on previous occasions the two major mining companies, the Blackett-
Beaumonts and the London Lead Company, had ridden out the depression, this 
time both companies decided to pull out of the area. The Blackett-Beaumonts sur-
rendered their Weardale lease in 1884 to concentrate on their interests in Allendale. 
The London Lead Company withdrew from Alston Moor in 1882, but continued to 
operate in Teesdale untill904 (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 155). Looking back to 
Figure 4.2, it can be seen that total lead production decreased, both in the North 
Pennines and nationally, after 1880. 
The disastrous effect of the mine closures on local employment is clearly illustrated 
by the falling population figures after 1880, especially in the lead district (see 
Figure 5.1). Between 1851 and 1901, there was a decline in population in all the 
former lead mining districts. Decline was particularly severe on Alston Moor (-
54%), Allendale (-65%), Stanhope (-35%) and Hunstanworth (-64%). In contrast, 
the parishes in North Yorkshire showed a greater stability, and in some cases even 
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Figure j.l - Population Change, 1851 to 1901 
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slight growth. The greatest population growth took place on the fringes of the 
North Pennines, around Barnard Castle and Lanchester [1]. 
Although mining continued into the 20th century, it never regained its former 
importance. New industrial demands have created markets for other minerals 
besides lead, especially fluorspar, barytes and zinc. The Weardale mineral lease 
was taken over by the Weardale Lead Company, which operated until1917 and was 
then taken over by the Weardale Iron Company. In 1924, this company also took 
over the last Blackett-Beaumont mines in Allendale. On Alston Moor, zinc mining 
became important, controlled by the Nent Head and Tynedale Zinc Company who 
had taken over the lease from the London Lead Company. In 1906, the lease was 
taken over by the Vielle Montagne Zinc Company. The last lead ore smelt mill to 
close was at Rookhope in 1919 (Raistrick & Jennings, 1965, 329). 
Figure 5.2 shows that between 1901 and 1951 the rate of population decrease 
slowed down, although decline continued (the population of Allendale declined by 
a further 42%). There was even a slight increase of population in Stanhope (1%). 
The highest rates of population growth continued to be around Barnard Castle. 
The lead mining industry bequeathed a legacy of smallholdings and an under-
capitalised farm sector. The farm sector had to readjust to the demands of the 
20th century. It was reported that in Allendale many farmers turned to dairying 
(Pawson, 1961, 81). Milk was transported to Hexham for production into butter. 
With the decline in the mining industry, the area became less accessible. In the 
1950s and 1960s all the branch railway lines closed down (Rounthwaite, 1965). 
The passenger service to Allendale stopped in 1930 although the line continued to 
carry freight until 1950. The passenger service to Wearhead ceased in 1957 and 
the line closed in 1967. 
5.2 Case Study One: The Wemmergill Estate 
5.2.1 1885 to 1900: Change on the Wemmergill Estate 
In 1885, John Bowes died and the landlordship of the Wemmergill estate reverted to 
the Scottish branch of the family. Claude, the 13th Earl of Strathmore, became the 
new landlord (see Appendix C). This meant that control of Wemmergill reverted 
243 
0) 
C") 
0) 
..... 
0 
..... 
lO 
ao 
ao 
pol 
~ 
11.1 
..... 
Q. 
.... 
Q,) 
CJ Q,) 
~ 
Q,) 
~ 
..... 
11.1 
~ 
-
·;, 
... 
Q,) 
8 
8 
~ 
I 
pol 
lO 
.! 
,.Q 
~ 
INCOME SOURCE 1896 
Agricultural Rents 5,372.80 
Customary Rents 62.70 
Quarry Rents 2,769.60 
Shooting Rents 3,012.00 
Customary Fines 77.70 
Timber -
Surface Damages 31.50 
Mise Receipts 55.20 
(Balance From Previous Year) -
Return of Property Tax -
(Remittances) -
TOTAL 11,381.50 
1900 1905 1910 1914 
5.326.00 4,959.45 5,130.20 4,999.35 
67.15 66.45 62.85 62.20 
3,121.55 3,160.30 3,425.55 2,693.70 
3,012.00 4,212.00 4,512.00 4.462.00 
- 135.95 18.55 4.05 
- - - 16.70 
- 54.50 42.00 42.50 
29.90 10.55 00.60 12.60 
- - (2,108.30) -
- - - 36.90 
(1,420.50) 
- - -
(12.977.10) 12.599.20 (15,300.05) 12,330.00 
bracket.~ indicate additional recPipt.~ 
1920 1925 1930 1937 
4,868.25 2,802.90 2,498.55 2,663.85 
59.80 63.90 - -
3,402.75 4,695.40 14.15 6.75 
3,314.50 281.00 2,519.00 2,500 
- 5.85 - -
258.15 22.25 25.95 29.25 
42.50 42.50 - -
39.75 537.00 121.90 45.30 
- - - (1,268.95) 
158.45 92.90 208.55 -
(148.30) - (2,985.75) (2,964.15) 
(12,292.45) 8.543.70 (8,373.85) (9.478.25) 
--- ·--------------
1939 
2,373.20 
-
15.15 
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-
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-
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EXPENSE 
Tithes 
Property Tax 
Local Rates 
Buildings 
Drains 
Fences 
Plantations 
Mise Repairs & Improvements 
Allowances to Tenants 
Sundry Labour 
Gamekeeper's Wages 
Agencies 
Estate Subscriptions 
Insurances 
Mise Payments 
Remittances 
TOTAL 
1896 
9.35 
353.00 
3.95 
1,056.50 
177.65 
174.45 
67.05 
205.20 
43.75 
31.80 
80.00 
95.00 
130.25 
45.55 
202.80 
7,100.00 
9.776.30 
1900 1905 1910 1914 
8.70 8.95 9.00 9.65 
382.40 597.10 847.60 971.40 
7.55 11.25 70.35 75.20 
1,099.70 841.00 1,253.55 1,047.10 
4.65 9.05 119.65 115.20 
245.50 203.85 202.20 218.40 
54.35 25.40 35.30 92.00 
107.20 87.00 61.10 10.75 
41.50 69.50 79.05 73.85 
81.45 59.60 123.90 70.80 
5.00 99.75 209.75 207.75 
95.00 95.00 95.00 95.00 
135.30 55.50 144.20 65.90 
49.10 48.15 50.00 62.90 
1,639.50 132.75 154.15 193.30 
8,000.00 9,250.00 8,000.00 11,000.00 
11,956.90 11,593.85 11,454.80 14,309.20 
1920 1925 1930 
12.60 10.45 -
3,423.30 1,814.60 698.10 
114.85 217.90 276.35 
791.95 584.60 742.85 
24.05 65.20 8.90 
411.55 119.70 191.50 
282.25 31.70 6.50 
2.45 20.45 15.15 
42.25 36.15 5.00 
135.15 351.40 140.45 
459.35 1,475.70 1,037.20 
222.40 525.00 213.20 
60.80 89.95 2.00 
82.55 104.70 145.65 
216.70 64.55 3.35 
6,148.30 3,000.00 4,872.35 
12.430.50 8.512.05 8,358.55 
1937 
-
972.75 
200.30 
568.50 
-
176.75 
41.80 
20.80 
27.75 
180.40 
1,089.50 
270.20 
29.35 
153.05 
5.65 
4,954.20 
8,681.10 
1939 
-
893.25 
540.35 
814.60 
1.00 
353.20 
16.10 
42.45 
12.50 
180.50 
826.45 
270.20 
34.80 
150.75 
2.75 
2,643.65 
6,782.55 
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from Streatlam Castle to Glamis. Ralph John Dent, the agent, died in 1889, when 
William Ralston took over as agent. 
These changes in the management of Wemmergill took place at the same time 
as the onset of the late 19th century depression in lead mining and agriculture. 
The balance and composition of income and expenditure on the Wemmergill estate 
from 1885 to 1939 is shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The depression in lead mining 
does not appear to have had a major impact on the revenue of the Wemmergill 
estate or on the inhabitants. It can be seen from Table 4.16, that the employment 
structure in Lunedale and Holwick had not changed significantly between 1851 
and 1881 [2], and Table 5.3 shows that there was no noticeable depopulation from 
the estate. This reflects that fact that lead mining had never been a dominant 
part of the estate economy. However, after 1891 there was a steady decline in the 
population, which may be linked to the withdrawal of the London Lead Company 
from Teesdale in the early 20th century. 
In 1887, general rent reductions were made across the estate. Total receipts fell 
from £7,260.55 in 1885 to £5,372.80 in 1896, a drop of 25% in ten years. On the 
Lunedale farms, rents also dropped by 25%, from £2,110.30 in 1885 to £1,796.60 
in 1895 (see Table 5.4). The further decline of rental income from the Lunedale 
farms in the early 20th century was due to the creation of three reservoirs on the 
estate. 
In 1876, an act was passed to allow the Stockton and Middlesborough Water 
Board to supply water to the boroughs of Stockton on Tees and Middlesborough 
(D/St/C2/16/8). As a result, three reservoirs were created on the Wemmergill 
estate: H ury and Blackton reservoirs in Baldersdale, and Grassholme Reservoir in 
Lunedale (see Figure 4. 7). The creation of these reservoirs involved a substantial 
loss of in-bye land, for which the water board was required to pay compensation. 
A surveyor, Samuel Rowlandson [3], was requested to report on the implications 
of the reservoirs for the estate (D /St/C2/16/8). The Grassholme reservoir in-
volved a loss of 33.7 hectares of farmland in Lower Lunedale. In all, seven farms 
and one stinted pasture were affected. The farm buildings of East Grassholme 
farm and Grassholme Mill were completely flooded. High rates of compensation 
were requested by the estate: £312 per hectare for the farmland, £1,000 for East 
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Table 5.3 - Population Change on the Wemmergill Estate, 1881 to 
1951 
Date Lunedale Holwick Mickleton Cotherstone Hunderthwaite Romaldkirk 
1881 345 231 707 638 266 297 
1891 257 237 665 940 409 287 
1901 326 193 655 665 258 251 
1911 303 192 566 644 249 240 
1921 249 173 520 701 240 233 
1931 230 187 475 611 179 205 
1951 182 140 415 503 177 169 
Grassholme farm, and £1,800 for Grassholme Mill. The Baldersdale reservoirs 
flooded a larger area, 54.1 hectares, but since the estate only held customary 
rights over these lands, a compensation payment of only £1.80 per hectare was 
demanded. The report goes on to state the 13th Earl's position concerning his 
other rights: 
"The mines and minerals to be reserved throughout the whole. The timber to 
be taken at a valuation, regard being had to premature cutting for which due 
consideration must be made in the price; say 50%. The reservoirs to be properly 
and substantially fenced round and so to be maintained by the corporations. 
The quantities are assumed in each case, subject to admeasurement when the 
b_oundaries are properly defined. The right of shooting, fishing, fowling etc 
reserved over the reservoirs. Proper access to be made for salmon passing up 
the rivers Lune and Balder". 
The reservoirs were completed by 1900 [4]. As a result, the lands of Grassholme 
East and East Close farms were greatly reduced, and were amalgamated with Rigg 
farm. Table 5.5 shows the rent reductions that were made on the affected farms. 
Although the sporting rights were at first reserved, they were later sold to the 
water board. 
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Table 5.4 - Lunedale Farm Rents, 1885 to 1946 
FARM 1885 1890 1895 1900 1911 
Close House & Arngill 78.00 69.50 69.50 69.50 69.50 
Lune Head 80.00 65.50 69.50 69.50 72.50 
Wythes Hill 155.00 128.00 128.00 128.00 128.00 
North Wythes Hill 32.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 -
Grains 0' Beck 164.00 138.30 138.30 110.00 110.40 
Blake House 82.00 76.50 76.50 65.00 65.40 
Scar Head 61.00 52.00 52.00 66.00 66.00 
Stackholme 112.00 88.00 88.00 88.00 81.00 
Low Wemmergill 146.00 125.00 103.00 103.00 103.40 
High Soulgill 50.00 45.00 45.00 45.00 50.25 
High Grain 87.00 80.50 80.50 80.50 74.75 
Wemmergill Hall 180.00 150.00 150.00 148.50 150.00 
Grassholme West 133.00 105.00 105.00 105.00 52.20 
Stack 81.00 73.00 73.00 72.50 77.00 
Rigg 47.00 34.30 34.30 34.30 34.10 
Grassholme East 70.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 22.75 
East Close 18.70 15.20 15.20 15.20 8.10 
Stake Hill 91.70 78.00 78.00 78.00 67.35 
West Park 93.40 87.00 87.00 87.00 80.25 
Thringarth 40.60 16.80 16.80 16.80 32.25 
Ea.'it Park 173.00 158.00 158.00 158.00 144.00 
Chapel House 24.90 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Cronkley 110.00 96.00 96.00 96.00 112.50 
TOTAL 2,110.30 1,796.60 1.778.60 1,750.80 1,626.70 
Sources: D/St/E3/9/47-50; IR/1/146; E3/9/33; E3/9/37 
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1920 193? 
69.00 55.00 
69.00 69.00 
128.00 130.00 
- -
120.00 99.00 
65.00 40.00 
67.00 67.00 
100.00 88.00 
103.00 94.00 
70.00 70.00 
80.00 80.00 
147.00 142.00 
52.00 56.00 
87.00 90.00 
66.00 66.00 
- -
- -
60.00 63.00 
70.00 76.00 
31.00 32.00 
134.00 137.00 
25.00 25.00 
100.00 100.00 
1,643.00 1,579.00 
1946 
108.00 
111.00 
151.00 
-
99.00 
29.00 
130.00 
92.00 
104.00 
85.00 
100.00 
177.00 
73.00 
104.00 
77.00 
-
-
71.00 
83.00 
32.00 
160.00 
24.00 
120.00 
1,930.00 
Table 5.5 - Rent Reductions on Lunedale Farms, 1901 
Holding Original Rent (£) Reduced Rent ( &) 
Grassholme West & Mill 105.00 50.00 
Grassholme East 62.00 35.00 
East Park 158.00 134.00 
West Park & Thringarth 118.80 101.80 
Stake Hill 78.00 60.00 
East Close 15.25 6.00 
Source: D/St/E3/9/31 
The reduction in farm rents was, to a large extent, offset by two major changes 
in the composition of the estate's income in the late 19th century. After 1896, as 
can be seen from Table 5.1, the Wemmergill estate ceased to be dependent for its 
revenue solely on farm rents. The income from quarry and shooting rents shot up, 
and between 1886 and 1920, the total estate income was composed almost equally 
of these three sources of revenue. The increase in quarry rents was due to the 
opening of a stone quarry across the river from Middleton, worked by Ord and 
Maddison. 
Despite the agricultural depression, expenditure on repairs and improvements to 
the farm buildings and lands was actually higher in 1896 than in 1885. It can be 
seen from Table 5.2 that total expenditure more than doubled between 1885 and 
1896. This was mainly due to the remittance payments, which rose from £3,000 
in 1885 to over £7,000 in 1896. It seems that under the 13th Earl, the accounting 
procedure altered. Figure 5.3 shows th;~.t in five years during the 1890s there was a 
deficit. Presumably, in these years the deficit was made up by cross-subsidisation. 
In 1900, expenditure increased even more, but this was largely due to the purchase 
of property worth £1,420.50 at Bowbank (E3/5/102). 
249 
Figure 5.3 - Income & Expenditure at Wemmergill, 1890 to 1939 
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5.2.2 1900 to 1940: Political Pressures, Survival Strategies 
A more serious threat, which threatened the survival of the Strathmore's whole 
estate, was posed by the political attacks on the landed elite in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries (see 2.3). In 1904, only ten years after the introduction 
of estate duty, the 13th Earl died, and left his son to inherit an estate valued 
at £716,150 but burdened with estate duties of £14,903 (D/St/C2/20/41). This 
amount might seem small in relation to the size of the inheritance, but it appears to 
have caused problems for the new earl. Correspondence between the 14th Earl and 
William Ralston (the agent) is much taken up with discussion as to which societies 
the new earl should support, and what minimum level of payments would be 
acceptable. (D/St/02/19/261). The tone of these early letters indicates that the 
new earl held Ralston in considerable respect, and he consulted Ralston frequently 
about his duties as a landlord. 
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With the seat of control now at Glamis Castle, it was decided to put Streatlam 
Castle to some productive use, and from 1904 onwards the castle was let as a 
sporting lodge with Cotherstone Moor (D/St/C2/20/41). 
The 14th Earl stood as the conservative MP for his home constituency of Forfar, 
and so was personally involved in the growing conflict between the government 
and the landed elite in the period leading up to the 1910 Finance Act (see 2.3). He 
describes the political tension of the time in his letters to William Ralston. The 
threat of a taxation on land values had caused land values to fall: 
''the property market is in a very depressed state owing to expectation of forth-
coming legislation" (Strathmore to Ralston, 12/3/1909) 
It appears that landowners were forming a protest lobby group: 
"Will you let Colonel Vane (Raby Estate) know that I think that our association 
(Durham Conservative Association) should get into communication with the 
Budget Protest Association, as they will give us the right lines or any how 
suggestions as to how to form our protest" (Strathmore to Ralston, 23/6/1909) 
The 14th Earl was unhappy about the ineffectiveness of the landowners' protest: 
"landowners are even now apathetic and there are the Liberty and Property 
Defence League and other bodies rather overlapping each other" (Strathmore 
to Ralston, 19/5/1910) 
The following outburst indicates the personal strain on the earl: 
"I am still paying death duties and the budget makes an enormous difference 
to me .... {he should know that) I don't spend much on myself, and (that) I do 
rtot race, yacht, hunt or play cards and (that) I do not even go to a theatre or 
smoke a cigar... apparently all my income goes in labour bills, improvements 
and subscriptions" (Strathmore to Ralston, 6/6/1910) 
As well as death duties and the threat of higher land taxes, a further financial 
pressure on the estate was posed by increases in other property charges. From 
1890 onwards, property taxes increased to become a considerable annual expense, 
particularly after 1914 (see Table 5.2). Although an annual return on the property 
tax was made after 1914, the return was less than 10% of the total expenditure. 
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The exceptionally high tax levied in 1920 could include the implementation of the 
1910 land tax [5]. Local rates also increased steadily after the First World War. 
These political and financial strains on the 14th Earl in the early 20th century 
were compounded by the continuing depressed state of the agricultural market. 
Many tenants faced economic difficulties. The 14th Earl wrote to Ralston in 1909 
concerning rent arrears, due to the low price of wool and mutton (Strathmore to 
Ralston, 20/3/1909). Two Lunedale tenants (Dawson of Stake Hill and Dent of 
Low Wemmergill) were badly in arrears with their rent, and the earl was uncertain 
of what strategy to adopt in order to recover the arrears: 
"I see now that your plan of compromising the arrears would not affect the 
tenants adversely. On the contrary, they will be getting something for nothing. 
In fact I think a 'time limit' should be fixed, otherwise the result would not be 
of much use to the executing, as matters should be wound up before very long ... 
How would it do to let the tenants in question know that all the amounts of 
arrears that they paid off during the next three or four years would count as 
double the amount they actually paid off; just as you suggest in fact, only with 
the time limit added... They should be told that it is the executing of the late 
Earl that requires some payment of arrears, and not the present management 
of the estate" (Strathmore to Ralston, 31/3/1909). 
It should be noted that the earl excuses himself for this action by putting the 
blame on his father. 
The importance of grouse shooting to the Wemmergill estate economy continued to 
increase, and it assumed a prominent position in the management of the estate in 
the 20th century. In 1914, for instance, shooting was let on Cotherstone Low Moor 
and High Moor, Mickleton allotments, Wemmergill and Holwick (D/St/E3/20/20). 
The shooting was the only resource in which the earls took a personal interest. It is 
important to analyse the management of the grouse shooting, since it played such 
a large role in the development of the estate in the 20th century, and is revealing 
about the motives of the earls towards the estate. 
Grouse shooting was a status sport. The lessees of the shooting were of a much 
higher social class than the farm tenantry. A memo written by William Ral-
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ston in 1906 describes the organisation of the shooting on Cotherstone Moor 
(D/St/C2/19/163). The low moor required thirteen drivers in a single line. Up 
to seven drives could be managed in a day and the moor could support about 
nine days shooting in the season. It was suggested that the two moors be shot 
alternately on four consecutive days, leaving at least ten days between shoots. The 
low moor had five lines of butts with six butts per line and there were four lines 
of six butts on the high moor. It was shot using a 'double drive', with drivers 
approaching from two different directions, so that the party could shoot first one 
way then the other. This needed 21 drivers. The low moor yielded, on average, 
500 brace [6] of grouse per season, and the high moor 600. The drivers were paid 6 
old pence a day (with no beer!). Table 5.6 shows statistics from the 1915 shooting 
season on Wemmergill Moor. There were, altogether, 13 shooting parties from late 
August to early September, although the numbers of grouse shot on each occasion 
declined as the season progressed. The majority of grouse were sent to London for 
sale, but a number were given as goodwill presents to the farm tenants and other 
local residents [7], and some were consumed by the shooting parties at Wemmergill 
Hall. 
From Table 5.7, it can be seen that 1915 was a moderate year for grouse shooting. 
Although grouse shooting could bring in a considerable income, it was not a reliable 
income source. The value of the moors depended on the quality of the shooting, 
and this varied enormously from year to year. Looking at the number of grouse 
killed on the three moors from 1893 to 1915, it can be seen that 1901 and 1912 
were bumper years, with over 9,000 head of grouse shot on Wemmergill moor, and 
over 7,000 on Holwick. 1913 was a disastrous season (only 620 and 153 head were 
shot_on Wemmergill and Holwick moors respectively). 
As well as being an unreliable income source, grouse shooting was also a consid-
erable expense. Table 5.2 shows that gamekeepers' wages increased considerably 
between 1920 and 1925, which indicates the growing importance of grouse shoot-
ing on the estate. The increase may have been due to the employment of more 
gamekeepers, or to a change in management practice. In 1917, the estate was 
responsible for keepering the moors and paying all local rates and taxes, but the 
tenants were expected to provide drivers and beaters (D/St/C2/19/163). In 1925, 
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Table 5.6- Grouse Killed on Wemmergill Moor, 1915 
Date Brace Killed - Disposed of - -
1915 shot picked up total London presents Hall damaged 
August 
28th 582 32 614 537.5 37 - 39.5 
30th 584 34 618 497.5 100 - 20.5 
September 
3rd 11 - 11 - 11 - -
15th 16 - 16 - - 16 -
18th 199.5 10.5 210 196 - - 14 
20th 312.5 7.5 320 293 10 - 17 
21st 157.5 4 161.5 149.5 4 - 8 
22nd 147.5 4 151.5 108 30 - 13.5 
24th 3 - 3 - 3 - -
October 
18th 17 - 17 - 2 14 -
20th 95 - 95 93.5 - 1.5 -
21st/22nd/23rd 171.5 8 179.5 151 10 9 9 
25th 61.5 5 66.5 66 - - 0.5 
27tll 108 8.5 116.5 100.5 9 3 4 
28th 8.5 - 8.5 - - - 8.5 
30th 120.5 3.& 124 117 - 7 -
November 
4th/5th 95 3.5 98.5 85.5 - 13 -
TOTALS 2,689.5 120.5 2,810 2,395 217 72 126 
Source: D/St/E3/20/65 
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Table 5. 7 - Head of Grouse Killed on the Wemmergill Moors, 1893 to 
1915 
Year Wemmergill Holwick Cotherstone Cotherstone 
- - - High Low 
1893 8226 5166 - -
1894 7421 4602 - -
1895 1895 2227 
- -
1896 9144 5672 - -
1897 7728 3591 - -
1898 5750 4407 - -
1899 3979 3457 -
-
1900 8270 6346 - -
1901 10072 7725 - -
1902 6135 1965 
- -
1903 3504 977 - -
1904 1415 1012 - -
1905 4559 2127 - -
1906 3930 3508 838 660 
1907 1106 2624 568 925 
1908 584 1508 unlet 805 
1909 4373 1747 783 957 
1910 5731 5177 956 1028 
1911 7463 6045 1172 1029 
1912 9633 7098 1486 890 
1913 620 153 805 902 
1914 3241 
- 965 874 
1915 5620 2431 - -
Source: D/St/C2/19/163 
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the estate met the cost of drivers' wages, gun and dog licences, and all the costs 
of maintaining the shooting lodges (D/St/E3/5/129). 
It was hard to let the moors during the 1914 - 1918 war, not least because of 
the difficulty of obtaining ammunition. By 1918, there was a scarcity of lead for 
civilian purposes (Strathmore to Ralston, 12/5/1918). Thus, Wemmergill Moor 
was let for only £1,250 in 1915 instead of the advertised £2,500. Holwick shooting 
was advertised for £1,000 in 1917, but finally let for only £650 (D/St/C2/19/163). 
Even the 14th Earl had problems obtaining game [8]. 
From Figure 5.3 and Tables 5.1 and 5.2, it can be seen that in the period leading 
up to the First World War, receipts from the Wemmergill estate continued to 
decline, and in several years expenditure exceeded income. In these years, the 
deficit was made up by cross-subsidisation from the earl's other properties. It 
is unclear whether the greater instability in the Wemergill budget following the 
death of John Bowes was due to new accounting procedures, or to actual changes 
in the estate budget. The percentage of the total receipts which were put back 
into repairs and improvements remained relatively constant at around 10%, and 
the percentage of the income which went towards remittance payments actually 
dropped under the 13th and 14th Earls. It should be remembered that when 
ownership of the Wemmergill estate reverted back to the Scottish branch of the 
family, the Wemmergill estate became part of a much larger property portfolio. 
Major structural changes to the Strathmore family's total landholdings took place 
in the 1920s, when the 14th Earl decided to, or was forced to, sell a substantial 
amount of property. His letters to William Ralston at this time show the bitterness 
he felt a.t having to reduce the estate. He talks about: 
"the folly of keeping up two large places in these days" (Strathmore to Ralston, 
13/4/1920) 
Property prices were depressed, and of the sale of Gibside Hall in 1920 the earl 
writes: 
"It is sad that a house such as Gibside should go for the small sum of £7,500, 
as I dare say it would cost £50,000 to erect now" {Strathmore to Ralston, 
16/4/1920). 
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In 1922, Streatlam Castle was sold along with a 2, 792 hectare estate, including 
a 167 hectare deer park (D /St/C2/20/ 42). After the sale, new estate offices and 
an agent's house were found in Barnard Castle. The Westwick estate (in South 
Durham) was also sold to the sitting tenants in 1922 [9]. 
A continuing depression in the land and agricultural markets in the 1920s caused 
further economic problems for the Wemmergill estate. Table 5.4 shows that total 
rents from the Lunedale farms dropped by 4% between 1920 and the 1930s. A 
major blow was dealt to the total estate revenue by the closure of the Middleton 
stone quarry in the late 1920s. Following the 1925 Property Acts (see 2.2.2), 
income from customary rents ceased. After 1920, it can be seen from Table 5.2 
that the level of donations to local societies, and the level of remittances paid to 
the earl dropped, both indications of financial strain. The depressed conditions 
showed no sign of easing in the 1930s. It was a time of considerable personal strain 
on all concerned in the management of the estate. In 1931, the Lunedale bailiff, 
John Brown, wrote to Thomas McQueen (the agent): 
"I would not like you to think I was not keeping expenses down... I do my best 
to keep them down, and will do so... But, in your letter you have chosen what 
is a very big month, and one that will not occur again this year" ( J. Brown to 
McQueen, 13/8/1931) [10]. 
A letter from a Cockfield tenant (South Durham) to McQueen in 1931 describes 
the agricultural distress: 
"I am endeavouring to do my best during this depression to keep the business 
going, and I may tell you it has cost me all I possessed in the hopes of this 
depression passing away. Everybody seems to be curtailing expenses, horses 
here are going on the land without shoes, farmers accounts that used to run 
from £8 to £14 per half year are from 30/ to £ 2" (G. Harrison to McQueen, 
1931). 
In 1932, the 14th Earl decided to divide the ownership and control of the Durham 
and Wemmergill estates between himself and his eldest son and heir, Lord Glamis 
(D/St/C2/20/28). The division was made as follows: the earl retained surface 
interests at Evenwood and manorial rights to Holwick and Gibside. Lord Glamis 
received the surface rights to Holwick and Gibside, plus surface and manorial 
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ownership of the Wemmergill (i.e. Lunedale) and Cockfield estates. The reasons 
for the division of the estate were, probably, due partly to the old age of the 
14th Earl (he was 77), and partly to the desire to alleviate the burden of death 
duties by transferring property during the earl's lifetime. It also smoothed over 
the transition of management from father to son (on the death of the father, the 
15th Earl assumed the ownership and control of all these estates). 
After this date, therefore, Lord Glamis took over the management of the Wem-
mergill estate. Rent rebates were allowed to the tenants in 1933, and John Brown 
describes their appreciation at the rent audit dinner: 
"They (also) made a unanimous and special request that I should let you know 
they all appreciated the allowance made to them today, and they wished you 
to let their Lordships both know how grateful they were, and they hoped that if 
times did not improve before the next rent audit that they would again make 
allowance" (J. Brown to McQueen, 10/4/1933) 
A dispute over rents may have been the subject of this following letter from Lord 
Glamis to McQueen: 
"I quite agree that the Holwick tenants must be treated firmly at the moment. 
Moreover, I fancy that if it came to what the Americans call a 'show down', 
very few would be prepared to throw up their farms. You confirm my suspicions 
that there is a ring-leader and he must be closely watched" (Lord Glamis to 
McQueen, 22/9/1933) 
Lord Glamis placed as great, if not greater, importance on the management of the 
grouse moors in comparison to his father. He was prepared to exploit the estate's 
historical associations in order to publicise the moors and obtain good lettings. 
1933 proved a difficult year in which to let the moors, because a grouse disease in 
1931/32 had reduced the population. By June 1933, the moors were still not let, 
and Thomas McQueen recommended that the estate should place an advert in the 
newspapers which glamorised the history of the moors: 
"If (an advert) were worked up on the famous guns that had been attracted to 
the Teesdale grouse moors since the visit of the late King Edward and his party 
in August 1866, and later the German Emperor to Wemmergill, and in more 
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Blake House John Watson ditto Joseph Peacock ditto Matthew Peacock Tallentine & Beadle 
~ Scar Head Robert Bayles ditto ditto ditto I. & J. Bayles W. Dawson 
Stackholmc John Kipling ditto ditto ditto ditto N. Williamson 
Low Wemmergill Henry Dent J. Hind & H. Dent J. & H. Dent ditto ditto T. Dent 
High Soulgill George Raine ditto ditto ditto W. & J. Bell -
Low Soulgill Thomas Sayer ditto T. Sayer's Exors T. Sayer ditto H. Staley 
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tO Wewmergill Hall William Collinson ditto G. & H. Collinson ditto R. Bainbridge's Exors 
--
~ 
.:-;l Grassholme West Henry Allinson ditto ditto Mrs Allinson J. Stokeld ditto 
-
-2: Stack Thomas Smith ditto ditto John Smith ditto T. Dent 
....... 
--
Rigg Richard Watson J. Bainbridge ditto Abel Smith ditto J. White 
....... 
~ 
~ Grassholme East Francis Smith ditto F. Smith's Exors J. & A. Smith A. Smith -
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~ East Close Ann Addison T. Addison T. Addison's Exors T. Addison ditto T. Addison's Exors 
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West Stake Hill John Dowson ditto ditto ditto ditto J. Collinson 
-t West Park J. Bainbridge ditto William Cameron ditto ditto J. W. Collinson 
Thringarth Joseph Sow(~rby ditto W. Cameron ditto G. Cameron T. Addison 
East Park John Dent ditto ditto M. & J. Dent J. Dent R. Raine 
Chapel House Valentine Raine William Raine ditto ditto John Jackson B. Teward 
I Cronkley Arthur Allinson ditto ditto M. Allinson J. Natrass A. Bell 
recent years mention of HRH the Duke of York's visit to Holwick, and that it 
was on Wemmergill Moor that driving was first seriously adopted, with Sir F. 
Milbank's record bag in 1872 .... " (MacQueen to Glamis, 4/7/33) [11]. 
Despite this glamorous portrayal, however, the Wemmergill shooting was finally 
let for only £1,000. 
Unfortunately, no information is available on tenancy changes between 1911 and 
1946, but Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show that several changes in tenancy took place 
during this period. Up to 1911, however, there were very few changes in tenancy, 
indicating a high degree of stability and continuity in the farm sector. 
5.2.3 Summary 
Several changes in ownership, control and resource use took place during this 
period, not only on the Wemmergill estate but also to the Strathmore family's 
total estate. The Wemmergill estate was not unduly affected by the lead mining 
depression, but the agricultural depression led to a fall in farm rents. The creation 
of three reservoirs on the estate caused a loss of in-bye land and a reduction in the 
number of farm holdings. 
Possibly due to the return of the ownership of the Wemmergill estate to the Scottish 
branch of the family, and possibly due to falling agricultural rents, the resource 
base of the Wemmergill estate broadened in the late 19th century. Rising rents 
from quarrying and grouse shooting offset falling agricultural receipts. Grouse 
shooting was to play a very high profile role in the development of the estate over 
the 20th century. 
Like_ other members of the landed elite, the 14th Earl faced financial pressures from 
the political attacks on private landownership and the rising burden of taxation. 
In the early 1920s, the Streatlam, Westwick and Gibside estates were sold, but 
the Wemmergill estate survived. In the 1930s, the management of the Wemmergill 
estate was taken over by Lord Glamis, the heir to the estate. He placed an equal, 
if not greater emphasis on the development of grouse shooting. 
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5.3 Case Study Two: Lord Crewe's Charity 
5.3.1 1860 to 1900: Change 
External pressures, both political and economic, were responsible for changes in the 
administration, charitable function and estate structure of Lord Crewe's Charity 
in the late 19th century. Lord Crewe's Charity was attacked politically not for its 
landownership, but for its charitable functions. During the 19th century, charities 
like Lord Crewes' began to attract public attention and criticism. Many charities 
had lost sight of their original purpose, and were accused of being anachronistic and 
even corrupt institutions. In 1818, the Brougham Commission was set up to record 
and report on all educational charities for the poor, and to instigate proceedings 
against those thought to be maladministered [12]. In 1828, Lord Crewe's Charity 
was investigated by the commission and was praised for its sound management 
(Stranks, 1976, 17). 
This temporarily silenced public criticism until the mid-19th century, when public 
interest in charities was again aroused. In 1853, the Charitable Act established the 
Charity Commissioners as an official body, with an Official Trustee for charitable 
lands and Official Trustees of charitable funds. The aim was to make charities pub-
licly accountable, by setting up a higher regulatory body. The Charity Commission 
was given the power to issue schemes of management to individual charities. In 
1862, the Charity Commissioners ordered an inspector, a Mr Martin, to investigate 
Lord Crewe's Charity (Stranks, 1976, 18). His findings were critical. The total 
income from the estate had increased from £1,312 in 1721 to £10,006 in 1877, yet 
few changes had been made to the level of charitable payments. He claimed that 
the_ charity was poorly administered and that much of its income was mis-spent, 
concluding: 
"The history of this Charity suggests many other observations:- enough has 
been said to prove the necessity of an entire change and of the interference of 
the Court of Chancery if not Parliament. The number of the trustees should 
be increased and an admixture of laymen would be desirable, the prohibition 
of the increase of the fixed payments should be rescinded and after such an 
augmentation of these as the altered value of money has rendered equitable, 
the surplus should be devoted to some specific purpose instead of being frittered 
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away in small payments frequently of little use if not occasionally mischievous" 
(Mr Martin, 1864, 23) [13]. 
Lord Crewe's Trustees protested against the findings of the report, and the matter 
was brought to the Court of Chancery [14]. The outcome of this public investi-
gation was the issue of a scheme of management, which was approved by orders 
of the Court of Chancery in 1876 ( 452/C5/36) [15]. The scheme enabled the ad-
ministration of the charity and the charitable payments to be updated. A hospital 
account was set up under the new scheme, into which any surplus funds could be 
placed. It was planned at a future date to found a hospital for suffers of scrofula 
(consumption) in Bamburgh Castle [16]. The castle was only to be let at an eco-
nomic rent, so ending the preferential use of the castle by the trustees. There was 
no change in the number of trustees, but the estate accounts and business matters 
were to be administered and regulated by a receiver, a secretary and a banker. 
The trustees were to meet twice yearly at Bamburgh Castle. 
The new scheme did lead to an improvement in the administration of the charity. 
In 1876, a new secretary and receiver were appointed (B.a.3, 29/9/1876). The 
secretary was Christopher Rowlandson, the former agent for Blanchland and son of 
the former secretary to the charity, Samuel Rowlandson. Later, in 1878, an auditor 
for the accounts was also appointed. The extra scrutiny of the estate accounts was 
proved to be necessary, for in 1883, the receiver was found to have made errors and 
consequently resigned (B.a.3, 29/9/1876). Thereafter, Christopher Rowlandson 
also performed the role of receiver. 
Although the new schedule effected an improvement in the administration of the 
charity, the charity soon faced pressures from another quarter. The economic de-
pression of the late 19th century resulted in falling revenues on all the charity's 
estates, with the result that the trustees were hard put to it to keep up the charita-
ble payments. In the 1870s, the trustees had decided to develop North Sunderland 
harbour as a centre for the herring industry, and for the export of corn and lime 
(Stranks, 1976, 22). The project had proved far more costly than expected and 
added an extra financial burden on the administration of the charity. The to-
tal income of the charity fell from £13,215.75 in 1875 to £11,764.40 in 1880 and 
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£10,896.70 in 1885 (B.b, 26,27,28). In 1887, the trustees decided to reduce their 
payments to schools: 
"In consideration of the depression in agriculture and the consequent reduc-
tion of the income of the charity, the grants to schools will be reduced" (B.a.3, 
29/6/87). 
The Charity Commissioners recommended that the trustees sell part of the estate 
(B.a.3, 29/7 /1894), but, fortunately, Lord Armstrong's offer to buy Bamburgh 
Castle saved the trustees from having to take this step. The castle was sold in 1894 
for £60,000, and Lord Armstrong also offered to house the charity's muniments 
and Dr Sharp's Library (B.a.3, 29/7 /1894). 
With such a major loss to the charity's property portfolio, the Charity Commis-
sioners decided that a new scheme of management was required. This second 
scheme of 1896 (452/C5/44) was jointly drawn up by the Charity Commissioners 
and the trustees. For instance, the suggestion by the Charity Commissioners that 
the number of trustees be increased to eleven, was amended to seven following 
protest from the trustees (B.a.3, 29/11/1895). The new scheme effected two main 
changes in the administration and ownership form of the charity. First, the num-
ber of trustees was increased from five to seven, with the inclusion of two laymen, 
bringing new management skills to the charity. The first laymen to serve were 
Lords Armstrong and Barnard. Both were local landowners and so had experience 
of estate management. Second, the charity became more accountable to the Char-
ity Commissioners. The legal title to all the charity's real estate was vested in the 
Official Trustee of charity lands, whilst the personal property was vested with the 
Official Trustees of charitable funds. All the accounts were from now on audited 
annually by the Charity Commissioners. 
The dramatic change in the composition of the charity's revenue following the sale 
of Bamburgh Castle can be seen in Table 4.17. The sale resulted in a drop in rents 
from the estates of 20%. The charity diversified its investment base into stocks and 
shares. The purchase money from the castle was invested, and the interest from 
stocks made up 15% of the charity's income in 1896. The income contribution 
from the Blanchland estates, it can be seen, remained almost unchanged at about 
25% 
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The effects of the 1896 scheme seem to have been beneficial. The trustees now met 
regularly on the last Wednesdays of April and October. After the sale of Bamburgh 
Castle, the offices of the charity were moved to an office in Newcastle. Charitable 
payments were decided and approved by the Charity Commissioners every April. 
The sale of Bamburgh Castle freed money that had formerly gone towards the 
upkeep of the school and shipwrecked sailors there. The scrofula hospital project 
was also abandoned. Instead, the trustees were authorised to divide the residue of 
the income into nineteen parts, of which eleven were to be applied in the Diocese 
of Durham and eight in the Diocese of Newcastle (see Appendix H). 
5.3.2 The Blanchland Estate in the late 19th Century 
How did the changes taking place to the structure of the charity affect the manage-
ment of the Blanchland estate? With the appointment of Christopher Rowlandson 
to the post of secretary, the Blanchland estate ceased to have a separate agent, al-
though a bailiff continued to reside on the estate [17]. The secretary and the bailiff 
corresponded frequently on matters concerning the management of the estates. 
In the 1870s it appears that the farms were prospering. In 1875, Thomas Hey (the 
bailiff) informed Christopher Rowlandson: 
"We have had fine harvest weather which I hope will continue. The fair on the 
24th was a good selling one" (Hey to Rowlandson, 6/9/1875) 
And in another letter soon after: 
"The fair on Monday was only thinly attended but all was sold and at good 
prices. We have a nice day for harvesting" (21/9/1975). 
In the late 1870s, a significant change took place in the letting of the Blanchland 
farms. Perhaps as a result of the 1876 scheme, the trustees issued the order that: 
"no person be accepted as tenant unless he can give at least two good suri-
ties for the payment of rent and the proper management of the land" (B.a.3, 
24/10/1876). 
Previously, no farmers of capital had taken the Blanchland farms and each farm 
had been let as a single holding. It can be seen from Table 5.10, however, that by 
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1880, Jasper Stephenson occupied four of the farm holdings. His father, William 
Stephenson, had taken the tenancy of Nookton farm in 1835 (see Table 4.28). In 
1840, Jasper Stephenson took over the tenancy from his father and in 1870 had the 
occupancy of Heatheryburn farm as well. In 1875, the tenancy of Burntshieldhaugh 
farm fell vacant. At first, it was assumed that the son of the former tenant would 
take over the tenancy: 
"A son, Joseph, who has been shepherd for Mr Stephenson at Newbiggenhope, 
is managing for the present for them at the Haugh. He is very desirous to 
become the new tenant and Mr Stephenson thinks that he might manage it, he 
is a very steady man and his family is grown up with two sons quite men who 
would assist him, whether he will be able to bring capital to invest in stocking 
it I do not know, he thinks that with the assistance his own family can give him 
that he can, a son that is married would be able to lend him some money, but 
there will be time to consider about that if you are inclined to treat with him", 
(Hey to Rowlandson, 19/8/1875). 
However, it appears that Mr Stephenson also had designs on the holding, and was 
considered a much more attractive proposition by Thomas Hey: 
"I have seen J. Saunderson since you were last here and he proposes to pay 
half a year's rent in advance if you accept him as tenant. But I think he wants 
energy for the management of a farm properly. Mr J. Stephenson can do it in 
quite a different manner. (Hey to Rowlandson, 19/10/1875). 
In the end Jasper Stephenson was selected as the new tenant, and on taking over 
the holding, began to improve the land by drainage. He was also anxious to take 
over the tenancy of Gibralter farm: 
"Mr J. Stephenson wishes to have the draining at Burntshieldhaugh commenced 
with, also he is desirous to know if he is to become the tenant of Gibralter, if 
so he would take the winter eatage and also prepare some manure for it without 
delay so as to be able to improve it" (Hey to Rowlandson, 11/1/1876). 
It would appear that Jasper Stephenson was a very different class of tenant to 
the others on the estate, although his origins were in the North Pennines (he was 
born in Allendale in 1819). His higher status is indicated by the fact that he was 
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the only farm tenant in the 19th century to rent shooting rights (he rented the 
shooting on Nookton Fell from 1875 onwards). He also enjoyed a greater security 
of tenure than the other tenants. He was given a lease of 21 years for Nookton in 
1859 and held Heatheryburn and Burntshieldhaugh farms on leases for 14 years. 
After his death in 1889, his son took over the tenancies of the four holdings, so 
that the Stephenson family retained a high profile on the estate. 
In 1880, a depression in both the mining industry and agriculture began to be felt 
on the Blanchland estates. The closure of the mines was foreseen in the mid-1870s, 
and the estate was concerned for the welfare of the miners: 
"The Derwent Mines Company have determined to cease working them.... this 
will cause a dispersion of the working inhabitants into other places in search of 
work" (Hey to Rowlandson, 16/11/1875). 
The company finally gave up its lease in 1884, and Christopher Rowlandson pointed 
out to the trustees the financial implications of their withdrawal: 
"The Derwent Mines are closed and the plant sold and I doubt if they are to 
be repaired, this causes an immediate loss of£ 135 per annum to the Trustees, 
besides the contingent loss of cottages standing empty and the reductions of the 
rent of other cottages from want of competition for them" (Rowlandson to the 
trustees, 13/10/1884). 
165 jobs were lost at the Jeffreys mine alone (Burt et al., 1983, 45). At Blanchland, 
101 men were employed in lead mining in 1851, but only 16 in 1881 (see Table 
4.25). At Hunstanworth the fall was equally dramatic, with 151 men employed in 
the \ead mining industry in 1851 and only 69 in 1881 (see Table 4.26). The total 
populations of Blanchland and Hunstanworth fell from 551 and 615 in 1851, to 276 
and 271 in 1881 respectively (see Table 5.12). 
The agricultural depression did not lead to out-migration, but it did cause some 
distress amongst the charity's tenants. In 1879, tenants at Blanchland sent a 
petition to the trustees to ask for a revaluation of their farms and a return on 
rents (B.a.3, 22/4/1879). By 1884, the farm holdings were in a very neglected 
condition: 
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Table 5.12- Population Change at Blanchland & Hunstanworth, 
1881 to 1951 
Date Blanchland Hunstanworth 
1871 501 704 
1881 367 502 
1891 276 271 
1901 232 220 
1911 229 247 
1921 217 200 
1931 207 208 
1951 170 173 
"Fences are very bad, I would like your opinion on them. Some of the fields are 
getting very poor for want of manure, the hay has been sold and no manure of 
any amount made, some parties have not put on what little has been made. At 
present one person has left last year's crop and the year before's too in the yard, 
not having had any animals during the winter" (Rutherford to Rowlandson, 
May 1884). 
Ten per cent rebates were granted to the tenants in 1887, and were continued until 
1893 (B.a.3, 29/6/1887). Table 5.13 shows that between 1885 and 1895, rentals 
dropped from £1,387.90 to £1,161.35, a drop of 17%. On most holdings, the 1895 
rent was equal to or less than the 1870 level [18]. 
Despite the agricultural distress and the out-migration of lead miners, it can be 
seen from Tables 5.10 and 5.11 that over the period from 1865 to 1911 there was a 
remarkable continuity in tenancies. With the exception of the Stephenson family, 
very few changes in tenancy took place. 
Although revenue from farms and mines continued to fall, the income from shooting 
rents rose. From 1885 to 1900, the shooting was let in three leases: the Nookton 
shooting (Jasper Stephenson, £50); the Allenshields shooting (various tenants 
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including Christopher Rowlandson, £60); and shooting over the Blanchland moors 
(J. Joicey, £200). 
5.3.3 1900 to 1940: continuity and change 
The 1896 schedule appears to have put the charity on a far more efficient footing. 
However, the charity still had to adapt and respond to the changing political 
and economic climate of the 20th century. Changes were made in the charitable 
payments. For instance, the Board of Education Act of 1899 removed the charity's 
obligation to provide funds for schools. Instead, the trustees set up a separate 
Educational Foundation. In 1909, further changes were made to the administration 
of the charity at the recommendation of the clerk and receiver (B.a.4, 28/4/1909). 
The office of the charity was moved from Newcastle to Durham where it has since 
remained. 
Table 5.14- Blanchland Wood Account, 1910 to 1950 
DATE RECEIPTS(£) EXPENSES ( £) 
1910 - 430 
1915 222 222 
1920 127 587 
1925 55 -
1930 171 -
1935 99 -
1940 502.50 301 
1945 207 112.50 
1950 191 231 
Sources: 452/B.b.35; B.b.36. 
The appointment of Lord Barnard as a lay trustee after 1896 had a positive benefit 
for the Blanchland estate. He took a personal interest in the management of the 
272 
plantations. On his advice, part of the Old Park and Deborah plantations were 
cleared, and new equipment was purchased for sawing the timber and replanting 
(B.a.4, 27 /4/1910). Table 5.14 shows receipts and expenditure for timber from 
1910 to 1950. Although expenditure exceeded receipts in some years, it should be 
remembered that the timber was also used on the estate. Estate receipts were also 
increased after 1902 by revenue from the Presser Pumping Station. This was an 
underground reservoir at Heatheryburn, managed by the Weardale and Consett 
Water Company. In 1911, the company paid £360 rent to the trustees. 
In the 1920s, pressures to sell parts of the Blanchland estates came from private 
and public interests. In 1918, the Blanchland estate was very nearly sold when 
a Messrs J.D. Wood and Co. of London, and a Messrs Bramwell, Clayton and 
Clayton of Newcastle, offered to purchase part of the estate (B.a.4, 24/4/1918). 
The trustees refused to sell a part, but were prepared to favourably consider an 
offer for the whole estate. On reflection, however, they refused to sell. In 1925, an 
offer was made for the Blanchland plantations and the lease of certain farms on the 
estate for 999 years by the newly formed Forestry Commission (B.a.5, 20/4/25). 
This was declined, but in 1936 a further offer was made to buy Acton, Penny Pie, 
Cowbyer, Cotehouse, Birkside and Burntshieldhaugh farms for £17,000 (B.a.5, 
28/10/1936). This second offer the trustees also refused [19]. 
In 1926, the Nookton estate (including Nookton, Heatheryburn and Gibralter 
farms) was sold to Colonel Joicey, a neighbouring landowner, for £11,000 (B.a.5, 
27 /10/1926). The reasons for the sale are uncertain. It was not in the tradition 
of the charity to sell land, and Nookton seems to have been one of the more prof-
itable holdings. One factor was, undoubtedly, that the three holdings had for some 
time been let as a unit to the Stephenson family. There may well have been some 
informal political pressure put on the trustees to sell. 
Figure 5.4 shows the total receipts from the Blanchland estate from 1910 to 1970, 
and the amount expended on repairs and improvements to the Blanchland proper-
ties. The receipts rose slowly over the first 25 years of the 20th century to £2,740 
in 1925, but had dropped again to £2,243.50 by 1940. In 1920, it was reported that 
rent increases on all the charity's properties totalled £556.85 (B.a.4, 24/4/1820). 
However, depression hit the farm sector again in the 1930s. All the Blanchland 
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tenants were granted a 10% rebate on their half year's rent in 1933, and rebates 
continued through the decade. The trustees appear to have been lenient to the 
tenants during the depression. They wiped off two cases of tenant debt [20], and 
gave allowances of artificial fertiliser in cases of special hardship [21]. Essential 
repairs to farm houses were carried out (see Table 5.15) although, as can be seen 
from Figure 5.4, expenditure was low. On the outbreak of the Second World War, 
it was decided to set up a reserve fund to meet the cost of repairs which might not 
be carried out during the war (B.a.5, 25/10/1939). 
Figure 5.4 - Receipts &: Expenditure at Blanchland, 1910 to 1972 
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Between 1945 and 1955, it can be seen from Figure 5.4 that expenditure on repairs 
and improvements to the Blanchland estate increased sharply, and receipts also 
gradually increased, indicating that the worst of the agricultural depression was 
over. 
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Table 5.15- Expenditure at Blanchland, 1930s 
Year Farm Type of Work Expenditure (£) 
1931 Birkside Draining ? 
1931 Cotehouse Repairs to farmhouse 298.80 
1932 Acton New hayshed 350.00 
1932 Penny Pie New hemel & loose box ? 
1932 Allenshields New byer & hayshed ? 
1932 Bale Hill Cow byer & calf hutches 120.00 
1933 Burntshieldhaugh Draining & roof repairs 75.00 
1937 Buckshott New byer & draining 220.00 
1938 Acton Roadside fencing 97.00 
1939 Allenshields New hayshed 80.00 
Source: 452/B.a.5. 
Various other small but significant changes took place to the management and 
structure of the Blanchland estate in the 20th century. With the closure of the 
lead mines, there was no longer a demand for the stinted pastures. Between 1880 
and 1900, the number of stintholders on the Park Pasture dropped from 18 to 
12. In 1911, the Close Pasture was leased with Cowbyers farm to J. & J. Vipond, 
and in 1922, a golf course was laid out on the Close Pasture with the help of a 
neighbouring landowner, Colonel Cowie, but was closed down soon afterwards in 
1925 (B.a.5, 28/10/1925). Mining, quarrying, and grouse shooting continued to 
bring in a small income. At least eight leases were granted for the extraction of 
ganister, barytes, fluorspar and barium between 1917 and 1940. These were mostly 
small scale, entrepreneurial enterprises [22]. 
5.3.4 Summary 
Over the late 19th century, changes in the administration, charitable payments 
and property holdings were imposed on Lord Crewe's Charity by outside events, 
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both political and economic. No structural changes were made to the Blanchland 
estate, although the closure of the lead mines caused hardship for many of the 
inhabitants. In the first half of the 20th century, parts of the Blanchland estate 
were sold but, otherwise, continuity has been the overriding feature of this estate, 
especially of the farm tenants. 
5.4 Case Study Three: The Stanhope Estate 
5.4.1 Political Pressure: reform of ownership 
From the late 18th century onwards, the Church was criticised both for its role as 
landowner and for its spiritual role in the community. Firstly, there was general 
dissatisfaction with the way the Church estates throughout the country were man-
aged and, in particular, with the ecclesiastical leaseholds. Secondly, with a growth 
in the number of urban parishes, the income distribution of parishes throughout 
the country had become highly unbalanced, and the need for a central fund to 
regulate church incomes was recognised (Sutherland, 1968, 131 ). 
As a result, a central body known as the Ecclesiastical Commissioners was set 
up in 1836 to manage all the Church's estates and to regulate the distribution of 
income. The commissioners included two archbishops, five members of government, 
all the bishops of England and Wales, three deans, six common law, equity and 
ecclesiastical judges and eight permanent lay commissioners [23]. The takeover of 
the various church estates by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners took a number of 
years to complete. In 1840, the commissioners assumed control of the Dean and 
Chapters' estates in Durham, but the Bishopric estates were not taken over until 
1856 (Musset, 1988, 13). Bishop Longley (1856 to 1860), in return for the loss of 
the estates, was given a yearly salary of £8,000 and retained the palace at Bishop 
Auckland as his official residence [24]. 
Following the establishment of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, the Stanhope 
estate became part of a nation-wide landed portfolio. Therefore any questions 
concerning its management were taken in a national context. The day-to-day 
management of the estates was handed over to two firms of land agents: Smiths 
Gore and Cluttons. Smiths Gore managed the Stanhope estate from an office in 
Darlington, so that neither landlord nor land agent resided on the estate. Smiths 
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Gore were given a fair degree of independence in management, although expendi-
ture over a certain amount had to be authorised by the commissioners in London 
(Respondent B). 
Two main structural changes to the Stanhope estate were effected by the Eccle-
siastical Commissioners in the 1860s and 1870s. First, ecclesiastical leaseholds 
were phased out. The abolition of ecclesiastical leases was a national policy of the 
commissioners. It obviously caused a short-term disruption to the total income 
whilst leases lapsed. Lessees were given the option to purchase the freehold of the 
property, or to take out a new tenancy at market rates [25] 
Obviously, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners faced financial constraints during this 
transitional period. Bishop Longley wrote to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners in 
1860, expressing his concern that they meet their duties as landed proprietors in 
County Durham by increasing beneficial payments, especially since other landed 
proprietors met their responsibilities. Apparently, County Durham suffered dis-
proportionate problems of poverty, distress and 'spiritual destitution' compared to 
other sees: 
"The parties who are thus consciously fulfilling their own obligations not un-
naturally enquire why they should be asked to aid in providing the ministrations 
of the Church and the means of Christian education" (Bishop Longley to Sir 
James Chalk, 1860). 
The Ecclesiastical Commissioners justified this short-term neglect of their spiritual 
duties by promising better long-term gains: 
. "in one of the worst endowed parishes in the County of Durham one fine of 
£ 1,500 and an annual rent of less than £10 are all that the Bishopric has 
derived in 80 years from a property which, since the renewal of the lease in 
1832, is believed to have yielded to the lessee £80, 000, the lease being still held 
upon three good lives". 
Although this policy may have prevented the Ecclesiastical Commissioners from 
meeting all their duties as landlords in the short-term, the effects were financially 
beneficial in the longer term. Between 1861 and 1891, for example, the total income 
from their estates increased from £147,000 to £1,107,000 (Sutherland, 1968, 134). 
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A second, but related, structural change to the Stanhope estate resulted from the 
decision by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners to expand their freehold estate in 
Stanhope. The reasons for this were strategic, as the following report describes: 
"it is desirable that the interests of the Commissioners in the surface of the 
lands of the parish should be increased as much as possible. Their income 
from the mines will be more secure and less liable to be interfered with exactly 
in proportion as they possess a larger control over the surface of the enclosed 
lands and there will also be less chance of any agitation for the enclosure of 
the commons. Their interests and those of Mr Beaumont the lessee of the lead 
mines are for this purpose identical during his lease.... The Commissioners 
have on my advice already purchased 1,1 00 acres of freehold over which ques-
tions of wayleave had begun to arise, and I advise that, with the exception of 
small detached parcels, the reversions of the leasehold lands be retained and the 
leasehold interests purchased. About 800 acres have already been agreed to be 
purchased .... " (Smiths Gore to the ECs, 1859). 
The report went on to state that there was no reason to suppose that the mines 
would decline in prosperity, improvements in tenure and better infrastructure coun-
teracting the partial exhaustion of the lead. It would appear that the Ecclesiastical 
Commissioners were optimistic about the future of mining in Weardale, and were 
determined to increase their control over the operations. 
The decision to purchase lands in Stanhope led to the paradoxical situation, 
whereby the commissioners were purchasing lands of which they were, in theory 
at least, already the owners. The Bishops had never sold the ancient freeholds 
in upper Weardale, they had merely lost control over these lands. Altogether, 30 
ancient freehold properties were purchased by the commissioners in the late 19th 
century (CC 134875). Sir Walter Beaumont decided to purchase the Killhope, 
Wellhope and Spark Shield estate from the commissioners but, despite the loss of 
this property, the Church had become, for the first time in 500 years, the principal 
landowners and controllers. 
The economic benefits of this new policy were short-lived, however, for the simul-
taneous depression in agriculture and mining in the 1880s was disastrous for the 
economy of Stanhope. It was the mining depression which was the major cause of 
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distress, but the depression in farming served to exacerbate the situation, partic-
ularly since the two sectors were so closely connected. Problems began in 1879, 
when a dispute between the Ecclesiastical Commissioners and the Beaumonts over 
the level of royalty rents resulted in a temporary closure of the lead mines. The 
scale of the distress which this event caused amongst the population of Stanhope, 
is indicated by the following newspaper articles reporting on the dispute [26]: 
"The leasehold lead mines belonging to Mr WB Beaumont, MP, in Weardale 
have been closed since the New Year, and there is naturally considerable anxiety 
in the Dale as to when they are likely to be reopened. It appears that the 
lessee considers that the rents now payable to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners 
from these mines are too high, and that there appears to be no probability of 
their being reopened until some arrangements are come to on this point between 
the Ecclesiastical Commissioners and Mr Beaumont. Whatever this matter 
be between the lessors and the lessee, the condition of Weardale needs speedy 
consideration" (1879, n.d.) 
The next article points out the wider repercussions of the lead mine closures: 
"Dear Sir - the struggle between capital and labour in the Durham coal trade 
affects such large numbers as to excite universal attention, but there may be 
suffering to a far greater extent, of which the country knows little or nothing, 
and this is the case with Weardale and the Weardale Miners. Born and reared in 
the Dale, it has come to have a fascination for them, which makes it exceedingly 
painful for them to tear themselves from it, even when the force of circumstances 
clearly indicate that it must be done. But when hopes are thrown out that works 
may . .recommence at any time, even at a few days notice, the power of home 
and its associations lead men to trust on and on and on, that the works will be 
reopened and they will be saved the painful necessity of breaking up their homes. 
It is thus the men of Weardale are lingering on unemployed. Some have been 
out of work since last June, and the whole works have been closed for several 
months, and yet they indulge in a phantom of a hope, which no-one dispels. 
Why cannot Mr Beaumont tell the men frankly that he does not want them?" 
(letter to the editor, Northern Echo, 17 /4/1879). 
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The dispute was not resolved, however, and in 1884 the Beaumonts finally surren-
dered their lease and retreated to Allendale, where they continued to mine until 
1924 (Dunham, 1948, 5). The Ecclesiastical Commissioners repurchased the Kill-
hope, Wellhope and Spark Shield estate from the departing mineral lessees [27]. 
The withdrawal of the Beaumonts from Stanhope left a legacy of small, under-
capitalised farm holdings, and the poor condition of the farm sector was exacer-
bated by the agricultural depression. The Royal Commission into the causes of 
the agricultural depression (HMSO, 1881, cmd 2778) gave the following report on 
the state of the farms in the upper dale: 
"Between Stanhope and Westgate, farms range from 30 - 200 acres. Beyond 
this, holdings are occupied by miners at low rents of £15 to £30 per annum. 
The depression in lead mining has caused great distress... Land hunger ensures 
a constant demand for land. The Ecclesiastical Commissioners have recently 
built lime kilns of which the tenants are allowed free use and free craw coal. 
Little liming has been done to date and what has been done is due to individual 
tenant enterprise. There is some arable land up to Eastgate, beyond this it is 
all grass". 
The commissioner thought that the withdrawal of the mining population would be 
beneficial for the farming economy: 
"As to future prospects, if the lead industry declines {not unlikely considering 
the competition from Spain, Germany and Rumania} changes will take place in 
the upper dale. Holdings will be enlarged and more land improved. At present 
tenants can't afford the outlay and lack horsepower for work. " 
Perhaps he hoped that a better class of tenantry might be induced to take the 
farms, or that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners would rationalise and improve the 
farm holdings? 
The following report on the state of the farms from the Smiths Gore agent for 
Weardale, Mr Minter, paints a similar picture: 
"Very nearly the whole of the lands are pasture and as such have not suf-
fered during the past seven years from the unpropitious seasons in the same 
way as arable lands, but during the past two severe winters of 1879/80 and 
280 
1880/81, serious losses have occurred to all the tenants by the unusual severity 
of the weather, want of food and being overblown by the snow, one tenant, {W 
Stephenson), lost over 200 sheep and another one, ( J Oliver), nearly 150... All 
the tenants have suffered in common with other occupiers of land and this year 
the hay has not reached half a crop, but the great number of the small occu-
piers have had to contend against a most formidable and almost insuperable 
difficulty in the closing of the lead mines, the great staple of the district, which 
wholly ceased working in 1879, remaining so for some time and have not been 
opened out since but to a very limited extent... The district has become de-
plorably poverty stricken, all the savings are exhausted and many there are who 
do not get a sufficiency of food. Migration to the coal and iron districts have 
drawn some away, emigration is continually sending forth all who can raise the 
means to depart and this state of things has materially depreciated the values of 
the smaller occupations which may be regarded as accommodation lands" (Mr 
Minter to the ECs, 10/10/1881). 
What action did the Ecclesiastical Commissioners take to alleviate the severity of 
the distress? The Royal Commission of 1881 reported that the Ecclesiastical Com-
missioners had initiated a programme of land improvements; providing 200 jobs 
in drainage, wall building and planting for the unemployed miners, but that they 
had no systematic policy of land improvement. In 1878, £5,000 was expended on 
drainage between Stanhope and Cowshill, and in 1880, over £3,500 was expended 
on building works and drainage. Mr Minter recommended to the Ecclesiastical 
Commissioners that they erect two to three limekilns in the upper dale to encour-
age land improvement a.a the lands were badly in need of drainage (5/5/1879). 
Apparently, many of the larger allotments had never been divided following the 
enclosu_r~ award and were still unimproved. It is clear that the improvements which 
Bishop Barrington predicted would result from enclosure had not been realised; 
indeed the condition of the agricultural estate had deteriorated. 
In 1881, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners granted their farm tenants rent al-
lowances of 20%, for those whose rents were less than £25 per annum, and 15%, 
for those paying over £25 (30/12/1881). Economic conditions continued to dete-
riorate, and in 1882 the tenants of Heatherycleugh and St John's Chapel sent a 
petition to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, demanding further rent reductions 
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(17 /7 /1882). The petition pointed out how the harsh climate, marginal land and 
heavy rates, as well as the closure of the mines, all contributed to the economic 
and social distress. They demanded a permanent reduction of 25% in farm rents, 
otherwise many tenants would be forced to give up their holdings. Certain reduc-
tions of rent were allowed, (reductions made in 1886 represented a reduction of 
farm rental income of 15%, see Table 5.16) and rent rebates continued throughout 
the 1880s. 
Once it became clear that the depression in lead mining was not temporary, many 
families decided to migrate. Looking back to Table 4.38, it can be seen that the 
population of Cowshill, Burtreeford, Heatherycleugh and Killhope declined from 
578 in 1851 to 461 in 1881, the decline being largely attributable to a fall in the 
number of lead miners from 152 to 78. The total population of Stanhope continued 
to grow until1871, but dropped from rapidly from 10,330 in 1871 to 8,793 in 1881, 
and was only 5,801 in 1901 (see Table 5.17). Many of the unemployed miners 
migrated to the Durham coal field for employment, but in the 1890s it was reported, 
in a letter to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners from the Weardale Miners Relief 
Committee, that a strike by Durham coal miners had compounded the distress of 
the unemployed lead miners: 
"On former occasions the inhabitants of the Dale have often been able to be-
take themselves to the pit districts and obtain temporary employment. In the 
present case, however, every avenue to work is closed. Much suffering has been 
caused by the increased price of coals. The want of fuel has been felt all the 
more keenly on account of the long continued cold weather. The Ecclesiastical 
Commissioners have always shown special concern for the material welfare of 
_the valley and if some way of easing the present burden of hardship could be 
fouTJd in affording some means of employment for those who are anxious for 
any chance of earning a little money, another cause of gratitude would be added 
to strengthen the ties existing between the Commissioners and the inhabitants 
of the Dale" (Thomas Watson, to the ECs, 25/4/1892) 
5.4.2 1900 to 1940: Estate Decline 
Despite the financial loss incurred by the closure of the lead mines and the distress 
which this event caused to the inhabitants of Weardale, the Ecclesiastical Com-
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Table 5.16- Farm Size & Rent Reductions at Stanhope, 1886 
AREA ORIGINAL REDUCED AREA ORIGINAL REDUCED 
(has) RENT(£) RENT(£) (has) RENT(£) RENT(£) 
11.3 28.80 26.00 5.4 25.00 21.00 
3.9 13.60 12.00 11.7 19.70 18.00 
18.75 83.00 75.00 2.1 17.00 14.00 
9.8 24.60 23.00 11.4 35.85 32.00 
2.0 13.60 11.00 4.0 11.50 9.00 
12.10 14.30 13.00 31.10 16.90 15.00 
6.3 17.90 15.00 30.05 26.95 10.00 
7.05 10.90 10.00 5.6 24.60 22.00 
6.0 23.85 21.00 11.9 23.60 21.00 
2.5 16.10 13.00 0.6 8.80 7.00 
4.0 17.00 14.00 1.9 8.50 7.00 
4.2 15.50 21.00 5.9 12.00 10.00 
1.4 8.50 7.00 6.2 15.30 13.75 
1.4 6.40 6.00 2.7 10.00 9.00 
1.3 11.10 10.00 21.5 21.20 17.00 
3.5 8.35 7.50 4.0 14.65 13.00 
3.7 22.10 17.00 3.5 18.80 15.00 
11.1 44.00 35.00 4.1 22.10 17.00 
1.2 9.00 8;00 5.3 16.50 15.00 
12.2 27.20 24.00 6.2 13.60 12.00 
15.9 30.60 27.00 5.6 14.50 13.00 
6.9 34.00 30.00 3.6 21.20 17.00 
1.25 7.60 6.00 1.4 8.00 7.00 
3.4 24.05 19.00 7.9 8.00 7.00 
3.7 22.50 20.00 - - -
Source: Stanhope farm files 
283 
missioners continued to base their estate management policy on mining, and it was 
obviously hoped that the mining industry would recover. The adherence to this 
policy may have been influenced by the commissioners' interests on the Durham 
coal field. Their receipts from mining in Durham rose from £300,000 in 1888 to 
£370,000 in 1917 (Ward, 1971, 67). 
Table 5.17 - Stanhope Wood Account, 1895 to 1910 
YEAR RECEIPTS ESTATE USE EXPENDITURE 
1895 259.00 -
-
1896 384.45 40.05 278.70 
1897 210.70 
- 243.05 
1898 235.85 30.75 273.10 
1899 353.95 11.30 276.15 
1900 564.50 7.65 304.35 
1901 124.90 24.85 341.30 
1902 147.60 73.25 275.55 
1903 - - -
1904 25.10 39.75 333.20 
1905 58.10 83.60 319.00 
1906 138.20 35.10 356.75 
1907 141.30 46.85 318.50 
1908 2.75 14.85 347.25 
1909 37.35 108.95 322.05 
1910 20.60 38.65 333.75 
Source:CC 48175 
The Ecclesiastical Commissioners continued to manage the plantations in Stan-
hope in hand. Receipts from the plantations were particularly high between 1895 
and 1900 (see Table 5.17), which may be linked to the activities of the new mineral 
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lessee. After the withdrawal of the Beaumonts from Weardale, a 60 year mining 
lease was taken out by the newly formed Weardale Lead Mining Company (Burt 
et al., 1983, x). The company's profits were low to start with, but in 1900 the 
company was reformed, and an improvement in the market raised its profits dra-
matically. Between 1901 and 1913 the Weardale Lead Company produced 40% 
of the total UK output (ibid., xii). There was another small boom in the local 
economy: 
"The Dale is probably more prosperous than it has ever been. The , various 
mining and quarrying undertakings are in a state of healthy activity, all capable 
workmen find ready employment, actually the supply of labour is insufficient 
and it is therefore extremely desirable to do what may be possible to increase the 
resident population .... " (Alf Pegler to Sir Alfred de Bock-Porter, 15/7 /1907). 
There is no small irony in the fact that, 25 years after the closure of the Beaumont 
mines, there was actually a shortage of miners to work the mines. The Weardale 
Lead Company wished to open up Rookhope as a mining area, but this plan 
was contingent upon an improvement in the accessibility of the dale, not only for 
transporting the ore, but also for securing a workforce. The company, therefore, 
put great pressure on the Ecclesiastical Commissioners to provide £1,000 towards 
the building of a new road from Rookhope to the railway station at Eastgate [28]. 
The following extract, from the secretary of the Weardale Lead Company to the 
Ecclesiastical Commissioners, describes the competition with the Allendale estate 
for skilled miners and the absolute necessity of the road: 
"Rookhope, and particularly Boltsbum, is the centre of the lead mining indus-
try. This Company has more than 250 men employed there, but there is living 
·accommodation for but a small part, about 50, of these in Rookhope. This is, 
naturally, very disadvantageous to the regular working of the mines, and at the 
moment it is a source of much anxiety to my Directors, as it is reported that 
working is likely to be recommenced in the Allendale mines. About 200 men 
of our Rookhope miners are 'wallet men' from Allendale and if work becomes 
available there, by the restoring of the Beaumont mines, these men will cease 
to travel to Boltsbum and the present prosperous work of this company will be 
seriously restricted and completely disorganised. It is evident a much needed 
supply of resident labourers is urgently required. So far as we can learn, every 
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dwelling in Boltsburn and even in Eastgate is fully occupied and our lodging 
shops are crowded and over crowded. If easy access were opened up from the 
main valley, there is but little doubt new houses would be built at Boltsburn 
and at Eastgate, and there would be a considerable addition to the resident 
population of the valley. It is very clear to all who are locally acquainted with 
the situation that additional labour is indispensable to the continued satisfac-
tory working of the minerals of the district" (Alf Pegler to Sir Alfred de Bock-
Porter, 15/7/1907) [29]. 
The Ecclesiastical Commissioners finally agreed to donate the required amount 
and the road was built. Not only did the mining industry make a partial revival 
by the opening of new mines, but changing industrial technology also created 
demands for new minerals such as fluorspar, barytes and iron. The mining industry 
thus diversified, but the prosperity of the lead mining boom in the 19th century 
was never regained. The revival in lead mining was short-lived, and in 1917 the 
Weardale Lead Company gave up its Weardale lease (Burt et al., 1983, xii). 
Despite the optimism of Mr Coleman in 1881, there is no evidence that the Eccle-
siastical Commissioners made any substantial improvements to the farms on their 
estate as a result of the decline in mining. An inspection of dairies and cowsheds in 
Stanhope by the county medical officer in 1900, found that on many of the farms 
the condition of the farm buildings was so insanitary as to be a positive health 
hazard: 
"all of them were very badly ventilated and in nearly every case the air space 
allowed per cow was too little. The walls of the byres were rough and dirty and 
the floors badly paved and generally defective ... None of the cowsheds had any 
p_roper drainage and the midden heap was usually placed immediately under a 
-
dwelling house occupied by several persons, the roof of the byre being unceiled 
so that all the smell and exhalations passed from the byre through the floor into 
the dwelling and dairy ... (the) conditions must seriously affect their (the cows) 
health and favour the development and spread of TB among them" (County 
Medical Officer's report, para 59, 23/7 /1900). 
The condition of the farms continued to deteriorate, with no alteration in the 
management policy of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. In the 1930s, another de-
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pression hit the mining industry, causing further unemployment in the dale. The 
Weardale Rural District Council expressed their concern and asked the Ecclesiasti-
cal Commissioners to provide the out of work miners with temporary employment 
in land improvement schemes and afforestation (22/5/1934). 
5.4.3 1940 to 1965: The Sale of the Stanhope Estate 
Another reform of the ownership structure of the Stanhope estate took place in 
1948, with the replacement of the Ecclesiastical by the Church Commissioners. 
This measure was a response to the increasingly commercial demands of land 
management. The old Ecclesiastical Commissioners did not possess the neces-
sary expertise, and the new Church Commissioners included qualified professionals 
(Sutherland, 1968, 137). 
The Church Commissioners adopted a more explicitly commercial approach to es-
tate management than the Ecclesiastical Commissioners had done, and decided to 
shift their investment base away from low-yielding assets, such as agricultural land, 
to stocks and commercial property developments. The Church Commissioners in-
herited approximately 118,750 hectares of agricultur~ land from the Ecclesiastical 
Commissioners, but by 1954 their agricultural holdings had been reduced to 90,417 
hectares through sales. At the same time, their income rose by 68% between 1948 
and 1957 {Hamnett, 1987, 408) [30]. 
Several farms in Stanhope were sold off under this new policy (see Table 5.18). It 
can be assumed, from the bad state of repair into which the farms in the upper 
dale had fallen in the 1950s, that few improvements or repairs to the farm sector 
had _been made in the 1930s or 1940s. For instance, a report on Low Cornriggs 
farm in 1949 described the poor state of repair of the buildings: 
"There are two cottages, separated by a store, and some small and very poor 
buildings. The cowbyer could not be made to conform with regulations. The only 
reasonable solution is to move the tenants to another holding as soon as one 
becomes available, and to incorporate this farm in another holding, leaving the 
buildings and cottages to decay. In the meantime, the minimum work necessary 
to give the tenants reasonable living accommodation should be done. At the 
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Table 5.18 - Sales of Stanhope Farms, 1950s 
FARM DATE OF SALE AREA (has) RENT(£) SELLING PRICE(£) 
Lane head - - - -
Low Corn Rigg 1949 22.9 77.55 amalgamated 
Greenfield Hush 1952 ? ? (vacant possession) 
The Rush 1952 13.0 ? 500 (sitting tenants) 
High Lanehead 1953 25.0 28.50 1,000 (vacant possession) 
Corn Rigg 1955 28.3 77.55 900 (sitting tenant) 
Westgate - - - -
Spot House 1951 2.2 ? 550 (sitting tenants) 
Westgate Farm 1951 51.5 64.80 1,600 (sitting tenants) 
Shields Close 1952 22.5 125.30 550 (sitting tenants) 
& Park House - 63.0 - -
Field Head 1953 117.0 158.85 2,100 (sitting tenants) 
& Green Head - - - -
Field Stile 1955 47.1 97.05 1,800 (sitting tenants) 
Crooks Alter 1956 53.9 ? 5,600 (sitting tenants) 
& Longlea Farm - 46.4 - -
White Hall 1957 20.9 - 950 (sitting tenants) 
Source;.. farm files (Lane head & Westgate) 
present time six persons occupy one cottage, which has two bedrooms, one very 
poor" (file 60832, 1949). 
Most of the holdings were sold to the sitting tenants, but this would appear to 
have been from necessity rather than choice, as the following remarks about Corn 
Riggs farm indicate: 
"The tenants have been unwilling to buy and attempts have been made to find 
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them another farm and so be able to sell Corn Riggs with vacant possession. 
These attempts have failed and in view of the very poor state of the fixed equip-
ment, we recommend that the farm be offered for sale subject to tenancy rather 
than that money should be spent on keeping the farm in repair pending obtaining 
vacant possession." (file 34788, 1955). 
The Church Commissioners, in fact, obtained very low prices from the sale of 
these farms. The farms in Stanhope had not been revalued for some time, and 
consequently rents did not reflect their market value. Since sale price was related 
to rental, most of the tenants were able to buy their holdings for a price well under 
the market value (Respondent C). 
The Church Commissioners' final land interests in Stanhope were sold in the 1960s 
(31]. The decision fitted into the general policy of selling low-yielding farm land, 
but was precipitated by the need to raise capital quickly due to a fall in the stock 
market (Hamnett 1987, 472): 
"Owing to the present state of the Stock Exchange Market, the Commissioners 
find themselves in an embarrassing position in so far as they are having to find 
regular and substantial sums of money in order to pay for developments which are 
in progress in London" (report of a meeting of the Church Commissioners and 
Smiths Gore, 26/7 /1962). 
The process by which the estate was sold reflects on the motives of the Church 
Commissioners as landlords, and on the specific characteristics of the Stanhope 
estate. 
In 1962, The Church Commissioners announced the need to raise £23 million 
within _two years to finance developments and new investments, £5 million of which 
was to come from sales of agricultural land. It was decided that the responsibility 
for raising the £5 million should be proportional to the respective management 
responsibilites of Smith's Gore and Gluttons. Smith's Gore managed the larger 
estate area (see Table 5.19) and were, therefore, requested to raise £3 million. 
The Church Commissioners issued certain instructions as to the sale procedure. 
Only low-yielding estates were to be sold, i.e. those which were forecast to give 
less than a 5% return over the next ten years. In addition, the sitting tenants 
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Table 5.19- Area Managed by Smiths Gore & Cluttons 
-
Hectares Rental (£) 
Smiths Gore 50,416.6 427,000 
Cluttons 30,000 332,000 
were to be given first refusal on the purchase of their farms. Only if the tenants 
failed to make sufficient offers were the estates to be offered for public sale. Apart 
from these two stipulations, Smiths Gore and Gluttons were free to decide which 
estates to sell and to negotiate with the tenants concerned. This was seen as an 
advantage by Smiths Gore, since by having control over which estates to sell they 
could minimise the damage to their own interests (3/8/1962). Their policy was 
to sell off whole estates rather than scattered parcels, on the grounds that it was 
better to close an office rather than lay off staff in several offices. Smiths Gore 
decided to include normal management sales in the total, to minimise the amount 
of land to be sold {11/10/1962). 
In order to decide which estates to sell, a vast amount of data had to be col-
lected on rents, acreages, and tenancies. Table 5.20 shows the estates which were 
finally chosen by Smiths Gore for sale. In total, twenty four estates were to be 
sold; including properties in West, Central and South Durham and Tyneside (the 
West Durham estate included the two North Pennine estates: Stanhope and Mug-
gleswick). Each property then had to be valued. The Church Commissioners were 
anxious to obtain the best price possible and requested that three valuations be 
made: 
• 'A'- 32 to 30 years purchase, (vacant possession price). 
• 'B' - 26 to 25 years purchase (sale subject to tenancy). 
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• 'C' - 20 to 21 years purchase (investment price). They feared that many ten-
ants would buy at the investment price and then sell their farms with vacant 
possession. The 'B' value was meant to represent the value of the farm to the 
sitting tenant which should be greater than to an investor. Smiths Gore was 
sceptical about this 'B' value: 
"'B' ... represents purely our own guess, presumably with the help of a crystal 
ball (as to) how much we can screw out of the tenant" (10/1/1963). 
With regards specifically to the sale of the Stanhope and Muggleswick estates, 
the Church Commissioners directed that the sporting and mineral rights over the 
enclosed lands be reserved. The grouse moors were to be offered to the current 
sporting tenants, aga.in reserving the mineral rights. The mineral rights were to 
be tendered separately, as were the plantations and other properties. The tenants 
were then given two months in which to submit offers above or below this price. 
The motive of the Church Commissioners towards the sale of the estate can be de-
scribed as a mixture of paternalism and commercialism. The Smiths Gore agent for 
Weardale believed that the commercial interests of the Church Comissioners would 
be best served by selling the Stanhope and Muggleswick estates as entire units. 
He argued that the estate as a whole was worth more than the sum of its parts 
because of the interrelatedness of the estate's resources: land, minerals, grouse and 
timber (Smiths Gore to the Church Commissioners, 6/11/1962). Specifically, four 
reasons were put forward in favour of selling the estates intact. 
First of all, most of the farmers had grazing rights on the adjoining commons. 
If the rental value of these farms was to be maintained, it was essential that the 
grazing rights were preserved. This would be easier if the farms and manorial 
rights to the commons remained under one ownership. Many of the commons were 
overstocked with sheep because of the activities of a few owner-occupiers. There 
was a danger that tenant farmers would lose their grazing rights unless they had 
the support of a landlord. 
Secondly, sporting interests would suffer most of all from severance. It was es-
sential for the preservation of the heather that the graziers co-operate with the 
gamekeepers. If the owners of the sporting rights were also the graziers' landlord, 
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Table 5.20- Sales of Church Estates, 1963 
ESTATE RECEIPTS ( £) BALANCE REMAINING AREA SOLD (has) 
Dumfries 480,000 - 2,267.5 
West Durham 7,711 340,000 65 
Tyneside 116,770 268,800 153 
Central Durham 9,965 88,000 12 
South Durham 107,500 80,000 103 
N orthallerton 6,250 9,000 3 
Ripon 50 - 0.4 
North Riding 1,805 104,965 0.8 
York 38,250 69,000 121 
Scrooby 55,750 
- 232 
East Lincolnshire 33,360 29,560 211 
South Lincolnshire 9,000 
- 5 
Southwell 1,850 101,000 4 
Foremark 29,200 
- 118 
Peterbomugh 9,000 - 3 
Kings Lynn 1,250 - 5 
Norwich 15,000 
- 8 
Ely 5,820 36,180 32 
Huntingdon 92,600 2,600 375 
Worcester 139,835 - 1732 
Corfton 24,100 262,600 104 
Longden 3,370 119,900 0.8 
Miscellaneous 5,150 35,500 15 
TOTAL 1,193,586 - 4,574 
Estates still to sell: - - -
Dissiugton 
-
175,000 -
South Auston - 40,000 -
North Lincolnshire - 45,000 -
Wollaston - 32,000 -
Source: file 49/4 
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they could call on the tenants' loyalty, or exercise coercion to maintain the right 
balance. Mineral lessees could also disturb grouse; again a balance could best be 
achieved by overall control. 
The third reason concerned minerals. Mineral ownership could be severed from 
surface ownership and still worked, but when minerals and land were in the same 
ownership access and surface damage were less contentious issues. Moreover, the 
mineral interests extended beyond the limits of the existing surface interest. If the 
estate was sold piecemeal to sitting tenants, the commissioners would still be left 
with ownership of the minerals in Upper Weardale. 
The fourth point related to woodlands. To be a viable proposition, woodland areas 
needed unlimited extraction rights over adjoining farm and common lands. When 
all were under one ownership, access was not a problem. Woods also harboured 
many farm and sporting pests such as rabbits and foxes. Control of these pests 
would be easier under one ownership. It might be that no-one wished to purchase 
the woodlands alone, (the Forestry Commission had already indicated that it was 
not interested). Forestry investment companies preferred bare land to standing 
woodlands and the Stanhope woodlands were at too high an altitude to be a 
commercial proposition. 
Despite these arguments, the Church Commissioners stuck to their national policy 
and upheld their decision to give the tenants first refusal on their holdings. 
After the required two months, the tenants of both M uggleswick and Stanhope 
had submitted their offers. Comparing Tables 5.21 and 5.22, it can be seen that 
the offers made by the Muggleswick tenants were, on average, 15 years purchase, 
whilst for Stanhope the average was 23. Six of the M uggleswick tenants failed to 
put in an offer for their holdings, while in Stanhope offers were received for all but 
four holdings. In contrast to the earlier sales in the 1950s, all the holdings had been 
recently revalued (in 1961 and 1962) so that the offers of over 22 years purchase 
equalled the market rate. It seems that the Muggleswick tenants deliberately 
submitted low offers to try to get their holdings cheaply {15/2/1963). It was, 
however, decided that the offered prices were too low to be accepted, and the 
Muggleswick estate was offered for sale as a whole. The Stanhope tenants, however, 
were able to purchase their holdings, and so that estate was broken up {18/3/1963). 
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As predicted by Smiths Gore, it proved very hard to sell the woodlands at Stan-
hope. Various packages were considered, such as including woodland in with 
the grouse moors, but in the end the Church Commissioners had to accept that 
the woodlands did not represent a commercial proposition (they were eventually 
bought by the Forestry Commission). The sporting rights on the commons were 
bought for the most part by the existing sporting tenants. In the end, the Church 
Commissioners retained ownership of the minerals. 
Table 5.22- The Muggleswick Estate Sale, 1962 (preliminary 
schedule) 
FARM RENT(£) AREA (has) TENANT'S OFFER(£) YEARS PURCHASE 
Birkhott & 453 169.5 12,000 19 
Carp Shield 173 41.7 - -
Dyke House & 80 6.3 1,500 ? 
East Cot House 77 24.7 ? ? 
Eddy's Bridge 433 55.2 6,500 15 
Gold Hill 334 63.5 5,500 16.5 
Grange 238 65.7 3,000 12.5 
Healyfield 718 94.1 10,500 14.5 
High Horsleyhope 184 30.2 3,000 16 
Home 220 30.0 ? ? 
Horsleyhope Mill 41 9.5 ? ? 
Limerick 110 33.2 2,250 20.5 
Low Horsleyhope 504 91.4 7,000 13.5 
.Middles 336 116.3 4,000 12 
Priory 280 38.0 3,000 11 
Shield 265 37.0 3,500 13 
Shooting Box 180 31.2 ? ? 
Springwell House 217 34.5 4,000 18 
TOTAL 4,843 890.2 65,250 -
Source: file 49/4 
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Table 5.21- The Stanhope Estate Sale, Preliminary Schedule, 1962 
FARM RENT(£) AREA (bas) DATE OF TENANCY LAST RENT REVIEW TENANT'S OFFER 
- - - - - (yea.111 purdlil.se) 
Ambling Ga.te 291 80.4 1937 1961 22.5 
Belle Vue 221 45 1937 1961 22.5 
Bra.nuon Walls 244 52 ucw 1962 16.5 
Chestergartb 196 32 1960 1962 25.5 
Glenwbelt 512 708.7 1942 1001 20 
Greenhea.U 295 44 1940 1001 24 
Greenhca.U 50 3.7 1900 1955 32 
Hall 494 51.6 1901 1901 24 
High House 285 54.5 1959 1962 26 
Hole House 264 47.9 1901 1901 no offer 
Horu Hall 228 27 1945 1901 25.5 
Ha.ugiug Wells 300 108.7 1941 1961 24 
Lint:.:garth House 335 229 1901 1901 24 
Low GrL'Cuhea.U 65 7.9 1025 1001 35 (va.ca.ut possession) 
Stanhope Mill 04 3.3 1960 1001 21 
Noah's Ark 254 45.8 1959 1961 17.5 
Old Park 252 62.5 '! 1901 27 
Park House 136 41.6 1936 1901 20 
Pease Myers 243 50 1943 1961 25 
Suu.ilsburn 233 143 '! 1961 23.5 
Shield Hurst 75 3.7 1960 1961 no offer 
Spu.iuslield 45 15.3 1900 1961 no offer 
Wolfcleugh 792 198.7 1933 1961 no offer 
Woodcroft 419 88 1947 1961 24 
TOTAL 6,568 2,266 - - -
Source: file 49/4 
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Following the decision to sell the Mugglewick estate as a unit, an offer was received 
from Lord Lambton (a Durham landowner). Here, the woodlands were a more 
commercial proposition, but the primary attraction of the estate was the grouse 
moor. The sale was finally agreed in 1963 for a price of £145,000. 
From evidence available, at least two alternative ownership scenarios could have 
followed the sale of the Stanhope estate. First, the Stanhope and Muggleswick 
estates could have been sold as a whole, (offers were made for this). This estate 
would have been a considerable size, (13,307 hectares) with a rental value of over 
£13,263. It is likely that the purchaser would have been a private individual. Sec-
ond, if the Stanhope tenants had failed to submit acceptable offers, the Stanhope 
estate might have been sold as a whole, in which case its development over the last 
20 years might have been very different [32]. 
5.4.4 Summary 
Great changes have taken place in the form of landownership and in the nature 
of rural society in Stanhope over the late 19th and 20th centuries. Altogether, 
over a period of 100 years, ownership has changed four times: from the Bishops of 
Durham, to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, to the Church Commissioners and, 
finally, to the sitting tenants. The Church Commissioners, however, retain the 
ownership of the mineral rights. 
The 1880s depression in lead mining dealt a very sudden and unexpected blow to 
the economy of the dale. Right up to this time, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners 
were planning to expand the industry and increase their control over it. The chief 
sufferers of the depression were the miners themselves, and the commissioners did 
little to alleviate their distress. Out-migration resulted. 
In the 20th century, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners continued to give priority 
to the mining sector and there was a short revival in the fortunes of the mining 
industry. The farm sector was never improved and, after years of neglect under the 
Bishops and then the commissioners, was beyond repair. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that when the Church Commissioners took over the ownership of the estate, 
it should be a victim to their more commercialised approach to the management 
of the estates. 
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5.5 Conclusion: Landownership, Continuity and Change 
In this discussion of continuity and change in landownership and rural society in 
the North Pennines in the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, many 
issues have emerged which throw light on the processes of continuity and change 
in landownership forms, and the emergence of socio-economic problems in upland 
Britain. What factors and processes can be identified which appear to have been 
of most significance, and how do the experiences of these estates compare to the 
national experience? 
Yet again, comparisons and contrasts can be drawn between the three estates. 
Continuity and change has been apparent in the ownership form and management 
of all three estates. All three landowners have experienced political and economic 
pressures for change, all three have sold property and reduced their total land-
holdings. Changes have been instigated by factors both internal and external to 
the region. However, the causes of change, and the processes by which change 
has taken place, have differed substantively. In the end, the Wemmergill and the 
Blanchland estates have survived to the present day whilst the Stanhope estate 
has been broken up and sold. 
The actions of the State and market forces are factors which have caused change; 
and ownership form, land control, resource use, motive and historical inertia are all 
factors which have influenced the way change has taken place. The first difference 
that can be observed, is a distinction in the cause and nature of political pressure 
faced by the three landowners. Institutional landowners were called to public 
accountability before attacks were made on private landowners. Moreover, it was 
not the landowning function of the institutions which was the primary target for 
attack. The Church was attacked on two fronts: for its role as landowner and for its 
spiritual role in society. Lord Crewe's Charity was attacked for its charitable rather 
than its landowning function. The earls of Strathmore were, however, attacked 
entirely for their landowning function. 
The political attacks on the institutional landowners were related to ownership 
form. It was observed in the previous chapter {see 4.5) that institutional ownership 
form is an obstacle to internal change. The Bishops of Durham were unable to alter 
the level and composition of the charitable payments. Changes were imposed from 
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the outside. In the case of the Bishopric estates, ownership by the Bishops was 
replaced by an entirely new and more institutionalised ownership form. In the case 
of Lord Crewe's Charity, the ownership form was retained, but the administration 
and the charitable payments were updated. What effects did these externally 
imposed changes have on the management of the Stanhope and Blanchland estates? 
The Ecclesiastical Commissioners were able to, and did, adopt a new strategy in 
relation to Stanhope, by reforming the ecclesiastical leaseholds and expanding their 
freehold estate. The Blanchland estate was little affected by the change. 
In contrast to the national experience, it was the depression in lead prices in the 
1870s and 1880s which, initially at least, had a more devastating effect on the 
economy of the North Pennines than the agricultural depression. The impact of 
the mining depression varied within the region, however, according to the degree 
of dependence on the industry. Distress was, therefore, greater in Stanhope and 
Hunstanworth than in Lunedale. The impact also depended on ownership motive 
and historical inertia. Lord Crewe's Trustees were less affected financially than the 
Ecclesiastical Commissioners. For the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, mineral rents 
were the primary income source and the scale of the industry was much greater 
in Stanhope than in Hunstanworth and Blanchland. The farming sector was in a 
better state on the Blanchland estate than the Stanhope estate. The Ecclesiastical 
Commissioners had been unable to remedy years of neglect by the Bishops, and 
smallholdings were never an economic proposition. Major structural reforms to 
land use and organisation were required. 
Another factor in the distress was landed control. It would appear that the division 
of the o:wnership and control of the lead in Stanhope had negative consequences 
for t_he inhabitants. The Beaumonts felt far less commitment to the miners in 
Weardale than they did to their own men in Allendale, and had little compunction 
in withdrawing from Weardale when lead prices dropped. All responsibility for the 
welfare of the unemployed miners fell upon the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. 
Pastoral farming areas in Britain were not as severely affected by the late 19th cen-
tury depression as lowland arable areas, and this was true for the North Pennines. 
Farm rents were lowered on all three estates in the 1880s, but it does not appear 
that farmers on the Blanchland and Wemmergill estates suffered undue distress. 
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However, falling rents on all Lord Crewe's Charity's estates made it difficult for 
the trustees to meet their charitable payments. It was economic pressure which 
led to the sale of Bamburgh Castle and the introduction of yet another scheme of 
management in the 1890s. 
The economic pressure of falling farm rents on the Wemmergill estate was offset 
by a concomitant rise in the contribution of grouse shooting and quarry rents to 
the Wemmergill estate budget. After 1890, grouse shooting became a major facet 
of the estate, a development which can be attributed partly to the quality of the 
moors, and partly to the ownership form and motive. It was a status sport and 
most attractive to private landownership. The earls of Strathmore took personal 
responsibility for the management of this resource. 
Following the closure of the lead mines, Blanchland became predominantly a farm-
ing estate, but the Ecclesiastical Commissioners tried to preserve the industrial 
character of the Stanhope estate. They continued to promote mining at the ex-
pense of farming. 
The earls of Strathmore undoubtedly suffered from the political attacks made 
on the landed elite in the early 20th century, both from the imposition of higher 
taxes and a loss of confidence in the future of landownership, but like Lord Crewe's 
Charity, changes resulting from these attacks were more apparent in the consociate 
wealth of the earls than in the Wemmergill estate. The sale of the Streatlam and 
Gibside estates contributed to the revolution in landownership in the 1920s (see 
2.3). Possibly due to taxation, ownership of the Wemmergill estate was divided 
between father and son in the 1930s, and can be interpreted as a first indication of 
the trend in private landownership towards a more flexible approach to ownership 
(see .2.4.2). Lands were sold on the Blanchland estate in the 1920s. This was not, 
apparently, a sign of economic pressure but seems to have been connected to the 
influence of the tenant, Mr Stephenson. 
The continuing agricultural depression of the early 20th century had a cumulatively 
negative effect on the farm sectors of the Wemmergill and Blanchland estates. 
Basic repairs were carried out but there was no surplus capital for investment. The 
legal commitment of Lord Crewe's Charity to maintain the estate was reflected in 
a more stable budget. In no year was there a deficit. On the Wemmergill estate, 
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however, there was a budget deficit in several years, and the Wemmergill estate 
was being supported partly through cross-subsidisation. 
The second reform of the ownership of the Stanhope estate in 1948 was internally 
instigated by the Church in response to the more challenging demands of the 20th 
century. The Church Commissioners adopted a new motive to estate management 
which was less traditional and placed a greater emphasis on commercial develop-
ment and the Church's urban properties. The Stanhope estate was a victim of this 
new approach. It was a low-yielding agricultural estate and was sold as part of a 
national policy. 
The experience of the three estates over this period reveals more about the nature 
of upland resources. The experience of the sale of the Stanhope estate, showed 
once again that the interrelatedness of land, minerals, grouse and timber (already 
noted in 4.5) lends itself to the landed estate form of ownership. The endurance 
of landed interests can be seen in the fact that the Church Commissioners did not 
relinquish all their interests in the Stanhope estate but have retained the mineral 
rights. 
Although the influence of landownership was clearly seen in the formation of rural 
society in the North Pennines in the 19th century, landownership has been a passive 
force in the economic and social decline of the region in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Landowners did not attempt to stem the out-migration following the 
closure of the lead mines. They have not provided any new forms of employment 
in the area. The Ecclesiastical Commissioners made no attempt to improve the 
farins on the Stanhope estate. Changes in the nature of rural society have been 
dramatic and negative, but on closer inspection, all these changes have been linked 
to lead mining. Farming has displayed a high degree of continuity, both in farming 
families and in farming practices. 
Notes 
1. The high population growth around Lanchester was due to the extension of 
coal-mining (1871 census). 
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2. In 1867, a railway was built from Barnard Castle to Middleton, which explains 
the employment of four Holwick tenants on the railway (as a station master, 
passenger guard, platekeeper, and porter) (D/St/C2/15/38). 
3. Samuel Rowlandson was also the land agent for the Durham Cathedral estate 
and Lord Crewe's Charity estate. 
4. It was planned to complete the Hury reservoir by 1890, the Blackton reservoir 
by 1894 and Grassholme reservoir by 1900 (D/St/C2/16/8). 
5. The land tax introduced by the 1910 Finance Act was not abolished until the 
Budget of 1920. 
6. One brace= 2 head of grouse. 
7. In 1915, grouse were given as presents to: 
• each Lunedale tenant (2 brace). 
• The Earl of Strathmore ( 4 brace of young birds). 
• William Ralston (3 brace). 
• The tenants of Lunehead Mines (2 brace). 
e The station master, policeman (one brace each). (D/St/E3/20/20). 
8. In 1918, the 14th Earl, who was at his London residence, requested Ralston to 
send him some rabbits. They had to be paunched, skinned and put in a small 
box, as officially food was not allowed to be sent due to rationing! (Strathmore 
to Ralston, 22/2/18). 
9. This estate was apparently offered first as a whole unit to a local landowner: 
"I can't conceive a man in Mr Pearce's position allowing a charming little estate 
to escape him which lies at his door and has no mansion house on it and is so 
excellent for sporting purposes" (Strathmore to Ralston, 22/10/1920). 
10. Thomas McQueen retired in 1934 due to nervous strain from overwork (Messrs 
J. Wood to Messrs Lindsey, Jamieson and Haldene 12/5/1934). 
11. More details of this 'record bag' are given in another letter: 
"a party of 5 guns shot 2, 070 head in one day, and at one stand Sir F. himself 
shot 191 grouse in 23 minutes, and during the day 728 birds to his own gun. 
The total bag for the season was 17,064 head". (29/7 /33) 
12. Nathan, Lord, Chairman (1952/3) Report of the Committee on the Law and 
practice relating to Charitable Trusts. Cmnd 8710. London, HMSO. 
13. Two trustees were too old to carry out their duties effectively. Examples given 
of 'unnecessary' expenses included the trustees' residence in Bamburgh Castle 
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with all the costs involved, and the upkeep of Dr Sharp's Library, which was 
used only by the trustees. 
14. (Attorney General v. Liddell, 9/11/1865). The trustees received the support 
of the local clergy for their case: 
"The trustees of Lord Crewe's Charity are most gratified by the resolution unan-
imously adopted at a meeting of the clergy of the Deanery of Bamburgh .. ex-
pressing their entire confidence in the general management of Lord Crewe's 
Charity.. whilst the trustees do not presume to claim for such management 
all freedom from error, and whilst they would gladly adopt suggestions for the 
extension of the charity, yet they agree with the clergy in deprecating any di-
version of the funds from the purposes contemplated by the founder" (B.a.3 
24/10/1865). 
15. Scheme for the Future Regulation and Management of the Charities of Lord 
Crewe and the Rev. J. Sharp. 17th June, 1876, {452/C5/42). 
16. A sum of £10,000 was needed for the establishment of the hospital. 
17. On assuming the post of secretary, Christopher Rowland~;~on was given a small 
gift by the Blanchland tenants: 
11The salver was small but the tenantry are not wealthy and gave it with hearty 
good will" (Hey to Rowlandson, 17 /3/1877). 
18. It can be seen.from Table 5.13 that rents actually rose at Cowbyer farm. This 
was due to a change of tenancy. The former tenant of Cowbyer, G Bell, had 
neglected the holding and it had fallen into a bad state of repair (Thomas Hey 
to Christopher Rowlandson, 31/8/1877). 
19. A 999 year lease of the plantations was finally sold to the Forestry Commission 
in 1955 (Respondent D). 
20. Two tenants died in debt to the trustees. Mr Robson of Cotehouse was served 
a notice to quit because of rent arrears in 1932 ~B.a.5, 17/ 4/1932). He died 
shortly afterwards and the trustees cancelled his debts of £46.75. Mr Collinson 
of Allenshields farm also died in debt to the trustees to the amount of £67.50, 
but these debts were also cancelled. 
21. For instance, the new tenants of Cotehouse Farm in 1934 were allowed £20 
for artificial manure for the first two years of their tenancy (B.a.5, 25/4/34). 
22. For instance, a lease was granted to General Refrectories Limited in 1929 to 
work sandstone, sand, ganister and clay at Dead Friars Quarry at an annual 
certain rent of £20 plus a royalty rent of 8 old pence a ton for ganister and 6 
old pence a ton for the other minerals. 
23. 1st Annual Report of the ECs for England, 1846. 
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24. Articles of Agreement, 27th October 1859, between the Right Reverend Charles 
Thomas, Lord Bishop of Durham, and the Ecclesiastical Commissioners for 
England on the other. 
25. 1st Annual Report of the ECs for England, 1846. 
26. The information presented in the following pages largely comes from records 
kept by the Church Commissioners at Milbank. Matters related to the general 
management of Stanhope were placed in a general management file (CC 49175). 
27. This estate was apparently in a very poor condition. It was reported by Smiths 
Gore that the buildings were old and dilapidated, many lacked privies, and the 
road to the farms needed repairs (21/3/1884). 
28. The road would cut down the distance needed to travel from Eastgate station 
to Rookhope from 6 miles to 3 miles. The former route was via Boltsburn, 
and involved climbing to 417.8 metres (Alf Pegler to Sir Alfred de Bock-Porter, 
15/7 /1907). 
29. 'Wallet men' were temporary single migrants. They lodged in mine shops by 
the mines or with families (Hunt, 1972, 162). 
30. In 1956 the Church Commissioners formed the Church Estates Development 
and Improvement Company (CEDIC) to enable the commissioners to partici-
pate in development schemes in collaboration with property developers. 
31. Information about the sale of the Stanhope estate has been obtained from 
the Smiths Gore office at Corbridge (file 49/4). Actual names have not been 
recorded in this research. 
32. It was reported that an offer had been submitted by a Roman Catholic order 
(2/4/63). 
303 
Chapter VI 
Contemporary Landownership and Land Management 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have looked at continuity and change in landownership, 
and at the development of the North Pennines over a period which, at the national 
level, saw the decline of the landed interest. The post Second World War period 
has seen the emergence of new forms of landownership at the national level. This 
chapter will look at contemporary landownership and land management in the 
North Pennines, and identify the factors and processes by which continuity and 
change in both ownership forms and management practices are taking place. 
Table 6.1 - Land Use in the AONB, 1985 
Commou land 24.9 
Agriculture 56.6 
Forestry Commission woods 1. 7 
Water Authority reservoirs 0.6 
Residual 16.3 
Source: Whitby {1986, 56) 
It is possible to build up a general picture of the contemporary landownership 
structure of the region, using the MAFF June census, the common land registers 
(see Appendix A), and recent reports. Table 6.1 shows land use in the North Pen-
nines AONB in 1985. Over half the total area is within some form of agricultural 
use. A further 25% of the area is designated common land, a surprisingly high 
30 lf. 
figure. Information about the pattern of landownership and the distribution of 
common land can be gained from Figure 6.1. It shows that a large proportion of 
the agricultural land area is rented. In 16 parishes, over 50% of the agricultural 
land area is rented, whilst in five of these parishes (Midgeholme and Geltsdale, 
Hunstanworth, Blanchland and Westwick), over 80% is rented. These areas indi-
cate the location of landed estates. Although, undoubtedly, owner-occupation has 
expanded as an ownership form, the area of landed estates is under-represented 
by the agricultural returns for two reasons (see Appendix A). First, land which is 
farmed in hand by the estate owner is entered as owner-occupied land. Second, 
privately owned moors do not appear in the MAFF returns or the common land 
registers, but yet form a large part of the area under estate ownership. It appears, 
therefore, that much of the residual category in Table 6.1 is, actually, privately 
owned moorland. 
Common land forms a very high percentage of the total land area of the North 
Pennines, particularly in comparison to the national average, but it is not evenly 
distributed. In 8 parishes (Milburn, Murton, Kaber, Dufton, Warcop, Stanhope, 
Eggleston, & Cockfield) over half the land area is common land. 
Forestry and water together make up only 23% of the land area of the North 
Pennines. These areas are owned mainly by the Forestry Commission and the 
Northumbrian Water Authority. The Ministry of Defence and the Nature Conser-
vancy Council also own land in the region, but these holdings are not identified 
separately in Table 6.1. Compared to other upland areas of Britain, however, the 
percentage of land owned by public agencies is very low. Nevertheless, although 
public agencies own only a small percentage of the land area of the North Pennines, 
they_ represent an important change in the landownership structure. 
It would appear that landed estates and common lands dominate the contemporary 
pattern oflandownership in the North Pennines, with owner-occupation and public 
landownership forming a smaller but still significant part of the structure. This 
chapter will examine three of these landownership forms: landed estates, common 
lands and publicly owned estates. Although owner- occupation is, undoubtedly, an 
important part of the overall structure, its influence is more narrowly agricultural, 
and is not given separate consideration in the analysis, although many of the factors 
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of importance to owner-occupiers will be touched on in relation to estate tenants 
and common land. 
6.2 Landed Estates 
The information presented in this section comes from interviews with the land 
agents of four landed estates in the region: Lord Crewe's Charity estate at Blanch-
land and the Strathmore estate at Wemmergill (whose histories have been traced in 
the earlier chapters), Lord Barnard's Raby estate in Teesdale and Lord Allendale's 
estate in Allendale [1]. Further interviews were conducted with tenant farmers 
on the Wemmergill and Blanchland estates, and with Lord Barnard, the landlord 
of the Raby estate. In addition, interviews were conducted with the geological 
agent for Weardale Minerals, the main mining company in the region, and with 
the mineral agents for Wardell Armstrong, a mining agency which manages the 
mineral interests of Lords Barnard and Allendale, and the Church Commissioners 
(see Appendix I). A range of views were, therefore, obtained on the way in which 
these estates are managed and the factors which influence estate policy. 
6.2.1 Estate Structure, Resource Use and Ownership 
The estates vary in size, shape, resource use and ownership form. By far the 
largest of the estates is Raby, the estate of Lord Barnard. It covers about 20,833 
hectares, stretching from Piercebridge in the east to the border with Cumbria in 
the west, and from the River Tees in the south to the watershed with Weardale in 
the north. The Raby estate is compact in shape, except for the Eggleston estate 
which forms a small wedge in Lord Barnard's otherwise monopolistic control of 
Teesdale. The Raby estate includes both a pastoral upland sector in the west, and 
an arable lowland sector in the east, so is by no means just an upland estate (indeed 
it is not perceived as such by the owner). The Raby estate is managed in three 
blocks: Upper Teesdale, Raby and Marwood. There are 171 tenanted holdings on 
the estate in all, ranging in size from 2 hectares to 1,875 hectares. There is no 
common land on the estate but several open moorlands which are used for rough 
grazing and grouse shooting. The Raby estate is primarily an agricultural estate, 
90% of the estate's income comes from agricultural rents, but other minor sources 
of income include (in decreasing order of importance): grouse, tourism, mines and 
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quarries, property and forestry. Lord Barnard also owns an estate in Shropshire 
but this is managed separately. 
The Allendale and Wemmergill estates are roughly comparable in size. The Wem-
mergill estate covers about 9,583 hectares of fell land (this is private moorland 
rather than common land) and 2,083 hectares of enclosed land. It contains 20 
tenanted farm holdings, ranging in size from 33 to 254 hectares. The size of the 
Wemmergill estate has been reduced by sales in the 1950s and, recently, the sales of 
Cronkley and Step Ends farms [2]. The Allendale estate consists of 2,154 hectares 
of enclosed farmland and 10,417 hectares of common land, with 23 tenanted farm 
holdings ranging in size from 33 to 292 hectares. Both are upland estates, but the 
Allendale estate is situated close to the family's lowland estate in the Tyne Valley 
and Hexhamshire in Northumberland, whereas the Strathmore family resides at 
Glamis Castle in Scotland where they also own a 4,167 hectare lowland estate. 
The Allendale estate is more diversified in its income sources than the Wemmergill 
estate. Farm rents make up about 60% of the estate income, but there is a 208 
hectare plantation managed in hand, three working mines and income from residen-
tial property and grouse shooting. There is no commercial forestry and practically 
. 
no residential property on the Wemmergill estate. The bulk of the Wemmergill 
income comes from farm rents and the grouse shooting, with a small rental from 
the Closehouse barytes mine and a stone quarry in Lunedale. 
The Blanchland estate is the smallest estate, covering just 3, 750 hectares. It 
comprises 8 farms and 2 moors (Blanchland and Hexhamshire). Agricultural rents 
form the main income source, but the owners of the estate, Lord Crewe's Trustees, 
also earn income from property rents (they own the village of Blancliland), grouse 
shooting and variable mine and quarry rents. The composition of the charity's 
total income in 1974 is shown in Table 6.3. It can be seen that the income from 
Blanchland and Hunstanworth contributed 41.7% to the total income. Farm rents 
from all the properties make up 63% of the charity's income, rents from residential 
property 14%, game rents 4% and mineral and quarry rents 0.8%. 
All four of these landed estates, therefore, form part of a wider property portfolio, 
and all four landlords command external sources of consociate wealth. The legal 
ownership form of the three privately owned estates has altered in response to fiscal 
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Table 6.2- Lord Crewe's Charity; Sources of Income 1974 
INCOME SOURCE AMOUNT(.£) % 
From the estates 
Hunstanworth 2,944.10 10.7 
Blanchland 8,720.23 31 
Bam burgh 101.83 0.3 
North Sunderland 2,962.17 10.7 
Shores ton 3,000.08 10.9 
Fleet ham 3,038.40 11.0 
Thornton 5,877.30 21.3 
River Tweed 850 3.0 
TOTAL 27,494.21 100 
IBY economic activity 
Farm rents 18,703 63 
Residential property 4,133.81 14 
Mines & quarries 235 0.8 
Mineral royalties variable -
Game rents 1,300 4 
Plantations 24.95 0.08 
Fisheries 850 2.9 
Water pumping station 285.85 0.9 
Inns, hotels 1,000 3.3 
Interest on investment 3,130.67 10.5 
TOTAL INCOME 29,663.28 100 
Source: 1974 Schedule 
policy. Raby is a settled estate (see 2.4.2) and Lord Barnard is the life tenant. 
The Marwood subunit of the estate has been granted as a discretionary trust for 
Lord Barnard's children, but will revert back to Lord Barnard when the period 
3Qq 
Table 6.3- Improvements to the Blanchland Estate, 1957 to 1972 
FARM 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Acton - 220.20 327.00 - - - 795.20 916.65 67.85 
Birkside - - 363.70 - 295.80 29.25 17.00 2,216.05 20.10 
Burntshieldhaugh - 125.40 329.85 - 303.25 - 151.50 454.95 70.95 
Cotehouse 524.35 - - - 1,133.25 - 2.55 98.85 -
Cowbyer (main) - 3,351.65 444.40 444.40 3,156.55 2,604.00 107.70 - 226.60 
Penny Pie - - - - 285.00 12.00 - 840.15 67.35 
Allenshields 232.20 502.00 428.75 17.90 306.05 - 894.95 1,185.30 -
Buckshott - - - 142.45 318.80 - 442.45 275.00 573.85 
Rape Barn - - - 555.30 547.30 585.65 18.70 - 1,416.75 
Blanchland Village - 1,050.30 - 508.35 11.65 234.20 - 739.50 6,221.00 
... 
FARM 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Acton - 220.20 327.00 - - - 795.20 916.65 67.85 
Birkside - - 363.70 - 295.80 29.25 17.00 2,216.05 20.10 
Burntshieldhaugh - 125.40 329.85 
- 303.25 - 151.50 454.95 70.95 
Cotehouse 524.35 - - - 1,133.25 - 2.55 98.85 -
Cowbyer (main) - 3,351.65 444.40 444.40 3,156.55 2,604.00 107.70 - 226.60 
Penny Pie - - - - 285.00 12.00 - 840.15 67.35 
Allenshields 232.20 502.00 428.75 17.90 306.05 - 894.95 1,185.30 -
Buckshott - - - 142.45 318.80 - 442.45 275.00 573.85 
Rape Barn - - - 555.30 547.30 585.65 18.70 - 1,416.75 
Blanchland Village 
- 1,050.30 - 508.35 11.65 234.20 - 739.50 6,221.00 
Source: 452/B.b.36 
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of the trust runs out. The Wemmergill and Allendale estates are private trusts 
(see 2.4.2). A trust was set up for the Strathmore estates following the death of 
the 17th Earl in the summer of 1987. Of the three trustees, two are members of 
the family so that, in effect, management of this estate remains within the family. 
Similarly, the Allendale estate trustees are family and friends. The ownership form 
of the Blanchland estate has not altered since the late 19th century (see 5.3.1). In 
1974, a new schedule of management was drawn up on the instigation of the former 
land agent.' This does not change the ownership form but allows the charity more 
flexibility in its expenditure [3]. 
6.2.2 Management of the Farms 
Farming practices on all four estates are broadly similar, and, although changes 
have occurred, still highly traditional. Agricultural policy and technological in-
novations have enabled an intensification of stock. The use of artificial fertilisers 
and silage allow more stock to be reared on the same area, and farmers can claim 
subsidies for every head of sheep and cattle. Several farms have had modern out-
buildings built for wintering stock alongside the old stone byres. The Wemmergill 
estate requires its tenants to provide 50% of the capital if they wish to construct 
a new out-building. A cow shed was built for Grains 0' Beck farm in 1988. Many 
improvements were carried out to the Blanchland farms in the 1960s (see Table 
6.3). The considerable amounts of capital expended at Blanchland in the 1960s 
can be seen as a concerted effort to invest in the estate and improve its value. This 
expenditure is reflected by the dramatic rise in rental income from Blanchland 
after 1955 (see Figure 5.4). The total income rose from £4,931 in 1960 to £10,015 
in 1970, although this rise is also partly due to a general inflation of hind values. 
Daicying on the estates has declined since Britain's membership of the EEC. For 
instance, the tenant of Allenshields (Blanchland estate) took the 'golden hand-
shake' offered to out-going dairy farmers in the 1970s (4). Today, he concentrates 
on sheep and cattle breeding. The upland farms are the start of the breeding cycle 
for lambs, which are then sold to lowland farmers for fattening. The imposition 
of milk quotas in 1984 raised fears that the lowland farmers would turn to inten-
sive sheep production and squeeze out the upland farmers, but at present upland 
farmers are in a strong position. On the Raby estate, the tenant farmers in the 
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upper dale can sell the lambs to tenant farmers lower down the dale for fattening, 
so that the whole cycle of sheep rearing is internalised within the estate. 
Farm management on some of the Wemmergill and Raby farms in Upper Teesdale 
has been altered by the designation of part of the area as a SSSI in 1963, and a 
larger area as an ESA in 1986 (see 3.4.4). Farmers within the SSSI are obliged to 
follow management practices laid down by the NCC in return for compensation, 
but participation in the ESA scheme is optional. The Wemmergill estate supports 
the ESA scheme for the sake of the farmers although the agent points out that the 
estate itself receives no financial benefits. Indeed, it is actually more expensive, 
since the estate must use traditional materials for repairs, for example slate instead 
of corrugated iron. The tenant of Hield House Farm joined at the beginning because 
he felt that, with such poor quality land, the offer of a secure income could not 
be refused. He has had to reduce the application of fertiliser on his meadow land 
from 600 cwt/hectare to 240 cwt/hectare, but he maintains the same number of 
stock by buying in extra feed. Part of his farm also lies within the Upper Teesdale 
SSSI and so is subject to a management agreement with the the NCC. His only 
complaint is that the SSSI contains a juniper forest which is a breeding ground for 
rabbits, and the SSSI has made it more difficult to control the rabbit population. 
Although farm business strategy is dependent on agricultural policy, the landlords 
exert an influence on the tenant farmers through their control over farm hold-
ing size, rents, selection of new tenants and farm repairs and improvements. All 
four estates stressed that landlord-tenant relations have been formalised and stan-
dardised by the Agricultural Holdings Acts. Many aspects of estate management 
are now governed by statute. Farm rents are reviewed every 3 years by the land 
agents. Rent levels are set according to likely farm income rather than land values 
(Respondent A). A holding's productive capacity is measured by livestock units 
and farm prices rather than area (the unreliability of farm size as an indicator of 
business size for upland farms has already been noted in section 4.2.3). Rent as a 
proportion of a farm's expenses has declined. The tenant of Allenshields (Blanch-
land estate) says that his rent today only forms about 10% of his farm expenses. 
This is due to the increase in livestock prices. Most of a farm's capital is now tied 
up in its stock. 
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Tenant right is seen as a major constraint on estate management. With the 
security of tenure awarded to the tenant farmer by the Agricultural Holdings Acts 
it is virtually impossible to evict a tenant unless he commits "one of the seven 
deadly sins" (Respondent E) [5). The 1976 Agricultural Holdings Act awarded all 
sitting tenants, and all new tenancies created up to 1984, security of tenure for 
three generations (see 2.4.2). Although the estates complain about the constraints 
which legislation imposes on them, it seems that it merely formalises what was 
the custom anyway. It is tthe fact that landlords are compelled to follow certain 
codes of behaviour, rather than exercise free choice in estate management, that 
angers landowners and agents. 
On all the estates family succession is the norm. The Raby estate gives the 
impression of having the most commercial outlook. The agent looks for experience 
of upland farming and sufficient capital when choosing new tenants. All vacant 
tenancies are advertised and some are awarded to outsiders (outsiders can usually 
affors a higher rent). On the Wemmer gill estate, about 40% of the estate tenants 
are sons of former tenants, and others also have estate connections. The tenants 
must fit the 'estate image' and agree with the way the estate is run. The tenant 
of Grains 0' Beck farm was formerly an employee at Wemmergill Hall, and the 
tenant of Hield House took over the holding from his brother-in-law. Similarly, at 
Blanchland the last change of tenancy was at Allenshields farm in 1977 when the 
former cow herd took over the holding. This preference for local tenants is not just 
an-example of paternalism on-the part of the estates. The Allendale agent -str~~sed 
that it was essential that new tenants have experience of hill sheep farming, and 
sons of former tenants were often the best candidates. 
The size of the farms at Blanchland have changed very little since the time of 
Lord Crewe, although the stinted pastures have now been incorporated into farm 
holdings. The farm holding structure has altered on the other estates, however. 
The Allendale estate, which inherited a farm structure of small holdings from the 
lead mining period, has amalgamated holdings into manageable units for fam-
ily farms. The Wemmergill estate deliberately maintains some smaller farms as 
'starter farms' for younger tenants. The youngest tenant on the estate in 1988 
was only 21 years old. Hield House is one such starter farm. The present tenant 
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has occupied the holding for 8 years, and has plans to move on, either to a larger 
holding on the estate or to a holding elsewhere. In the 1950s, more in-bye land 
was lost in Lunedale on the creation of Selset Reservoir (see Figure 4. 7), which has 
further unbalanced the ratio of fell to in-bye land. Now, the area of in-bye is too 
small to support the full use of the moorland area. The ratio of the in-bye to fell 
lands at Holwick is more balanced. The agents says that it is too expensive to buy 
more in-bye land in Lunedale. The demand for good land is such that it fetches 
the same prices as good land in lowland areas. 
Traditionally, many of the tenants of the smaller farms in the upper dales have 
supplemented their farm income with a second employment (see 4.1 ). This is still a 
common practice, but with fewer alternative employment opportunities today, the 
future of these smaller holdings may be under threat. On the Wemmergill estate 
about 30% of the tenants have a second employment, which ranges from farm 
contracting to veterinary work. Examples of second employment on the Raby 
estate include farm contracting, quarrying, lorry driving, and one tenant is a post 
man. 
6.2.3 Grouse Shooting 
The trend towards grouse shooting, noted in the previous chapter in relation to 
the Wemmergill estate, has continued in the latter half of the 20th century, and is 
an important income source on all the estates. The growing profitability of grouse 
shooting is due to scarcity value. The Scottish moors have deteriorated in quality 
so that the North Pennine moors now offer some of the best shooting in the world. 
Demand is now international. Grouse shooting as a source of revenue is probably 
most significant on the Wemmergill estate where, in a good year, it can be as high 
as 75% of the total estate income. The shooting is managed in hand and let on 
a daily basis, mainly to foreigners. The conditions on the Wemmergill moors are 
said to be some of the best in the area, and Lune moor now has an international 
reputation. Weather conditions are usually good, and the size of the moors ensures 
a long shooting season. The Raby and Allendale estates keep some of the shooting 
in hand and let the rest. The Raby shooting is let to a local shooting syndicate. 
The Blanchland moors are let to a syndicate which includes some of the tenant 
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farmers [6]. The 6 year shooting lease was renewed by the trustees in 1989 for a 
sum of over £22,000, more than twice the former rental value. 
Although a day's shooting can earn an estate about £1,000, the management 
costs of grouse shooting are high. The annual cost of maintaining the shooting 
at Wemmergill is £150,000. The moors must be keepered throughout the year 
and six full-time gamekeepers are employed (five are employed on the Allendale 
estate). During the shooting season (from August 12th to December), the estates 
and shooting parties take on casual labour for beating the moors and looking after 
the shooting parties. Each estate offers accommodation for the shooting parties: at 
Holwick lodge for Wemmergill, Allenheads Hall for Allendale, Lord Crewe's Arms 
Hotel for Blanchland, and Eggleston Hall is often used by the Raby estate. These 
buildings must be maintained out of season. All the estates pointed out the positive 
spin-offs of grouse shooting for the local community in terms of employment and 
increased visitor spending. For instance, there is a hotel in Allendale which caters 
specifically for shooting parties, and other hotels in the town also report good 
business. 
Although grouse shooting has substantially improved the financial position of these 
estates, it remains an unreliable income source. Grouse are vulnerable to disease 
which seems to run in roughly three-yearly cycles. Every few years the grouse 
population is decimated and the estates cannot let the shooting. The income from 
grouse shooting at Wemmergill can vary from 75% in a good year, to only 10% in 
a bad one. A cold winter may kill the baby grouse, but a warm winter increases 
the risk of pests. In 1989, a mild winter led initially to a high grouse population 
but an epidemic of a pest in July resulted in a disastrous season. 
6.2.4 Other Income Sources 
The role of mining on the estates is now minimal, but is probably of most impor-
tance on the Allendale estate. The estate is reluctant to rule out the possibility of 
reopening mines if economic conditions improve in future, but mining is a skilled 
activity and it is difficult to retain the miners with necessary experience when 
employment is so uncertain (see 5.4.2). The industry is totally market-led. Some 
miners have emigrated to use their mining skills overseas. Mining is also con-
strained by the past. In the 19th century, mineral rights were sometimes traded 
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in the interests of efficient lead mining. This causes legal difficulties today. For in-
stance, at Fraser's Grove mine in Upper Weardale where fluorspar is being worked, 
the Church Commissioners own the fluorspar but Lord Allendale owns the lead. He 
is, therefore, entitled to a compensation rent for the loss of the lead (Respondent 
F). 
Lord Allendale, Lord Barnard and the Church Commissioners employ a firm of 
specialist mineral agents to manage their mineral interests. None of the landowners 
play an active role in mining operations. The main mining company in the North 
Pennines today is Weardale Minerals, which operates three fluorspar mines in 
Weardale and two in Allendale. The Fordamin company works a barytes mine 
at Closehouse on the Wemmergill estate. The mining leases generally devolve all 
responsibility for working and restoring the mines on the company, but prohibit 
the subleasing of mine working [7]. Periodically, short leases or licences are granted 
to speculators, but these are all small scale, short-term concerns. The agent for 
Weardale Minerals feels that the mining companies must cause the estates more 
trouble than the economic returns justify. 
Attitudes to forestry vary between the estates. The Allendale estate agent is most 
· in favour of forestry, and believes that forestry will take over from farming in 
the future as the main land use of the uplands. There are three very ancient 
sawmills on the Allendale estate to process timber for estate use, but most of the 
timber is sold standing to firms of professional foresters. He would like to expand 
the timber resource, but complains that opposition to both mining and forestry 
operations from conservation interests is a majc;>r constraint on the expansion of 
these resources. The Wemmergill estate, on the other hand, has never had a policy 
of afforestation (see 4.2.4). There are some small plantations on the Raby estate, 
but these are mainly deciduous trees and are not managed commercially, although 
they can be considered as a long-term investment. The estate uses timber for its 
own repairs and owns a sawmill. Lord Crewe's Trustees no longer manage any 
forestry at Blanchland (the plantations were sold to the Forestry Commission in 
1955). The present agent points out that plantations require careful management, 
and are not such an easy alternative as is sometimes thought. Much of the land 
available for planting is too poor in quality to be suitable. 
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Tourism is an underdeveloped income source on all the estates, and none of the 
landlords have plans for future developments. The Raby estate contains two major 
tourist attractions: Raby Castle and High Force Waterfall, but the castle is only 
open for the minimum number of days necessary to obtain a grant from English 
Heritage. Smaller ventures, such as bed and breakfast, are left to individual tenant 
initiative. The agent for Raby is cynical about the potential for tourism in the 
North Pennines. For five months of the year Upper Teesdale is snow bound. Gener-
ally, the farmers up there have chosen a harsh, isolated lifestyle and are, therefore, 
unlikely to welcome tourists. Most of the farmhouses have no extra rooms for 
guests, and all the farm buildings are used for farm purposes. The Allendale es-
tate agent also thinks that weather conditions are too harsh for tourism. On the 
Wemmergill estate one tenant has got a grant from the Countryside Commission 
for a bunk house barn and another runs bed and breakfast, but again this is the 
result of individual tenant initiative. -The tenant of Cotehouse Farm (Blanchland 
estate) lives with his family in the farm cottage and rents out the main farm house 
to earn some extra income. 
Not surprisingly, mining interests in the region are dismissive of the region's poten-
tial for tourism. They wonder who would want to come to a place "in the middle 
of nowhere" (Respondent F), and quote the saying "where there's muck there's 
brass" (Respondents G). 
It can be extrapolated from discussions with the agents and the tenants that one 
of the main reasons for the opposition of all the estates to tourism is the question 
of public access. The main attraction of the upper dales is for walkers, who are 
not appreciated by the estates or the farmers. The usual management problems 
caused by walkers are mentioned: gates are left open and dogs and people stray 
from the paths. In principle, Lord Barnard is in favour of public access, but is not 
prepared to maintain the footpaths himself and states firmly that all responsibility 
for the upkeep of footpaths should be taken by the county council. The Pennine 
Way runs across the Wemmergill and Raby estates. Both estates' attitude to this 
well used footpath is passive; there is no attempt to exploit its tourist potential. 
6.2.5 Estate Management and Landlord-Tenant Relations 
Landlord-tenant relations and estate management practices vary between the es-
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tates, depending to some extent on estate size but also on the personality of the 
landlords and land agents. On all the estates the role of the agent is of as great, if 
not greater, importance than the landlord. The land agent performs a managerial 
role and has the most contact with the estate tenants. Three of the estates (Raby, 
Allendale and Blanchland), are managed by an individual full-time land agent. 
The Wemmergill estate is managed by an individual, but he is attached to a firm 
of land agents based in Newcastle. The Blanchland and Allendale land agents also 
manage their employers' other estates. The Blanchland agent in fact manages the 
Cathedral's estates in addition [8]. 
Blanchland, which is the smallest estate, has the most personalised approach to 
management. The present agent has managed the estate for 26 years and knows all 
the tenants personally. He is the sole decision-maker now since there is no longer 
a bailiff on the estate. The charity cannot afford to employ full-time workmen on 
the estate but must employ contract workers when necessary, a situation which 
the agent regrets, since contract workers lack sufficient loyalty to the estate and 
are unreliable. Some repair work is carried out by the farm tenants. The tenant of 
Allenshields, for example, is a professional stone-waller and works for the estate. 
The agent seems to be well liked by the farm tenants, but says it is difficult to 
manage the estate commercially when the tenants are personal friends. He is not 
prepared to antagonise the tenants by constantly raising the rents to keep in line 
with the market value. 
The agent for the Wemmergill estate is younger, and has only managed the Wem-
mergill estate for two years. He is considered by the tenant of Grains 0' Beck 
farm to be fair because he is prepared to listen to the tenants. There are, however, 
points of conflict between the estate and the tenants. The main conflict concerns 
stinting levels on the open fells. The estate is anxious to reduce stint numbers, in 
order to prevent over- grazing and improve the grouse shooting. Every time a farm 
falls vacant, it is re-let with reduced stints. Sheep are no longer allowed to graze on 
the fells in winter to prevent the trampling of the heather at feeding points. The 
tenant of Grains 0' Beck has had his :Bock reduced by 200, and says that this is 
the only change to have taken place on the estate for "donkeys years" (Respondent 
H). Every year the sheep are counted by the agent to ensure that farmers do not 
exceed their stint allowances, which creates an atmosphere of suspicion. The estate 
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is now trying to increase its control over the tenanted farmland by encouraging 
the tenants to sign contracts giving up their right of succession. The tenant of 
Grains 0' Beck claims that the estate is using coercive tactics to put pressure on 
the tenants. For example, he wanted to buy 100 stints on Cronkley Fell in 1988, 
but was told he could only do this if he signed a contract. He took advice from 
the NFU who offered to pay legal costs if necessary, but he decided not to buy the 
stints. 
Although the Strathmore family are absentee landlords, they appear to be well 
liked by the tenants. The tenant of Grains 0' Beck recounted an occasion when 
the late 17th Earl held a New Year's Eve party in Holwick Lodge for the tenants, 
and greatly amused them by appearing at the end of the party in a pair of red 
longjohns. The connection with the Queen Mother through the Bowes family also 
engenders a loyalty to the estate. The Queen Mother has been to visit the estate, 
and on her 80th birthday the tenants were bussed down to Buckingham Palace to 
attend the official party. The agent says that the family still takes a great interest 
in the estate. Estate loyalty also takes the form of antagonism to other estates. 
The tenant of Grains 0' Beck farm was dismissive of the Raby estate's attitude to 
their tenants (he described the estate as "tight" and "stand-offish"). 
Stints have also been reduced on the Allendale estate by 50%, in order to conserve 
the heather and reduce over-grazing. However, the agent points out the danger 
of upsetting the balance between sheep and grouse essential for the successful 
management of the commons. If sheep on one farmer's heaf are reduced, then 
sheep from neighbouring heafs may stray. The Allendale estate employs some 
full~time workmen and some contractors who, in practice, are nearly full-time 
employees. The agent is the manager of several estate departments, including a 
forestry department with head forester and woodland staff, a farm manager for the 
home farm at Bywell, and an estate works department. Expenditure on repairs is 
particularly high because of the harsh weather conditions (see 4.3.4) and the age 
of the farm buildings. Many repairs require specially made materials which adds 
to their cost. The agents of the above three estates liaise with the owners, but 
seem to be allowed a large degree of freedom in the day to day management of the 
estates. 
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The Raby estate, because of its size, has the most complex and formal management 
structure. Lord Barnard acts as a director with ultimate responsibility for the 
estate's management. Under him is the chief land agent, who is responsible for 
the day to day management of the estate. He presides over the various estate 
departments, such as finance and estate works. It is a hierarchical system of control. 
Each department has its own staff. The chief land agent describes himself as "a 
jack of all trades and a master of none" (Respondent E). His role is managerial, and 
he must pacify many different interests. Lord Barnard attends all meetings where 
long-term strategic decisions concerning the estate are decided. Frequently, outside 
specialists are invited to attend these meetings as consultants. Lord Barnard 
recognises that often a landlord will have a pet interest, so he tries to maintain 
a balanced interest in all aspects of the estate. He does not have any contact 
with the tenants except on an incidental basis. He used to have more informal 
contact when he hunted, but has not done so since the 1960s. He also feels that 
the landlord-tenant relationship has become more formalised through legislation 
and the unionisation of farmers. 
Three of the estates (Raby, Allendale and Blanchland) contain estate villages which 
are wholly owned by the estates. Both the agents of Allendale and Blanchland 
say that owning residential property is not profitable in this area. The buildings 
require constant repairs, and rents only just cover the costs of upkeep. The village 
of Blanchland is let on fair rents. There are two shops which, the agent believes, 
could not stay in business if they were not heavily subsidised by the estate. The 
new tenant of the post office recently asked for repairs to the building, but the 
agent does not think this is feasible at the present rent. Many of the cottages 
surrounding Allenheads village are let as holiday cottages, and the estate plans to 
sell these off, retaining a nucleus of properties in the village centre. Five workshops 
are rented in Allenheads village, but before the estate agrees to rent a workshop 
it must first ensure that the tenant can be housed in the village. 
It does not seem that any of the estates have a policy to regenerate the village com-
munities. The population of Blanchland is ageing, and only recently Allenheads 
village was featured in the Sunday Times as an example of a dying upland village 
(see 7.7.2). Lord Barnard, however, mentioned that recent housing legislation had 
enabled the estate to raise cottage rents to a more economic level. 
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6.2.6 Continuity, Change and the Future 
How do the estates perceive themselves, and how do they view the future? Lord 
Barnard is more forthcoming than his land agent about the changing role of the 
landlord and estate management. He would like to see changes in the decision-
making process. For instance, he would prefer to be on a board of directors than 
to be sole decision-maker. He would also like to introduce a less hierarchical 
management structure, and give each department more autonomy. He feels that 
the profession of land agency has changed since the Second World War. Today, 
increasingly, estates employ a firm of land agents rather than an individual, and 
the career of land agency has become more structured. Agents no longer stay on 
the same estate for life. 
Taking a broader view of the role of the landlord, Lord Barnard sees a cyclical 
pattern in the demands of landownership. In the 18th century, landlords took an 
active role in land management. In the 19th century, landlords distanced them-
selves from their estates. Today, they have to fulfil a more active role again. The 
profitability of agriculture also runs in cycles. The greatest threat to the future of 
the estate, in Lord Barnard's view, is taxation. The estate is slowly being whittled 
away by financial demands. His freedom of decision-making is constrained by the 
fact that he is only a life tenant of the estate. For instance, he would like to di-
versify his investments into non-landed property, but the terms of the settlement 
are too restrictive for this to be a feasible proposition. The settlement prevents 
risk-taking on the part of the landlord, but prevents change. 
The agent of the Allendale estate also believes that taxation is the greatest threat 
to landownership, but for different reasons. The trend away from individual private 
ownership to more informal and flexible arrangements threatens to undermine the 
custom of primogeniture. Ownership by a family trust does not engender the same 
loyalty to an estate that individual ownership ensures. Divided ownership increases 
the possibility that the decision-makers will disagree and the estate will break up. 
Opinions differ on the question of the future of the estates. The Allendale agent is 
pessimistic about upland farming, although he says that the 'peasant element' in 
the EEC is a safeguard for small farmers. The Wemmergill agent is optimistic as 
long as grouse shooting retains its profitability. As to the future of hill farming, in 
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the present short-term political climate, no-one is prepared to predict the future. 
The Blanchland agent says that he is not prepared to invest in the farm sector 
until the future is more certain. 
None of the estates make much of an economic return, it is said. The agent for 
the Wemmergill estate claims that the costs of estate maintenance have rocketed 
upwards, and that repairs and improvements are the major expenses. On this 
estate, grouse shooting profits now fund the upkeep of the farms. As long as 
grouse shooting remains profitable, the future of the estate looks safe. Changes in 
estate policy may also take place with changes in management. The Blanchland 
agent will retire next year, and says that the trustees will probably employ a firm of 
land agents to manage the estate. If the trustees were to adopt a more commercial 
policy, the village of Blanchland could make a very profitable sale. 
6.2. 7 Summary 
Similarities and differences can be observed in the estate management policies of 
these four landed estates. The overwhelming impression of all three estates is 
the continuity of resource use, management and motive. What changes have taken 
place conform to Massey and Catalano's observations on the adaptations of former 
landed property (see 2.5). There has been a reduction in the size of the estates, 
there has been a redefinition of ownership on two of the estates, and there has 
been a growth in commercial sporting activities, but these are all insignificant in 
comparison to the fundamental changes which have taken place in the national 
landownership structure. 
Many of the issues considered m this discussion have been raised in the past. 
The management of the stinted moors and pastures has been a recurring source 
of conflict on the Wemmergill estate and taxation and tenant right are not new 
constraints. The reasons for this continuity of ownership and management can 
be found in the decision-making frameworks of the estates. Many of the factors 
mentioned by the estates are factors which constrain change (see Table 3.2). Tenant 
right and taxation seem to be the major factors of constraint, a finding which 
corresponds to Denman's 1957 study. Rising maintenance costs, low profits, and 
an inability to keep rents in line with inflation are also significant constraints. 
Of course physical resources are an unavoidable constraint on land management 
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options, but it is significant that none of the estates wish to develop tourism, 
although the moorland landscape is a highly suitable resource. Other constraints 
which were mentioned included environmental controls, which obstruct mining, 
quarrying and forestry activities. 
As well as these constraints, continuity in the landed estates is largely due to 
motive. The estates do not want to change. They are all traditional, and display 
a strong attachment to the land. Although none of the estates actively promote 
employment opportunities, they show a degree of paternalism towards their farm 
tenants (for instance the Wemmergill estate maintains 'starter' farms). 
There are differences in motive which may, partly, be attributed to historical tra-
dition. The Allendale estate's emphasis on mining and timber may reflect its 
more industrial history, whilst the Wemmergill estate has actively promoted grouse 
shooting since the late 19th century. 
6.3 Common Land 
The analysis now moves on to consider a very different, but equally important, form 
of land control to landed estates. Common land has been touched upon in earlier 
sections of the thesis. In sections 2.2.2 and 2.4.5, the legal basis of common land 
and its present day extent were discussed. Common land has also been referred 
to in the analysis of the historical development of the Stanhope estate in relation 
to enclosure (see 4.4.3). As yet, however, common land has not been considered 
as a form of land control in itself. It is a key part of the overall landownership 
structure of the North Pennines and, therefore, deserves special attention. 
Common land is the last surviving ancient form of land control. It has its origins 
in the manorial period, and the law relating to common land has evolved over 
centuries. Indeed, the law of the commons has never been formally written down, 
and the legal control of commons has evolved differently in different parts of the 
country according to local custom. As this discussion will show, common land is a 
general term which covers a variety of customary legal forms. In the last 25 years, 
public attention has focused on the remaining common lands, and their role in 
the contemporary rural society and economy has been reassessed with a view to 
reform. Of all forms of land tenure, common land displays the highest degree of 
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historical inertia. Change is constrained by the non-exclusive nature of common 
rights (every commoner must respect the rights of other interests in the common) 
and, since the late 19th century, by statutory legislation (see 2.4). 
The commons in the North Pennines today are, almost without exception, located 
on the open fells. They are the lands which were considered too poor to be im-
proveable at the time of enclosure. Not all the open fells, however, are commons. 
The distinction between commons and private moors in terms of land use is very 
fine, but in terms of control is very significant. The commons are located in the 
parishes where, at the time of enclosure, there was no principal landowner. The 
great extent of common lands in Stanhope, for example, reflects the fact that 
the Bishops of Durham were not the principal landowners and so could not claim 
freehold ownership of the moors (see 4.4.3). 
As stated above, the land use of the North Pennines commons is very similar to 
that of the private moors, already discussed in earlier sections. Both are stinted, 
and both are characterised by dual use for sheep grazing and grouse breeding. 
The legal interests which are most actively exercised in these commons are, there-
fore, grazing rights and shooting rights. The commons represent an important 
additional grazing resource for many farms and, just as the popularity of grouse 
shooting has increased on the landed estates, so too has the value of grouse shoot-
ing on the commons grown. Unlike the private moors, however, there is no overall 
control to regulate the use of the commons. 
The Commons Registration Act of 1965 has been a major issue in the North Pen-
nines, because of the extent of commons in the region, and because, in recent years, 
there has been a revival of interest in the economic potential of the resources of 
common lands. Management practices which have evolved by custom over cen-
turies are now being reassessed in the light of new demands on and public interest 
in this land resource. This section of the chapter will examine the ownership, 
control and management of three commons in County Durham, to show the im-
pact of recent legal and economic pressures on this ancient form of land control. 
The information has been obtained from interviews with the agents for the shoot-
ing interests on Bollihope Common and Bowes Moor (see Appendix I), and from 
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the analysis of the Commons Register for County Durham and the report of the 
Commons Commission concerning ownership of Burnhope Moor. 
Burnhope Moor and Bollihope Common are located in Stanhope parish (see Figure 
4.17) and are, therefore, located within the former estate lands of the Bishops of 
Durham. Burnhope Moor is 1,670 hectares in area, and at registration rights 
to graze 1,517 sheep (320 stints) were made by 16 persons. Bollihope Common 
is 2,988 hectares, and at registration rights to graze 11,670 sheep were recorded 
by 42 persons. Today, Bollihope is owned by a private individual as part of an 
estate which encompasses two other commons: Pikestone Fell and Hamsterley, plus 
166.6 hectares of enclosed land. Bowes Moor is located south of the Wemmergill 
estate and covers, altogether, 5,000 hectares. It is divided into two sections: the 
north moor and the south moor. At registration, rights to graze 5,781 sheep were 
registered by 107 persons. 
6.3.1 The Commons Registration Act 
The history of the Commons Registration Act has already been described (see 
2.4.5). Tables 6.~and 6.5 provide a summary of the data available for each com-
mon which was registered in the North Pennines [9]. Owners of commons in County 
Durham include private individuals, syndicates, MAFF, an investment company 
and the Public Trustee. It can be seen that ownership of four commons in County 
Durham were contested, and on 13 commons the claims of stintholders were dis-
puted. All cases of disputed ownership were referred to the Commons Commission 
for resolution, and in many cases disputed stints were also referred. The registra-
tion of the North Pen nine commons has been a lengthy and controversial process, 
and in some cases registration has still not been finalised. 
Bowes Moor and Burnhope Moor were both commons where ownership was dis-
puted. The freehold ownership of Bollihope common was claimed by a shooting 
syndicate at registration, although the Church Commissioners claimed manorial 
and mineral rights over the common [10]. Bollihope was subsequently sold to a 
private individual, and in 1984 changed hands again and was purchased by its 
present owner. The owner also owns the sporting rights over the common, but the 
grazing is controlled by the stintholders and the mineral rights are reserved to the 
Church Commissioners. 
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Table 6.4- Commons in County Durham 
PARISH COMMON HECTARES OWNERSHIP STINTHOLDERS SHEEP 
Stanhope Bollihope 2988 Individual 42* 11670 
Stanhope Stanhope 3103 Syndicate 34* 7768 
Stanhope Burnhope 1670 Public Trustee* 16* 1517 
Stanhope Ireshope 413 Individual 16 418 
Stanhope Harthope 264 Public Trustee 5 355 
Stanhope Windyside Moss 22 Public Trustee 2 56 
Stanhope Westernhope 1068 Syndicate 3 1797 
Stanhope Chapel Fell 174 Public Trustee 6 414 
Stanhope Linzgarth 167 Syndicate 2 290 
Stanhope N orthgate Fell 174 Syndicate 5* ? 
Stanhope Burtree Fell 6 Investment Co. 1 ? 
Stanhope Sedling Fell 80 Public Trustee 7 ? 
Stanhope Puddingthorne 172 MAFF 4 234 
Stanhope Killhope 510 MAFF 1* 30 
Stanhope Wellhope 575 Individual 1 2482 
Stanhope Moss Moor 100 Public Trustee* 4 80 
Wolsingham Pikestone Fell 1500 Individual 15* 3675 
Wolsingham Waskerley Park 769 Individual 1 700 
Wolsingham Wolsingham Park 852 Individual 7* ? 
Edmond byers Edmond byers 732 Syndicate 9* 2458 
Muggleswick Muggleswick Park 299 Syndicate 3 44 
Muggleswick Muggleswick Common 2232 Syndicate 9* 1490 
Cockfield Cockfield Fell 557 Trustees* 54 428 
Hamsterley Hamsterley 834 Individual 11* 2284 
Cotherstone Cotherstone Pasture 1275 Public Trustee 39 3892 
Bowes Bowes Moor 2732 Public Trustee* 107* 5781 
Barningham Barningham 395 Individual 4* 357 
Eggleston Eggleston 1951 Individual 32* 2482 
* indicates dispute over stints or ownership 
Source: Common Land Registers 
326 
Table 65- Commons in Cumbria & Northumberland 
PARISH COMMON HECTARES STINTHOLDERS SHEEP 
Stain more East Stainmore North Moor 1508 29 1121 
Stain more East Stainmore South Moor 1043 23 693 
Winton & Kaber Winton & Kaber 2220 47 4745 
Warcop Kentland 48 8 518 
Warcop Sandford 16 3 20 
Warcop Burton 1418 25 2048 
Milburn Milburn Forest 2033 19 2627 
Murton Murton Fell 1348 25 5183 
Murton Hilton Fell 1440 39 9276 
Murton Brackenber Moor 169 34 6528 
Murton Pasture End 19 17 1902 
Murton The Ghyll 5 18 2446 
Hartley Hellgill Howe 46 14 1993 
Hartley Hartley Fell 461 6 1459 
Long Marton Knock Fell 17 21 3709 
Dufton Dufton Fell 4617 34 11066 
Dufton Dufton Fell (disputed) 21 53 15010 
Nate by Nateby 285 15 2904 
Ousby Melmerby Fell 935 16 4055 
Ousby Ousby Fell 1449 39 6780 
Culgaith Skirwith Fell 880 28 4521 
Culgaith Kirkland Fell 439 17 3321 
Culgaith Blencarn Fell 280 19 3451 
Culgaith The Rigg 29 20 2508 
Ainstablc Crogliu Coombes 35 1 100 
Ainstable Seavy Holmes 5 1 3 
Allendale & West Allendale Allendale 4312 96 2699 
Hexhamshi1·e Hexhamshire 1275 13 1054 
Source: Common Land Registers 
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The ownership of Bowes Moor was unknown at the time of registration. Claims 
to ownership were submitted by two parties: the owners of the grazing rights (the 
stint holders), and the owners of the sporting rights. An investigation was held by 
a commons commissioner in 1985 to decide the matter. The decision was based 
on historical evidence dating back to the 17th century [11]. In 1657, the Manor 
of Bowes (including the villages of Bowes, Boldron, Sleightholme and Spital) was 
purchased by several individuals as a trust. In 1681, lands within the manor were 
controlled by a court leet and court baron presided over by five Lords in Trust. In 
1845, an act for the enclosure of the manor of Bowes was passed and the award 
was made in 1859, turning the moor into a regulated pasture. Altogether 5,781 
stints were awarded, of which 361 were awarded to the Lords in Trust: 
"in full compensation for the right and interest in the soil of the said lands, but 
excluding all mines, minerals, stones and other substrata". 
Thus the stintholders became the freehold owners of the moor and the Lords in 
Trust the owners of the sporting rights. The commons commissioner upheld the 
stintholders' claim to the ownership of the moor, but stated that the stintholders 
as a body could not be registered as the owners, so ownership was vested in the 
Public Trustee [12]. 
On Burnhope Moor in Stanhope, ownership was also disputed between the stinthold-
ers and the owners of the shooting rights, but this case differed in several respects 
from that of Bowes Moor. In the initial registration period, the claim for ownership 
of Burnhope Moor was submitted by the Burnhope Moor Stintholders Association, 
but was disputed by a shooting syndicate who owned the shooting rights. The 
case was heard by a commons commissioner in 1988 [13]. The shooting syndicate 
claimed that they had been the lessees of the shooting rights on Burnhope Moor 
since 1936. In 1959, they had purchased the moor from the Church Commissioners 
on the understanding that the conveyance gave them both the rights of sporting 
and freehold ownership. They apparently were not aware of any other claims to 
ownership. Since the purchase, they claimed that they had exercised the rights of 
ownership without protest from the stintholders; for example, making an access 
road, maintaining a shooting cabin and grouse butts, burning heather, griping [14] 
and draining. They also claimed that they had regularly informed the stintholders 
of the days when they were going to shoot. Their case, therefore, rested on the 
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grounds that they had purchased the freehold as well as the sporting rights in 
1959, and had since acted as owners. They also thereby implied that the Church 
Commissioners before them had also owned the freehold of the moor. 
The stintholders, on the other hand, claimed that the ownership of the moor was 
divided between the stintholders according to the number of stints. This had been 
determined by the Weardale Enclosure Award (see 4.4.3), and each successive 
farmer had stated that this was the case. One witness said that when his father 
had bought his farm from the Church Commissioners in 1955 he had purchased 
the stints and with them a share of the ownership of the moor. Moreover, the 
stintholders disputed the fact that the shooting syndicate had acted as owners 
of the moor. The stintholders had never even thought that the syndicate claimed 
ownership. The syndicate had never given the stintholders formal warning of when 
they were going to shoot, and the stintholders had also renewed fences and cut 
ditches on the moor without seeking permission from the syndicate. 
The commons commissioner, in making his final decision, stated that neither side 
had produced sufficient evidence to support their claim to ownership. He based 
his decision on the Weardale Enclosure Award of 1815. The essential question was 
whether the Bishop of Durham had then, or beforehand, been the freehold owner of 
the moor. The commissioner found that the Bishop of Durham had been awarded 
17 stints on the moor out of a total of 320. The small percentage of the total 
stintage awarded to the Bishop did not suggest that he was being compensated 
for foregoing the rights of sole proprietor of the moor, but that he was granted 
stints according to his freehold interest on the same basis as the other proprietors. 
The Bishop was, therefore, granted part ownership of the moor along with the 
other stintholders. The Church Commissioners had subsequently sold the farms to 
whic-h these stints were attached, so that the Church could no longer claim even 
part ownership of the moor. As to the confusion over the 1959 conveyance: 
"My guess is that someone in the office, not realising or forgetting that stinthold-
ers could have a share in the ownership of the soil, and persuading himself that 
a stint could not be more than a right of grazing, concluded, without much 
consideration either of the 1199 Act or the 1815 Award, that because he could 
think of no other owner and because the Bishop had owned so much land in the 
County, the whole of the Burnhope unit (except so much of it as had between 
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1867 and 1885 been acquired by conveyance) must have been in some seignorial 
capacity owned by the Bishop" (51). 
The commons commissioner concluded that the stintholders owned the freehold of 
the moor but, since the freehold could not be registered in a body of stintholders, 
it would be registered with the Public Trustee on behalf of the stintholders. 
The establishment of the number and ownership of stints on the commons also 
caused confusion at registration. In most cases, more stints were registered than 
could possibly be supported by the common. For instance, 11,500 claims were made 
for stints on Bollihope common at registration which was a gross overestimation of 
the grazing capacity of the moor, but only 5,000 of the claims were substantiated. 
Where disputed claims came before a commons commissioner, decisions were again 
often based on historical documents relating to past stinting regulations. 
The registration of the commons has had two effects. First, it has increased the 
importance of ownership in common land, and has formalised the division of own-
ership and control. Second, registration has also formally distinguished common 
lands from private moors. There were attempts to register private moors. The 
Ramblers Association, for instance, submitted applications for the registration of 
the moors on the Wemmergill estate; including Lunedale and Holwick Moors, Hoi-
wick Fell, Hunderthwaite Moor, Crossthwaite Moor and Mickleton Moor, but the 
applications were rejected. 
The conflict and controversy which has characterised the registration process is 
partly due to the inappropriateness of the legislation. The diversity and com-
plexity of the ways in which common lands can be owned and controlled was not 
appl'eciated at the time. Common land, perhaps more than any other form of 
land· tenure, shows the significance of historical inertia. Many of the disputed 
claims could only be resolved by reference to the enclosure awards, or even earlier 
agreements. 
6.3.2 Grouse Shooting and Sheep Grazing 
This section will look at changes in the management of common lands, and how the 
recent revival of interest in sporting rights has altered traditional land management 
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practices and generated new conflicts. The dual use of the commons, for rough 
grazing and grouse breeding, has been successful because of the complementarity 
of the two activities. The sheep maintain the heather at different stages of growth 
for the grouse to feed on, and many of the land improvements such as griping [14] 
and draining necessary for the grouse also benefit the sheep (Denman, Roberts & 
Smith, 1967, 36). The balance between the two activities is very delicate. Over-
grazing may destroy the heather, whilst under-grazing may allow bracken and other 
weeds to spread. No-one knows, however, what the optimum balance should be. 
Changes have taken place in the management of the grazing of the commons. Stint 
levels for most commons were worked out under the enclosure awards of the 18th 
and 19th centuries, but over the 20th century most of these traditional management 
systems have broken down. There has been a trend towards greater exclusivity 
in common grazing. As farm holdings have amalgamated and the total number 
of holdings has decreased, so stints have become concentrated in fewer and fewer 
hands. Although several commons have many registered interests, the number of 
registered stintholders is misleading. In practice, the bulk of the stints are owned 
and used by a few farmers. On Bowes Moor, for instance, the majority of the stints 
are occupied by five farmers. 
There has also been a trend towards higher stocking levels on the moors. Agricul-
tural policy is partly blamed for this, since headage payments encourage farmers 
to maximise the size of their flock. Overstocking is also linked to the concen-
tration of stint ownership. In the past, when commons were stinted, regulations 
for the management of the stinting were drawn up and enforced by a stintholders 
committee (a similar practice was observed on the landed estates in the 19th cen-
tury). Most committees appointed a shepherd as an independent body to manage 
the sheep. Nowadays, many stinting committees have lapsed or lost their original 
self-regulatory function. Expense and easier access (many farmers now own small 
tractors which provide speedy access over rough terrain) mean that shepherds are 
no longer employed. 
Both Bowes Moor and Burnhope Moor have stinting committees, but these have 
lost their regulatory function. On Bowes Moor the five farmers who own the 
stints also act as the field reeves for the regulation of the grazing. They therefore 
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regulate themselves, which means that there is no higher body to ensure that the 
moor is not over-grazed. Burnhope Moor is grazed by six farmers who also have 
a stintholders committee which meets once a year. The committee funds the cost 
of repairing fences and cutting drains by levying fines on overstints (one overstint 
is allowed for every ten stints). There was no active organisation to manage the 
grazing on Bollihope Common when the present owner purchased the estate in 
1984, but since then the owner has set up a commons grazing committee. 
The commons are now subject to the same conflicts between shooting and farming 
interests as the moors on the landed estates. Like the landed estates, the owners 
of the shooting rights wish to cut down on sheep numbers to preserve the heather, 
but unlike the owners of the private moors, shooting interests on the commons lack 
the overall control to achieve this goal directly and have had to seek alternative 
methods of reducing the number of stints. The solution adopted has been to take 
stints in hand, by buying up neighbouring farms with stints as they come on the 
market and then selling them with reduced stint levels. As well as the 361 stints 
awarded to the Lords in Trust of Bowes Moor by the Enclosure A ward, they had 
acquired by 1988 a further 174.5 stints. Of these, 144.5 are kept in hand and the 
rest are let to farmers. The ones in hand are not used to ease the pressure on 
grazing. In the spring of 1989, the Lords in Trust acquired a further 400 stints 
which will considerably reduce the grazing on the moor. The Bollihope estate has 
also pursued a policy to buy up stints in order to increase its control over the 
grazing. 
The value and popularity of grouse shooting today is such that the owners of 
shooting rights are prepared to invest capital in land improvements. The Belli-
hope estate has initiated a research programme into the improvement of heather 
moorland. A ten year project with Liverpool University has been set up, to ex-
periment with the impact of different land management practices, such as liming, 
spraying bracken and making water courses, on grouse numbers. Winter foddering 
of sheep causes localised trampling of the ground and kills off the heather. In 
order to prevent this damage, the estate has got the permission of the farmers to 
carry out land improvements (although the estate finances the improvements, it 
has allowed the farmers to claim MAFF land improvement grants in order to win 
their co-operation). 
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Although the stintholders have little power to prevent the buying up of stints, they 
can obstruct the activities of the sporting interests. For instance, the Bollihope 
estate wished to put up some temporary fencing on the common as part of the 
heather management project. They needed the assent of all the commoners, but 
because of an objection from one commoner could not proceed. On Burnhope Moor 
several actions by the shooting syndicate have been stopped by the stintholders 
since commons registration. 
The Bollihope estate is an example of a new trend in landownership in the North 
Pennines generated by the growing reputation of the grouse moors. It has been 
purchased primarily as a sporting estate and has caused something of a local 
sensation because ·of the nationality of the buyer [15]. The management policy 
of the Bollihope estate can only be understood with reference to the vast capital 
resources which the landowner commands. Local landowners complain that the 
estate has upset local wage levels by paying its employees above the going rate, but 
the Bollihope agent defends the estate's management policy. The present owner 
has the capital resources to carry out real improvements to the moor which will, he 
says, benefit local farmers and create local employment from grouse shooting. He 
also claims that although initial capital output is high, it is profitable in the long-
term to improve the moor. For instance, £1/2 million expenditure will generate a 
return of £1 to £11/2 million in ten years. Perhaps because of the initial adverse 
reaction, the estate is anxious to be seen to contribute positively to the local 
community. 
6.3.3 The Common Land Forum and the Future 
Another recent event which may change the balance of control over the commons 
in the future is the Common Land Forum ( CLF). The CLF has decided to press for 
legislation to, firstly, allow general public access to all common lands and, secondly, 
to ensure that management committees are set up for every common so that their 
use may be regulated not just by common right owners but by other interested 
bodies. 
The second proposal, to set up management committees, is accepted by shooting 
and grazing interests. Many of the North Pennine commons already have manage-
ment committees, so that the legislation will have the effect merely of formalising 
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what is already normal practice. It is the first proposal, to allow general public 
access on all commons, which could upset the present balance of land management. 
Shooting interests fear that general public access could destroy grouse shooting. It 
would make the task of keepering the commons far more difficult, there would be 
the danger of littering and fire, and the commons would have to be closed off for 
large parts of the year, including the grouse breeding and shooting seasons, and 
during tupping and lambing. These issues are considered in more depth in the 
next chapter ( 7.4). 
6.3.4 Summary 
This analysis of common lands is interesting, both for the light which it throws on 
the process of continuity and change in land control, and because of the implica-
tions of the commons for the economy of the North Pennines. 
Common land is an extreme example of continuity in land control. Ownership of 
common land is meaningless in terms of ability to control or change. Until the 
1965 Registration Act, the management of common land was governed more by 
practice than law, and the legal right of different interests was often undefined. 
The 1965 Act has sought to formalise the division between ownership and control, 
and has thereby increased the importance of ownership. 
Despite the unchanging external form of common land, however, the management 
and control of common lands has altered in response to changing external con-
ditions. Grazing rights have become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands and 
traditional management systems have broken down. The recent desire on the part 
of sporting interests to reduce the number of sheep grazing on the commons has 
led to a tendency for the control of sporting and grazing rights to coalesce. At 
present, the balance of control over the commons is tipped in favour of the shoot-
ing interests because of the economic value of grouse. Farmers may well fear that, 
once lost, the stints will never be regained. However, if the proposal of the CLF 
goes ahead to allow public access on the commons, the advantage may once again 
go to the grazing interests, or to new recreational interests. 
The discussion has also shown that, in contrast to commons in other parts of the 
country, the commons of the North Pennines are actively used and fulfil an impor-
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tant economic role in the local economy. There may be conflicts between sporting 
and grazing interests, but neither side wishes to see common lands reformed. This 
raises the question whether national policy can be uniformly applied to commons in 
all parts of the country as is at present proposed, a question that will be addressed 
in the following chapter. 
6.4 Public Landownership 
Four public agencies own land in the North Pennines today: the Forestry Commis-
sion, the Northumbrian Water Authority (NWA), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), 
and the Nature Conservancy Council (NCC)[16]. In comparison to other upland 
regions of Britain, the area within public landownership is small, lands under 
Forestry Commission and NWA control form only 2.3% of the total land area (see 
Table 6.1). Nevertheless, the growth of public landownership has been an impor-
tant change in the landholding structure, and an understanding of the decision-
making frameworks which influence estate management by these landowners is 
significant for an understanding of contemporary land use and rural development 
in the region. It is also important to ask why public landownership in the North 
Pennines is not more extensive. 
The decision-making framework for public landowners differs in certain general 
respects from private landownership (see 2.4.3). Public landowners own land for 
a specific function (although this main use may be compatible with other land 
uses). Decisions are made according to national rather than local considerations. 
Their actions are governed by statute, and of all landownership forms are most 
directly accountable to the State. With a constantly changing national political 
climate, the management requirements of public landowners have altered over the 
yea.rS. Two changes have occurred in the recent past. Over the past ten years, 
all public agencies have come under pressure from central government to become 
more commercially viable and generate revenue. Over the last 20 years, public 
landowners have been pressurised to take environmental and social factors into 
account in their management policies, due to demands from the conservation lobby 
to take more account of the environment, and from the rural development lobby 
to place more importance on their social responsibilities to rural areas. All these 
external pressures have resulted in changes in the management strategies of public 
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landowners. The following information comes from interviews with representatives 
of the Forestry Commission, NWA, MoD and NCC (see Appendix I). 
6.5 The Forestry Commission 
The Forestry Commission is the largest public landowner in the region. The North 
Pennines is divided between four Forestry Commission districts: Durham, Kielder, 
Border and South Lakes, all within the North England Conservancy (see Figure 
3.4). In 1986, the Forestry Commission managed 77,440 hectares efland (see Table 
6.6) in the four districts, although much of this is outside the North Pennines itself. 
The most extensive forestry plantation in the North Pennines is Hamsterley Forest 
in the Durham Dales. The Forestry Commission's other holdings consist for the 
most part of scattered parcels of woodland (such as the plantations at Blanchland). 
Table 6.6- Forestry Commission Holdings in the Northern Region, 
1986 
District Total Area (ha) Planted Area (ha) 
Border 12,982 11,436 
Durham 5,788 5,396 
Kielder 50,671 40,180 
South Lakes 7,999 6,983 
Source: Forestry Commission (1985/86) 
Each district has its own director and staff. The Forestry Commission plays the 
market like any private company. Timber can be sold at different stages of growth, 
on the open market, or by contract with a processing company. The Forestry 
Commission does not process the timber itself, and until recently cut timber was 
being exported to Scandinavia to be processed [17]. With its dominant position in 
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the market, the Forestry Commission has an advantage over smaller private timber 
growers in the market place because it can guarantee a supply. 
The changing requirements and pressures on the Forestry Commission are reflected 
in the management of the Forestry Commission's estates in the North Pennines. 
Hamsterley Forest, the largest plantation in the region, was bought by the Forestry 
Commission in 1927 from the Surtees family (Walker, 1987). The 2,083 hectare 
estate originally consisted of three farms, a shooting lodge and a grouse moor. The 
initial planting phase reflected the Forestry Commission's original remit to expand 
Britain's timber as quickly and as cheaply as possible. At Hamsterley, initial 
planting took place between 1927 and 1951. Today, those trees have matured and 
86% of Hamsterley Forest is coniferous woodland (see Table 6. 7). Hamsterley is 
an example of the early mistakes of the Forestry Commission which have aroused 
opposition from conservationists (see 3.4.3). 
Table 6.7- Hamsterley Forest: Land Use 1986 
Land use 1987 (%) Forecast (%) 
Coniferous woodland 86 82.5 
Broadleaved woodland 4 8 
Pastures & meadows 4.5 4.5 
Conservation area 0.5 2 
Recreational grassland 1 1 
Forest rides & roads 4 2 
Source: Walker {1987) 
The Durham District's policy today reflects the Forestry Commission's concern to 
improve its image with the general public, and shows a greater responsibility for 
the environment and the needs of the community. Now up to 5% of the Forestry 
Commission's revenue is set aside for landscaping purposes and the Forestry Com-
mission employs a professional landscape architect. Five per cent of the saplings 
now planted are broad- leaved deciduous trees. These are planted for maximum 
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effect along footpaths and rivers. It is a slow process of change, but eventually it 
is hoped to reduce the percentage of coniferous woodland to 82.5% and double the 
percentage of deciduous woodland to 8% (see Table 6. 7). 
The Forestry Commission now has a big commitment to tourism, which both earns 
revenue and improves the commission's image with the general public. Hamsterley 
Forest is the most visited spot in County Durham, with 150,000 visitors a year. 
Most are day-trippers, and many come for specialist sports such as cycling, car 
rallies, cross-country skiing, horse riding and wildlife. The Forestry Commission 
is considering building log cabins to attract overnight visitors, but recognises that 
it must first do some market research into what the public wants. 
Part of the opposition to the Forestry Commission's forests has come from other 
public agencies such as the Countryside Commission. Another way in which the 
Forestry Commission aims to improve its image, is to encourage formal inter-
organisational co-operation. The Durham District director chairs an environmental 
panel of non-foresters as a platform for discussion. The panel includes representa-
tives from many other agencies and lobby groups, such as the Nature Conservancy 
Council, the RSPB, Durham County Council, the Countryside Commission and 
the Sports Council. The director admits that public opinion has had a big influence 
on policy. 
Why has the Forestry Commission not acquired more land in the North Pennines? 
One of the arguments the commission has used to promote the expansion of forestry 
is its job-creating role. The Durham District employs thirty full-time workmen and 
frequently employs up to ninety private contractors. The Forestry Commission 
claims {DCC, 1984, 23) that afforestation is the cheapest and most effective way 
to crea~~ jobs in the region. Durham County Council, however, is less optimistic, 
estimating that only one job is created for every 100 hectares planted (DCC, 1986, 
22). The Countryside Commission is even more pessimistic. It calculates that 
it costs £29,000 to create even one job in forestry, and is, therefore, the most 
expensive method of job creation (DCC, 1984, 18). 
There has undoubtedly been opposition to further afforestation by the environ-
mental lobby, but the chief clue as to why expansion has not taken place lies in 
the previous two sections. The common lands and landed estates in the region act 
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as an effective barrier to any change in land use. A further problem is that the 
lands which are most freely available, the open fells, are not suitable for plant-
ing. The most suitable lands for planting, the valley sides, are also required for 
farming. Durham County Council {1986, 21) have estimated that 3,500 hectares is 
the maximum area which could be planted in the Durham Dales, and this would 
involve the co-operation of private landowners. 
Now any expansion in the Forestry Commission's holdings is unlikely. The present 
government wishes to see an expansion of the private rather than the public sector 
in forestry. The Forestry Commission must now rationalise its estate, and is selling 
off many of the smaller holdings such as the plantations at Blanchland. These 
were, originally, acquired with the intention of expanding them as land came on 
the market, but this has not happened. 
In the future, the Forestry Commission looks likely to reduce its landholdings and 
promote tourism and conservation on its remaining estates. 
6.5.1 The Northumbrian Water Authority 
The NWA owns several reservoirs in the North Pennines: Burnhope, Waskerly and 
Tunstall reservoirs in Weardale, and Grassholme, Selset, Hury, Blackton and Cow 
Green in Teesdale, but the main reservoir in the N orthumbrian region, Kielder, lies 
just outside the study area [18). The Northumbrian Water Authority was set up 
under the 1973 Water Act and has recently been privatised under the 1989 Water 
Act [19). The ownership and management structures are, therefore, in a state of 
change. 
Unlike other upland water authorities such as North West and Yorkshire, NWA 
owns very little non-operational land around the reservoirs. Its function as a 
landowner is limited. What land is owned is let out to farmers on short-term 
grazing licences. The relatively small and scattered nature of NWA's total estate 
(there are some 900 separate properties covering 5,833 hectares), places a major 
constraint on land management options. However, the water authorities have 
also been influenced by the political climate and public opinion. Like the Forestry 
Commission, NWA's remit now includes a greater commitment to increase revenue 
and to improve its image with the general public. 
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Since NWA was established in 1974, its policy has been to allow public access to 
and use of its reservoirs. NWA owns the fishing rights to most of its reservoirs 
(Cow Green is an exception), and stocks many of them (but not Balderhead or 
Selset ). The revenue from fishing comes to about £180,000 per annum. Recre-
ational use of the reservoirs is greatest at Kielder because of its size. NWA has 
built a club house there which is let to a sailing club, and there is also a sailing 
club at Selset. However, the sailing clubs struggle to attract members as demand 
is lacking. During the dry summer of 1989, the water level at Kielder fell below the 
level of the slipways, and at Selset the surface area of the reservoir was so reduced 
that it was not feasible to sail. 
Public opposition to the creation of reservoirs has been strong. Kielder Reservoir 
has been the only new reservoir to be created by NWA, but its size ensured that 
it was a controversial issue. The whole process took eight years, during which 
time two public enquiries were held. NWA was probably helped by the fact that 
the landscape had already been altered dramatically by Kielder Forest, and the 
Forestry Commission was the main landowner. This simplified negotiations. The 
creation of Cow Green reservoir in Upper Teesdale by the then Water Resources 
Board in 1967 was also a controversial issue [20). Part of the site chosen was an 
SSSI, and part was common land. The Water Resources Board had to obtain a 
private bill to authorise the reservoir, since the provisions of the Water Resources 
Act, 1963 were insufficient to cover these circumstances. 
NWA takes conservation issues into account in its management policy, but does not 
let them interfere with its primary purpose of water provision. In 1988, the Nature 
Conservancy Council carried out a survey of all NWA's properties to identify areas 
of special ecological interest and "whilst its only advice, we do listen to a lot of 
what they have to say" (Respondent J). NWA tried planting trees at Selset for 
landscaping purposes, but the project was unsuccessful due to the unsuitability of 
the ground. 
Now the Northumbrian Region has a water surplus, and no new reservoirs are 
planned in the foreseeable future. The land agent for NWA would like to diversify 
and expand NWA's estate, but this is unlikely, and any expansion will be located 
on the lowlands rather than in the North Pennines. The privatised company will 
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be under greater pressure to generate revenue, and may look to diversify its in-
vestments (the waste disposal business is one possibility). The privatised company 
may also give conservation a lower priority, especially in the next five years or so 
when the company will have to invest in the upgrading of its water supply and 
sewage equipment. 
NWA has had an impact on landowners in the North Pennines in terms of the 
reduction of in-bye land, but otherwise its impact is minimal. It is likely that, 
once again, the landed estates and common lands have acted as a barrier to the 
expansion of the water authority's non-operational landholdings. 
6.5.2 The Ministry of Defence 
The Ministry of Defence manages three training sites in the North Pennines (a 
fourth at Stainmore has recently been acquired after a public enquiry) [21]. These 
sites are part owned and part leased. Warcop is the largest holding. Here, nearly 
6,250 hectares are owned and a further 3, 750 are leased. At Battle Hill army 
rifle range, 45.8 hectares are owned and 175 leased. The MoD also owns 83.3 
hectares on Bowes Moor. In addition, the MoD has training rights over a far wider 
area, including Hamsterley Forest [22]. The MoD's function is to provide military 
training, and the MoD must show that there is a genuine operational need for all 
its property. It cannot hold land in reserve. 
The North Pennine estates are managed from Catterick Camp in North Yorkshire 
by the MoD's estates department (like the Forestry Commission and NWA, the 
main estate of the MoD is outside the North Pennines) [23]. Military use of land 
falls into two categories. On live training areas, live ammunition is used, whilst 
on dry training areas less dangerous ammunition is used such as flares, small 
pyrotechnics and trip wires. Although undoubtedly the MoD enjoys the greatest 
State protection of all public landowners, it too has had to change its management 
policy in response to government and public pressures. 
The MoD now looks to increase revenue from its estates, and "will take any com-
mercial opportunities available" (Respondent K), although military training must 
always come first. On most of the sites, military use is compatible with agricultural 
grazing. Land is let on normal agricultural tenancies, although training rights are 
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always reserved in the agreement. On the Catterick estate, the MoD manages a 
750 hectare plantation. This serves both economic and military purposes. The 
timber is used for estate repairs and can be sold on the open market, and the 
woods are used for military training exercises. Landscaping often enhances an 
estate's training potential. 
The MoD's policy towards conservation and public access was altered dramatically 
by the Nugent Report [24): 
"Pre Nugent the bye-laws used to be 'you cannot do anything, but very gener-
ously we'll allow you to walk along that path'. After Nugent it became much 
more general saying 'look, you've got access to the area but you can't actually 
damage things or go into danger zones"' (Respondent K). 
The agent emphasises that the MoD cannot guarantee public safety, and he cannot 
understand the attitude of the public who will stray off paths in danger zones, and 
who object to any re-routing of a path, even if it improves the public's safety. 
Pressures for public access in the North Pennines, however, are far less intense 
than in the more populated south of the country. The MoD's sporting facilities are 
rented out to local groups, which both earns revenue and improves local relations. 
The agent also claims that the MoD has a good record on conservation. Since the 
Nugent Report, the MoD has employed a conservation officer to co-ordinate MoD 
conservation policy throughout the country. Most districts have a conservation 
panel which is staffed by military personel, but which co-opts representatives of 
conservation groups onto it. This at least ensures that the MoD makes informed 
decisions. The agent points out that the extensive nature of the land uses on the 
MoD estates must benefit conservation inierests, and keeps down destruction by 
vandalism. Part of the newly acquired Stainmore site is a rare example of a sugar 
limestone pavement and has been designated an SSSI. The MoD will maintain and 
preserve it accordingly. 
Whilst the MoD has no statutory duty to promote local employment, it can have 
a tremendous impact on the local community. In the northern region this influ-
ence is concentrated at Catterick. Employment benefits to the North Pennine 
communities, however, are limited. 
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The landownership structure of the North Pennines has not been such an obstacle 
to the expansion of the MoD's landholdings as it has been to the former two 
public landowners. This can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, the MoD is 
able to manage much of its land on leases. Secondly, many of the MoD's land use 
requirements are compatible with the existing land uses on the open fells. Military 
land use is preferable from the point of view of landowners to public access. 
Any reduction in the MoD's landholdings in the foreseeable future is unlikely. If 
anything, the MoD will need to expand its estate. As weapons get larger so more 
space is needed to test them, but the size of the MoD's landholdings will always 
be a political issue. Military use on the whole has no long lasting effects on the 
land, and military lands could easily revert to their former uses. However, in some 
cases effects are long-term. For instance, the Bowes Moor site was used for storing 
toxic materials in the Second World War and is still contaminated by mustard gas 
(Respondent I). 
6.5.3 The Nature Conservancy Council 
The final public landowning agency that will be considered in this chapter is the 
NCC. Like the MoD, the NCC both owns and leases land. The statutory function 
of the N CC is to designate, monitor and manage areas of special ecological interest. 
It is strictly a conservation body and has no socio-economic commitments. 
The NCC owns two main sites in the North Pennines: Moor House (3,894 hectares) 
on Stainmore Common which is owned outright, and Upper Teesdale (3,497 hectares) 
which is leased from the Raby and Wemmergill estates. Besides these two proper-
ties, the NCC manages several small SSSis (which may be only one or two hectares 
in size 1-The most recent SSSI to be designated in the region is on Bowes Moor, 
the first site to be designated on ornithological grounds (Respondent I). 
The acquisition and expansion of the NCC's interests in the North Pennines has not 
been unduly obstructed by the existing landownership structure. Like the MoD, 
the NCC manages much of its lands on leases. Furthermore, the management poli-
cies of the NCC are largely compatible with existing land uses. A large part of the 
Upper Teesdale SSSI is grouse moor, and the management of the grouse shooting 
coincides exactly with the wishes of the NCC. Heather burning maintains heather 
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at different stages of growth for both grouse and wild birds, such as the golden 
plover, merlin and birds of prey, to feed on. The requirements which the NCC 
places on farmers within the SSSI are also fairly similar to existing practices. The 
harshness of the environment in the upper dale has constrained the modernisation 
of farming. As was observed in section 6.2.2, farmers are, on the whole, happy to 
receive a regular guaranteed income. 
So closely do the management objectives of the NCC and landowners coincide, 
that the NCC is even prepared to help grouse shooting interests to reduce sheep 
numbers on the stinted moors. For example, the NCC has given the owners of the 
sporting rights of Bowes Moor a grant to enable them to buy up stints (Respondent 
I). 
6.5.4 Summary 
It can be concluded from this examination of public landownership in the North 
Pennines, that private landownership to a large extent has determined the location 
and extent of public landholdings in the region. This finding corroborates Mac-
Gregor's (1975) criticism that public landowners are unwilling to exercise their 
powers of compulsory purchase against private interests (see 3.4.5). The expla-
nation is not as clear cut as this, however. For instance, the expansion of the 
Forestry Commission's holdings has also been constrained by opposition from the 
conservation lobby. The question of public ownership cannot be separated from 
the rural development debate. 
The public landowners which have caused least conflict in the North Pennines have 
been those whose management policies most closely correspond to those of private 
land9wners. The MoD and NCC have both been accepted by the landed estates 
because they do not necessarily need to own their land outright, their land use 
requirements do not conflict unduly with those of private landowners, and they 
are all united in their opposition to public access. Although the landholdings 
of these public agencies are not extensive, public landownership has influenced 
private landownership in other· ways. The Forestry Commission, for instance, has 
promoted private forestry planting. 
Of all the public landowners, the Forestry Commission is the only agency which can 
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claim positively to contribute to the rural development of the region. It has created 
jobs, and is the only landowner actively to promote tourism. Public opinion has 
had a big influence on the management policy of this agency. In the near future 
at least, an expansion in public landownership does not seem likely in the present 
political climate. 
6.6 Contemporary Landownership & Rural Development 
The discussion in this chapter has focussed on continuity and change, both internal 
and external, in the landownership structure and land management practices of 
the North Pennines. In this final summary, a separate but related question will be 
asked: what are the implications of these estate management policies for the rural 
development of the region? 
In Chapter Three (see 3.2.5), MacGregor's {1988) study of landownership in the 
Scottish Highlands was discussed. This study concluded that the landownership 
structure was a fundamental barrier to the economic development of the region. 
The land was under-used. Could this criticism also be applied to the landowners 
of the North Pennines? To answer this question requires a value judgement, and 
must be to some extent subjective. 
Employment is one measure with which to assess the present effectiveness of land 
use against its potential. All the landed estates would appear to be committed to 
traditional forms of employment. Agriculture is the main source of employment on 
all the landed estates, and it would seem that the estates offer certain advantages 
over owner-occupation. It is possible that tenant farmers enjoy greater financial 
security than owner-occupiers. By maintaining a variety of farm sizes, the estates 
provide an opportunity for young farmers to enter the farming industry. Tenant 
farmers have less security of tenure than owner-occupiers, but the estates are pa-
ternal towards their tenants, and family continuity on the farm holdings is the 
norm. 
Although mining and quarrying provide employment, labour force requirements in 
these two industries are sporadic and offer no long-term security. No estate has 
turned to forestry on a major scale, although the Allendale estate would most like 
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to expand this resource. The estates certainly have a far higher potential to ex-
pand forestry than owner-occupiers. An expansion of forestry would increase local 
employment, but would reduce the farming population. The estates claim that 
grouse shooting benefits the local economy by providing seasonal employment and 
generating increased visitor spending. The benefits to the community, however, 
are minimal compared to the benefits to the landowners. The growth in grouse 
shooting has negative implications for the farming community. On both the private 
moorlands and the commons, sheep numbers have been reduced. 
As to residential property, perhaps the estates charge rents below the market rate, 
but they are passive landlords. None of the estates has sought to promote social 
or economic development in its settlements. 
The main contribution of the landed estates to local employment in the North 
Pennines would appear to be farming. The main barrier to employment creation 
which the landed estates pose is in their opposition to tourism. Tourism would 
create jobs and generate revenue in the local communities more directly than grouse 
shooting does. The only landowner in the region which positively wishes to develop 
tourism is the Forestry Commission. The potential demand for tourism in the 
region is indicated by the fact that Hamsterly Forest is the most visited spot in 
County Durham. 
Thus, in terms of local economic development, landowners in the North Pennines 
could be accused of under-use of their lands. The fault, however, does not lie 
entirely with the landowners. Today, many issues concerning land use and rural 
development in the region are made by external public agencies. Certain public 
intervention measures have not been in the best interests of rural employment. For 
instance, the expansion of the Forestry Commission's estate has been constrained 
by the -opposition of conservation interests. The same is true of forestry, mining 
and quarrying on the landed estates. 
The next chapter will consider the relative impact of landowners and public policy-
makers on the rural development of the North Pennines, with an examination of 
the most significant public intervention measures in the region. 
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Notes 
1. In 1906 the Beaumonts were created Lords Allendale. 
2. Today, the Wemmergill estate has been reduced to the Lunedale and Holwick 
sectors. The Cotherstone, Mickleton and Hunderthwaite properties were sold in 
the 1950s. Recently, Step Ends Farm (Holwick) and Cronkley Farm (Lunedale) 
were also sold. 
3. The main change effected by the 1974 schedule was to set up an extraordinary 
repair fund, into which a yearly sum of money is transferred: 
''for the purpose of providing for the extraordinary repair, improvement or re-
building of the property belonging to the charity". 
4. Between 1973 and 1979, the EEC ran a Dairy Herd Conversion Scheme which 
offered farmers a financial incentive (golden handshake) to give up their dairy 
business. 
5. There are 7 grounds on which a tenant can be evicted (Northfield, 1979, 105): 
• Where a landlord has obtained the Agricultural Land Tribunal's (ALT) consent, 
prior to serving the notice to quit. 
• Where the land is required for non-agricultural use, for which planning permis-
sion has been granted. 
• Where the landlord has obtained a certificate of bad husbandry by the tenant 
from the ALT. 
• Where the tenant has failed to comply with a previous demand from the land-
lord to pay rent that is due from him, or has failed within a specified time to 
comply with a written demand to remedy a breach of his tenancy agreement. 
• Where the landlord's interest in the holding is materially prejudiced by a non-
remediable breach of the tenancy agreement by the tenant. 
• Where the tenant has become bankrupt. 
• Where the notice to quit is given on the death of the tenant (although this 
does not apply under the terms of the 1976 Act). 
6. The tenant of Allenshields jokingly suggested that it would be more profitable 
to drive sheep across the butts than to raise them for meat. 
7. Subleasing is prohibited so that the owners can retain some control over the 
activities of the lessees; the owners are ultimately responsible for their actions. 
There is no standard lease, the terms of each lease depend upon the particular 
circumstances. The normal period of a mining lease is 21 years, but the Church 
Commissioners grant leases for 42 years (Respondents G). 
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8. This is now an established tradition. It was noted in Chapter Five that Samuel 
Rowlandson, the agent for Lord Crewe's Charity, also managed the Cathedral 
estates. 
9. Table 6.5 shows ownership, whilst Table 6.4 shows stinting levels only. The 
data on Durham commons was compiled from the Commons Registers by the 
author. The data on the Northumberland and Cumbria commons is taken from 
Whitby (1986). 
10. The Church Commissioners claimed manorial rights over all the Stanhope com-
mons, although in practice these residual powers are of negligable significance. 
11. The historical information on Bowes Moor was given by Respondent I. 
12. The position of Public Trustee was created by the 1965 Registration Act. All 
unclaimed commons and stinted pastures (such as Bowes Moor and Burnhope) 
are vested in the Public Trustee. 
13. Commons Commission (1988) In the matter of (1) Burnhope Moor and (2) 
Moss Moor. Stanhope, Wear Valley District, Durham. 
14. Griping is a northern term for cutting ditches. 
15. The new owner of Bollihope Common comes from the royal family of Dubai. 
The purchase of the estate was publicised in the local press under headlines 
such as 'Shooting Sheik buys £1 million moor' (The Journal, 1985, n.d.). 
16. From 1972 until October 1988, all Crown properties were managed by a govern-
ment land management body called the Property Services Agency, responsible 
to the DoE. Now control of the MoD lands has been given back to the MoD. 
17. In the early 1980s there was no home market for pulp wood and much was 
exported to Scandinavia for processing, but recently several processing plants 
have been opened in Britain. 
18. Kielder Reservoir is both the largest and the most ambitious of NWA's projects. 
It is a multipurpose scheme. Water storage is combined with forestry, recre-
atiop and electricity generation (the CEGB operates an electricity generator 
f_!om water passing through the dam). 
19. See the 1989 Water Act for details of privatisation. 
20. Cow Green was chosen from one of three sites on the grounds of cost-effectiveness 
(Water Resources Board, 3rd Annual Report, 1966). 
21. A public enquiry was called for over the Secretary of State's decision to al-
low the MoD site on Stainmore Common. Opposers to the scheme included 
residents of Stainmore, Eden District Council, Stainmore Parish Council and 
Cumbria and Durham County Councils (Independent, 8/6/89). 
22. The MoD owns training rights over all Crown lands. 
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23. The Catterick Camp estate is 9,583.3 hectares. The agent likened the effects 
on local employment of closing down Catterick Camp to the impact of the 
steelworks closure at Consett. 
24. Nugent, Lord, Chairman. (1971/73) Report of the Defence Lands Committee. 
Cmnd 5714. London, HMSO. 
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Chapter VII 
Private Landownership and Public Intervention 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter moves on from the analysis of land management under different 
landownership forms, to consider the interaction of private interests and public 
policy-makers in recent debates concerning land use and socio-economic devel-
opment in the North Pennines. In common with other upland areas of Britain, 
responsibility for solving the rural development problems of the North Pennines 
has been shouldered by public agencies. Public agencies now play a major role 
in decisions concerning land use and rural society in the region. There is now a 
national interest in the development of the region. 
The question of public intervention in the rural development process has already 
been considered (see 3.4). It has been established that the term 'public interven-
tion' covers a variety of policies, differing in their orientation, aims, scale, and 
methods of implementation (see Table 3.5). It was also established that there is 
no consensus as to what the 'public interest' is, or as to what path rural devel-
opment should take. Many different policy approaches have been attempted since 
the Second World War. After more than forty years of planning, public agencies 
have yet to achieve any lasting improvements in rural areas. Old problems still 
remain and new problems have emerged. The failure of public intervention can 
be explained at different levels. The sectoral approach of British planning and or-
ganisational self-interest have been blamed for producing unco-ordinated and even 
contradictory policies. A more radical interpretation places the blame on a public 
misinterpretation of, and failure to tackle, the root problems of rural areas. Private 
interests, including those of landowners, still exert a large degree of influence over 
the formulation of policy and its implementation. It is important, therefore, to be 
aware of the class structure of rural societies, and to understand the nature of the 
relations between the local elite and national policy- makers. 
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Without doubt, the North Pennines faces serious socio-economic problems. The 
economy has continued to decline, as have population levels in the majority of 
parishes, with the exception of certain parishes on the fringe of the region (see 
Figure 7.1). With only 21,000 inhabitants in 1981, the North Pennines is the most 
sparsely populated area of England (Whitby, 1986). The population is also ageing, 
which creates new demands for public services. In 1981, 35% of the population 
was aged over 50 years (DCC, 1985, 3). Employment in the traditional industries 
of mining and agriculture has contracted. Agricultural employment has decreased 
by 24% since 1971 (DCC, 1986, 7), whilst employment in manufacturing has de-
clined from 16% in 1971 to 3% in 1985 (see Table 7.1). Today, the majority of 
employment opportunities are in the service sector, including jobs in the tourist 
industry. The male unemployment rate stood at about 12.7% in 1981 (DCC, 1985, 
4). The economic problems of the North Pennines have been compounded by the 
economic decline of the traditional industries of County Durham: coal, steel and 
ship-building. Unemployment in County Durham as a whole was 19% in 1985 
(DCC, 1985, 5). 
Table 7.1 - % Employment in the Durham Dales, 1985 
EMPLOYMENT %TOTAL 
Agriculture 35 
Services 45 
Mining & Quarrying 14 
Manufacturing 3 
Source: from DCC (1986) 
The analysis concentrates on the period from the late 1960s to the present day. 
Before this period, rural development policies were formulated within the national 
sectoral planning framework established after the Second World War (see 3.4). Ru-
ral settlement planning was carried out by the five respective county councils, with 
no overall co-ordination of policy. Indeed, the North Pennines was not perceived 
as a planning region by policy-makers until the late 1960s. 
Agricultural policy has had an influence on the structure of farming in the North 
Pennines. The agricultural economy of the North Pennines is still predominantly 
pastoral. 97% of the agricultural area is under some form of grass (rough or 
improved pasture), but there has been a change in the farm business structure. 
Livestock rearing is now the main activity, and both sheep and cattle numbers have 
increased since the 1960s. At the same time dairying has declined (see Table 7.2). 
The number of farm businesses has declined by 31% since 1967, whilst the average 
farm holding size has increased by 42% (see Table 7.3), but still the majority of 
farms are classed as part-time holdings under MAFF specifications, although the 
number is dropping. 
The role of public landownership in the region has already been discussed in Chap-
ter Six (see 6.4). Public landholdings in the North Pennines are limited in extent 
and have had a limited impact on local employment opportunities. Until the 1960s, 
no serious moves were made to protect the environment of the region. The North 
Pennines, albeit a reduced area of 653 square miles, was considered for National 
Park designation by the Dower Committee (HMSO, 1945), but was later rejected 
[1]. Two National Nature Reserves were designated by the then Nature Conser-
vancy in 1963: Moor House on Stainmore Common and Upper Teesdale, as well 
as several smaller SSSis {see 6.4.4) . 
In the late 1960s, the first policy specifically relating to the North Pennines was 
launched with the North Pennines Rural Development Board (NPRDB), since 
when the-region has increasingly been treated by policy-makers as an administra-
tive unit which faces common problems needing common solutions. The analysis 
will consider in detail three policies which have had a direct impact on landowners, 
and which have caused local controversy: the NPRDB, the Area of Outstanding 
Natural Beauty {AONB) and the Common Land Forum (CLF). In addition, the 
policies of the local authorities and the Development Commission towards rural 
development in the region will be more briefly examined. Finally, three smaller de-
velopment projects will be discussed which have achieved a high degree of success: 
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Table 7.2 - Farm Businesses in the AONB, 1971 to 1983 
FARM TYPE 1971 1978 1983 %CHANGE 
Specialist/Mainly Dairy 319 195 160 -50 
Mostly Cattle 59 49 39 -34 
Mostly Sheep 94 65 78 -17 
Cattle & Sheep 342 383 392 +15 
Part Time 553 547 515 -7 
Others 71 31 27 -72 
TOTAL 1438 1270 1211 -16 
Source: Whitby (1986, 75) 
Table 7.3 -Farm Size in the AONB, 1971 to 1983 
FARM SIZE (ha) 1967 1974 1983 %CHANGE 
0- 19 726 443 364 -50 
20-39 511 404 306 -40 
40- 200 477 469 481 +1 
over 200 9 11 18 +100 
TOTAL 1723 1327 1169 -31 
Source: Whitby {1986, 73) 
the East Cumbria Countryside Project (ECCP), Allenheads Village Trust and the 
Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA) scheme. 
The information presented in the following discussion has been obtained from inter-
views with key individuals from public agencies which are involved in policy-making 
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in the region, and from the analysis of reports concerning the areas's development. 
The enquiry will focus on the following issues: have local private interests affected 
the way national policies are formulated and implemented? Are national policies 
suitable for the specific conditions of the North Pennines? What factors explain 
the degree of success or failure of different policies? Is landownership an explana-
tory factor? What light does the analysis throw on the nature of rural society in 
the North Pennines? 
7.2 The North Pennines Rural Development Board 
The Rural Development Board (RDB) concept was proposed in a government white 
paper (The Development of Agriculture, 1965), and was passed into legislation in 
the Agriculture Act of 1967. The main purpose of the RDBs was to tackle the 
problems of upland agriculture in an more integrated fashion than former agricul-
tural policies had taken. It was proposed that a separate board would be set up for 
each region, in order that policies could be specifically targetted. Administered by 
MAFF, the primary aim of the RDBs was to regenerate upland farming by ratio-
nalising and enlarging the farm structure through farm amalgamation. This was 
only part, however, of a broader goal to develop farming and forestry as comple-
mentary land uses, to improve the infrastructure of rural areas, and to encourage 
tourism and other appropriate enterprises. The RDB concept, with its integrated 
and regional remit, was, therefore, a radical departure from previous government 
thinking about the uplands. 
The RDB concept was similar to the Highlands and Islands Development Board 
(HIDB) which was set up in 1965 (see 3.4.4). Although a RDB was proposed 
for Mid Wales, the NPRDB was the only board to be established under the act, 
and came into being on the 1st of August, 1969. The NPRDB covered a vast area 
( 41,667 million hectares), stretching from the Craven Gap in Yorkshire to the Scot-
tish border. It covered two national parks (Yorkshire Dales and Northumberland) 
and parts of seven counties. It was, therefore, far larger than the current admin-
istrative definition of the North Pennines. The boundaries were drawn largely on 
the basis of the upland agricultural economy. It was estimated that the area con-
tained 6,246 farms, of which approximately 37% were of insufficient size to support 
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a viable full-time farm business (NPRDB, 1970, para 28). There was considered 
to be a pressing need for structural reform to the farm sector. 
The NPRDB was run by fourteen staff, including a professional land agent and two 
sub-agents. Its headquarters were centrally located at Ormside near Appleby, and 
the estimated budget for the first year of operations was £280,000 (NPRDB, 1970, 
para 23). What were the actual implications of the NPRDB for the inhabitants 
of the North Pennines, and how was it received by the area's inhabitants? The 
NPRDB had both positive enabling powers and negative controlling powers. The 
positive powers included financial resources to improve the rural infrastructure; 
for instance, to subsidise rural bus services and improve electricity, water and gas 
supplies. The board also hoped to fund other projects of benefit to the local 
economy such as caravan and camping sites (MAFF, 1967b, A23). 
The main aim of the NPRDB was, however, to improve the region's farm structure 
by enlargement and rationalisation. In order to achieve this goal, the board was 
given the power to control all transfers of agricultural land [2]. All sales of agri-
cultural land had to be notified to the board, who could then veto the transaction 
if they felt it would lead to the creation of an unviable holding. The board had 
limited powers of compulsory purchase, but it was hoped that an improvement 
in the farm structure could be obtained by voluntary co-operation rather than 
statutory coercion (MAFF, 1967b, A2). The board could, however, purchase land 
on the open market to form a land bank. The board also had negative controls 
over forestry. All applications to plant more than four hectares of forest had to 
be first approved by the board. The NPRDB's remit did not stretch to settlement 
planning, and the local authorities retained all their normal powers. Finally, the 
NP~DB had an advisory rple. All members of the board were expected to be 
experts in land management and rural development and to have a good knowledge 
of the local area (MAFF, 1967b, A4). 
In its first year of operation the NPRDB considered 129land transfer applications, 
of which 69 resulted in farm amalgamations (an area of 1,214 hectares). Of the 
other 60 applications, 7 transfers were to forestry and the others concerned small 
amenity land parcels not of interest to the board. No application was refused 
(NPRDB, 1970, para 34). The board also issued licences to plant 1,937 hectares 
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of forest and envisaged further planting in future. Spread over such a wide area, 
the impact was, therefore, modest. Furthermore, the small size of the first year's 
budget limited the board's options to initiate infrastrutural improvements. 
There is a lack of information concerning local reaction to the NPRDB. The first 
annual report states that opposition had been encountered largely from outside 
amenity groups (NPRDB, 1970, para 25). The report emphasised that all decisions 
would be made with close consultation with other interested organisations, and 
that a balance would also be striven for: 
"between the whole potential of the land and the number of human beings who 
depend upon it for a livelihood" but that "nothing in life stands still and the 
Board's views must reflect the harsh economic circumstances of life" (NPRDB, 
1970, para 26). 
Opposition to the NPRDB must have been great, however, for the NPRDB folded 
just one year after its creation. The official reason given for the decision was 
that the NPRDB was not cost effective and was a victim of the government's 
econ~~.f drive, but it is highly likely that local opposition was a major contributory 
fact~r.'Trom the farming community, opposition focused on the board's powers of 
;. 
control over land transfers. This corroborates MacGregor's opinion (1988) that any 
measure which threatens private land rights will be blocked by private landowners 
(see 3.4.5). 
In retrospect, farm enlargement would not have been a beneficial policy for the 
area. Even the NPRDB in its annual report expressed doubts about this policy; 
there were already fears about the future prosperity of hill farming, and most 
farmers did not possess the necessary capital to finance enlargement schemes. The 
social benefits of a diverse farm structure were recognised; smallholdings provided 
an opening into the industry for young farmers, whilst older farmers often had no 
wish to manage a commercial farm unit: 
"what is needed is a variety, not only of size and of type, but also of age, skill 
and outlook in the members of a village or hamlet" (NPRDB, 1970, para 33). 
Capstick {1979), in a retrospective evalution of the NPRDB, criticises the board's 
emphasis on farm structure as a panacea for the economic problems of the North 
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Pennines. It would have been better to look at ways of developing ancillary ru-
ral enterprises and improving the basic infrastructure of the region. At the time, 
opposition to the NPRDB's policies also came from the environmental lobby. En-
vironmentalists were particularly worried about the likely increase in afforestation. 
The board's decision to allow planting in Upper Langstrothdale in North Yorkshire 
was particularly controversial (Guardian, 19/1/71). 
In the final analysis, the NPRDB seems to have aroused negative reactions from 
many different quarters. Farming and landowning interests opposed the board 
because it represented a threat to private land rights. Conservationists opposed it 
on landscape grounds, fearing an increase in afforestation. Neither of these fears 
were grounded on fact but on suspicion and fear of the future. In retrospect, the 
concept of farm enlargement as the solution to rural development problems has 
been criticised. Farm enlargement was perhaps not the most appropriate policy 
for the region. 
There are some people, on the other hand, who feel that the NPRDB did achieve 
some positive developments; it subsidised four rural bus services (which subse-
quently had to close), and the board rejected more forestry planting schemes than 
it accepted (Guardian, 19/1/71). An integrated rural development board could 
have provided a valuable framework for other integrated initiatives (Quayle, 1985). 
7.3 The Area Of Outstanding Natural Beauty 
Five years after the NPRDB folded, a proposal was made to designate the North 
Pennines as an AONB (see 3.4.3). Twelve years later, the designation was finally 
confirmed after a long and emotional battle, culminating in a public enquiry. Al-
tho~h_ i~ policy terms the AONB has had minimal impact on the region, it has 
aroused greater local opposition than possibly any other policy, and has became 
endowed with great symbolic significance. 
The proposal to designate the North Pennines as an AONB coincided with a major 
review by the Countryside Commission of the purpose of AONBs [3]. From the 
beginning, therefore, the purpose and implications of designation were issues of 
confusion, and, not surprisingly, aroused local suspicion. A preliminary map of the 
proposed North Pennines AONB was submitted to the Countryside Commission in 
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1975 and discussions were held with the local authorities concerned. The proposed 
area covered 2,304 square kilometres: from the Tyne Gap in the north to the edge 
of the Yorkshire Dales in the south, and from Hamsterley Forest in the west to the 
Vale of Eden in the east (DCC, 1977, para 2.1). 
The local authorities gave their provisional support in 1976 and formal consulta-
tions commenced in 1977, but in 1978 proceedings were halted due to the national 
reappraisal of AONB policy. Following certain suggestions that were made in the 
AONB discussion document [4], Cumbria County Council and Eden, Carlisle, Tees-
dale and Weardale district councils all withdrew their support. The Countryside 
Commission then resubmitted the designation order in 1979 {this time excluding 
North Howgill and Mallerstang), but the Secretary of State decided to delay his 
decision until the national AONB review was completed. 
The Countryside Commission published a new policy statement on AONBs in 1983, 
which clearly set out the implications and objectives of designation. The North 
Pennines designation process could then recommence. But the story was still not 
over, for although Cumbria County Council then gave its grudging approval, local 
opposition was such that a six week public enquiry was held in October 1985, the 
only case ofa public enquiry being called over an AONB designation (DoE, 1985, 
96). The enquiry finally decided in favour of the AONB (with further exclusions) 
and designation was confirmed in 1988. 
Following the 1983 policy statement, what implications did AONB status pose for 
the North Pennines? The Countryside Commission claimed that the effects of des-
ignation in terms of added controls on land use were minimal, particularly since 
1968 wlien many of the powers exercisable in AONBs were extended to the country-
side -a.t iarge. The Countryside Commission identified four benefits deriving from 
designation. First, designation would provide a label which could be marketed, if 
desired, to promote tourism. It created an identity for the area. Second, in cases 
of disputed land use, the AONB status could add weight to objections against ob-
trusive developments. Third, grants of up to 75% were available for conservation 
projects within the AONB (as opposed to 50% outside). Fourth, landowners within 
AONBs would be more likely to qualify for exemption from Capital Transfer Tax. 
[5]. 
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As with the NPRDB, the AONB would not curtail the planning powers of the local 
authorities, although they would be expected to take account of the AONB when 
considering environmentally damaging development applications. However, since 
most AONBs crossed several local authority boundaries, the Countryside Commis-
sion suggested that the authorities in question set up joint advisory committees 
(JACs), or appoint an officer to co-ordinate policies within each AONB. The com-
mission emphasised that no extra controls were to be placed on agricultural land 
use. 
AONB designation can be classed as an 'anti-growth' policy (see Table 3.5), since 
it adds extra controls against environmentally damaging developments, and it can 
help to promote tourism, although there are no specific provisions made for this 
purpose. 
How then did the AONB come to be such an emotive issue? At the public enquiry 
20 groups/individuals gave evidence in support of the AONB, and 23 spoke against 
it [6]. Those in favour fell into two groups: the county councils and 'outsider' con-
servation/ amenity groups. The opposition fell into five groups: the district and 
parish councils, public landowners, private landowners' lobby groups, mining inter-
ests and landed estates. A pronounced 'insider-outsider', private-public sector split 
was evident between the opposers and the supporters of the AONB. An analysis 
of the arguments put forward by each side at the enquiry suggests that ideology 
played a significant part in the opposition's evidence, so that it is necessary to 
distinguish the real motives underlying the ideological arguments [7] 
Arguments put forward by the pro-AONB lobby basically covered four points. 
First, the area contained st>me habitats of outstanding ecological value which 
should be preserved in the national interest. Second, the conservation of the land-
scape would attract tourism and thereby create local jobs. There was no future in 
mining or agriculture. Third, the designation would bring perceptual advantages. 
By raising the profile of the North Pennines and creating an identity for it, the 
AO NB would not only help the North Pennines but would have positive spin-offs 
for the surrounding areas. Finally, it should be designated because other areas of 
similar landscape quality had been. 
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The district and parish councils, which most closely represent the interests of 
the non-elite inhabitants of the North Pennines, argued for the opposition that 
the landscape of the North Pennines did not merit the label 'outstanding'. It 
was a working landscape created by the people of the dales. Wear Valley District 
Council felt that Weardale differed from other upland areas because of its industrial 
character: 
'It was a one-off, a very unusual area" (Wear Valley District Council, 50). 
A strong feeling of local autonomy and pride emerged, almost of stewardship: 
'It was the people of the Dales who had cared for the area and who would care 
for it in future" (Teesdale Parish Council, 51). 
The local community clearly valued their independence and resented the interfer-
ence of an outside body. A strong ideology of community was apparent within 
the rural society of the North Pennines, based on a feeling of local uniqueness, 
historical tradition and belonging. Their loyalty to an industrial way of life, and 
hostility to the idea of tourism indicates a 'traditionalist' attitude to rural devel-
opment. There was also criticism of the Countryside Commission for allowing the 
local inhabitants no say in the decision-making process. 
The three public landowners giving evidence (the Forestry Commission, the MoD 
and the NCB) argued that their activities were in the national interest, but made 
no reference to the local interest. Neither did they oppose the principle of an 
AONB. To paraphrase their opinion: 
'we don't care what you do to the area as long as you leave us alone". 
The _MoD and NCB both r~quested modifications of the AONB boundary to ex-
clude their sites [8]. The evidence given by these agencies throws no light on the 
nature of the local society, although it does reinforce the observation made ear-
lier (see 6.4) that public landowners, with the possible exception of the Forestry 
Commission, are not concerned with rural development. It also illustrates the fun-
damental conflict within the public policy community between development and 
conservation. 
Interorganisational conflict was also apparent in the evident antagonism between 
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the Forestry Commission and the Countryside Commission over the AONB. When 
the AONB boundaries were drawn Hamsterly Forest was pointedly excluded. This 
confl.ict perhaps explains why the Forestry Commission opposed the AONB. The 
AONB designation would give the Countryside Commission greater powers over 
forestry planting, since any plan to plant more than ten hectares in an AONB 
would first have to be approved by the Countryside Commission. The Forestry 
Commission in its evidence even suggested that the North Pennines should be 
regarded as a control area, with which to compare other designated uplands. 
Neither does the evidence of the landowners' lobby groups throw any light on 
the nature of local society. However, the NFU, CLA and Timber Growers UK 
showed their support for their members' interests and a fundamental antagonism 
to the Countryside Commission. The NFU attacked the Countryside Commission 
directly. They implied that the commission were a bunch of audacious amateurs to 
believe that they knew better than local professional landowners and farmers, who 
had managed their lands for generations. The Countryside Commission's evidence 
was not scientific: 
'The Commission's case, based on subjective opinion by people who were not 
experts, was totally inadequate" (NFU, 53). 
They also attacked the Countryside Commission for being 'outsiders': 
'The idea of a Commission in Cheltenham with an outpost in Newcastle telling 
the locals what to do, with the implication being that outsiders know better than 
the locals, was totally objectionable" (NFU, 57). 
The AONB was seen as a totally negative measure. The region needed positive 
suppo~ £ather than negative controls, and the lobby groups feared that the AONB 
might be a stepping stone to more stringent negative controls in the future. The 
Countryside Commission had failed to assuage people's fears. 
Four mining companies gave evidence for the opposition: Blue Circle, Weardale 
Minerals, Fordamin and the National Association of Licensed Opencast Operators. 
They argued that it was in both the national and the local interest to oppose any 
further restrictions on mining activity. The mining companies provided valuable 
resources for the nation's industrial needs, and much needed local employment. 
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Like the district and parish councils, the mining companies pointed out that the 
distinctive Pennine landscape had been created by mining activity in the past, and 
was a working landscape. The close links between farming and mining were also 
emphasised. The National Association of Licensed Opencast Operators even went 
as far as to use an ideology of stewardship, claiming to have been: 
'good housekeepers over generations" (74). 
Noticeably, the mining companies did not mention self-interest as a factor in their 
opposition to the AONB, although this was undoubtedly the principal factor. 
Last but by no means least, three landed estates gave evidence for the opposition: 
Allendale, Raby and Strathmore [9). All three used ideologies of paternalism, 
stewardship and community in their arguments; they had looked after the land for 
generations and knew what was best for the area. They claimed that all sectors of 
the community were unified in their opposition to the AONB. Raby estates claimed 
that the AONB would: 
'change everything that local customs, people and nature had achieved over so 
long a period" (Raby Estate, 77). 
The Allendale estate showed the greater importance it attached to its mineral 
resources, by supporting the mining companies in their opposition to the greater 
controls which the AONB would entail. The Raby and Strathmore estates picked 
up on the questions of public ~cess, and the damage that increased tourism might 
inflict on the local economy, or rather on the grouse shooting. 
Self-interest was not a factor mentioned by any of the three landed estates that 
gave-evidence, although like 'the mining companies, it was unquestionably the main 
factor in their opposition. The real motives of the estates in opposing the AONB 
may be inferred from the evidence presented in the previous chapter (see 6.2.6). 
The Allendale estate has the greatest commitment to mining, and would also like 
to expand its forestry resource. Both of these actions would be constrained by 
the AONB. All the estates are opposed to tourism and public access, issues which 
are both supported by the Countryside Commission. A further significant factor 
in their opposition is, undoubtedly, that they do not wish to be answerable to a 
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public agency, and value their independence. The AONB would increase the local 
power of the conservation lobby. 
It can be concluded from the above discussion that the AONB became such a 
highly charged issue, not because of its actual implications for the region, but 
because it sparked off deep-seated conflicts of interest at local and national level. 
First, with the possible exception of the Forestry Commission, no local elite group 
in the North Pennines favours tourism, and all are, therefore, antagonistic to any 
measure likely to promote it. Tourism and the traditional North Pennine industries 
of mining and quarrying are mutually exclusive activities, and the latter is the 
locally preferred option, even though prospects for the mining industry are bleak. 
The inhabitants of the North Pennines are 'traditionalists' whilst the Countryside 
Commission epitomises the 'conservationist' attitude to rural development. 
This fundamental antagonism over rural development is also seen in the relations 
between MAFF and the Countryside Commission. The AONB controversy is an 
illustration of the power struggle between these two organisations (see 2.6.2). The 
mining companies, farmers and landed estates, on the other hand, opposed the 
AONB out of self-interest. Their freedom of decision-making would be constrained 
by environmental controls. Despite the differing motives, all classes in the North 
Pennines could present a unified front in their opposition to the AONB. 
Extrapolating further from this analysis, it should be asked why there does not ap-
pear to be any articulated conflict within the society of the North Pennines, since 
the potential for conflict undoubtedly exists. For instance, employment in mining 
is highly uncertain, and it was shown in the previous chapter that there are several 
sour-ces. of conflict between the tenant farmers and estate owners. Internal differ-
ences of interest are hidden by the ideology of community engendered by external 
threats to the existing order. The absence of any vocal 'immigrant' middle class to 
challenge the local elite has helped to preserve this ideology of community, which 
can easily be exploited by the estates and mining companies when the need arises. 
The power of the landed estates, and to a lesser extent the mining companies, in 
the local society is shown by the way the local inhabitants identify themselves with 
the estates and allow their interests to be defined by them. 
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The Countryside Commission picked up on some of these points in its reply to the 
objectors: 
"The Commission did not judge that any objector had gone beyond identifying 
a potential prejudice to his own interests" {92). 
They also blamed: 
''those who gave a lead to public opinion in the Area" (88) 
for swaying majority opinion in Teesdale and Weardale. 
The Countryside Commission was also at fault for the way it handled the designa-
tion process. Had the commission involved the local inhabitants in the designation 
process from the beginning and been less antagonistic to local interests, they might 
have had a better reception. The Countryside Commission appears to have a fun-
damental dislike of the farming community. Trying to persuade farmers to accept 
a policy has been likened to trying to turn the Queen Mary in a 10 mile stretch of 
water (Respondent L). 
The inspector at the enquiry also recognised the 'paradox' of the AONB; the fact 
that' its actual significance was minimal in comparison to its perceived importance. 
He laid the blame partly on the Countryside Commission, who had a lot of "fence-
building" (116) to do in order to restore public confidence, and partly on the intan-
gible nature of the AONB which made it such an emotional issue. He concluded 
that the fears of the opposition were exaggerated and largely unfounded, and that 
the benefits of the AONB would outweigh the disadvantages. 
7.4 The Common Land Forum 
- . 
An issue-which follows on from some of the points raised in the discussion of the 
AONB, and which is closely related to the analysis of common land in Chapter 
Six, is the proposal of the Common Land Forum ( CLF) to pass legislation allowing 
general public access to all common land. It is a national measure, but opposition 
to it has been strongest in the North Pennines, so much so that the landowners 
of the North Pennines have formed a lobby group to fight the proposals. Why are 
the North Pennine landowners isolated in their opposition to the CLF and what 
arguments do they employ against it? 
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The CLF is the last stage in the reform of the management and use of common 
lands initiated by the Royal Commission in 1958 (see 2.4.5 and 6.3.1). It is not a 
development initiative as such, but a statutory measure which will curtail private 
land rights in favour of the public interest. The CLF was set up in 1984 by the 
Countryside Commission, but many different interest groups were represented on 
the forum, including the NFU and the CLA [10]. The forum make two proposals 
which it is hoped to pass into legislation. The first proposal is that management 
associations be set up for every common to represent public and private interests, 
so that the public can have a voice in the management of each common. The second 
proposal is to allow unrestricted public access to all commons for the purpose of 
quiet enjoyment [11]. 
Not surprisingly, it is the proposal to give the general public a statutory right to 
walk freely on all commons that has roused the opposition of both grouse shooting 
and farming interests in the North Pennines. It was observed in Chapter Six that 
the recent profitability of grouse shooting has greatly increased the economic value 
of common lands in the region. Many owners of shooting rights have invested a 
large amount of capital in improving the moors, and fear that if the public gained 
access they could destroy the prosperity of grouse shooting. 
Why did the CLA and NFU, who in the case of the AONB wholeheartedly sup-
ported their members' interests, fail to lend their support in this case? There are 
two related reasons, claim the Moorlanders Association. First, representation on 
the forum was biased towards southern interests; the members of the CLA who 
took part in the forum were all from the south. Second, the forum did not un-
derstand that the northern commons differ from the commons found in south and 
lowl~d England. Whereas ~ommons in southern England and many other upland 
areas have lost their economic function, in the North Pennines the commons are 
still actively used and fulfil an important economic function in the local economy. 
In 1986, a lobby group called the Moorlanders Association was formed to fight the 
CLF. Its members own 163 moorland commons, mainly in the North Pennines, 
North Yorkshire and Northumberland, covering over 250,000 hectares of the esti-
mated 291,666 hectares of heather moorland still remaining in England and Wales. 
These commons also support 1,248 farmers who have common rights. In 1987, the 
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Moorlanders Association produced a statement setting out their arguments against 
the proposal for public access [12]. They employ three lines of argument against the 
CLF's proposal to allow general public access: factual, ideological and practical. 
The factual argument concerns the management of the commons in the North Pen-
nines which has already been described (see 6.3.2). Public access, the moorlanders 
argue, would upset the delicate balance between sheep, grouse, and other wildlife 
species to the detriment of all three. The heather moors are a valuable but threat-
ened ecological resource. Private landowners have the capital to invest in their 
upkeep, but only whilst they have confidence in the land (para F3). The quality 
of moorland has deteriorated rapidly in areas where unlimited public access has 
been allowed, such as the Peak District, so that the northern moors are the last 
haven for grouse south of the Scottish border (para G8) [13]. The Moorlanders 
Association also claim that the CLF has misinterpreted the intentions of the Royal 
Commission of 1958. The commission never intended that all commons be treated 
in the same way [14]. 
The report also adopts an ideological argument, claiming that the national in-
terest is best served by excluding the public from the commons, since where 
conservation and public access conflict conservation should be given priority (para 
G10). The report goes on to argue that grouse shooting benefits the local economy, 
both directly through the employment it provides, and indirectly through visitor-
spending. Table 7.4 shows the association's estimate of the money generated by 
grouse shooting in the local economy in 1986. 
Conservative Party interests are appealed to when the Moorlanders Association 
imply that the proposal for public access is a 'socialist conspiracy' which will 
eventu~y lead to calls for unlimited public access to all unenclosed land (para C9) 
[15). This again displays the strength of opposition to, and fear of, any move which 
might curtail private land rights. The Moorlanders Association is lobbying hard 
to win its battle before the next general election, whilst a conservative government 
is still in power (Respondent M). 
Finally, the Moorlanders Association states the practical objections to public access 
(which were discussed in section 6.3.3). They point out that public access might 
involve considerable public expense if, as the CLF suggest, landowners receive 
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Table 7.4- Estimated Capital Generated by Grouse Shooting, 1986 
Expenditure Amount(£) 
Hotels 340,000 
Catering 51,000 
Shops 53,000 
Restaurants 15,000 
Domestic Help 63,000 
Car Hire 23,000 
Temporary Employees 240,000 
Other 712,000 
TOTAL 1,497,000 
Source: Moorlanders Association (1986, 35) 
compensation for any economic loss incurred by public access. The moorlanders 
have estimated that land values could fall by £300 per hectare on the best moors, 
and £108 on the poorer ones. The total cost of compensation could run into £ 
millions. In addition, there would be costs of fencing and the administration of 
wardening to be born by the local authorities. 
The arguments of the Moorlanders Association conform in many respects to the 
lobbying tactics identified in earlier sections of the thesis. For instance, the Moor-
landers adopt the exclusive interpretation of conservation (noted in 2.6.2) by claim-
ing that !he national interest is best served by excluding the public from the grouse 
moors. In addition, the Moorlanders demand the right to compensation (see 3.4.3) 
in the event of the public gaining a right of access, and stand to receive a substantial 
sum of money if the proposal goes ahead. 
Despite the fact that some of the arguments are ideological covers for self-interest, 
they raise some important issues. There would appear to be a valid case for 
distinguishing between commons which are under- or mis-used, and those which 
fulfil an important economic function. Should common land be treated as a blanket 
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issue, when in reality it is such a varied resource? It is interesting that, as with the 
AONB enquiry, the controversy takes the form of an 'insider-outsider' division. 
This time, however, the 'outsider' group includes members of the moorlanders' 
own landowning lobby groups. This could be an indication that, with the growing 
pressure on the agricultural lobby to embrace environmental goals, the CLA is 
prepared to make concessions to the environmental lobby on an issue that, in 
national terms, is of minor significance. 
The Moorlanders Association does suggest an alternative strategy to improve pub-
lic access to the commons. They are not opposed to public access on well defined 
footpaths and suggest that a footpath network be established (para 1.2). This 
need not necessarily follow existing rights of way, as many of these are neither 
necessarily scenic nor circular. New paths can be established .. They also point out 
that the public interest in the future of commons will be adequately represented 
by the management committees, to ensure a fair deal for ramblers. 
7.5 The Local Authorities 
7.5.1 The County Councils: Durham 
As early as 1947, the importance of recreation in the Durham Dales was recognised 
(DCC, 1947), although it was expected that the main demand would be from day-
trippers from the urban areas of County Durham. There was not thought to be 
a future in mining. In the late 1950s, the Durham Dales were designated by the 
county council as an Area of Great Landscape Value, but no separate policy was 
formulated for the area. Durham County Council still adhered to a traditional 
attitudE; to rural development. 
During·t11e AONB designation controversy, the three county councils with plan-
ning authority for the North Pennines underwent a change in their attitude to the 
region. In 1976, Durham County Council first proposed the necessity for a sepa-
rate policy to tackle the problems of the dales (DCC, 1976). Whilst the overall 
population of the county was static, an internal redistribution of the population 
was taking place, with migration from the west to the centre. A policy was needed 
to combat depopulation in the dales by providing more jobs. The council realised 
that such a policy would face the dilemma between conservation and development. 
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Should tourism and recreation be promoted, or jobs that might involve negative 
consequences for the environment? 
The change of attitude in the part of the county councils was undoubtedly a 
factor in the ultimate success of the AONB. Why did this change of heart come 
about, and what is Durham County Council's policy for the Durham Dales? It 
is attributed to both 'push' and 'pull' factors. The 'upland debate' had come 
onto the national agenda, so that the political climate favoured upland' initiatives. 
With constant pressure from the Forestry Commission for further afforestation on 
the one hand, and opposition from conservationists on the other, Durham County 
Council recognised the need for a co-ordinated land use policy. In addition, the 
decline of the traditional industries of the county also pressurised the council to 
look for alternative development policy approaches. 
At the same time, changing social trends made tourism a more promising prospect. 
In the 1960s, tourist traffic consisted of local day-trippers, and caravaners and 
campers in the summer holidays. Today, visitors come from further afield and stay 
overnight. The tourist season has lengthened as people pursue all-weather activ-
ities. As well as the planners in County Hall, the Council employs a countryside 
ranger for the dales who lives locally and can act as an intermediary between the 
local residents and the planners. The present ranger comes from a local farming 
background and has lived in the area for over 15 years. He claims that his job has 
changed "out of all recognition" over the 15 years he has held it (Respondent N). 
In 1984, Durham County Council held a seminar on the future of the Durham 
Dales at which the opinions of many land use interest groups were aired [16]. 
The aim was to stimulate discussion about future policy for the area. Leading on 
from this the Durham Dales Report was published in 1986, setting out Durham 
County Council's policy for the area until 1996. The document assesses the likely 
contributions of different economic sectors to future employment creation, and sets 
down all the various agencies which have an interest in different land uses. The 
emphasis of the document is on moving away from the reliance on the traditional 
primary industries of farming and mining, to small scale manufacturing and tourist 
developments, promoting policies which correspond with the aims of the AONB. 
The orientation of the policy is towards achieving growth which is sensitive to 
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the environment. In the same year (1986), Durham County Council launched the 
Land of the Prince Bishops' campaign to promote tourism in the whole of County 
Durham, thereby strengthening its commitment to the development of tourism. 
Durham County Council believes that the dales people have a different perception 
of their environment to outsiders. Whilst the latter tends to be idealised and 
aesthetic, the former is strictly utilitarian. For instance, the CEGB have proposed 
building a wind farm which will cover 208 hectares on Stainmore Common. At a 
meeting between the CEGB and the local inhabitants, the local MP stood up to 
say how privileged they felt that this site had been chosen [17]. The opening of 
the Blue Circle cement works at Eastgate was also welcomed by the residents. 
The council certainly recognises the influence of the estates on the area's develop-
ment. The powers of the county council planners are constrained by the dominance 
of the Raby estate in Teesdale. It adds an "extra dimension" to planning (Respon-
dent N). The way the estates are run is medieval, and they are only just being 
dragged into the 20th century (ibid.). It is noticeable, for instance, that all the 
caravan and camping sites are located in Weardale rather than Teesdale. 
The three county councils are also involved in the Rural Development Programme, 
an integrated socio-economic project promoted by the Rural Development Com-
mission (see 3.4.4). There are three Rural Development Programmes running 
within the North Pennines RDA, each administered by the respective county coun-
cil. The aims of the RDP are to achieve growth which does not detract from, or 
even enhances the physical and social environment. Although the Durham RD P 
has only been running since 1985, it has already achieved developments in work-
shop provision, transport services, community services and community training 
scheme~ 118]. 
The Rural Development Programme is a national policy which is formulated and 
implemented at regional level. Because of this tiered approach, each programme 
can be tailored to local needs. Because ·so many local agencies are involved in 
formulating policy in each RDA [19], it has enabled a higher degree of co-operation 
than could otherwise be achieved. Although most of the projects are very small 
in scale they can be seen as positive developments. The success of the RDPs can 
be largely attributed to these factors. The programme is, of course, primarily 
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concerneq with rural settlements rather than agricultural or afforested land, so 
that it does not affect the interests of farmers and landowners, another likely 
explanation for its success. 
7.5.2 The District co¥ils: Wear Valley 
Wear Valley District Council has undergone an even more dramatic change of 
policy direction than Durham County Council. In 1967, the then Weardale Rural 
District Council predicted that tourism would be a growth sector of the local econ-
omy, and that mining and manufacturing industries were on the decline (Weardale 
Rural District Council, 1967). Until recently, however, its approach to planning 
was traditional. In 1986, the council put forward a proposal to build the world's 
largest dry ski slope in Weardale as part of an Alpine village, together with hotels, 
an ice rink, golf course and other leisure facilities. Although the site will only 
cover 17 hectares, the ideas and capital involved in the project are big. The esti-
mated cost of the project is £30 million, but part of this will be met by private 
investors as the council plans to hand the project over to private developers once 
the groundwork has been prepared. 
A change in policy direction has, to some extent, been forced on Wear Valley 
District Council by the decline of mining and other traditional industries in the 
area, but the council has also taken active steps to change its image. Visible 
symbols of change are the new council buildings which are modern and open-
plan. In 1986, a new Department of Leisure was created, and in May 1988 this 
was merged with the Planning Department to form a Department of Leisure and 
Economic Development. This department now controls one third of the total 
council budget. The Alpine village project itself is attributable to one individual 
within ~~is department. His.philosophy is that leisure is not only a growth industry, 
it is also a new way of life. People benefit from sport both mentally and physically, 
and widening access to sport is a genuine way to improve the society and economy 
of Weardale. Under his direction, Wear Valley District council built a dry ski slope 
at the leisure centre in Spennymoor which has proved to be a popular attraction 
for both local residents and visitors. 
Whilst the proposed alpine ski resort aims for international recognition, it is also 
planned to be available for local use. There are many logistical and political 
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problems_ which must be overcome if the ski resort is to go ahead. First, there 
is the problem of finding a suitable location. The original idea was to locate 
the village at Rookhope at the top of Weardale. This site had to be abandoned 
because it included some common land, and it would have taken at least two years 
to get the land deregistered. Indeed, the extent of common land in Weardale has 
constrained the choice of locations. The council is now looking at sites lower down 
the dale, preferably where they need negotiate with only one or two landowners. 
They would prefer to buy the land outright if possible. The weather is also a 
locational factor. At the lower end of Weardale snow cover is less predictable, but 
at the top of the dale the harsh conditions would deter many visitors. 
Local reaction to the proposal has been reported to be mixed, with those under 
forty supporting the scheme, those between forty and fifty undecided and those 
over fifty opposing it (Respondent 0). Certainly, other organisations, including 
Durham County Council and the Countryside Commission, have been vocal in 
their opposition to the scheme. The initiator of the project does not hide his ex-
asperation with planners. Planners are by nature controllers. In his view, tourism 
and planning are totally incompatible activities, and he believes that development 
should take precedence over conservation. Tourism must be visionary. In the same 
vein, he says he will not wait for Durham County Council to provide the necessary 
infrastructure, but expects that they will follow once the scheme is completed. It 
is still undecided whether or not the project will go ahead. 
7.5.3 Summary 
The development of the North Pennines in the last 20 years has been characterised 
by controversy. The two main sticking points seem to have been, firstly, that 
policie~ b.ave been too ambitious; the scale of the policies has been too large, and 
they have tried unsuccessfully to integrate too many groups. Secondly, integrated 
packages have been wrongly marketed. They have been perceived as being too 
negative. 
This analysis has clearly shown that the society of the North Pennines is tradi-
tional. It is dominated by a powerful local elite of landowning and mining interests, 
but 'traditionalists' would appear to be becoming increasingly isolated and are now 
fighting a losing battle against conservationists. Part of the problem has been that 
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there is npt just an insider-outsider split, but that 'outsiders' have been divided. 
The final section will look at some alternative development initiatives which might 
point to a way ahead for future policies. 
7.6 Small Scale Policy Initiatives 
This final section will look at three recent development initiatives in the North 
Pennines which differ from those previously discussed in scale, aim and implemen-
tation. New approaches to rural development are ever emerging in a constantly 
changing political climate, and these three schemes illustrate some contemporary 
alternatives. Two of the examples, the East Cumbria Countryside Project and the 
Allenheads Village Trust, are local level initiatives, whilst the Environmentally 
Sensitive Area (ESA) scheme is run by MAFF. 
7.6.1 The East Cumbria Countryside Project 
The East Cumbria Countryside Project (ECCP) took over from an earlier scheme 
(the East Fellside and Alston Moor Project) and has been running since 1985. The 
ECCP is funded mainly by the Countryside Commission, but is also supported by 
Eden and Carlisle district councils. The aim of the ECCP is to enhance the en-
vironment, and public enjoyment of it, through co-operation with landowners and 
the public. More specifically, its work can be divided into five areas. First, the 
project can offer advice. The project employs a woodlands and countryside officer 
to advise farmers on tree planting schemes. Second, the project promotes public 
access. It has already opened up several circular footpath walks with accompa-
nying interpretive guides, using MSC Community Programme labour to improve 
the footpaths. In order to create a footpath network, the project has managed to 
negotiate permissive access routes with farmers [20). The walks are geared primar-
ily to local users, although it is also hoped to attract visitors away from the more 
crowded Lake District. Third, the project promotes the local area and runs a se-
ries of guided walks using local volunteers. At present forty volunteers participate. 
Fourth, the ECCP organises special events for educational purposes such as farm 
open days. These are intended mainly for school parties. Fifth, the project plans 
to develop a data base on the area, which can be used to devise a management 
plan. This part of the work is more experimental and exploratory. 
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The ECG_P has modest aims and resources. Its projects are low key and its or-
ganisers invite local input and ideas. Carlisle District Council initially opposed 
the ECCP, but due to the project's success it now enjoys general backing and has 
been promised funding for another five years. The project organiser believes that 
the small scale of the scheme is the reason for its success. The staff have made an 
effort to build good working relations with local residents and to establish trust. 
Continuity of staff is extremely important in this respect. The project has also 
been small enough to avoid the constraints of institutionalism. It can exercise 
flexibility in its relations with external organisations. For instance, when talking 
to local authorities the project can stress the local benefit of a scheme, but when 
talking to national agencies national benefits are emphasised. 
The ECCP liaises with a committee of the local authorities (which avoids most 
of the bureaucratic red tape), and periodically holds a land management advisory 
panel, to which landowning interests are invited. The meetings are always con-
troversial, but it seems that the project enjoys the support of most of the groups 
attending. 
7.6.2 The Allenheads Village Trust 
A problem encountered by many public agencies has been the difficulty of involving 
the local community in the development process (Hogglrt & Buller, 1987, 186). 
The project to revitalise the village of Allenheads (which was referred to in the 
previous chapter in the consideration of the Allendale estate), is a true community 
initiative and the only scheme of its kind in the country. It is important, therefore, 
to examine how the community was activated on this occasion, and to see how the 
sche~e was formulated and ,implemented. 
The idea for the project originated in 1985 following a series of articles in the 
Sunday Times about the decline of upland Britain, which used Allenheads as: 
11a classic example of a village that was absolutely dying on its feet" (Respondent 
P). 
This stirred the population of Allenheads into action and a village meeting was 
held, at which it was decided to carry out a village appraisal. A questionnaire was 
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sent out t_o all village residents and the results were analysed and presented as a 
report: Allenheads - the way ahead. 
A village trust was set up to raise money and administer the project, and even-
tually it is hoped that the trust will be self- supporting. The three basic aims of 
the project are; to create employment, provide new housing and improve village 
services. The project has depended on advice and financial support from outside 
agencies. Once a plan had been formulated, outside agencies were invited to a 
presentation evening. This stage depended on being able to communicate with 
these agencies and to sell the idea as a commercial proposition. The organisers 
succeeded, and the project received widespread support and national publicity 
(including a well publicised visit from Prince Charles). 
The first stage of the project was to renovate three old barns in the village centre 
for productive use. One of these was donated to the trust by the Allendale estate. 
Using MSC Community Programme labour, one barn was converted to house a 
new village shop and post office at one end, with a community j conference centre 
upstairs, and a holiday cottage at the other end. Another barn was converted into 
workshops, and the third into a cafe and workshop. Rentals from the workshops 
and holiday cottage will provide revenue to finance other developments. This stage 
is now almost completed. In addition, a new barn is being built to house one of 
the first electricity generators (made in 1846) which has been donated to the trust 
by Lord Armstrong [21]. This should be an additional tourist attraction. The 
second stage of the project is now about to begin. It is planned to build ten new 
retirement homes. 
Due to the tremendous publ~city received, the project has had positive spin-offs for 
other local businesses such as the village pub through increased numbers of visitors. 
The project's organisers have, however, had to overcome many difficulties along 
the way, and their experience indicates why more such schemes are not initiated. 
Firstly, skill, knowledge and energy are required in the fund-raising stage. It is 
essential to know how to: 
"work the system" and ''talk to them (the agencies) in the language they un-
derstand" (Respondent P). 
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The succe_ss of the project has depended upon having key individuals with relevant 
experience of business and finance in the community. The local authorities and 
government agencies will only ever fund up to 50% of any project, and need much 
sonvincing that a project is worthwhile. Private organisations (such as Business 
tUW the Community) have: 
"stacks of influence, loads of contacts" (Respondent P) 
if they are on your side. The biggest problem that the trust has faced has been the 
ending of the MSC Community Programme in 1988. The replacement Employment 
Training Scheme does not provide enough funds to attract or train a voluntary 
workforce. The project has had to raise an extra £40,000 as a result and thinks 
that it now would not be possible to start such another scheme (presumably, the 
East Cumbria Countryside Project has also faced similar problems of manpower 
since the ending of the community programme). 
The other main obstacle to the scheme has come from local residents. Opposition 
is inevitable: 
"you've got to learn to live with it" (Respondent P). 
One individual went round the village with a petition against the new houses. 
The trust decided to hold a referendum which it won. The project's organisers 
defend themselves against critics by emphasising that they are local people doing 
voluntary work. They stress that the trust is a non-profit making institution. 
The Allendale estate, which owns all the properties in Allenheads village, has 
supported the scheme passively rather than actively (although it did donate a barn 
to the project and has rented land and buildings in the village centre to the trust 
at a-nominal rent). The land agent for the Allendale estate rather patronisingly 
referred to the project as a "valiant effort", adding that he would not put his own 
money in it (Respondent M). However, the project has appreciated having to deal 
with only one landowner. 
7 .6.3 The Environmentally Sensitive Areas Scheme 
The final policy to be considered returns to the national level, but displays some 
important differences to other national policies which have been considered in this 
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chapter. The ESA scheme is, in fact, a policy devised by the EEC but administered 
at national level and implE!mented at regional level (see 3.4.4). Like the RDA 
scheme, ESA policies may be tailored to meet the specific needs of each area. 
Only a small part of the North Pennines has been designated as an ESA, so that 
its impact is limited, but the main significance of the scheme lies in the fact that 
the policy has been devised jointly by MAFF, the Countryside Commission and the 
Nature Conservancy Council and has won the approval of farming and conservation 
interests. It is administered by MAFF and represents a dramatic new departure 
for this agency. 
There are, in fact, five Pennine dales within the ESA: Dent Dale (Cumbria), 
Wharfedale, Langstrothdale, Waldendale and Swaledale (North Yorks), Teesdale 
and Weardale (County Durham), but only the latter two are in the AONB (see 
Map 3.5). Together, they cover 7,500 hectares. In 1987, 200 farmers in the Pennine 
dales ESA joined the scheme (Farmers Weekly, 1/1/1988). The valued features 
of the Pennine ESA are the species-rich hay meadows and the traditional stone 
barns and stone walls. Farmers who join the scheme are limited in applictions of 
fertiliser, lime, herbicide and pesticide on their meadow land. Cutting dates for 
hay and silage are stipulated, to allow for flowers to pollinate (in Teesdale and 
Weardale it is July 15th). In return, farmers receive at present £96 per hectare 
compensation payment (to be reviewed in 1990). They are also entitled to grants 
for the upkeep of stone barns and walls. 
For the farmers, membership of the scheme means that their productivity drops, 
so that to maintain the same number of livestock it is necessary to buy in extra 
silage. At first, uptake was limited to farmers in the upper dales who did not feel 
they W?~ld lose out financially. Farmers on better quality land lower down the 
dale still felt they could make more by continuing to farm intensively. Uptake was 
higher in Teesdale than Weardale, a fact attributed to the higher percentage of 
tenant farmers in the former who were, perhaps,' more prepared to adopt a less 
capital intensive farming system. Tenant farmers may apply for the scheme but 
are required to inform their landlord of the action. Landlord and tenant may also 
enter jointly. 
The scheme, not surprisingly, attracted initial suspicion, and there was opposi-
378 
tion to tl~e lateness of the cutting date. However, farmers have come round to 
the idea; so much so indeed that farmers outside the ESA complain about their 
exclusion (Respondent H). It has been described as the jewel in the government's 
crown (Bell, 1989). The success of the ESA scheme has been attributed to three 
factors. Firstly, it is price affordable to the government. Secondly, it is acceptable 
to farmers because it is voluntary, and thirdly, it allows them to carry on farming 
(as opposed to the set aside policy). It also releases participants from the 'tech-
nological treadmill' (see 3.4.1) and may fit the traditional view of farming many 
small farmers held but were afraid to express (Bell, 1989). Undoubtedly, exter-
nal events have been the major factor behind the success of the scheme. Recent 
events in farming policy, such as the imposition of milk quotas in 1984, have seri-
ously undermined the confidence of the farming community in a growth-orientated 
agricultural policy (Respondent N) 
7. 7 The Politics of Development: conclusion 
This discussion has considered many different development issues and policies. 
What conclusions can be drawn about the nature of rural society in the North 
Pennines and the interaction of local and national interests in the region? What 
degree of success have policies achieved to date, and what hope is there for future 
improvement? 
The experience of the NPRDB, the AONB and the CLF reveal several points 
about the rural class structure of the region. The society of the North Pennines is 
dominated by a landed elite whose power is strengthened by an alliance with mining 
and farming interests. There is no 'immigrant' property owning middle class to 
challenge their interests. Al~hough there are several potential conflicts of interest 
between the workforce and the elite groups, these conflicts are subordinated to the 
'external threat' from outside public intervention measures. The local elite has 
fostered an ideology of community to which the workforce readily subscribe. Any 
issue which threatens the interests of the local elite may be turned into an 'insider 
outsider' split. 
What are the interests of the local elite? They are to protect the autonomy of 
their control over their estates and to protect their income sources. Since mining 
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and forestry are important estate resources, the landowners tend to be more pro-
growth than the outside agencies. Conflict has emerged in the North Pennines 
because of the growing power of the national conservation lobby in recent years. 
The fact that the North Pennines was not designated as a national park or AONB 
in the 1950s perhaps intensifies the conflict today. The landowners have had more 
time to develop income sources based on exclusive land control. 
Associated with the conservation lobby is the issue of tourism, which is seen by 
outsiders as a future growth area. The question of public access poses a direct 
threat to the hegemony of private land rights and is a particular threat to the 
grouse- shooting interest. It is significant that in respect to common land the CLA 
have abandoned their members' interests in the North Pennines in order to make 
concessions to the conservation lobby. 
Any policy, therefore, which threatens to constrain land use, or to challenge the 
exclusiveness of private land rights, will be opposed by the landed elite, who are 
not afraid to resort to using ideological arguments to justify their position. On 
the other hand, policies which do not threaten these interests, including rural 
settlement planning, have met with relatively little opposition. Conflict in this 
area is more likely to result from interorganisational disagreement than from public-
private differences. 
Of all the agencies concerned in the development of the North Pennines, the Coun-
tryside Commission has the worst relations with both the local elite and other 
public agencies. This agency advocates conservation and tourism, issues which 
are anathema to the 'traditionists'. The also somewhat undefined position of the 
Countryside Commission within the policy community poses a threat to other 
organis~1ions. 
Today, the North Pennines certainly does not lack for public policies. It has been 
described as a classic case of 'initiatives' (Respondent Q). Its a case of having so 
many agencies that they need to be co-ordinated and then the co-ordinators have 
to be co-ordinated. In the final evaluation, it is necessary to ask the question: have 
all or any of these initiatives actually resulted in improvements in the standard of 
living of the resident population? This same question was asked by Alec McNicol 
of CoSIRA (DCC, 1984, 26): 
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"The Development Commission has been responsible for a policy of increasing 
the number of employment potentials in the rural areas for about 75 years and 
with CoSIRA and other agencies, a considerable effort has been mounted and 
yet here we are today". 
There is no simple answer. Firstly, most policies have been blocked by opposition 
interests, either from the local community or from other organisations. Certainly 
the local elite has played a significant role in fighting to protect its economic 
interests, and has had a considerable degree of success. Secondly, what is thought 
of as development at any one time may be regretted later on. With a constantly 
changing political and economic climate, it is impossible to plan for the long term 
or make any certain predictions. 
The solution to rural development problems can be interpreted in different ways 
(see 3.4.5). Taking a pragmatic approach, it would seem that for any scheme to 
have success, the support and co-operation of the local elite is needed. Indeed, the 
local elite possess financial resources which, if channelled in the right direction, 
could enable substantial positive developments to take place. It would appear that 
two approaches could usefully be adopted in future development initiatives. First, 
small scale policies using personal contact, such as the East Cumbria 'Countryside 
Project and the Allenheads Village Trust, can achieve far more than any number 
of planners sitting in offices (Respondent N). Development must be 'on the spot'. 
Second, policies must be seen to be positive and to come from within the system 
rather than be imposed from the outside. The ESA and RDP schemes would 
appear to offer a real chance of positive development. 
Planners and agencies should not necessarily be constrained by conventional ap-
proaches to development and, whilst the Alpine Village Project may not be feasible, 
schemes of this sort should not be dismissed out of hand. Finally, the greater de-
gree of success which recent schemes appear to have achieved could also be due to 
a change of heart amongst the local elite: 
"With a changing agricultural climate affecting the fortunes of the great North 
Pennine estates, there are signs of change in the attitudes of local decision-
makers and landowners towards traditional types of development" (Quayle, 
1986). 
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Notes 
1. The CPRE stated at the AONB Public Enquiry that, in their opinion: 
"had it not been for the fact that the North Pennines were being actively con-
sidered as a National Park, the area would have become an AONB long ago" 
(34). 
2. The NPRDB's powers over land transfers did not extend to dwelling houses 
and gardens, public bodies, transfers within the family or transfers under the 
terms of a settlement (MAFF, 1967a). 
3. Countryside Commission (1978) Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty: a dis-
cussion paper. 
4. The inspector at the Public Enquiry referred to the following examples (106): 
• that management plans for AONBs should be comparable to National Park 
plans. 
e That agricultural notification procedures already established for National Parks 
should be extended to AONBs. 
• References to public access. 
5. Tax relief is available to landowners whose land is considered to be of outstand-
ing scenic interest. In making the decision, the Inland Revenue relies on the 
advice of the Countryside Commission. Participating landowners must enter 
into a management scheme. 
6. Those supporting the AONB included: Durham, Northumberland and Cumbria 
County councils, Derwentside District Council, Northumbria Tourist Board, 
Ramblers' Association, Durham County Conservation Trust, Northumberland 
Wildlife Trust, Open Spaces Society, CPRE, British Mountaineering Council, 
YHA, Derwent Valley Protection Society, Friends of the Lake District, Cum-
bria Trust for Nature Conservation, Wear Valley and District Trades Union 
Council and three individuals. Those giving evidence against the AONB in-
cluded: Eden, Teesdale and Wear Valley District Councils, Stanhope and Tees-
dale Parish Councils, MoD, NFU, CLA and Timber Growers UK, Forestry 
Commission, Institute of Chartered Forestry, National Coal Board, Blue Cir-
cle Industries, Weardale Minerals, Fordamin, National Association of Licensed 
Opencast Operators, Allendale Settled Estates, Raby & Marwood Settled Es-
tates, Strathmore Estates, Bowes Moor and five individuals. 
7. The following information comes from the AONB Public Enquiry (page num-
bers are given after quotes). 
8. In the final designation Battle Hill and Bowes Moor MoD sites were excluded, 
as was Weardale east of the western boundary of the Eastgate cement works. 
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9. The Strathmore estates spoke on behalf of several other owners of grouse moors 
in the region including; Sir J. Nickerson (Stublick Moor), Mr H.C. Torbuck, 
Rotherhope Moor, The John Brazil Trust, Broadland Properties Ltd (mineral 
and shooting interests), Mr R.N. Burton (Bracken Bank Lodge Ltd, Burnhope 
Moor), and J.P. Hall (Cotherstone High and Low Moors). 
10. The following organisations were represented on the forum: Association of 
County Councils, Association of District Councils, Association of Metropolitan 
Authorities, British Horse Society and Byways and Bridleways Trust, Council 
for National Parks, Council for British Archaeology, Council for the Preser-
vation of Rural England, Council for the Protection of Rural Wales, Country 
Landowners Association, Countryside Commission, Crown Estate Commission-
ers, Dartmoor National Park Officer, National Association of Local Councils, 
National Farmer's Union, Nature Conservancy Council, National Trust, Open 
Spaces Society, Ramblers' Association, Sports Council, Association of Welsh 
Commoners. 
11. The forum avoided the phrase "a universal right of public access because it 
was too permissive (Aitchison, 1987). "A right of access to persons on foot for 
the purpose of quiet enjoyment was a more cautious choice of wording. 
12. Moorlanders Association (1987) Proposals for further legislation on common 
land. Lancaster. 
13. The Moorlanders Association claims that the Peak District moors used to 
produce the most concentrated grouse population in England (over 640 birds 
per 1000 acres in the 1930s), but today the average is only 250 (G8). 
14. The Moorlanders Association quote the following passage from the report to 
show that the royal commission intended that commons should be treated 
differently: 
"Some finding their place in the agricultural economy of the country, some 
serving for forestry, and some providing recreational facilities, and that schemes 
of management would need to be prepared for each according to their peculiar 
needs" 
15. The Ramblers Association and the Open Spaces Society are campaigning for 
general public access to all open spaces. In 1988, the Durham Ramblers Asso-
ciation organised a mass trespass on Mickle Fell (Wemmergill estate). 
16. The following groups spoke at the seminar: NFU, NCC, Countryside Com-
mission, Forestry Commission, Blue Circle, CoSIRA, Northumbrian Tourist 
Board, Durham Rural Community Council (RCC). 
17. The independence and intransigence of the inhabitants of the dales was also 
noted by the inspector at the AONB Enquiry, who described them as: 
"possessing a rugged independence of mind and attitude which they have needed 
383 
over the years to live and work in the harsh environment of the North Pennines" 
(106). 
The Chairman of the NPRDB also talked about: 
"a sturdy non-conformism and a profound faith in man's independence and his 
ability to stand on his own two feet" (NPRDB, 1970, para 53). 
18. The following schemes, for example, have received funding from the RDP: 
Teesdale Enterprise Agency; Burnhope Community Minibus; Weardale Villages 
Playscheme and sports coaching project (DCC, 1989/90). 
19. The following agencies are involved in formulating the RDP: Durham County 
Council, all the district councils concerned, the Development Commission, 
CoSIRA, English Estates, Durham RCC (in 1988 the Development Commission 
and CoSIRA were amalgamated to form a new body, the Rural Development 
Commission). 
20. Shoard (1987, 396) discusses permissive footpaths at more length. 
21. An earlier Lord Armstrong bought Bamburgh Castle from Lord Crewe's Trustees 
(see 5.3.1 ). 
22. It was a conservative government which took the decision to fold the NPRDB. 
The concept of a RDB, particularly its powers over land transfer, was alien to 
the conservative philosophy (Clout, 1972, 194). 
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Chapter VIII 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this final chapter, the aim is to summarise the main findings of the thesis, and 
then to consider some of the issues that have emerged from the research which ap-
pear to have a more general significance. The thesis has considered landownership 
and rural development in general terms, and the specific influence of landowner-
ship on the development of the North Pennines over the 19th and 20th centuries. 
In the final analysis it should be asked; has the study of the North Pennines en-
abled a better understanding of the general processes and relationships identified 
in Part One? To what extent has the experience of the North Pennines conformed 
to the national picture, and in what respects has it differed? How valuable is this 
approach for an understanding of contemporary rural development problems? 
It was established in Chapter Two that the apparently dramatic transformation 
of landownership and its role in rural society in Britain in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, is not as fundamental as it appears. Many changes have been exter-
nal only, hiding an essential underlying continuity. The landownership structure 
has diversified but has not been transformed. Similarly, the political power of 
landowners has changed but has not vanished. In the 19th century, the rights of 
landowners to exercise power were enshrined in the law. Today, a landed interest 
has been replaced by a farming interest, an alliance of working farmers and ren-
tier landowners. The power base of the modern agricultural interest is, however, 
narrow~r_ than that of the landed interest in the 19th century. Today, it is most 
directly seen in the formulation of agricultural policy, although it spills over into 
other aspects of rural planning. Furthermore, land still remains a source of eco-
nomic power. Land is the only private asset whose ownership is concentrated in 
the upper wealth brackets. 
Landowners have managed to retain much of the economic, social, and political 
power which they enjoyed in the 19th century despite the political and fiscal attacks 
against them. This is due to two factors. First, landowners were never an isolated 
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group, economically or socially, in British society. Second, their acquiescence in, 
and even instigation of, their own demise enabled them to control the pace and 
nature of change. 
The relationships between landowners and rural society at the local level, and the 
processes by which landowners can influence local level development were discussed 
in Chapter Three. It was proposed that landowners can influence the rural devel-
opment process in three ways. First, they can exert a direct influence through 
the management of their estates. How they use their land will affect the local 
environment and local employment opportunities. Second, landowners can exert 
a less direct influence through the exercise of formal and informal power in local 
politics. Third, landowners can influence the nature of public intervention in rural 
areas. Farming lobby groups can influence national policy formulation, and local 
landowners can influence the implementation of policy through the exercise of lo-
cal power. The degree to which landowners can influence the rural development 
process in any one locality is, however, contingent upon a number of factors, and 
the relationships between landownership and rural society have altered over the 
19th and 20th centuries. 
It was shown that the landownership structure can exert a significant direct influ-
ence on local development. Different types of landowner will manage the land in 
different ways and will be differentially affected by external influences. To some 
extent, generalisations can be made about the motives of different landownership 
groups towards owning land, but at the most detailed level of analysis, it is impos-
sible to predict the behaviour of an individual landowner. No two decision-making 
frameworks will be alike. However, in most cases, the welfare of the local com-
munity is not given a high priority in the decision-making framework, particularly 
today when local authorities are meant to shoulder this responsibility. The im-
portance of this type of influence depends upon the structure of landownership 
(landed estates or owner-occupied farms?) and the influence of landowners in the 
local economy (what is the local employment structure?). This direct form of in-
fluence is likely to be greatest where the landownership structure is dominated by 
landed estates, and where agriculture is an important sector of the local economy. 
In the 19th century, it was shown that landownership was the main influence on 
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rural society in lowland England. Clear socio-economic differences were apparent 
between estate and non-estate areas. In the uplands, the distinction was less 
marked. Social control by landowners was harder to enforce, because of the more 
scattered nature of the population, the more industrial basis of the economy and 
the historical legacy in which landowners played little part. The society of upland 
Britain displayed predominantly open characteristics. Public intervention in rural 
development was not an issue in the 19th century, although the external economy 
certainly was an important influence. 
In the 20th century, it was observed that three factors have acted to reduce the 
power of landowners at the micro-scale. First, landed estates no longer cover such 
a large area of the countryside. Second, the unquestioned position of landowners 
as the local elite class has been challenged by the influx of a non-landed property 
owning class. Third, the State has come to play an increasingly important role in 
the development of rural areas. The political power of landowners in rural areas 
today is contingent on the importance of agriculture in the local economy, the 
presence or absence of other property owning groups, and the degree of intervention 
by the State. These processes and their effects, however, have been spatially 
uneven. The property owning elite is most dominant in lowland Britain whilst the 
importance of farming in the local economy (in terms of employment) is greatest 
in upland areas, which would suggest that, today, the farming interest is most 
dominant in upland Britain. However, public intervention is also greatest in upland 
areas. There is a national interest in the development of upland Britain which does 
not always coincide with the farming interest. This divergence of interests has led 
to conflict, particularly over questions concerning the environment and tourism. 
Despite the number and variety of public intervention measures which have been 
directea -to solving the socio-economic and land use problems of the uplands, none 
have, as yet, achieved any lasting improvement in the economy or society of upland 
Britain. This failure has been interpreted in different ways. On one level, the 
sectoral framework of British planning has been blamed. There is no consensus 
between agencies with an interest in rural development as to how the uplands 
should develop. Policies have been unco-ordinated and often contradictory. On 
another level, it has been claimed that private landownership is the major barrier 
to rural development, and that no progress can be made until the hegemony of 
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private land rights is challenged. The current planning framework has failed to 
do this. The public interest has been aligned to the interests of the bourgeois 
classes. Similarly, there has been a misinterpretation, conscious or otherwise, of 
the solution of the upland problem. The western, capitalist model of development, 
which has been applied to the uplands, has been inappropriate or even harmful in 
its effects. 
It is clear that the whole question of rural development is far more complex than 
might appear on the surface, and the problem can be construed at many different 
levels. There is a great deal of uncertainty as to the role which landownership 
plays today in the rural development process, both because of the lack of official 
statistics on landownership, and because, up to now, little attention has been paid 
to landownership as a factor in the rural development process. 
The case studies of landownership and rural development in the North Pennines 
have enabled the conceptual framework to be applied in practice. Three sets of 
conclusions can be drawn from the analysis; some specific to the North Pennines, 
some of relevance to upland Britain, and some of more general relevance. 
First, conclusions relating specifically to the North Pennines will be considered. 
There is no doubt that landownership has been in the past, and continues to be, 
a major influence on the rural development of the region. From the outside, the 
North Pennines might appear to be a homogeneous region in terms of land use, 
rural society and landownership. At a more detailed level of analysis, differences 
in landownership form, motive and land control have caused differences in resource 
development and rural society within the region which have been, and still are, 
important to the people living there. 
-
In the 19th century, although the society was predominantly open, differences were 
apparent between the estates. On the estates where the mineral rights were leased, 
the mining companies exerted as great an influence, if not greater, on the inhabi-
tants. A difference in openness was observed between the mining community and 
the farming community. Those estates with a separate farming community were 
less open, although they could not be described as closed. The harshness of the 
environment effectively prevented the emergence of a rural middle class of tenantry 
(although it is significant that the earls of Strathmore considered this possibility 
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after enclosure). Therefore, in the North Pennines landownership did exert an 
influence on the nature of rural society, although the nature of this influence took 
a different form to that observed in lowland Britain. Furthermore, in the North 
Pennines absenteeism does not seem to have necessarily been a negative influence 
on rural society. All three landowners studied were absentee. Motive, resource use, 
and land control were all factors which exerted a greater influence on rural society 
than absenteeism or residence. 
More recent developments and land use conflicts in the North Pennines cannot be 
understood without reference to other specific features of the region. In compar-
ison to lowland Britain, and many other areas of upland Britain, landowners in 
the North Pennines have faced relatively few alternative land use pressures. The 
North Pennines was not designated as a National Park or an AONB following the 
1949 Act, and did not attract a non-landed middle class to present a challenge 
to the traditional elite. The autonomy which landowners within the region have 
enjoyed until recently, has enabled them to develop management policies based on 
exclusivity. The estates have altered from the industrial image of the 19th century, 
to a recreational image in the 20th century. In comparison to the labour-intensive 
demands of the lead mining industry, grouse shooting is capital intensive and is 
an extensive, exclusive land use. The growing profitability of grouse shooting has 
been a major factor in the survival of the landed estates, and has also brought 
new landed capital into the region. There are, therefore, powerful local interests 
to prevent development measures which may affect the future prosperity of this 
resource. 
The economies of the landed estates today are based primarily on farming and 
grouse 'shooting, and to a lesser extent on forestry and mining. The landowners 
are not-anti-growth as such. They support the continuation of mining and forestry, 
but they oppose any development over which they have no control, which threat-
ens their autonomy of decision-making, or the hegemony of private rights. This 
explains their opposition to recent moves by external agencies, by the Countryside 
Commission in particular, to impose added environmental controls on land use 
within the region, and to encourage tourism and public access. Conflict is all the 
greater because it has come at a later date than in other upland areas of England 
and Wales. 
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Although .the landed estates claim that grouse shooting is in the public interest (in 
terms of conservation and the local economy), there is no doubt that it benefits 
private interests far more than public ones. In some ways, it acts against the 
interests of the local community. Shooting interests are seeking to reduce grazing 
on the open moors and commons, thereby reducing the farmers' grazing resources. 
The furore that Commons Registration and the Common Land Forum have aroused 
in the North Pennines can also only be understood with reference to the specific 
conditions of the region. The commons not only make up a large part of the 
land area, they also play a vital role in the local economy. Commons Registration 
has, perhaps, increased the conflict between grazing and shooting interests noted 
above, but both farmers and shooting interests are united in their opposition to 
any external threat to this land resource. Neither interest wishes to allow public 
access to the commons. 
The political influence of the landowning elite on the society of the North Pennines 
is evident in the ideology of community that was displayed at the AONB public 
enquiry. The society is traditional in its outlook on rural development, an attitude 
which the local elite do nothing to dispel. 
Second, certain conclusions can be drawn about landownership and rural society 
which may be applicable to other upland areas of Britain. The research has con-
sidered continuity and change in rural society and landownership. It would appear 
that change in rural society has been associated with industry, continuity with 
farming. Continuity in farming has been largely due to the environment, which 
has limited the degree to which change can take place. 
Reliance-on industry would also appear to be a reason, although not the only rea-
son, for changes in upland landownership. For instance, once lead mining declined, 
the Stanhope estate was no longer of economic interest to the Church Commission-
ers. Other factors can be identified which have preserved continuity in landown-
ership. Continuity has been most marked in privately owned, traditional landed 
estates. Historical tradition, attachment to the land, the attraction of game shoot-
ing, and a lack of alternative land pressures are all factors of importance. Since 
the decline of the industrial economy of upland Britain, it certainly cannot be said 
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that profit is an attraction of ownership, as evidenced by the growing popularity 
of sporting estates. 
Although many land use conflicts in upland Britain are attributable to the intran-
sigence and self-interest of local elites, these groups are not entirely to blame for 
the failure of many public intervention measures. Certain pragmatic criticisms of 
public intervention can be made, and suggestions put forward, from the lessons of 
the North Pennines. Many 'uniform' policies have been inappropriate to the needs 
of individual areas, as shown by the Commons Registration Act and the Common 
Land Forum. Policies which are target ted to the specific needs of an area (such as 
the ESA and RDP schemes) are much more effective. Many policies suffer from 
the way they are implemented, and the image of the implementing agency (for 
instance the NPRDB and the AONB). Small-scale policies which do not threaten 
elite interests (such as the ECCP and Allenheads Village Trust) are far more likely 
to succeed than large-scale, externally imposed ones. 
Furthermore, conflict over upland development is not just a question of private 
versus public interests. There are conflicts of interest between public agencies 
and alliances of interest between private landowners and public agencies. Private 
landowners share a common interest with the NCC and the MoD, for example, 
in wishing to exclude the public from their lands. The Countryside Commission 
has antagonised both private interests and other public agencies (for instance the 
Forestry Commission) in its campaign to control land use. The ability of local 
elites to preserve their interests is to a large extent dependent upon maintaining 
an alliance with their national lobby groups. This alliance is showing signs of 
strain in the face of the growing power of the environmental lobby, and it may be 
that_~ at national level, the farming interest is more prepared to make concessions 
to the environmental lobby over questions concerning upland land use in order to 
preserve the autonomy of lowland farmers. 
Finally, certain issues of a more general relevance to an understanding of landown-
ership decision-making and continuity and change in landownership forms have 
emerged from the research. The comparison of the three case study estates has 
revealed important differences in the motives and the decision-making frameworks 
of private, instititional, and charitable landlords. These concern the interrelated 
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issues of internal and external change, historical inertia, and the significance of 
control as well as ownership. 
Institutional landownership forms have only a limited ability to adapt internally to 
changing external conditions. The most extreme example is charitable landown-
ership, where strict management and administrative practices are laid down by 
the charitable foundation. The inability to effect internal change means that, af-
ter a time, the institution becomes unable to fulfil its functions. Change in this 
landownership form must be imposed from the outside. In the case of both Lord 
Crewe's Charity and the Bishopric estates, changes in estate structure, administra-
tion and ownership form were imposed from the outside. Private landowners enjoy 
a greater, although by no means total, freedom of decision-making which gives 
them a limited ability to change internally. A further difference between institu-
tional and private landownership, which is important in understanding continuity 
and change, is that institutional landowners own land for a specific purpose, they 
are more than landowners, and their fiduciary purpose will affect their manage-
ment of the land. The primary motive of the trustees of Lord Crewe's Charity, 
for instance, was to meet the charitable payments, rather than to maximise the 
profits from their estates. 
The research has clearly shown that land rights are enduring, and that historical 
inertia in land rights may be a very great constraint on a landowner's control of 
his estate. Two extreme examples of historical inertia have been considered in 
this thesis. The Bishops of Durham, in the 19th century, faced the unenviable 
position of being principal landowners in theory, but in practice having little con-
trol over their surface lands, due to the legal protection which customary tenants 
had _received in the Thdor period. It is ironic that, in the late 19th century, the 
Ecclesiastical Commissioners bought back many of the lands of which they were, 
in theory, already owners. 
Common land is the most extreme form of historical inertia in land control to 
have survived up the present day, and until the 1965 Commons Registration Act, 
individual commons were regulated by custom rather than law (although common 
land as a whole was protected by statute). It is the only form of tenure where the 
owner may be unable to exercise any control over the land. The Commons Reg-
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istration Act has clarified the legal position of common land and, by reawakening 
an interest in this land resource, has also increased the importance of ownership. 
It remains to be seen what changes will result from the Common Land Forum. 
In the final analysis, how valuable is this conceptualisation of rural development 
to an understanding of current rural development problems? First, certain qual-
ifications should be made about its applicability. It was formulated with specific 
reference to upland Britain, and has been tested in a region where the landowner-
ship structure and political power base are both highly traditional. The framework 
is, obviously, today most applicable to regions where farming is still a dominant 
activity in the local economy, and it has proved to be more helpful in understand-
ing contemporary land use conflicts than questions concerning rural settlements. 
However, these qualifications apart, this approach places contemporary rural de-
velopment problems in a new light, and could facilitate a better understanding of 
rural development. 
An understanding of past land management practices may throw light on current 
land use issues. For instance, in the North Pennines, the analysis of 19th century 
stinting regulations could provide a basis for the establishment of management 
committees under the terms of the Common Land Forum. A historical perspective 
also puts many contemporary land use and development conflicts into perspective. 
Over the time period considered in this thesis, there have been several changes 
in resource use, but these have not altered the essential underlying continuity of 
landownership in the North Pennines. Certain themes have been recurring, such 
as the use of the moors and the defence of land rights. Looked at in a historical 
perspective, the present day emphasis on conservation and tourism may be just 
another passing trend. In the future, other resource conflicts will emerge. There 
may even be a resurgence of mining. The whole question of rural development is 
extremely complex and contradictory. It is ironic, for instance, that the landscape 
which is valued today is the result of mining activity in the past and the traditional 
farming methods which have been preserved by the landed estates, yet mining 
today is opposed on conservation grounds, and landlords are the most vocal in 
their opposition to tourism. 
This is a rather negative view of the whole question of rural development, but 
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perhaps one that is held by the landowners. However, this approach also suggests a 
more positive and practical possibility for achieving rural development. A historical 
analysis of rural development in any locality under specific landownership forms 
provides a behavioural perspective, which enables a better understanding of that 
locality's society, and which, in turn, should help policy-makers to predict how 
different policies will be received, and what effects they will have. 
This thesis has been wide-ranging in subject matter, and, consequently, it has been 
impossible to consider all the issues in as much depth as might be desired. The 
PhD is primarily a learning process and, inevitably, much of the work is exploratory 
in nature. There are several lines of research which have been touched on in 
the thesis, which might yield valuable results if pursued in more detail. Firstly, 
the analysis of the historical development of three landed estates has suggested 
that local variations in development could be explained by ownership motive, land 
control and resource use. An examination of the experience of other estates in 
the region would add validity to these observations. Did Greenwich Hospital's 
estate on Alston Moor resemble the Stanhope estate or the Blanchland estate in 
its development? How did the Blackett-Beaumonts, who were more dependent on 
lead than the Bishops in the 19th century, adapt to the loss of mining income in the 
20th century? Owner-occupation in the North Pennines has not been considered 
in this thesis, but an analysis of this ownership form could address the questions; 
has change been greater on owner-occupied farms than on the estates? How do 
farm sizes in estate and non-estate areas compare? The growth of grouse shooting 
in the North Pennines would appear to be a significant trend in the contemporary 
development of the region, and parallels can be drawn with Scotland. This could 
be an important area for further investigation. 
Secondly., there would appear to be a need for further research into the nature of 
rural society in upland Britain, and the influence of landownership upon it. The 
estate archives, census records and parish records offer possibilities for more de-
tailed studies of household composition, migration, marriage and living conditions. 
An ideology of community was identified amongst the present day population of 
the North Pennines, and it would be valuable to examine in more depth the extent 
to which this ideology is adhered to, and whether attitudes towards development 
are changing. 
394 
Secondary Sources 
Aitchison, J.W., & E.J. Hughes (1982) 'The Common Land Registers of Eng-
land and Wales: a problematic data source', Area, Vol. 14, 151-156. 
-
Aitchison, J.W. (1987) 'Public Access, Commons and Village Greens', Area, 
Vol. 19, No. 1, 19-23. 
Ambrose, P. (1974) The Quiet Revolution. London, Chatto & Windus. 
Ambrose, P. (1986) Whatever Happened to Planning?. London, Methuen. 
Anderson, P. (1987) 'Figures of Descent' New Left Review No. 161, 24-77. 
Appleton, J., & D. Symes (1986) 'Family Goals and Survival Strategies', Soci-
ologia Ruralis, Vol. 26, No. 3/4, 345-363. 
Arensberg, C., & S. Kimball (1940) Family €3 Community in Ireland. Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. 
Arkleton Trust (1982) Bibliography on Community and Rural Development: 
Europe 1978-1981. Oxford, Commonwealth Bureau of Agricultural Economics. 
Bailey, J., G. Cully & A. Pringle (1797) General View of the Agriculture of the 
Counties of Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmoreland. Newcastle, Sol 
Hodgson. 
Bailey, J. (1810) General View of the Agriculture of the County of Durham. 
London, Richard Phillips. 
Baker, A.R.H., & D. Gregory. eds. (1984) Explorations in Historical Geogra-
phy: interpretive essays. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Barlow, J. (1986) 'Land and Property in Rural Britain', International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 10, No. 3, 309-329. 
Barr, J. (1969) 'Durham's Murdered Villages', New Society, Vol. 13, No. 340, 
523-525. 
Barr, R. (1980) 'The Parish Council is Dead ... ', Town and Country Planning, 
Vol. 49, No. 11, 414-416. 
Bateman, D.l. (1989) 'Heroes for Present Purposes? - a look at the chang-
ing idea of communal land ownership in Britain', Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, Vol. 40, No. 3, 269-289. 
Bateman, J. 4th ed. 1883. (1971) The Great Landowners of Great Britain €3 
Ireland. Leicester, Leicester University Press. 
Bavisker, B.S., A.V. Patel & J.B. Wright (1983) Development Approaches and 
Institutions in Three Rural Areas of the UK. Longholm, Scotland, The Arkleton 
395 
Trust. 
Bell, C., & H. Newby (1971) Community Studies: an introduction to the soci-
ology of the local community. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
Bell, M. (1989) The Future of Rural Land Use. Paper presented at the Depart-
ment of Geography, University of Durham, 2nd May. 
Bell, T. {1856) 'Report upon the Agriculture of County Durham', Journal of 
the Royal Agricultural Society, Vol. 17, 86-123. 
Bennet, S. (1976) Rural Housing in the Lake District. Lancaster, University of 
Lancaster. 
Best, R.H., & J.T. Coppock (1962) The Changing Use of Land in Britain. 
London, Faber & Faber. 
Bierce, A. (E.J. Hopkins, ed) (1967) The Enlarged Devil's Dictionary. London, 
Penguin. 
Blacksell, M., & A. Gilg (1977) 'Planning Control in an Area of Outstanding 
Natural Beauty', Social and Economic Administration, Vol. 11, No. 3, 206-215. 
Blacksell, M., & A. Gilg (1981) The Countryside: planning and change. Lon-
don, George Allen & Unwin. 
Blythe, R. (1969) Akenfield: portrait of an English village. London, Allen Lane. 
Body, R. (1982) Agriculture: the triumph and the shame. London, Temple 
Smith. 
Boserup, E. (1965) The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: the economics of 
agrarian change under population pressure. London, George Allen & Unwin. 
Bouquet, M. (1985) Family, Servants and Visitors: the farm household in 19th 
and 20th century Devon. Norwich, Geobooks. 
Bourne, J.M. (1986) Patronage and Society in 19th Century England. London, 
Edward Arnold. 
Bowers, J.K., & P. Cheshire (1983) Agriculture, the Countryside and Land Use: 
an economic critique. London, Methuen. 
Bowler, I.R. (1987) 'Agricultural Geography (progress report)', Progress in 
Human Geography, Vol. 11, No. 3, 425-432. 
Bowler, I. R. ( 1988) 'Agricultural Geography (progress report)', Progress in 
Human Geography, Vol. 12, No. 4, 538-548. 
Bracey, H.E. (1970) People and the Countryside. London, Routledge & Keegan 
Paul. 
Bradley, A. (1981) 'Capitalism and the Countryside: rural sociology as political 
396 
economy', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 5, 581-
587. 
Bradley, A., & P. Lowe. eds. (1984) Locality and Rurality. Norwich, Geobooks. 
Brenner, R. (1976) 'Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in 
Pre-industrial Europe', Past & Present, Vol. 70, 30-75. 
Brodrick, G.C. (1881) English Land and English Landlords. London, Cassell, 
Petter, Galpin & Co. 
Brown, M., & S. Winyard (1975) Low Pay on the Farm. London, Low Pay 
Unit. 
Browne, P. (1985) 'The Milking of West Wales', Observer Magazine, June 9th, 
14-19. 
Bulmer (1884) History, Topography and Directory of East Cumberland. Pre-
ston, Bulmer & Co. 
Bulmer (1885) History, Topography and Directory of Westmoreland. Preston, 
Bulmer & Co. 
Bulmer (1886) History, Topography and Directory of Northumberland. Preston, 
Bulmer & Co. 
Bulmer (1890) History, Topography and Directory of North Yorkshire. Preston, 
Bulmer & Co. 
Burt, R., P. Waite & R. Burnley (1983) The Durham and Northumberland 
Mineral Statistics. Exeter University, Department of Economic History. 
Buttel, F.H., & H. Newby (1980) The Rural Sociology of Advanced Societies: 
critical perspectives. New Jersey, Allanheld, Osmun & Co. 
Buttel, F.H. (1982) 'The Political Economy of Agriculture in Advanced Indus-
trial Societies: some observations on theory and method', Current Perspectives 
in Social Theory, Vol. 3, 27-55. 
Caird, J. first published in1851 (1968) English Agriculture in 1850-51. 2nd ed. 
London, Frank Cass & Co Ltd. 
Caird, J. first published in 1873 (1967) The Landed Interest. 5th ed. London, 
Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 
Capstick, M. (1978) 'Economic, Social and Political Structures in the Uplands 
of Cumbria', in R.B. Tranter. ed. The Future of Upland Britain. Vol. 2. 
Proceedings of a Symposium held at the University of Reading, September, 
1977, 510-518. 
Carter, I. (1975) 'A Socialist Strategy for the Highlands', in J. Brown. ed. The 
Red Paper on Scotland. Edinburgh, EUSPB, 24 7-253. 
397 
Carter, I. (1978) 'Sociology and Upland Britain', in R.B. Tranter. ed. The 
Future of Upland Britain. Vol. 2. Proceedings of a Symposium held at the 
University of Reading, September, 1977, 578-604. 
Carter, I. (1980) 'The Highlands of Scotland as an Underdeveloped Region', 
in F.H. Buttel & H. Newby. eds. The Rural Sociology of Advanced Societies: 
critical perspectives. New Jersey, Allenheld, Osmun & Co., 353-385. 
Chambers, J.D., & G.E. Mingay (1966) The Agricultural Revolution, 1750 to 
1880. London, B.T. Batsford Ltd. 
Chassagne, E. (1979) 'Community Control of Land Use: historical develop-
ment and limitations, corrective mechanisms. The French system as an ex-
ample', case studies by OECD member countries Agriculture in the Planning 
and Management of Peri-Urban Areas. Vol. 2. Paris, Atelier Central d'Etudes 
d' Amenagement Rural. 
Cherry, G. ed. (1976) Rural Planning Problems. London, Leonard Hill. 
Cheshire, P. (1985) 'The Environmental Implications of European Agricultural 
Support Policies' in D. Baldock & D. Conder. eds. Can Cap Fit the Envi-
ronment? the environmental implications of future EEC farm price policies. 
London, CPRE and the Institute for European Environmental Policy, 9-18. 
Clay, C. (1985) 'Landlords and Estate Management in England', in J. Thirsk. 
ed. The Agrarian History of England, Vol. V, Agrarian Change. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 119-251. 
Clayton, D., A. Harrison & B. Hill (1967) Capital Taxation and Landowner-
ship in England and Wales: a preliminary assessment. University of Reading, 
Department of Agricultural Economics Misc. Studies No. 44. 
Clemenson, H. (1982) English Country Houses and Landed Estates. New York, 
Croom & Helm. 
Cloke, P. (1977) 'An Index of Rurality for England and Wales', Regional Stud-
ies, Vol. 11, 31-46. 
Cloke, P. (1983) An Introduction to Rural Settlement Planning. London, Methuen. 
Cloke, P. & C.C. Park (1985) Rural Resource Management. London, Croom 
Helm. 
Clout, H. (1972) Rural Geography. Oxford, Pergamon Press. 
Coleman, J. (1881) 'Report on Durham', Digest and Appendix to Part I in 
Royal Commission into the Depressed Conditions of Agricultural Interests. C. 
2778, 11 XVI. 
Collins, E.J.T. (1978) The Economy of Upland Britain. University of Reading, 
CAS Paper No. 4. 
398 
Commons Commission (1988) In the Matter of (1) Bumhope Moor €3 {2) Moss 
Moor. Stanhope, Wear Valley District, Durham. 
Cooper, S. (1980) Rural Poverty in the UK. London, Policy Studues Institute. 
Coppock, J.T. (1977) 'The Challenge of Change; problems of rural land use in 
Great Britain', Geography, Vol. 62, 75-86. 
Coppock, J.T. (1978) Land Use €3 Town €3 Country Planning. Reviews of UK 
Statistical Sources. Vol VIII. Oxford, Pergamon Press. 
Countryside Commission (1975 to 1980) Annual Reports. London, HMSO. 
Countryside Commission (1978) Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty, discus-
sion paper. Cheltenham, Countryside Commission. 
Countryside Commission (1983a) Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty: a pol-
icy statement. Cheltenham, Countryside Commission. 
Countryside Commission (1983b) The Changing Uplands. Cheltenham, Coun-
tryside Commission. 
Countryside Commission (1984) A Better Future for the Uplands. Cheltenham, 
Countryside Commission. 
Countryside Commission (1986) Common Land: the report of the Common 
Land Forum. Cheltenham, Countryside Commission. 
Cox, G., P. Lowe & M. Winter. eds. (1986) Agriculture; People €3 Policies. 
London, Allen & Unwin. 
Cragg, A.R., & J.R.V. Marchant (1901) Hints To Young Valuers; a practical 
treatise on the valuation of property. London, The Land Agents' Record, Ltd. 
Commons Commission (1988) In the Matter of {1) Burnhope Moor €3 {2) Moss 
Moor. Stanhope, Wear Valley District, Durham. 
Crown Commissioners (1985/86) Report ofth~ Commissioners. London, HMSO. 
Cumbria RDP Strategy Committee (1988) Developing Rural Cumbria: draft 
strategy. Carlisle, Cumbria County Council. 
Dartington Institute (1984) Integrated Rural Development: a study of Bodmin 
Moor, Dartmoor and Exmoor. Dartiugton, Dartington Institute. 
Darling, F. (1955) West Highland Survey: an essay in human ecology. Loudon, 
OUP. 
Daunton, M.J. (1989) 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Industry, 1820-
1914' Past and Present No. 92, 125-147. 
Denman, D.R. (1957) Estate Capital: the contribution of landownership to 
agricultural finance. London, George Allen & Unwin. 
399 
Denman, D.R. & V.F. Stewart (1959) Farm Rents. London, George Allen & 
Unwin. 
Denman, D.R., R.A. Roberts & H.J.F. Smith (1959) Commons and Village 
Greens. London, Leonard Hill. 
Denman, D.R., & S. Prodano (1972) Land Use; an introduction to proprietary 
land use analysis. London, George Allen & Unwin. 
Department of the Environment (1985) North Pennines Area of Outstanding 
Natural Beauty, Public Local Enquiry, Inspector Sir Stephen Berthon. 8th 
October to 8th November. 
Development Commission (1983/84) 42nd Annual Report London, HMSO. 
Development Commission (1984a) The Next Ten Years. London, Development 
Commission. 
Development Commission ( 1984 b) Guidelines for Joint Rural Development 
Programmes. London, Development Commission. 
Dexter, K. (1977) 'The Impact of Technology on the Political Economy of 
Agriculture', Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, 211-221. 
Douglas, R. (1976) Land, People and Politics. London, Allison & Busby. 
Dower, J. Chairman (1971/3) Report of the Defence Lands Committee, Cmnd 
5714. London, HMSO. 
Dowrick, F.E. (1974) Public Ownership of Land - Taking Stock. London, 
Stevens & Stevens. 
Drury, J.L. (1980) 'Sir Arthur Hesilrige and the Weardale Chest', Transactions 
of the Architectural and Archaeological Society of Durham and Northumberland, 
New Series, Vol. 5, 125-137. 
Drury, J.L. (1987) 'More Stout than Wise: tenant right in Weardale in the 
Tudor period', in D. Marcombe. ed. The Last Principality: politics, religion 
and society in the Bishopric of Durham, 1494-1660. University of Nottingham, 
Department of Adult Education, 71-100. 
Dunham, K.C. (1948) Geology of the North Pennine Ore Field, Vol. 1, Tyne 
to Stain more. London, HMSO. 
Dunn, M.C. (1976) 'Population Change and the Settlement Pattern', in G. 
Cherry. ed. Rural Planning Problems. London, Leonard Hill, 13-42. 
Durham County Council (1947) Some Considerations Preliminary to the Out-
line Plan for the Development and Redevelopment of the County of Durham: 
report to the County Planning Committee. Durham County Council. 
Durham County Council (1964) County Development Plan- Written Analysis. 
400 
Durham County Council. 
Durham County Council (1967) Weardale: a review of current problems. Durham 
County Council. 
Durham County Council (1976) Durham County Structure Plan. Durham 
County Council. 
Durham County Council (1977) Proposal for the Creation of the North Pen-
nines AONB: Statement of Intent. Durham County Council. 
Durham County Council (1980) Streatlam €3 Gibside: the Bowes and Strath-
more families in County Durham. Durham County Council. 
Durham County Council (1984) A Seminar on the Future of the Durham Dales. 
Durham County Council. 
Durham County Council (1985) East and West Durham RDAs: strategy. Durham 
County Council. 
Durham County Council (1986) A Future for the Durham Dales: a policy doc-
ument. Durham County Council. 
Durham County Council (1987) East and West Durham RDAs: monitoring 
and progress report. Durham County Council. 
Durham County Council (1988/9) East and West Durham RDAs: annual pro-
gramme. Durham County Council. 
Ecclesiastical Commissioners (1846) 1st Annual Report. Parliamentary Paper 
35 XXIV 183. 
Ecclesiastical Commissioners (1860) Return of Benefices in the Diocese of Durham 
from which the Ecclesiastical Commissioners have received money in respect to 
episcopal and capitular estates. Parliamentary Paper 63 LIII 73. 
Ernie, Lord (1961) English Farming Past and Present. 5th ed. London, Heine-
mann. 
Evans, E. (1976) The Contentious Tithe: the tithe problem and English agri-
culture, 1750-1850. London, Routledge & Keegan Paul. 
Farmers Weekly (1988) 'Flower Power to Save the Dales: ESAs', 1st January, 
31-35: 
Forestry Commission (1985/86) 66th Annual Report €3 Accounts. London, 
HMSO. 
Forestry Commission (1986) Timber Production in Britain. London, Forestry 
Commission. 
Garnier, R.M. (1908) History of the English Landed Interest. Vol. II. London, 
401 
Swan Sonnenschein & Co Ltd. 
Gasson, R. (1973) 'Goals and Values of Farmers', Journal of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, Vol. 24, 521-542. 
Gasson, R., G. Crow, A. Errington, J. Hutson, T. Marsden & M. Winter (1988), 
'The Farm as a Family Business', Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 39, 
No. 1, 1-42. 
Gerth, H.H., & C.W. Mills. eds. (1970) From Max Weber: essays -in sociology. 
London, Routledge & Keegan Paul. 
Gibbs, R., & A. Harrison (1973) Landownership by Public and Semi-Public 
Bodies in Great Britain. University of Reading, Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Management, Misc. Study No. 56. 
Gibbs, R., & M. Whitby (1973) Upland Access. Newcastle, Agricultural Ad-
justment Unit. 
Girouard, M. (1979) The Victorian Country House. New Haven & London, 
Yale University Press. 
Gonner, E.C.K. (1912) Common Land and Enclosure. London, MacMillan. 
Granger, J. (1794) General View of the Agriculture of the County of Durham. 
London, Colin Macrae. 
Gregory, D. (1978) Ideology, Science and Human Geography. London, Hutchin-
son. 
Gregory, D. & J. Urry (1985) Social Relations and Spatial Structures. New 
York, St Martins Press. 
Gregson, N. (1984) Continuity and Change in Agrarian Organisation in North 
West England, 1100-1800. Durham Univ. (unpublished) Ph.D. thesis. 
Grigg, D. (1982) The Dynamics of Agricultural Change: the historical experi-
ence. London, Hutchinson. 
Grigg, D. (1987) 'Farm size in England and Wales, from early Victorian times 
to the present', Agricultural History Review, Vol. 35, No. 2, 179-189. 
Guardian (1971) 'No Tears for the Pennines Board', 19th January. 
Hamnett, C. (1988) 'The Church's Many Mansions: the changing structure of 
the Church Commissioners' land and property holdings, 1948-1977', Transac-
tions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 12, 465-481. 
Harris, B. & G. Ryan (1967) The Law Relating to Common Land. London, 
Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 
Harrison, A. (1981) Factors Influencing the Ownership, Tenancy, Mobility and 
402 
Use of Farmland in the UK. Commission of the European Communities, Infor-
mation on Agriculture, No. 7 4. 
Harvey, D. (1982) Limits to Capital. Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
Hawley, A. (1950) Hvman Ecology: a theory of community structure. New 
York, Ronald. 
Hobhouse, Lord. Chairman (1947) Report of the National Parks Committee 
{England and Wales). Cmnd 6628. London, HMSO. 
Hobsbawn, E.J., & G. Rude (1969) Captain Swing. London, Lawrence & 
Wishart. 
Hodge, I.D. (1988) 'A Reassessment of the Role of County Council Smallhold-
ings', Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 39, No. 2, 243-253. 
Hodge, I. (1986) 'Rural Development and the Environment: a review', Town 
Planning Review, Vol. 57, No. 2, 175-187. 
Hodgson, R.I. (1979) 'The Progress of Enclosure in County Durham 1550-1870', 
in H.S.A. Fox & R.A. Butlin. eds. Change in the Countryside: essays on rural 
England, 1500- 1900. London, Institute of British Geographers, 94-100. 
Hoggert, K., & H. Buller (1987) Rural Development: a geographical perspective. 
New York, Croom Helm. 
Holdsworth, W.S. (1927) Historical Introduction to the Land Law. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press. 
Hollowell, P. ed. (1982) Property and Social Relations. London, Heinemann. 
Hoskins, W.G., & L.D. Stamp (1963) The Common Lands of England and 
Wales. London, Collins. 
Hoskins, W.G. (1985) The Making of the English Landscape. Middlesex, Pen-
gum. 
Houston, G. (1987) 'Assessing the IDP Programme for the Western Isles (Scot-
land)', Scottish Geographical Magazine, Vol. 103, No. 3, 163-165. 
Howell, D.W. (1977) Land and People in Wales. London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
Hughes, M. (1963) Lead, Land and Coal as Sources of Landlord Income in 
Northumberland between 1700 and 1850. Durham Univ. (unpublished) Ph.D 
thesis (Kings College, Newcastle). 
Hunt, C.J. (1970) The Lead Miners of the Northern Pennines. Manchester, 
Manchester University Press. 
Hunter, J. (1976) The Making of the Crafting Community. Edinburgh, J. Don-
403 
ald. 
Ilbery, B.W. (1983) 'Goals and Values of Hop Farmers', Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 8, 329-341. 
Independent (1989) 'Ridley Defends Army Use of Land', 8th June. 
Johnson, R., D. Gregory & D.M. Smith (1986) The Dictionary of Human Ge-
ography. 2nd ed. Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
Kain, R., & H. Prince (1985) The Tithe Surveys of England and Wales. Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Kelly (1914) Directory of Durham. London, Kelly & Co. 
Kelly (1925) Directory of Durham and Northumberland. London, Kelly & Co. 
Kelly (1925) Directory of Cumberland f3 Westmoreland. London, Kelly & Co. 
Kelly (1937) Directory of North and East Riding (Yorks} . London, Kelly & 
Co. 
Kerridge, E. (1969) Agrarian Problems in the 16th Century and After. London, 
George Allen & Unwin. 
Land Registry (1982) Registration of Title to Land, London, HMSO. 
Lea, D.A.M., & D.P. Chaudhri (1983) Rural Development and the State. Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Lindert, P.H. (1987) 'Who Owned Victorian England? the debate over landed 
wealth and inequality', Agricultural History Review, Vol. 61, 25-76. 
Lowe, P., G. Cox, M. MacEwan, T. O'Riordan, & M. Winter (1986) Country-
side Conflicts: the politics of farming, forestry and conservation. Aldershot, 
Gower Publishing Co. 
Maas, J.H.M. (1974) 'The Behaviour of Landowners as an Explanation of Re-
gional Differences in Agriculture: Latifundists in Sevilla and Cordoba (Spain)', 
Tijdschrift Voor Economische en Sociale Geografie Vol. 74, 87-95. 
MacDonald, S. (1979) 'The role of the individual in agricultural change: the 
example of George Culley of Fenton, Northumberland', in H.S.A. Fox & R.A. 
Butlin. eds. Change in the Countryside: essays on rural England, 1500-1900. 
London, Institute of British Geographers, 5-22. 
MacEwan M., & A. MacEwan (1981) National Parks: conservation or cosmet-
ics'?. London, George Allen & Unwin. 
MacGregor, J. (1985) 'Rural Land Development and Land Policy: some prob-
lems and opportunities', 24-33, in I. Evans & J. Hendry. eds. Land for the 
People. Edinburgh, Scottish Socialist Society, 25-33. 
404 
MacGregor, B.D. (1988) 'Owner Motivation and Land Use on Landed Estates 
in the North West Highlands of Scotland', Journal of Rural Studies, Vol. 4, 
No. 4, 389-404. 
MAFF (1967a) A Rural Development Board: purpose and powers as laid out 
in the 1967 Agriculture Act. London, HMSO. 
MAFF (1967b) The Proposed North Pennines Rural Development Board (Ques-
tions and Answers). Newcastle, MAFF. 
MAFF (1968) A Century of Agricultural Statistics, Great Britain, 1866-1966. 
London, HMSO. 
MAFF (1985/86) Agricultural Statistics, UK. London, HMSO. 
MAFF (1986a) Annual Review of Agriculture. Cmnd 9708. London, HMSO. 
MAFF (1986b) The ESAs (Pennine Dales} Designation Order. Statutory In-
struments 2253. 
MAFF (1986c) Pennine Dales ESA: Guidelines for Farmers. 63:502.7 
Markusen, A.R. (1980) 'The Political Economy of Rural Development: the 
case of Western US boom towns' in F.H. Buttel & H. Newby. eds. The Rural 
Sociology of Advanced Societies: critical perspectives. New Jersey, Allenheld, 
Osmun & Co. 
Marsden, T., S. Whatmore, R. Munton & J. Little (1986a) 'Towards a Polit-
ical Economy of Capitalist Agriculture: a British perspective', International 
Journal of Urban and Rural Research, Vol. 4, 498-521. 
Marsden, T., S. Whatmore, R. Munton & J. Little (1986b) 'The Restructuring 
Process and Economic Centrality in Capitalist Agriculture', Journal of Rural 
Studies, Vol. 2, No. 14, 271-280. 
Marsden, T. (1986) 'Property State Relations in the 1980s: an examination of 
landlord tenant legislation in British agriculture', in Cox, G., P: Lowe & M. 
Winter. eds. Agriculture; People & Policies. London, Allen & Unwin, 126-143. 
Marsden, T., S. Whatmore & R. Munton (1987) 'Uneven Development and 
the Restructuring process in British Agriculture: a preliminary examination', 
Journal of Rural Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4, 297-308. 
Massey, D., & A. Catalano (1978) Capital and Land. London, Edward Arnold. 
McArevey, M. (1972) A Guide to Definitive Maps of Public Paths. London, 
Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society. 
McEwan, J (1975) 'Highland Landlordism', in G. Brown. ed. The Red Paper 
on Scotland. Edinburgh, EUSPB, 262-269. 
McEwan, J. (1979) Who Owns Scotland?. Edinburgh, EUSPB. 
405 
Mills, D.R. (1980) Lord and Peasant in 19th Century Britain. London, Croom 
Helm. 
Mingay, G.E. (1963) English Landed Society in the 18th Century. London, 
Routledge & Keegan Paul. 
Mingay, G.E. (1976) Rural Life in Victorian England. London, Heinemann. 
Moorlanders Association (1987) Comments on the Government's Consultative 
Proposals For Further Legislation on Common Land. Lancaster. 
Munton, R. (1976) 'An Analysis of Price Trends in Directory of Cumhrrland 
f:J Westmoreland. the Agricultural Land Market of England and Wales', Tijd-
schrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie. Vol. 67, No. 4, 202-212. 
Munton, R. (1977) 'Financial Institutions: their ownership of agricultural land 
in Great Britain', Area, Vol. 9, 29-37. 
Mussett, P., & P. Woodward (1988) Estates and Money at Durham Cathedral, 
1660 to 1985. Dean & Chapter of Durham. 
Nathan, Lord. Chairman (1952/53) Report of the Committee on the Law and 
Practice relating to Charitable Trusts. Cmnd 8710. London, HMSO. 
National Trust (1976) National Trust Handbook. London. 
Nature Conservancy Council (1979/80) 6th Annual Report. London, HMSO. 
Neasham, G. (1893) North Country Sketches: notes, essays and reviews. Durham, 
Thomas Caldcleugh. 
Newby, H. (1977) The Deferential Worker. London, Allen Lane, Penguin 
Books. 
Newby, H., C. Bell, D. Rose & P. Saunders (1978) Property, Paternalism and 
Power. London, Hutchinson. 
Newby, H. (1980) Green and Pleasant Land? social change in rural England. 
London, Hutchinson. 
Newby, H. (1986) 'Locality and Rurality: the restructuring of rural social rela-
tions', Regional Stud·. , Vol. 20, No. 3, 209-215. 
Norris, P., A.R. Townsend, & J.C. Dewdney (1983) Demographic and Social 
Change in the Durham Coalfield. University of Durham, Census Research Unit 
Working Paper No. 23. 
North, R. (1987) 'When the Subsidies Cease', Independent, 22nd January. 
North Pennines Rural Development Board (1970) 1st Annual Report. London, 
HMSO. 
406 
North Riding County Council (1975) North Riding Pennines Study: study re-
port. N orthallerton. 
Northfield, Lord. Chairman {1979) Report of the Committee of Enquiry into 
the Acquisition, Ownership and Occupancy of Agricultural Land. Cmnd 7599. 
London, HMSO. 
Norton, W. (1982) 'Historical Geography as the Evolution of Spatial Form', 
in A.R.H. Baker & M. Billinge. eds. Period €3 Place. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 251-260. 
Nugent, Lord. Chairman (1971/73) Report of the Defence lands Committee. 
Cmnd 5714. London, HMSO. 
Offer, A. (1981) Property and Politics, 1870- 1914: landownership, law, ide-
ology and urban development in England. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Orwin, C.S., & E.H. Whetham (1971) History of British Agriculture, 1846-
1914. Newton Abbot, David & Charles. 
Pahl, R.E. (1965) Urbs in Rure: the metropolitan fringe in Hertfordshire. Lon-
don School of Economics and Political Science, Geographical Papers No. 2. 
Pawson, H.C. (1961) A Survey of the Agriculture of Northumberland. London, 
Royal Agricultural Society of England: County Agriculture Survey No. 3. 
Perry, P.J. {1974) British Farming in the Great Depression, 1870-1914. Newton 
Abbot, David & Charles. 
Phillips, E.M., & D.S. Pugh {1987) How to get a PhD. Milton Keynes, Open 
University Press. 
Picozzi, N. (1971) 'Breeding performance and shooting bags of red grouse in 
relation to public access in the Peak District National Park', Biological Con-
servation, Vol. 3, No. 3, 214-220. 
Platt, J. (1981a) 'Evidence and Proof in Documentary Research: some specific 
problems of documentary research', Sociological Review, Vol. 29, No. 1, 31-66. 
Platt, J {1981b) 'Some shared problems of documentary research', Sociological 
Research, Vol. 29, No. 1, 53-66. 
Pred, A. (1984) 'Place as Historically Contingent Process: structuration and 
the time geography of becoming places', Annals of the American Association 
of Geographers, Vol. 74, 279-297. 
Prince, H. (1967) Parks in England. Isle of Wight, Pinhorus. 
Purchas, F.H. (1904) 'The Raby Estates', Estate Magazine, Vol. 4, 449-457. 
Quayle, B. (1985) 'Which Way for the North Pennines?', Community News, 
407 
Durham Rural Community Council, 8-9. 
Quayle, B. (1986) Conservation and Development in the North Pennines, ideas 
for a post AONB initiative. Draft Outline Paper, Durham Rural Community 
Council. 
Raistrick, A., & B. Jennings (1965) A History of Lead Mining in the Pennines. 
London, Longmans. 
Raistrick, A. (1968) The Pennine Dales. London, Eyre & Spottiswoode. 
Raistrick, A. (1977) Two Centuries of Industrial Welfare: the London Lead 
Company, 1692-1905. 2nd ed. Hartington, Moorland Publishing Company. 
Ramblers Association (1987) Public Rights of Way and Public Access to the 
Countryside in County Durham: a strategy for improvement. Durham County 
Council. 
Redclift, M. (1986) 'Survival Strategies in Rural Europe: continuity and change', 
Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. 26, 218-227. 
Rees, A.D. (1950) Life in the Welsh Countryside. Cardiff, University of Wales 
Press. 
Renouf, J. (1989) 'An Alternative PhD', Area, Vol. 21, No. 1, 87-92. 
Report of the Commission on Common Land in England and Wales (1957 /58). 
Cmnd 462. London, HMSO. 
Rhind, D., & R. Hudson (1980) Land Use. London, Methuen. 
Robinson, G. (1988) Agricultural Change: geographical studies of British agri-
culture. Edinburgh, North British Publishing. 
Rogers, A.W. (1983) 'Housing', in Pacione, M. ed. Progress in Rural Geography. 
Beckenham, Croom Helm, 106-129. 
Rogers, A., J. Blunden, N. Curry (1985) The Countryside Handbook. London, 
Croom Helm. 
Rose, C. (1986) 'Conservation and the Conservatives', in E. Goldsmith & N. 
Hilyard. eds. Green Britain or Industrial Wasteland'?. Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 54-65. 
Rose, D., H. Newby, P. Saunders, & C. Bell (1977) 'Land Tenure and Official 
Statistics: a Research Note' Journal of Agricultural Economics Vol. 28, No. 1, 
67-75. 
Rowntree, B.S. (1913) How the Labourer Lives. London. 
Rounthwaite, T.E. (1965) The Railways of Weardale. The Railway Correspon-
dence and Travel Society. 
408 
Rubinstein, W.D. (1981) 'New Men of Wealth and the Purchase of Land in 
19th Century England' Past and Present No. 92, 125-147. 
Sarre, P. (1984) 'Recomposition of the Class Structure', in C. Hamnett, L. 
McDowell, & P. Sarre The Changing Social Structure. London, Open University 
Press, 78-123. 
Sayer, A. (1984) Method in Social Science: a realist approach. London, Methuen. 
Scott, Mr Justice. Chairman (1942) Report of the Committee on Land Utilisa-
tion in Rural Areas. Cmnd 6378. London, HMSO. 
Select committee on the mode of granting and renewing leases of property of 
Ecclesiastical bodies. Minutes of Evidence. Parliamentary Paper (1837 /38) 
Cmd 692 IX.l. 
Self, P., & Storing (1962) The State and the Farmer. London, Allen & Unwin. 
Shaw, J.M. ed. (1979) Rural Deprivation and Planning. University of East 
Anglia, Geo Abstracts Ltd. 
Shoad, M. (1987) This Land is Our Land. London, Paladin. 
Short, B. (1986) 'Landownership in Edwardian England and Wales: a new 
source for geographical analysis', Area, Vol. 18, No. 2, 153-156. 
Shucksmith, M. (1980) 'Local Interests in a National Park', Town €3 Country 
Planning, Vol. 49, 418-421. 
Sillars, J. (1975) 'Land Ownership and Land Nationalisation', in Brown, J. ed. 
The Red Paper on Scotland. Edinburgh, EUSSB, 254-261. 
Simpson, A.W.B. (1961) An Introduction to the History of the Land Law. Lon-
don, Oxford University Press. 
Simpson, S.R. (1976) Land Law and Registration. Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Smailes, A.E. (1968) North England. London & Edinburgh, Nelson. 
Smellie, K.B. (1968) A History of Local Government. 4th ed. London, George 
Allen & Unwin. 
Smith, M.J. (1989) 'Land Nationalisation and the Agricultural Policy Commu-
nity' Public Policy and Administration Vol. 4, No. 3, 9-21. 
Spring, D. (1952) 'The Earls of Durham and the Great North Coal Field, 1830-
1880', Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 33, No. 3, 237-253. 
Spring, D. (1963) The English Landed Estate in the 19th Century: its admin-
istration. Maryland, John Hopkins Press. 
Spring, D. (1971) 'English Landowners and 19th Century Industrialism', in 
409 
J.T. Ward & R.G. Wilson. eds. Land and Industry: the landed estate and the 
industrial revolution. Newton Abbott, David & Charles, 16-62. 
Spring, D. (1971) European Landed Elites in the 19th Century. Baltimore, John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Stamp, L.D. (1962) The Land in Britain: its use and misuse. 3rd ed. London, 
Longmans. 
Stamp, L.D., & W.G. Hoskins (1963) The Common Lands of England and 
Wales. London, Collins. 
Stanworth, P., & A. Giddens. eds. (1974) Elites and Power in British Society. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Stapledon, R.G. (1935) The Land: now and tomorrow. London, Faber & Faber 
Ltd. 
Stapledon, R.G. (1937) The Hill Lands of Britain: development or decay'?. 
London, Faber & Faber Ltd. 
Stone, L., & J.C.F. Stone (1984) An Open Elite'? England 1540-1880. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press. 
Stranks, C.J. (1976) The Charities of Nathaniel Lord Crewe and Dr. John 
Sharp, 1721 to 1976. Dean & Chapter of Durham. 
Sutherland, D. (1968) The Landowners. London, Antony Blond. 
Tate, W.E., & M.E. Turner (1978) A Domesday of English Enclosure Acts and 
Awards. University of Reading. 
Tate, W.E. (1967) The English Village Community and the Enclosure Move-
ments. London, Victor Gollancz Ltd. 
Thirsk, J. (1985) 'Agricultural Innovations and their Diffusion', in. J. Thirsk. 
ed. The Agrarian History of Engaland & Wales. Vol. 5. Agrarian Change. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 533-589. 
Thompson, E.P. (1976) 'The Grid of Inheritance', in J. Goody, J. Thirsk, & 
E.P. Thompson. eds. Family and Inheritance: rural society in western Europe, 
1200- 1800. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 328-360. 
Thompson, F.M.L. (1957) 'The Land Market in the 19th Century', Oxford 
Economic Papers, Vol. IX, 285-300. 
Thompson, F.M.L. (1963) English Landed Society in the 19th Century. London, 
Routledge & Keegan Paul. 
Thrift, N., & P. Williams. eds. (1987) Class & Space. London, Routledge & 
Keegan Paul. 
410 
Tranter, R.B. ed. (1978) The Future of Upland Britain. Vol. II. Proceedings 
of a symposium held at the University of Reading. 
Urry, J. (1981) 'Localities, Regions and Social Class', International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 5, 455-4 7 4. 
Vickers, J.O.N. (1988) Customary Tenure and Tenant Right in the County 
Palatine of Durham, 1485-1662. University of London, Thesis for Diploma in 
History. 
Walker, B (1987) 'Hamsterley Forest: an Introduction', Journal of the Northern 
Naturalist Union, 17 - 20. 
Waller, R. (1986) 'Britain's Farm Policy', in E. Goldsmith & H. Hilyard.eds. 
Green Britain or Industrial Wasteland?. Cambridge, Polity Press, 45-53. 
Ward, J.T. (1971) 'Landowners and Mining', in J.T. Ward & R.G. Wilson. eds. 
Land and Industry: the landed estate and the industrial revolution. Newton 
Abbot, David & Charles, 63-116. 
Water Resources Board (1966/66) 3rd Annual Report. London, HMSO. 
Webb, B. & S. Webb (1924) English Local Government from the Revolution to 
the Municipal Corporations Act: the Parish and the County. London, Long-
mans, Green & Co. 
Whatmore, S. (1986) 'Landownership Relations and the Development of Mod-
ern British Agriculture', in G. Cox, P. Lowe & M. Winter. eds. Agriculture; 
People €3 Policies. London, Allen & Unwin, 105-123. 
Whatmore, S., R. Munton, T. Marsden & J. Little {1987) 'Towards a typology 
offarm businesses in contemporary British agriculture', Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. 
27, No. 1, 21-37. 
Whellan, F. (1856) Durham. London, Mercer & Crocker. 
Whellan, F. (1892) Durham. 2nd ed. London, Mercer & Crocker. 
Whellan, F. (1855) Northumberland. London, Mercer & Crocker. 
Wiener, M.J. (1981) English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 
1850-1980. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Winter, M. (1982) 'What Happened to the Agrarian Bourgeoisie and Rural 
Proletariat under Monopoly Capitalism? A reply to Goran Djurfeldt' Acta 
Sociologica Vol. 25, No. 2, 147-157. 
Whitby, M.C. ed. {1986) Agriculture in the North Pennines. University of 
Newcastle, Agricultural Environmental Research Group. 
White, D. (1980) 'Villages of the Mind?', New Society, Vol. 53, No. 924, 
208-210. 
411 
Whiting, C.E. (1940) Nathania[ Lord Crewe: Bishop of Durham (1674-1721} 
and his Diocese. London, SPCK. 
Williams, R. (1973) The Country and the City. London, Chatto & Windus. 
Williams, W.M. (1963) A West Country Village - Ashworthy: family, kinship 
and land. London, Routledge & Keegan Paul. 
Primary Sources 
Durham County Record Office 
Report and sketch of Lune and other manors by Thomas Sopwith (2/10/1867). 
(D /St/B2/100). 
The Durham Chronicle: articles on the South Durham election, (11/6/1841). 
(D /St/Cl/16/275) 
Correspondence with Tees Valley Railway Co. (1864- 68). (D/St/C2/15/38). 
Letters from W. Collinson to Ralph Dent re. sheep numbers. (D/St/C2/15/42). 
Letters from Thomas Bell & Sons to Ralph Dent re. estate valuation (1860). 
(D /St/C2/15/50). 
Letters to Ralph Dent (and replies) re. Grouse Shooting (1866- 1871). (D/St/C2/15/51). 
Letters from Thomas Sopwith to Ralph Dent re. the survey of lead mining in 
Lunedale and Baldersdale (1867). (D/St/C2/15/102). 
Correspondence with the Stockton and Middlesborough Water Board (1872 -
1889). (D /St/C2/16/8). 
Correspondence with the Lands Improvement Company for a loan plus printed 
brochure about the company (1886). (D/St/C2/16/21). 
The Wemmergill agent's letter files (1927- 33). (D/St/C2/18/70- 76). 
Correspondence re. the leasing of Wemmergill Hall and Shooting Rights on 
High and Low Cotherstone Moor and Holwick (1915- 1917). (D/St/C2/19/163). 
Letter from the 14th Earl Stathmore to William Ralston re. buying sheep stints 
on Cotherstone Moor (24/5/1904). (D/St/C2/19/240). 
Letters from the 14th Earl to William Ralston (1904- 1925). (D/St/C2/19/261 
- 283). 
Correspondence re. maintenance claims for tax relief on necessary payments 
at Wemmergill (1933- 1940). (D/St/C2/22/9). 
412 
Wemmergill estate receipt accounts (1841- 1889). (D/St/E3/5/72- 75). 
Wemmergill estate expenditure accounts (1841 - 1890). (D/St/E3/5/76- 79). 
Estate abstracts of payments and receipts (1890 - 1941 ). (D /St/E3/5/100 -
145). 
Balance of receipts and payments, Wemmergill estate (1890- 1919). (D/St/E3/5/102). 
Notices to Quit (1811- 1885). (D/St/E3/8/43). 
Customary, Longleasehold & Free Rents at Wemmergill (1822). (D/St/E3/9/18) 
List of reduced farm rents on Lord Strathmore's Wemmergill estate (6/4/1903). 
(D/St/E3/9/31). 
Draft analysis of the area and rentals of the agricultural holdings on the Wem-
mergill estate (1/6/1920). (D/St/E3/9/33). 
Rentals for the Holwick and Wemmergill estates of Lord Glamis and the Earl 
of Strathmore (1947). (D/St/E3/9/37). 
Wemmergill estate rent ledgers (1841- 1902). (D/St/E3/9/47- 50). 
Dispute between Strathmore Estate and Mr R. Ancaster of Step Ends Farm. 
Correspondence and Sale of Goods (1827). (D/St/E3/9/103). 
Sales of Goods on Farms (1816- 1830). (D/St/E3/9/107). 
Valuation of farms in the townships of Hunderthwaite, Mickleton, Lune and 
Bowes, belonging to the trustees of the late Earl of Strathmore, by Thomas 
Bell & Edward Clint (2/3/1821). (D/St/E3/11/3). 
Report on the present state of the farm buildings on the estates of the late Earl 
of Strathmore by Thomas Bell and Edward Clint (12/6/1823). (D /St/E3/11/3). 
Valuation of the Streatlam and Highland estates by Joseph Watson (1825). 
(D /St/E3/11/5). 
Detailed valuations of John Bowes' estates in Lune, Holwick, Hunderthwaite 
and Mickleton townships by Thomas Bell & Sons (21/11/1860). 4 Vols. (D/St/E3/11/6 
- 7). 
Valuation and rents of Highland farms (1861). (D/St/E3/11/8). 
Field book for the Highland farms, survey of state of cultivation (1841 ). (D /St/E3/13/17). 
Misc. lists of livestock and stints on Hunderthwaite Moor, Holwick Moor, 
Holwick Fell, Lune Moor, Crossthwaite Pasture and Mickle Fell (1847- 1871). 
(D /St/E3/13/5). 
Rules for stinting the commons in the parish of Middleton, belonging to the 
Duke of Cleveland (1860). (D /St/E3/13/6). 
413 
Reports in connection with meetings of stint owners and field reeves, regula-
tions, scales of stints and other papers concerning Cotherstone regulated pas-
ture and Cotherstone Moor (1873- 1920) (D/St/E3/13/7) 
Misc. papers concerning stints on Holwick Fell (1894, 1895, 1920). (D/St/E3/13/9) 
Misc. papers concerning stints on Wemmergill Moor and Wemmergill Allot-
ment (1898- 1925). (D/St/E3/13/10). 
Proposals for repairs to farm buildings by Messrs Richardson and Wilson 
(1826). (D/St/E3/14/3). 
Note of Poaching on Holwick Moor (1803). (D/St/E3/14/22). 
Act for inclosing and exonerating from tithes lands in the townships of Lune, 
Holwick and Romaldkirk, 51 Geo. III (1811 ), and act for consolidating provi-
sions usually inserted in acts of inclosure, 41 Geo III, c cix (1801). (D/St/E3/19/78). 
List of proprietors with their opinion on enclosure in Holwick and Lune (11/1/1811). 
(D /St/E3/19/79). 
Enclosure award for Cotherstone Moor by C.R. Moorson, valuer (1866). (D/St/E3/19/142) 
Note of the terms for letting the Wemmergill shooting and Cotherstone Moors 
(1915). (D/St/E3/20/20) 
List of game to be given away by Lord Strathmore's orders (16/9/1915). (D/St/E3/20/20). 
Details of grouse killed at Wemmergill (1915). (D/St/E3/20/65) 
Drainage ledger account of outlay for draining on Streatlam and Wemmergill 
estates during Mr Millner's agency (1833- 1841). (D/St/E4/13/2). 
Government drainage loan application book, with details of applications and 
particulars of the drainage of Streatlam, Wemmergill and Westwick estates 
(1846 - 1886) (D /St/E4/13/3). 
Application to Inclosure Commissioners for transfer of drainage loan in the 
parishes of Cockfield and Romaldkirk, with subsequent substitution orders and 
related papers (3/7 /1846- 1851). 
Note of terms for letting Streatlam Castle and shooting in conjunction with 
Cotherstone Moor (1911 ). (D /St/E4/18/9). 
Lune and Holwick farm field plans (1841). (D/St/P4/4/12). 
Lune Division enclosure maps drawn by Thomas Bell. (D /St/P4/7 /11 - 15). 
Census Enumerators Schedules for Lunedale, Holwick, Stanhope & Hunstan-
worth (1851 & 1881). 
Domesday Books for Mickleton, Lunedale, Holwick, Hunderthwaite, and Gather-
stone parishes (1911 ). (IR/1/14 7,146,142,143,156). 
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Domesday Book for Edmondbyers & Hunstanworth (1911). (IR/1/21). 
Chapter Office (Durham) 
The Charities of Nathaniel Lord Crewe, Bishop of Durham, and Dr John Sharp. 
Report of Mr Martin (17th June 1864). 
Scheme for the Regulation of Lord Crewe's Charity (1974). Charity Commis-
siOn. 
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Northumberland Record Office 
The Minute Books of the Trustees for Lord Crewe's Charity: 
• 1800 - 1875, ( 452/B.a.2). 
• 1876- 1896, (452/B.a.3). 
• 1896 - 1920, ( 452/B.a.4 ). 
e 1921 - 1940, (452/B.a.5). 
The Account Books of Lord Crewe's Charity: 
• 1800- 1822 (452/B.b.3). 
• 1823- 1840 ( 452/B.b.4). 
• 1841 - 1852 ( 452/B.b.5). 
• 185~ - 1862 ( 452/B.b.6). 
• 1865 - 1869 ( 452/B.b.8). 
• 1870- 1874 ( 452/B.b.25). 
• 1875- 1879 ( 452/B.b.26). 
• 1880- 1884 ( 452/B.b.27). 
• 1885- 1889 ( 452/B.b.28). 
• 1890- 1895 ( 452/B.b.29). 
• 1900 - 1904 ( 452/B.b.31 ). 
• 1905- 1909 ( 452/B.b.33). 
Lord Crewe's Charity Summary Accounts: 
• 1910- 1938 ( 452/B.b.35). 
• 1939 - 1972 ( 452/B.b.36). 
Lord Crewe's Trustees, Rental Book (1883-1894). (452/B.d.5) 
Lord Crewe's Trustees, Rental Book (1894- 1907). ( 452/B.d.6) 
Minute and Account book of Blanchland Park Pasture Stintholders (1880-
1911 ). ( 452/B.b.80). 
Blanchland Rent Audits (1909 - 1930). ( 452/B.d.12) 
Letters from Thomas Hey to Christopher Rowlandson. (January 1875- August 
1877). ( 452/C3/22-24). 
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Attorney General v. Liddell (9th November 1865). ( 452/C5/36) 
Scheme for the Future Regulation and Management of the Charities of Lord 
Crewe and the Rev. J. Sharp (17th June, 1876). (452/C5/42). 
Report of C. Rowlandson to the trustees on taking over the post as receiver 
(1884). (452/C5/43). 
it Scheme of the Charity Commissioners for the Future Regulation of Lord 
Crewe's Charity (1st January 1896). (NR0/452/CS/44). 
Schedule of Estates. K.C. Bayley (1908). ( 452/C5/45). 
Lease of sporting rights at Hunstanworth (1870). ( 452/E1/3) 
Rent levels on Blanchland Farms (Mayday 1805). ( 452/E2/35) 
Expenditure at Blanchland for incidental work since 1813 to May 1818. ( 452/E2/37). 
An account of the Blanchland rents belonging to the trustees of the late Lord 
Crewe (January 26th 1819). ( 452/E2/37). 
Half-Yearly Account Book of Thomas Fenwick. (1823- 1828). ( 452/E2/38-44). 
Estate rentals and expenses for Blanchland and Shatley tithes (1843-1860). 
( 452/E2/ 45-51 ). 
Report of S. Rowlandson and Messrs Dickson as to state of mines (1855). 
(452/E3/3). 
Copy of Lead Mining Rentals (1801 - 1856). ( 452/E3/3). 
Thomas Fenwick's Report on Blanchland Farms (August 1816). ( 452/E3/12). 
Surveys of farm and cottage buildings (1860, 1861, 1867 & 1871 ). ( 452/E3/21-
24). 
Cropping Sheet for Acton Farm (circa 1860). (452, unsorted box) 
Blanchland Accounts for Audit (1860- 1865) (452, unsorted box). 
Census Enumerators' Returns: Shatley High Quarter, (1851 & 1881). 
Domesday Book, Shatley High Quarter (1911). (IR/2000/85). 
Department of Paleography and Diplomatic, Durham 
Copy of presentments concerning custom of Forest of Weardale (26/5/1601). 
(Weardale Chest, item 44). 
Bishop Cosin's survey of the Bishopric of Durham (1662). (Sharp Collection 
no. 167). 
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Weardale enclosure correspondence (file of letters). (CC 34457a & 34459a). 
The Weardale Enclosure Award (1815). (Durham Chancery Records). 
Notitia Book for the Darlington Ward properties (late 16th - early 19th cen-
turies). (CC 54007). 
Notitia Book for Darlington Ward with plans (early 19th century). (HC M10 
321764). 
Articles of agreement between the Rt. Rev. Charles Thomas, Lord Bishop of 
Durham and the ECs for Eng on the other (27/10/1859). (CC 60/31609). 
Darlington Ward customary rents (1856-57). (CC 134875). 
Smiths Gore, Corbridge 
Case on behalf of the Lord Bishop of Durham respecting his Lordship's rights 
upon and over lands within and parcel of the Park and Forest of Weardale. 
W.L. Tindal, Lincoln's Inn (10/10/1828). 
Land tenure and rights on the Bishop's Stanhope estates. Smiths Gore to James 
J. Chalk Esq. (1859). 
Church Commissioners sale of land, Stanhope (1962-3) (File 49/4). 
Church Commissioners, Milbank 
Stanhope General Management files (1876 - 1943). ( 48175). 
Stanhope estate farm files: 
• a) Lanehead: 
• Greenfield Hush Farm (47969). 
• Peaceful Cottage Farm (34677). 
• The Rush (82265). 
• High Lanehead Farm ( 49880). 
• Low Cornriggs Farm (60832). 
• b) Westgate: 
• Spot House Farm (81984). 
• Crooks Alter Farm (94861). 
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• Westgate Farm ( 42006). 
• Field Head Farm ( 40008). 
• White Hall Farm (54450). 
• Field Stile Farm (80249). 
• Shields Close ( 43163). 
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Appendix A 
Sources of Landownership Data 
Landownership belongs to that group of 'sensitive' subjects where availability of 
data decreases with closeness to the present day. Far more material is available 
on landownership in the 19th century than in 20th century. This situation has 
several drawbacks for a study of continuity and change in landownership over 
the 19th and 20th centuries. There are no continuous data sets which cover the 
whole time period, and for the time-series of data which do exist, changes in 
definition and methods of collection normally constrain comparability over time. 
In general, data on landownership in the 19th century tends to be very detailed 
and place-specific, whereas contemporary landownership data tends to be available 
in aggregate and generalised form. These discrepancies, not surprisingly, influence 
the methodology employed in a study of continuity and change. The main data 
sources on landownership available to the researcher will be briefly discussed in 
this section, stating the advantages and disadvanatges associated with each. 
A.l 19th Century Data Sources 
Landownership data sets can be classified into four groups according to their spatial 
and temporal coverage. The first group includes data sets which provide detailed, 
place-specific information, relating usually to a single case study. The second 
group includes data relating to a larger area. Larger scale data sets must be easily 
aggregated and, therefore, lose much specific detail. The third group includes one-
off surv~ys of landownership at one point in time, whilst the fourth group includes 
data-se~s-which cover a certain time span. The table below is a rough classification 
of landownership data sources using this grouping. 
For a detailed, in-depth study of continuity and change in landownership, individ-
ual estate archives are by far the most valuable data source. Although the amount 
and nature of data which was recorded and which has survived will vary from 
one estate to another, most archives contain information on estate income, expen-
diture, tenancies, land use and the style of management over a period of time. 
Obviously, accessibility to private estate archives varies, depending on whether 
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Landownership Data Sources 
DETAILED /CONTINUO US GENERAL/CONTINUO US 
Estate Archives (various dates up to 1950) Land Tax Returns (1780 to 1820) 
Census Enumerators Books ( 1841 to 1881) Population Census (1801 to 1981) 
- Local Directories (various dates) 
- MAFF June Census (1866 to 1989) 
Enclosure Awards (various dates up to 1834) Return of Owners Survey (1873) 
Tithe Commutation Maps (1836) Domesday Books (1910) 
Commons Register (1967) 
-
DETAILED/ONE-OFF GENERAL/ONE-OFF 
or not they have been deposited at county record offices, and whether they have 
already been catalogued. For those estates which are still in private ownership, 
access to estate records relating to the period after 1945 is limited or prohibited 
for reasons of confidentiality. 
Two important data sources on landownership in the early 19th century are en-
closure awards and tithe commutation awards. The scale of coverage of both data 
sources is generally the township or parish, but they offer possibilities for larger 
scale analysis of landownership over a region. 
Enclosure has taken place in Britain over a long time period (Kerridge, 1969, 
94), but many enclosure awards were made in the early 19th century following 
parliamentary enclosure acts (Tate, 1967, 139). The awards usually refer to a 
singl_e township, but in som~ cases only part of a township was enclosed, whilst in 
other cases several contiguous townships were enclosed in one award. The awards 
give information on landownership (but not necessarily land occupancy), rights 
of way, roads and field patterns. The awards were always accompanied by plans 
(ibid., 52). 
Often tithes were commuted from payments in kind to money payments at the 
same time as enclosure (Evans, 1976, 95). All remaining tithes were commuted 
by the Tithe Commutation Act of 1836. The act demanded that all tithes in kind 
420 
be commuted into a fluctuating money payment known as a tithe rent charge. 
This was adjusted each year on the basis of the seven year average price of wheat, 
barley and oats. The tithe surveys required detailed maps to be compiled of 
landownership, occupancy and land use. Summaries of owners and occupiers in 
each parish were published separately (Kain & Prince, 1985). 
Kain and Prince (1985, 230) have advocated the use of the tithe surveys as a 
historical data source, in their own right or in conjunction with other data sources. 
The coverage of the country by the tithe surveys is not comprehensive, however, 
and the data obtainable have limited value in a study of change. 
One data set which Kain and Prince suggest could be used in conjunction with the 
tithe surveys is the population census. From 1841 to 1881, detailed information 
is available from the census emunerators' books. These give information on each 
individual's age, sex, employment, marital status and place of birth, as well as in-
formation about household composition (Norris, Townsend & Dewdney, 1983, 24). 
After 1881, population data is only available aggregated to parish level. It should, 
perhaps, be mentioned here that although much data is available at the level of 
the parish, parish boundaries have changed over time. Widespread changes to 
parish boundaries took place in the late 1880s following the reorganisation of local 
government (Darling, 1955, 73). This must be taken into account when comparing 
parish-level data over time. Land tax returns could also complement information 
gained from enclosure and tithe awards (Mills, 1980, 71 ). These records, spanning 
the late 18th and early 19th centuries, list landowners and occupiers by parish 
with the taxable value of their property but not the acreage. 
The_ most comprehensive s';lrvey of landownership in the 19th century was the 
Ret~rn-Of Owners Survey or Second Domesday, carried out in 1873 (Thompson, 
1963, 27; Stone, 1986, 60). Commissioned by Lord Derby, the object of the survey 
was to confound the popular opinion that landownership was concentrated in too 
few hands. The survey had the opposite result. The returns revealed that four-
fifths of the land of Britain was owned by less than 7,000 persons: 
"As a weapon in political controversy it proved to be a boomerang" (Thompson, 
1963, 27). 
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The survey was carried out at county level. Each landowner was entered alpha-
betically in the register. His seat of residence, extent of landholdings within the 
county and their annual value were recorded. The value of this survey for stud-
ies of landownership below county level are limited, since landownership was not 
mapped. The survey also has drawbacks for an analysis of the national structure 
of landownership. The larger landowners, whose estates covered several counties, 
were entered two or three times and the total extent of their estate was underes-
timated. London was not covered by the survey, nor were woodlands, wastes or 
common lands entered (Brodrick, 1881, 158). The most accurate analysis of the 
Returns was made by Bateman (1883), who compiled a register of all the major 
landowners from the survey (those owning 1,250 hectares or more). 
An easily accessible data source on 19th century landownership are the county 
histories, local directories and family genealogies. These documents were often 
commissioned by landed families who, in return, expected to be mentioned by 
the compilers (Stone, 1986, 84). The directories provide useful information about 
population and services by parish. 
A.2 20th Century Data Sources 
A more recently discovered potential data set are the Land Valuation or Domesday 
Books of 1910 (Short, 1986). These were compiled following the so-called 'People's 
Budget' of 1910 (Douglas, 1976, 144). The 1910 Finance Act called for a tax to be 
placed on the incremental value of land (the value arising purely from locational 
benefits). In order to calculate the tax, a complete inventory of the ownership, 
occupation and control of land was required. The survey was carried out on a parish 
basis and the information recorded in what are known as Domesday Books (Short, 
1986). J.ike the Return of Owners Survey and the Tithe Commutation Awards, the 
Domesday Books provide a wealth of information on the landownership structure 
at one point in time, but do not indicate processes or patterns of change. No large 
scale analysis of the Domesday Books has yet been completed. 
The major, but perhaps least satisfactory, data source on landownership in the 
20th century are the agricultural statistics, collected by MAFF on a yearly basis 
in the June Census. The census was instigated in 1866, but comparisons over time 
are limited because of many changes in the way the data is collected and published 
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(Coppock, 1978, 16). The major failing of the census, however, is that it does not 
collect data on ownership but only on occupancy. This omission does not only 
affect the researcher on landownership, but also agricultural policy-makers: 
"It is disturbing that so little is known about the pattern of acquisition, ownership 
and occupancy of agricultural land, and that governments should have to take deci-
sions with far-reaching effects on agricultural structure, on the basis of incomplete 
or non-existent data" (Northfield, 1979, 109). 
The smallest level at which the census data are published is the parish, in order 
that individual holdings may not be identified. Again, inaccuracies in the data 
may result when a farm holding crosses a parish boundary (Coppock, 1978, 23). 
Another potential source of contemporary data on landownership is the Land Reg-
istry, but the registers are not open to public inspection. This is a pity, since the 
registers record information on the geographic location and extent of each regis-
tered property, with details of leases, the nature of the legal title and details of any 
registered mortgages or other financial burdens (HM Land Registry, 1982). Cov-
erage of the country by the land registry is as yet incomplete, however, especially 
in rural areas (Northfield, 1979, 56). 
More specialised but accessible data sources are the Common Land Registers. 
These registers contain information on the ownership, common rights, location and 
extent of all common lands in England and Wales (Aitchison & Hughes, 1986). The 
registers were compiled on a county basis in the late 1960s and early 1970s following 
the Commons Registration Act of 1965. There are problems associated with using 
this data set. The drawing up of the registers proved to be a highly contentious 
issu~, ~n_d the legal validity of many of the data entries is questionable (ibid., 
1986) . Changes in ownership since registration have often not been recorded. 
Finally, several surveys have been carried out into particular aspects of landown-
ership and occupancy, which provide useful and easily accessible information on 
national patterns and trends. In Scotland, Millman {19??) and McEwan (1979) 
have both mapped the pattern of landownership in the Highlands. In England 
and Wales the two major surveys of contemporary landownership are the North-
field Report {1979) and the Commission of the European Community into farm 
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ownership and occupancy (Harrison, 1981). 
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Appendix B 
North Pennines: Administrative Divisions 
ECCLESIASTICAL PARISHES, 1832 
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Lane hester 
NORTH PENNINES 
ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES, 
PRE 1974 
County boundary 
Rural District 
Boundary 
1 Romaldklrk 
2 Brough Sowerby 
3 Boldron 
4 Woodland 
5 ·whorlton 
B Weatwlck 
7 Rokeby 
a Startforth 
g Eggleatone Abbey 
10 BARNARD CASTLE 
PARISHES IN THE NORTH PENNINES 
Alston Moor 
4-2.1 
NORTH PENNINES 
ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES: 1989 
-·-·-·- County boundary 
------ District boundary 
--- Parish boundary 
~ 
~ 
..() 
John, 9th Earl = Mary Eleanor Bowes 
assumed surname Bowes of Streatlam & Gibside 
(1737-1776) I 
' 
John. 10th Earl = Mary, clan of Thomas, 11th Earl 
(Baron Bowes of Streatlam J. Milner. Stainton (1773-1846) Mary, clan of Geo. Carpenter Castle & Lunedale. 1815) 
(1769 -1820) 
John Bowes 
(1811-1885) Thomas Geo. = Charlotte Grinstead ( 1801 -1834) 
I I I 
Thomas Geo.~ 12th Earl 
( 1822 -1865} 
Patrick, 15th Earl = Dorothy, clan of 
( 1884 -1949) Duke of Leeds 
Timothy, 16th Earl 
( 1918- 1972) 
Caude, 13th Ear I 
Baron Bowes of Streatlam 
Castle & Lunedale, 1887 
(1824 -1904) 
-
-
Frances, clan of 
Oswald Smith 
I 
Claude Geo., 14th Earl = 
{1855 -1944) 
Michael Bowes-lyon = Elizabeth Gator 
(1893- 1953) 
Nina Cavendish-
Bentinck 
Fergus Michael Claude = Mary McCorquodale 
17th Earl 
( 1928-) 
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Landlords at Wemmergill 
Landlord Dates of Landlordship Number of Years 
John, lOth Earl Strathmore & Baron Bowes 1800- 1820 20 
John Bowes (Durham only) 1820- 1885 65 
Claude, 13th Earl Strathmore & Baron Bowes 1885 - 1904 19 
Claude, 14th Earl Strathmore 1904- 1944 40 
Patrick, 15th Earl Strathmore 1944- 1949 5 
Timothy, 16th Earl Strathmore 1949- 1972 23 
Fergus, 17th Earl Strathmore 1972- 1987 15 
Agents at Wemmergill 
Agent Period of Agency No. of Years 
George Colpitts 1799- 1812 13 
Richard Dobson 1812- 1833 21 
' 
Charles Millner 1833- 1840 7 
Ralph Dent 1840- 1872 32 
Ralph John Dent 1872- 1889 17 
William Ralston 1889- 1929 40 
Thomas McQueen 1929- 1935 6 
Ernest Kirkup 1935-? ? 
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Appendix D 
The Holwick, Mickleton & Hunderthwaite Farms, 1860 
Farm Size & Rentals at Holwick 
FARM HECTARES No. OF RENT RENT 
- - STINTS (£) (1859) (£) (1860) 
Holwick Head 12.2 45 50.50 54.60 
Hield House 19.7 26 39.00 43.65 
Mire House 12.1 10 17.00 20.25 
Mizzies House 24.4 25 48.00 54.10 
West Close 4.2 12 17.00 18.70 
Pikestone (main) 11.8 25 37.00 41.10 
Pikestone (small) 11.3 15 29.00 33.35 
Holwick West (main) 10.5 33 45.40 53.70 
Holwick West (small) 5.8 25 29.50 34.10 
Holwick Cottage 7.0 10 25.50 31.25 
Holwick Middle 26.8 40 123.30 144.00 
Holwick East 13.7 20 60.00 70.50 
Hungry Hall 16.6 40 63.00 65.00 
Park End & Unthank 76.7 120 224.30 265.5 
Crossthwaite West & Middle 49.5 98 156.60 185.50 
Step Ends 255.3 ( 1/3 Mickle Fell) 332.55 382.00 
Lonton South 65.4 - 114.60 130.00 
Lonton Limekiln 23.3 - 77.00 80.00 
Lonton East 76.2 - 145.20 165.00 
-
Lont~n smith's shop 4.3 ' 11.70 15.50 -
TOTAL 726.8 544 1,646.15 1,887.80 
Source: D /St/E3/11/6 
Farm Size & Rentals at Mickleton & H underthwaite 
FARM HECTARES No. OF RENT RENT 
- - STINTS (£) (1859) (£) 
MICKLETON - - - -
Mickleton stinted pasture 167.3 
- 53 70 
Howe & Beck Head 63.8 - 115 128 
Kelton East Wham 44.4 - 53.30 60.50 
Lane or Sonning Head 12.2 8 26.05 29.40 
Kelton Three Chimnies 27.1 19 55.10 60.70 
Bink House, West Wham & Knowle 94.1 - 120.95 140 
Mickleton Public House & land 19.4 - 94.50 94.5 
Mickleton High & Low Mill 13.3 - 98 112 
Mickleton Haugh 5.7 - 33 33 
High Cross 49.2 
-
57.50 60 
Low Green & Dukes 18.9 - 79 85 
Thatcher's House 11.2 - 17.50 20 
TOTAL 526.6 27 802.90 893.10 
HUNDERTHWAITE - - - -
Hunderthwaite 13.8 - 35.95 40 
Gill House 32.6 - 70.35 77 
Thorngarth Hill 13.9 - 39.65 45 
Hury Mill 5.1 - 37.35 40 
East New Houses 109.2 32 60.05 72 
West New Houses 340.8 31 170.35 183 
- -
' 
Birk Flat 99.1 45 64 75 
East Carnigill 477.6 110 120.05 147 
TOTAL 1,092.10 218 597.75 679 
Source: D/St/E3/11/6 
Abbreviations of Lunedale Farms 
• C Cronkley. 
• CH Close House. 
• LH Lune Head. 
• WH Wythes Hill. 
o G B Grains 0' Beck. 
• BH Blake House. 
• SH Scar House 
• SM Stackholme. 
• LW Low Wemmergill. 
• HS High Soulgill. 
• HG High Grain. 
• WH Wemmergill Hall. 
• GW Grassholme West. 
• SK Stack. 
• R Rigg. 
• SKH Stake Hill. 
• WP West Park. 
• T Thringarth. 
• EP East Park. 
• CH Chapel House. 
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Appendix E 
Bishops of Durham, 1509 to 1990 
Thomas Ruthall 1509 to 1523 
Thomas Wolsey 1523 to 1528 
Cuthbert Tunstall 1530to 1559 
James Pilkington 1561 to 1576 
Richard Barnes 1577 to 1587 
Matthew Hutton 1589 to 1595 
Tobias Matthew 1595 to 1606 
William James 1606 to 1617 
Richard N eile 1617 to 1628 
George Monteigne 1628 
John Houson 1628 to 1632 
Thomas Morton 1632 to 1659 
John Cosio 1660 to 1672 
Hon Nathaniel Crewe 1674 to 1721 
William Talbot 1721 to 1730 
Henry Chandler 1730 to 1750 
Joseph Butler 1750 to 1752 
Richard Trevor 1752 to 1771 
John Egerton 1771 to 1787 
Thomas Thurlow 1787 to 1791 
Hon Shute Barrington 1791 to 1826 
William Van Mildert 1826 to 1836 
Edward Maltby 1836 to 1856 
Charles Thomas Longley 1856 to 1860 
Henry Montague Villiers 1860 to 1861 
' 
Charles Baring 1861 to 1879 
Joseph Barber Lightfoot 1879 to 1889 
Brooke Fosse Wescott 1889 to 1901 
Handley Carr Glyn Maule 1901 to 1920 
Herbert Hensley Henson 1920 to 1939 
Alwyn Terrell Peter Williams 1939 to 1952 
Arthur Michael Ramsey 1952 to 1956 
Maurice Henry Harland 1956 to 1966 
Ian Thomas Ramsey 1966 to 1972 
John Stapylton Habgood 1973 to 1983 
David Edward Jenkins 1984 -
Appendix F 
Tables of Enclosure 
Northumberland, Cumberland & Westmoreland 
ENCLOSURE IN CUMBERLAND 
PARISH AREA (hectares) DATE OF ACT DATE OF AWARD 
Culgaith 661 1773 1775 
Farlam 909 1777 1780 
Cumwhitton & Cumrew 2,500 1796 1801 
Castle Carrock 792 1801 1805 
Alston Moor 8,333 1803 1820 
Kirkoswald 22,00 1806 1816 
Ainstable 2,458 1808 1815 
Hayton 83 1807 1814 
Croglin* 2,458 1808 1815 
Kirkoswald 1,042 1814 1818 
Ainstable 833 1818 1823 
Alston 55 1840 1843 
Alston 85 1854 1856 
Ousby 530 1855 1858 
Glasson by 648 1857 1860 
Ousby 667 1858 1863 
Glasson by 390 1861 1867 
-
- - Kirkoswald 1,053 1861 1864 
Kirkoswald 1,029 1862 1877 
Glasson by 625 1865 1868 
Source: from Tate & Turner (1978) 
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ENCLOSURE IN DURHAM 
PARISH AREA (hectares) DATE OF ACT DATE OF AWARD 
Bowes 850 1766 1768 
Wolsingham 83 1769 1770 
Hamsterley 3,720 1758 1760 
Staindrop 221 1764 1765 
Wolsingham 4,637 1765 1767 
Lanchester 6,793 1773 1781 
Stanhope 6,312 1799 1815 
Mickleton 1,815 1802 1810 
Barningham 134 1803 1807 
Egglestone & Middleton 2,495 1805 1817 
Stanhope 976 1809 1816 
Romaldkirk 2,833 1811 1827 
Woodland 942 1814 1825 
Middleton 3,844 1834 1841 
Cockfield Fell 258 1845 & 1863 1868 
Hunderthwaite 1,705 1856 1858 
Bowes Moor 5,215 1857 1859 
Cotherstone Moor 2,118 1863 1867 
Edmond byers 397 1864 1870 
ENCLOSURE IN NORTHUMBERLAND 
PARISH AREA (hectares) DATE OF ACT DATE OF AWARD 
Hexham & Allendale 16,801 1792 1800 
Hexhamshire 1,730 1753 1755 
East Coanwood 673 1808 1814 
East Coanwood 659 1845 1851 
Knaresdale 4,167 1853 1859 
Kirkhaugh 1,028 1859 1862 
Plenmellor 1,303 1862 1865 
Hartley burn 1,042 1864 1869 
Kirkhaugh 715 1864 1868 
ENCLOSURE IN WESTMORELAND 
PARISH AREA (hectares) DATE OF ACT DATE OF AWARD 
Long Marton 417 1770 1772 
Warcop na 1772 1773 
Warcop 300 1790 1791 
Long Marton 417 1804 1809 
Milburn 490 1812 1820 
Milburn 1,175 1812 1820 
Warcop 300 1815 1831 
Long Marton 1,325 1815 1823 
-
Oufton 958 1827 ? 
- -
' Milburn 69 1855 1857 
Hilbeck Fell 417 1857 1859 
Great Musgrave 576 1857 1859 
Stainmore 1,698 1879 1890 
Winton, Kaber & Hartley commons* - 1911 1915 
Appendix G 
Examples of Stinting Regulations 
G.l Stinting Regulations for Cotherstone Pasture, 1873 
1. All owners or occupiers of stints having stock on the pasture should, by the 
6th April each year, give the Field Reeves a statement of the number of stints 
owned or rented, the kind of stock, the brandings, tar, other marks. Penalty 
for not doing so: 1 shilling per stint. 
2. The owner of all animals put on the pasture must mark them with a Manor 
mark: an 'X' for cattle, made with tar and put on top of the hind quarters; for 
geese a mark of tar on the top of the head. Penalty for default up to 1 shilling 
per animal. 
3. No owners/occupiers of stints may herd their stock, except during lambing 
se.eson (16th April - 16th May). If any stintholder disturbs other peoples' 
stock he will forfeit a fine of up to £5. 
4. Stintholders who frequently withdraw stock from the pasture and replace it 
must pay compensation for the additional labour involved as well as normal 
expenses. 
5. Any stintholder wishing to change his stock must give three days advance 
warning to the shepherd appointed to attend the said stock, must state the 
kind of stock intended, and will be liable to a fine of up to 1 shilling for each 
animal put on the pasture without notification. 
6. On and after the lOth October each year, each lamb will be counted as one 
sheep stint. 
7. No rams are allowed on the pasture between January 6th and April 6th of each 
year, and between September 1st and November 23rd. Any ram put on the 
pasture during these times will be charged up to £1. 
8. No t>er~ons are to put a~y infectious animal on the pasture. 
9. The Field Reeves are to employ as many shepherds as they think fit for the 
proper herding of the stock upon the said pasture; some of them to be engaged 
the whole year round as necessary. 
• To give instructions to the shepherds as to their duties and ensure due perfor-
mance of them. 
• To see that no stintholders put more stock on the pasture than their allowance. 
• To order and direct the distribution of stock over the pasture according to the 
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quantity and quality of the pasture in the Field Reeves' judgement. 
• To attend to the opening of ditches and water courses, keeping the pasture in 
good order, may distrain all stock and animals found thereon contrary to the 
regulations, and do all other acts of maintenance and improvement as the Field 
Reeves think fit. 
10. The Field Reeves shall prosecute any persons who shall interrupt them in the 
execution of their duties, the costs of such prosecutions to be paid out of the 
rate. 
11. For defraying all expenses in and about the management of the said pasture, 
the Field Reeves to set a rate, not exceeding 6d in the pound, and to collect it 
from all the stintholders, with power to take action against non-payments. 
G.2 Conditions for stinting Hiwick Fell, 1895 
1. From 15th.April - 1st.October only summer stock allowed in allotment v1z; 
ponies and cattle. 
2. From 1st.October all ponies and cattle must be taken from allotment and put 
into enclosed land. 
3. From 1st.October - 25th.December the gates between the allotment and the 
moor will be thrown open. No driving up from the allotment to the moor will 
be permitted. 
4. From 25th.December - 20th.March, all sheep must be brought into the allot-
ment. The gates shall, upon the first named date, be closed for the winter. 
5. From 20th.March - 15th.April, the gates between the allotment and the moor 
will be thrown open. 
6. After 15th.April, the gates will be closed for the summer and for lambing. 
7. During every snowstorm, at any period in the year, all sheep must be brought 
into the allotment, the gates of which will be closed until the conclusion of such 
snowstorm. 
8. All .ewe's must be lambed in the allotment, or ,upon enclosed land. 
9. No foddering will be allowed outside of the allotment at any time of the year. 
10. A common shepherd shall be appointed, whose duties shall commence upon 
April 6th. in each year, to be appointed by the Earl of Strathmore or his agent. 
11. After 15th.April none but the common shepherd will be allowed on the moor. 
12. No dogs allowed on the moor, except upon particular occasions such as col-
lecting sheep, clipping and washing, or any other necessary purposes. 
13. All sheep to be distinguished by their owners' initials, or by a stock mark. 
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14. An official list of the number of sheep belonging to each stint-holder to be kept 
by the estate bailiff, who has powers to check the truth of the lists. 
15. The stintholder to render assistance to the above in the collection and enu-
meration of the stock. 
16. If any stintholder is caught overstocking, he must remove the surplus at once, 
and a reduction in stint allowance equal to the surplus will be made from the 
next day. 
G.3 Conditions for Grazing in the Wemmergill Allotment, 1901 
1. Rent one shilling per sheep, to be paid in equal half yearly installments to the 
Chief Agent of the Earl of Strathmore at the Agricultural Rent Audit. 
2. Grazing from 15th.March - 15th.November in each year. If the ground is cov-
ered in snow at any time, the tenant shall remove all sheep from the allotment 
immediately upon receiving notice from the Wemmergill Head Keeper. 
3. No cattle or horses to be grazed in the allotment. 
4. No foddering to be allowed at any time in the allotment. 
5. No shepherding to be done in the allotment without permission from e the 
Head Keeper. No dogs allowed under any circumstances in the allotment. 
6. Control of sheep to be exercised wholly by the Head Keeper. 
7. Tenant to provide shooting lessee of Wemmergill whenever required bith one 
driver for every fifty sheep, or fractional part thereof, grazed by the tenant in 
the allotment, at a wage of five shillings a day. 
8. All sheep grazes in the allotment must be distinguished by their owners' initials 
or a distinctive stock mark. 
9. The right of grazing hereby conferred is distinct from the agricultural tenancy, 
and is to be terminated by three months notice prior to the 15th.March in any 
year. 
G.4 Weardaie Enclosure: Regulations aS' to the Stinted Pastures 
1. If anyone is found to have exceeded their stint allowance, they are to be fined 
20 shillings per excess, and the excess cattle are to be impounded until the fine 
is paid. 
2. Some persons(s) shall be elected by the occupiers to act as impounder to control 
stint numbers, but if it looks as though the extra stints were due to accidental 
escape the Impounder is only to charge 1 shilling per extra stint. Each occupier 
of the stints is to give the lmpounder an account of the stock they intend to 
put on the pasture and to give notice of any changes, otherwise they will be 
liable to a fine of 5 shillings. 
3. Stinting definitions: 
• Every beast above 2 years old shall be counted as one stint. 
• Every mare or gelding above 2 years old equals two stints. 
• 5 sheep above 1 year old equal 1 stint. 
• 8 lambs above 1 year old equal one stint. 
• Every colt or filly between 6 months and 2 years equals 1 stint. 
• Each young beast under 2 years equals half a stint. 
4. The majority attending each meeting to reflect the number of stints rather than 
the number of occupiers. 
G.5 Rules of Management for Blanchland Park Pasture 
1. Scaling to be done by tender. 
2. Persons recouping the stints by stirks are to pay 25 shillings for each stirk. 
3. If anyone wishes to withdraw a cow or replace it by a stirk, they must tell the 
stewards by the 29th March of that year. 
4. Commoners should give also give notice to the stewards if they wish to put 
stirks on the common. If there are more applicants than vacancies, allocations 
will be decided by casting votes. 
5. So long as vacancies can be filled up by stintholders, no other parties are to be 
admitted into the pasture. 
6. If a cow is hulling, the owner has a duty to take the cow out of the pasture 
within 3 hours of being told, otherwise others are allowed to do this. 
7. Cows are not to be changed once they have been put into the pasture at Mayday 
without a good and valid reason. 
- ' . 
8. Cows are to be put into the pasture on the 13th day of May and to be taken 
out on the 29th September. 
9. If any stintholder wishes to put a cow or stirk into the pasture during the 
winter, they must pay 9 shillings for a cow and 6 shillings for a stirk, and the 
cattle must be out of the pasture on the last day of February. 
10. Two stewards are to be elected each year. 
11. Rent is to be collected twice yearly and is to be recorded in the accounts, as 
well as repairs and improvements. 
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12. Accounts are to be checked by the Blanchland agent. 
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Appendix H 
Lord Crewe's Charity: Charitable Payments 
PAYMENT PER ANNUM£ CHARITABLE PURPOSE 
1721 1896 1974 
-
20 each 240 total 720 total 12 exhibitions at Lincoln College 
for up to total total Oxford (to natives of the Diocese of Durham, 
8 years 
- -
Northallerton, of the parish of Newbold). 
- -
-
Verdon, or the Diocese of Oxford. 
40 40 40 Minister of Bamburgh church. 
30 30 30 Minister of St Andrews Auckland. 
10 each 120 total 120 total 12 poor livings in the Diocese of Durham. 
10 each 40 total 40 total 4 livings belonging to Lincoln College. 
10 each 40 total 40 total 8 poor scholars of Lincoln College. 
10 
- -
Bible Clerk, Lincoln College. 
20 20 20 Rector, Lincoln College. 
10 each 120 total 120 total 12 Fellows of Lincoln College. 
2 each 40 total 60 total Armspeople of Durham, Auckland, 
- - -
Brackley, and Hinton. 
20 20 50 Schoolmaster, Newbold Verdon. 
10 each 10 each 25 total Relief of widows and children 
- - -
of clergymen at Sparkenhoe, Leics. 
6each 6each 25 total Charity school, Daventree, Northampton. 
-
- -
"' 20 20 50 Schoolmaster for Bishop Auckland. 
30 30 
-
To clothe 30 poor boys at Bishop Auckland. 
f:" 
f::' 
-p 
DATE (S) 
OF INTERVIEW (S) 
29/1/87; 19/4/88 
3/2/87 
27/2/87 
13/7/87 
16/7/87 
11/1/88 
12/1/88 
24/2/88; 13/2/89 
25/2/88 
25/2/88; 11/7/89 
11/3/88 
7/4/88 
11/4/88 
14/4/88 
3/5/88 
27/5/88 
2/6/88 
21/6/88 
NAME 
-
Alec Peart _ 
Mr Tomlinson 
Simon Fisher 
Mr Kirton-Darling 
Mr Woodward 
Mr Sandys-Clarke 
Keith Buchanon 
Mr Jamieson 
Mr Stubbs 
Major McGowan 
Mr Pritchard 
Isobel Dunn' 
Charles Dent 
Robert Stavely 
John Barrett 
Les Morgan 
Roy Lemberger 
David Strutt 
ORGANISATION POSITION REFERENCE 
- - IN TEXT* 
- Weardale Farmer -
CoS IRA Durham Director -
NFU, Durham Branch Vice-President -
Lambton Estates Land Agent -
Lord Crewe's Charity Agent Respondent D t"" 
.... 
Raby Estates Agent Respondent E fll 
"'" 
Countryside Commission Director, North East Respondent L 0 
> ...., 
Strathmore Estates Land Agent Respondent A 
- Weardale farmer - I 
Allendale Estates Land Agent Respondent M 
Forestry Commission Director, Durham District -
::D "0 
tD "0 
fll tD 
"0 
= 0 Q.. 
= 
..... 
Q.. >< 
tD ~ 
East Cumbria Countryside Project Organiser - = "'" fll 
Bollihope Estates Land Agent - I 
Lightwater Estates Owner -
I 
Nature Conservancy Council Assistant Director (NE) -
I 
Weardale District Council Alpine Ski Resort Promoter Respondent 0 ' 
MAFF Pennine Dales ESA Coordinator - I 
Weardale Minerals Surveyer Respondent F 
* References are only given for direct quotes 
DATE (S) NAME ORGANISATION 
OF INTERVIEW (S) - -
23/6/88 Robert Windle Smiths Gore 
1/7/88 Mr Dickenson & Mr Cooper Wardell Armstrong 
6/7/88 Mr Morton Stanhope Parish Council 
31/8/88 Mr Hancock Durham County Council 
- & Simon Hodgson ditto 
8/9/88 Len Pattinson -
21/9/88 David Flush Allenheads Village Trust 
22/9/88 Mr Bourne Smiths Gore 
8/2/89 Mr Kennedy Blanchland Estate 
8/2/89 Mr Graham Blanchland Estate 
8/2/89 Mr Makepiece Blanchland Estate 
20/3/89 Mr Walton Strathmore Estate 
20/3/89 Mr Foster Strathmore Estate 
5/5/89 Major McBain Lords in Trust of Bowes Moor 
16/3/89 Lord Barnard Raby Estates 
8/8/89 Mr Hollister Ministry of Defence, Catterick 
13/11/89 Mr Rippon Northumbrian Water Authority 
POSITION 
-
Land Agent 
Mineral Agents 
Clerk 
Team Leader, Local Plans 
Countryside Ranger, West Durham 
Retired Lawyer, Weardale 
Organiser I 
Former Agent, Weardale 
Tenant, Birkside 
Tenant, Allenshields 
Tenant, Cotehouse 
Tenant, Hield House 
Tenant, Grains 0' Beck 
Agent 
Owner 
Estates Agent 
Estates Agent 
REFERENCE 
IN TEXT* 
-
Respondents G 
-
Respondent Q 
Respondent N 
Respondent C 
Respondent P 
Respondent B 
-
-
-
-
I Respondent H r · 
Respondent I i 
-
Respondent K 
Respondent J 
II) 
~ 
-.t' 
